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Abstract
Theories of communitarianism have become increasingly important in understanding 
UK housing policy and regeneration practice, as governments promote active 
citizenship and community empowerment in the management and governance of 
housing. Community land trusts (CLTs) have been embraced by communities and 
governments as a potential vehicle for the delivery and management of affordable 
housing in locations where there is thought to be insufficient supply. Rather than rely 
on provision from state or private actors, CLTs directly undertake development in 
order to meet the local needs of their area.
This thesis studies how and why people form, or attempt to form, CLTs in England 
and Wales, contributing to an emerging body of academic work on CLTs at national 
and international levels. It draws upon theories of community (Etzioni, 1995a; Tam, 
1998) and neighbourhood governance (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008) to illustrate the 
underlying rationales of CLTs and describe their negotiation within and between 
communities, financiers, and local and national governments.
The research finds that the intrinsic rationale for CLTs is the alteration of power 
relations that privilege the autonomy of a defined, constructed or imagined 
community in the governance of local housing, influencing its tenure type, use and 
occupation in line with the needs of a CLT's instigators and beneficiaries. However, 
the creation of a CLT, as a form of communitarian governance, is a relational and 
political process that involves positioning for resources and legitimacy within wider 
social, cultural and political contexts. This gives rise to a variety of organisational 
forms and outcomes that reshape our understandings of a CLT. It should be 
understood as an approach with diverse rationales and characteristics rather than a 
uniform model. The potential effectiveness and composition of CLTs is likely to 
depend on the linkages made with broader structural forces, indicating that agendas
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of communitarianism and localism may be as dependent on the role and influence of 
external forces as they are on the active citizenship of local people.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis studies how and why some actors within particular local communities 
form, or seek to form, community land trusts (CLTs) to instigate social change in the 
ownership and governance of housing. An emphasis on community as an answer to 
societal issues is not novel. It has simultaneously existed as a central component of 
state policy agendas, an important and pragmatic alternative to governmental 
solutions, and as a device capable of articulating local opposition and resistance to 
dominant political discourse and hegemony. Theories of communitarianism have 
been strongly influential in political rationales and policy underpinning housing and 
regeneration. Yet, while the discourse around community ascribes many positive 
statements to its existence, the construct carries with it varied meanings and 
interpretations that shape the extent to which it is vital or marginal and filled with 
democratic potential or regulatory limitations (DeFilippis et al. 2010, p. 2).
These possibilities are especially pronounced in the field of housing with residential 
movements that actively involve people in the design, management and governance 
of housing now seen as common in the United Kingdom. Yet, while there is a long 
history of housing that is planned and controlled by its users (Handy et al., 2011), a 
plethora of organisational forms, roles and possibilities for community can be found 
in this tradition. These range from co-operative housing entirely owned by its users 
and tenants, to social housing schemes where tenants are participants in 
governance rather than owners. As such community-led and controlled housing is 
best understood as a sector that is "diverse in terms of scale, management, 
organisational objectives, history and location" (Handy etal., 2011, p. 16).
CLTs have emerged in recent years as a progression of this tradition. CLTs are 
structured as non-profit organisations, usually formed on a voluntary basis, and 
established to further the social and economic interests of a local community by 
acquiring and managing land in order to develop and own local housing (HM
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Government, 2008). Described as a "largely theoretical model" (HM Treasury, 2006) 
by politicians as recently as 2006, CLTs have grown in prominence in the last five 
years to be identified not only as a potential vehicle for the delivery of affordable 
housing but also as an agent through which governmental agendas of localism and 
community empowerment can be channelled. Indeed, in 2010 CLTs were used as a 
case study by government to justify proposals to decentralise power and decision­
making in planning policy to community level (Shapps, 2010b), while the coalition 
government's programme for action released soon after their election in 2010 
promised to "create new trusts that will make it simpler for communities to provide 
homes for local people" (HM Government, 2010, p. 12). This support links into 
governmental commitments to devolve power downwards from the centre to the local 
level, reflecting communitarian views that embrace the neighbourhood as the 
primary site to engineer social change. Such standpoints can be found in the rhetoric 
that advocates CLTs as a form of autonomous organisation capable of producing 
favourable outcomes for its beneficiaries:
In essence, CLTs provide an opportunity to regenerate urban and rural 
communities from the bottom up. They build on local tacit knowledge of local 
community needs, engage local communities in developing innovative 
approaches and experiment with new forms of community governance in 
order to create genuinely sustainable solutions - in social, financial and 
environmental terms.
Bailey (2010, p. 50)
Yet while the language used to endorse CLTs speaks in such effusive terms, CLTs 
remain in their infancy in England and Wales and references made to their 
emergence and exact operation are often oblique. Goodchild (2010, p.22, my 
emphasis) refers to the "proposed Community Land Trust"; Handy et al. (2011, p. 
13) refer to a "potential" but unproven and untested CLT model, and, despite their 
political sponsorship, the Conservative Party recently described CLTs as an
10.
"existing, yet still largely experimental, way for local communities to work together" 
(Conservative Party, 2009, p. 23). This is indicative of a lack of awareness as to the 
extent and operations of CLTs. While Conaty (2011, p. 28) observed that there are 
over 140 CLTs engaged in developing housing in England, this figure conflicts with 
the observations of other sources. In January 2011 Triodos Bank (2011), a major 
charitable funder that has supported CLTs, stated that there are "just 13 Community
Land Trusts in the UK, with a further six in the process of being established". While
tthe figure of CLTs is higher than this, there is no comprehensive or reliable source 
that expressly states how many CLTs exist and the extent of their activity.1 There is 
therefore a gap in our understanding of exactly how CLTs engage local communities 
and experiment with forms of community governance. The purpose of this thesis is to 
bring empirical evidence and theoretical understanding to these ambiguities, 
exploring how and why CLTs are formed to develop housing and the conditions 
under which these new forms of community governance are implemented. The 
research aimed to answer the following overarching research question:
What is the purpose and function of CLTs as a form of housing governance in 
England and Wales?
To do this, it is first necessary to lay the foundations of our understanding of CLTs. 
This chapter begins by considering the antecedents to CLTs in England and Wales 
by tracing their international origins in the USA and Scotland, before considering the 
housing trends and policy development that provided the genesis for this study. I 
then outline the structure of this thesis.
1 The National CLT Network have an 'activity' map on their website - http://www.communitvlandtrusts.ore.uk - 
though this does not provide a cumulative figure of CLT development (in terms of number of homes delivered 
or number of CLTs in existence) nor does it contain anything beyond basic information on many of the CLTs 
listed.
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The origins and evolution of CLTs
The label of "CLT" was first applied to organisations in the USA in the late 1960s, an 
outgrowth of the civil rights movement with the specific aim of providing marginalised 
populations with greater access to rights of land use and asset ownership (Davis, 
2010). CLTs as they are understood in the USA today are predicated on their ability 
to offer affordable forms of housing, either through shared equity owner occupation 
or sub-market rental properties, to households on low to medium incomes. This is 
achieved by retaining the freehold of the land, aiming to ameliorate the impact of 
open market forces by attaching conditions to the occupation and resale of the 
housing that stands upon it with an emphasis on preserving its affordability for those 
on lower incomes (Diacon et al., 2005). By retaining ownership of the land, and 
therefore a stake in the property that stands upon it, the CLT aims to ensure housing 
remains affordable and that it is not sold or developed except in a manner which the 
trust's members consider beneficial for the local community (Davis and Stokes, 
2009). It is in this way that CLTs have become a mechanism to protect indigenous 
communities in rural and urban areas from a range of pressures including 
speculative private house building, gentrification and absentee landlordism, and are 
often found in urban neighbourhoods subject to modernising and gentrifying reforms 
(DeFilippis, 2004; Gray, 2008).
i
CLTs in the USA now number over 230 with over half of these formed since 2000. 
These CLTs have a historical reliance on voluntary endeavour and philanthropy 
(Sungu-Eryilmaz and Greenstein, 2007). In addition to acting as a mechanism to 
retain housing affordability, a key argument in favour of these CLTs is that their 
community-led structure places an emphasis on the democratic stewardship of 
assets, engaging local people in governing the use of properties and enhancing 
governance at the neighbourhood level (Diacon etal., 2005, p. 3). This is exemplified 
by the American CLT's tripartite governance structure where board representation is 
split equally between CLT residents and owners, representatives from the wider 
community unconnected to the CLT, and local municipal officials that represent the
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public interest (Davis and Stokes, 2009, p. 10). The aim is for CLTs to be guided by - 
and be accountable to - the people who reside within the physical, geographic 
boundaries in which a CLT operates, emphasising a strong attachment to place, 
locale and claims to community representation (Davis, 2010, p. 262).
The important relationship between community governance and connections to 
localities is also found in the way CLTs have formed in Scotland. Here, community 
land ownership has a long history dating back to a community buy-out of private land 
in 1908, though CLTs have been given recent impetus by legislation that makes 
explicit provision for their acquisition of land (Bryden and Geisler, 2007; 2010).2 The 
fundamental drivers for CLTs in Scotland have related to historical patterns of 
concentrated private land ownership which divorced governing powers from the local 
area. CLTs were instigated as a response to socio-economic problems brought by 
private landowners who oversaw minimal investment in, and development of, the 
communities that occupied the land they owned, resulting in the decline of local 
areas (Satsangi, 2007; 2009). Community buy-outs of land via a CLT offered the 
opportunity for a resident-led governance model that allowed them the opportunity to 
control and direct the destiny of the local area in accordance with local knowledge 
and desires for community renewal. Here, Community was a device that (re)asserted 
the rights of local people to lead and fully participate in the decision-making 
processes that affected their local area.
Community control, therefore, shaped a process of social change that placed the 
locus of power to local levels and, as in trie USA, created CLTs that aim to accord 
greater weight to community influence over the management and production of their
2 In 1997 a dedicated Community Land Unit was created by the Scottish Government to provide technical 
assistance to CLTs and administered a dedicated Land Fund that provided funding from 2001 to 2006. 
Additionally, a Land Reform Act was introduced in 2003 that allowed CLTs a pre-emptive right to purchase land 
in their area when offered for sale on the open market. These developments are discussed further in Chapter 
3.
I
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locality. Hypothetically, this places CLTs as a community development strategy 
aimed not just at delivering housing that is affordable to the people that reside within 
this locality, but to promote neighbourhood stability, participation and elevate 
empowerment, though Gray (2008, p. 75) argues that there is a "dearth of empirical 
evidence" to support these claims.
i
Although English housing policy has a historical tradition of non-profit and 
philanthropic housing3, CLTs can be considered a phenomenon that is in its infancy. 
Its prominence in England can be traced to a publication published by the New 
Economics Foundation in 2003 that used the American experience of CLTs to offer 
them as an antidote to a crisis in the affordability of housing (Conaty et al., 2003). In 
particular, CLTs were promoted as a mechanism that could be particularly effective 
in rural locations where low levels of affordability pose problems for rural households 
to access property at a cost within their means. These issues have been well versed 
in the literature over the past three decades (Shucksmith, 1981; 1990; Yarwood, 
2002; Sturzaker, 2010; Satsangi et a/., 2010), with disparities between local incomes 
and house prices exacerbated by high demand for rural living that sees wealthy 
"adventitious purchasers" (Shucksmith, 1981) enter and outbid local households in
rural markets. These issues are intensified by housing and planning policies that
!
have failed to provide rural locations with their "fair share" of development, with 
housing targets planned at a regional level failing to filter down to the local level 
(Gallent, 2009). These issues were well documented by the Taylor Review of the 
rural economy, which argued that rural locations were at a crossroads with a choice 
between becoming "ever more exclusive enclaves for the wealthy and retired, or 
building the affordable homes to enable people who work in these communities to 
continue to live in them" (Taylor, 2008, p. 3).
3 Examples include almshouses, a type of charitable housing that has existed for centuries, along with the 
emergence of philanthropic housing societies and housing associations in the early 20th Century.
It is primarily within this context that CLTs have emerged, with Taylor (2008, p. 113) 
arguing that the community-led nature of CLTs can provide reassurance that any 
housing they develop will be used for the express purpose of benefiting local people 
and prioritising affordable housing to meet these needs, as opposed to the 
construction of private homes subject to the vagaries of the open market. A national 
demonstration programme was launched as a result of the report published by the 
New Economics Foundation in 2003 (Conaty et al., 2003), with 16 interested 
community groups (equally split between rural and urban areas) participating in 
forming and developing CLTs. Seedcorn technical assistance for this was provided 
by charitable donors such as the Carnegie UK Trust and administered by an 
independent action research unit based at the University of Salford. The 
demonstration programme aimed to facilitate CLT access to land, finance and 
technical assistance that could remove legal barriers to their development. An 
evaluation in 2009 estimated the quantitative outcome of this programme to be the 
planning or development of approximately 150 CLT homes in rural locations (Aird, 
2009), although the evaluation also identified a series of obstacles to their delivery:
CLTs are currently being established on an ad-hoc basis but a common 
ingredient is lay-led leadership by local people who are committed to making 
a difference in their community. To succeed, they need to be given practical 
support and encouraged to overcome the obstacles that, inevitably, will need 
to be negotiated along the way.
CFS (2008a, p.44)
Additionally, it was stated that the urban strand of the demonstration programme was 
still at an "early stage of investigation and experimentation" in contrast to the rural 
element where a number of CLTs were more fully-formed (CFS, 2008b, p. 3). As a
15
result, this research is primarily concerned with the rural dimension of CLT formation 
and organisation.4 f
The ad-hoc basis on which CLTs were being formed in this period was partly due to 
a series of definitional, financial and organisational problems in which CLTs were 
seen to be operating on the margins without sufficient practical support from local 
and national governments (CFS, 2008a; CFS, 2008b). "Absurdist, bureaucratic 
obstacles" (Aird, 2009, p. 24) were cited as being problematic for CLTs engaged in 
the national programme, often related to the language and definition of CLTs and the 
problems this posed in engaging stakeholders. These observations were supported 
by one of the few academic articles on CLTs in Britain (Paterson and Dunn, 2009), 
who focused on two community groups that were considering the formation of a CLT 
as an answer to the questions posed by an unaffordable and insufficient supply of 
housing. This research, though, was non-committal in observing the actual solutions 
of CLTs in practice and instead focused bn the theoretical role they may play to 
"ensure local control and affordability in perpetuity" (Paterson and Dunn, 2009, p. 
764).
There have been a number of important progressions in CLT policy since the 
national demonstration programme concluded. A legal definition of CLTs was 
inserted in the Housing & Regeneration Act 20085 as a consequence of the 
demonstration programme's recommendations. During this period, a specialist CLT 
Fund was established by charitable bodied to provide a source of start-up finance, 
assisting with organisational creation, technical assistance and business planning. 
Crucially, this was unable to provide sufficient finance to acquire or purchase land as 
the Scottish Land Fund did.
4 Though two urban CLTs did participate in the study and are featured in the analysis.
5 See Appendix 1.
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Then, concurrent to changes at government level, CLTs began to receive greater 
recognition at a national level. Importantly, as a central element of the Conservative 
government's plans for a 'big society' - engaging communities in the governance of 
their local area by devolving power and responsibility - CLTs were identified as a 
vehicle through which agendas of localism and community empowerment could be 
channelled. In particular, CLTs were framed as an ideal type of organisation that 
could participate in the government's neighbourhood planning proposals that aim to 
empower local communities to take responsibility for the development of planning 
policy and decisions in their neighbourhood, responding to their apparent 
powerlessness:
Resistance from local communities to proposals for housing and economic 
development within their neighbourhoods is partly related to communities' lack 
of opportunity to influence the nature of that development. A top-down and 
target-driven approach has alienated communities and stimulated opposition 
to development.
CLG (2011a, p. 2)
Indeed, at the national CLT conference in 2010 the Housing Minister argued that "for 
the first time it will be communities, not central government, who decide what 
happens in their local area", though this was countered by the concurrent view that 
"CLTs are going to have to work within the same financial constraints as everyone 
else ... government funding is not the answer" (Shapps, 2010a).
The genesis of the research
There are therefore still attendant questions as to how CLTs acquire these 
resources. The literature poses many possibilities, such as the transfer of land from 
local landowners or public authorities; the acquisition of loan finance or subsidy; and 
potential partnerships with housing developers or housing associations to actually
construct homes (CFS, 2008a; CFS, 2008b). What the literature has so far failed to 
explore in any detail are the conditions under which these disparate possibilities are 
realised and the dilemmas and negotiations that are faced during these processes. 
The lack of insight into these issues provided the genesis for this research. This 
research study was confirmed in the summer of 2008, the day after the legal 
definition of CLTs was inserted into the Housing & Regeneration Act, and began in 
September of that year.
While the chapters within the thesis are concerned with analysing the acquisition of 
resources by CLTs, there are deeper issues that underpin these. CLTs are not just a 
form of resident-led housing that can be easily categorised. CLTs are a form of 
citizen governance and, although housing development is often a central component 
and a precipitating factor in their formation, their activities and significance are far 
broader. For example, although CLTs were included in a legislative act that is 
concerned with housing and regeneration, the legal definition of CLTs does not 
mention housing once. Instead their distinguishing features, according to the Act, is 
the emphasis CLTs place on community leadership and ownership in their 
organisation and management and the preoccupation with ensuring community 
benefit and accountability as an outcome of their activity.
As such, though chapters in this thesis are structured around investigating the 
practicalities of CLT development, they are also concerned with theories of 
community that elevate the neighbourhood and its citizens to a preeminent level in 
engineering and delivering social change. This elevation is clearly evident in the 
advocacy literature that is published on CLTs, dating back to the perspective 
promoted by American CLTs whereby they act as a mechanism through which the 
legitimate interests and rights of an individual are "durably secured and equitably 
balanced" (Davis, 2010, p. 23) with the interests and rights of a community as 
represented via a CLT. Similar claims can be found in the English literature. One of 
the outputs from the national demonstration programme asserted that the potential of 
CLTs lies in:
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connecting the process of physical change with the achievement of wellbeing 
outcomes in particular places, through the engagement of communities in the 
process, in individual and collective behaviour change, and retaining the 
intrinsic value of their assets for reinvestment in that place.
V
CFS (2008b, p. 2)
With reference to the main research question of the purpose and function of CLTs in 
housing governance, their role extends beyond the mere physical delivery of 
housing, though the lack of clarity as to the conditions and outcomes that CLTs 
operate and produce requires an interrogation of exactly what the role of community 
is and how their expressed attachment to place manifests in engineering social 
change in their local area.
To do this, Chapter 2 begins by analysing the communitarian theories of Etzioni 
(1995a) and Tam (1998), which are of particular interest due to their influence on UK 
political and governmental rationalities and housing and regeneration management 
and policy in the last two decades. The ^ chapter explores the ideological weight 
placed on the potential of community in the governance of local neighbourhoods.
These theories are explored alongside the various uses of community as both the 
means of engineering social and behavioural change and the site for this to occur. 
The chapter also unpicks the notions of "empowerment, "participation" and 
"democracy" that are often suffixed to "community". Unravelling the construct of 
community illustrates the manifold definitions and manifestations it can bring, offering 
prospects for both communal emancipation and objectification by policymakers to 
justify state agendas.
This provides the theoretical framing for the study, which is further developed in
i
Chapter 3 by interrogating the link between collective action in residential arenas and 
constructs of governance. The chapter explores definitions of community
governance and the varied possibilities its attachment to locality and community can 
hold. In particular, there are a number of tensions inherent to these processes that 
illustrate the need for an analytical approach that takes account of the underlying 
motivations for the genesis of CLT formation. A framework of rationales used by 
Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) is presented and justified as the primary analytical tool 
alongside the theories of communitarianism described in Chapter 2.
i
!fChapter 4 discusses the design and conduct of this research. It justifies the selection 
of qualitative research as the means to investigate CLTs and describes the process 
of obtaining a sample of participants and the implementation of research methods. 
The chapter reflects on the practicalities of researching the unsteady and evolving 
topic of CLTs during the project's time frame and discusses the relationship between 
the researcher, the topic, study participants and the practices of data collection and 
analysis. The aim is to be transparent about the research process and to provide an 
explicit account of how the procedures undertaken in this study may have influenced 
and constructed its findings. '
With the theoretical framing of the research in mind, alongside the attendant 
uncertainty as to the practicalities of CLT development, the empirical chapters are 
framed around the following sub-questions:.
• What are the motivations and perceived advantages held by CLTs for 
volunteers and strategic stakeholders?
• What are the enabling factors and tensions that occur during the process of 
land acquisition?
• How do the objectives of CLTs reconcile with the process and demands of 
obtaining finance from public and quasi-public stakeholders?
• What is the extent and importance of institutional support structures for local 
CLTs?
Chapter 5 seeks to understand why CLTs are initially formed and the relationships 
between their formation and local housing contexts and dynamics. This chapter 
explores the rationales presented by those involved and argues that these are linked 
to a structural change in housing governance that privileges not only constructs of 
affordability but also reconstitutes control over the use and occupation of housing in 
line with the voice of a defined, physical community. Here, the importance of 
community attachment, self-help and autonomy emerge as predominant features of 
CLT visions and rationales.
Chapter 6 - The importance of land: acquisition and influence - investigates the way 
CLTs have accessed or acquired the land necessary for their developments. It 
explores how public and private stakeholders have rationalised the release of land to 
CLTs at (usually) low cost. Where CLTs have been unsuccessful in accessing land, 
the question is posed as to why this is the case with particular reference to the 
challenges forms of community governance face in their operation. The chapter 
engages with issues of community representation and legitimacy and interrogates 
the way in which CLTs define the benefibiaries of their activities in relation to a 
reconfiguration of the use and occupation of local housing.
Chapter 7 explores the Dilemmas, compromises and trade-offs that occur as a CLT 
seeks to acquire finance from either a local authority or state-sponsored funding 
programmes. It explores how communitarian objectives relating to autonomy in local 
control and governance of housing can be negotiated and reconfigured from the top- 
down. This results in hybrid organisational arrangements for CLTs which should be 
understood as a product of two-way facilitation as opposed to solely communitarian 
endeavour or top-down dictat. Here, an understanding of CLTs is advanced by 
identifying their relationship to, and influence by, wider social, economic and political 
forces.
i
Chapter 8 is titled From experimentation to replication: the creation of a CLT sector. 
and explores the evolution of the institutional landscape in which CLTs have
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operated from the national demonstration programme in 2006 to 2011. This identifies 
that CLTs differ in their organisational form, arguing that the operation and practice 
of 'being a CLT1 differs according to its reasons for formation, the reception and 
negotiation of these among key actors, and its access to critical human and 
economic resources. It finds that forms of development, assistance and legitimacyt
differ according to these geographical contingencies and advances a key argument 
of this thesis that CLTs should not be understood as a uniform model of
development. Rather, it is an approach that denotes an idealised form of social 
relations and particular objectives which will be subject to negotiation and
reconfiguration, as opposed to operating as a uniform model with universal
characteristics. It is, therefore a relational and politicised process as opposed to one 
that is guided solely by its ideological roots.
The final concluding chapter describes and develops the main findings of the 
research, which relate not only to the diverse nature of the CLT sector and the hybrid 
organisational forms it produces, but also to the extent to which the attempts of a 
CLT to realign aspatial forms of ownership and governance are successful within its 
larger social, political and economic environments. The political and theoretical 
implications of the research are discussed, the limitations of the thesis are 
highlighted and pathways for much needed further research are proposed, 
recognising that one intended contribution of this study has been to provide a basis 
for future enquiry. t
Chapter 2: Conceptualising community 
governance
The concept of 'community' is regularly critiqued for its apparently vague and elusive 
nature, a lack of specific meaning and confusion due to its wide ranging application, 
use and diverse connotations (Day, 2006; Somerville, 2011a, p. 1). Communities can 
be defined by specific tastes, interests, identities and geographies, they can describe 
particular networks of social and political organisation and they can operate at local, 
national and international levels. Community is frequently used and objectified by 
politicians and policymakers in political strategies, yet strands of community 
development practice can place as much emphasis on opposing state institutions as 
on working with them (Kenny, 2011, p. i16).
These ambiguities make a succinct definition and understanding of community 
difficult to pin down and lead to contestation as to the desirability of placing it at the 
heart of social research: "all too often 'community' signifies something vague and ill- 
defined, an excuse for not thinking hard enough about what exactly it is that people 
do have in common" (Day, 2006, p. 2). Yet, following Fremeaux's (2005, p. 265) view 
that community is "one of the most important yet ill-defined concepts in social 
sciences", it is precisely the fact that the concept is complex, multi-faceted and 
contested that makes it an important object of research enquiry. As Day (2006) 
highlights, the study of community holds promise for social research, though the 
elasticity of the concept's meanings and connotations make it "a highly problematic 
term, alluring in its promise but to be approached with extreme care" (Day, 2006, p. 
2).
With this in mind, it is necessary to delineate exactly what is meant by 'community' at 
the outset of any enquiry which places it as a central concept. The first section of this
chapter looks at approaches which see 'community' as a desirable quality of social
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life, a taken for granted reality that requires restoration. The second section 
advances this through the lens of the communitarianism of Etzioni (1995a) and Tam 
(1998), who emphasise the importance of social ties, shared values and common 
interest in the creation of a healthy society. This links to the third section exploring 
the concepts of citizen participation and active citizenship in processes of 
governance and community development. These are underpinned by a narrative of 
change in the relationship between the state and communities in the latter half of the 
20th Century until the present day. During this period there has been an increased 
emphasis on the empowerment of communities through state action and 
encouragement, reflective of both the perception that processes of empowerment 
are essential to the renewal and sustainability of neighbourhoods and to the 
increased interest in enabling governance rather than top-down government.
It is for this reason that the chapter has a focus on the work of Etzioni and Tam. 
Their work, emphasising the role of communities in devolved processes of 
government, has had particular emphasis on international housing and social 
policies, particularly under the New Labour administration in the UK. Their work 
advocates both a change in relationship between the state and community, and an 
alteration of relations within communities where strong communal ties, self- 
governance and mutual action are to be promoted. Autonomous forms of collective 
action and organisation at the neighbourhood level are seen as essential to a 
democratic society and as an antidote to multifaceted social and economic problems, 
with the state providing encouragement for local actors to meet their own needs. In 
the context of CLTs, the communitarian action that underpins their development is 
thought to challenge the problems faced by local areas, while governments are keen
for this type of activity to flourish autonomously in local communities.
I
Yet, while community action holds prospects for empowerment and improved social 
outcomes, as the chapter will describe there are several critiques of the 
communitarian paradigm. These relate to key aspects of community including the 
dynamics of power, dissent, contention and the co-option and institutionalisation of
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community organisation at local, regional and national levels. In this context 
communitarianism provides a useful theoretical background to the study, with its 
avocation of active citizenship and self-government at the local level that is 
encouraged by the state holding explanatory power for both the formulation of local 
communal organisation and for the rationales for community empowerment and 
governance held by state actors.
By tracing the historical antecedents and modern advocates of communitarianism 
the chapter aims to present a theoretical background to the study of CLTs as a form 
of community organisation and communal action at the neighbourhood level. It 
discusses related literature on the shift from a top-down ‘government’ to an enabling 
‘governance’, linking this shift to the prevalence of communitarian thought and action 
in the design of housing and social policies, and discussing the supporting 
arguments in favour and critiques of new forms of citizen engagement and 
democratic organisation. r
2.1 The strength of communal ties
Historically one of the most influential theoretical contributions in considering the 
strength and desirability of collective ties in the context of societal change has been 
the work of Ferdinand Tonnies (1887) and his conceptualisation of two different 
patterns of social organisation: gemeinschaft ('community') and gesellschaft 
('association' or 'society'). These ideal types distinguish ties to a locality and the 
people within it marked by longevity and loyalty, from short-term relations 
emphasising individual rationality and independence.
Gemeinschaft relations are based on kinship, loyalty and co-ordinated action 
orientated towards a common good, while gesellschaft refers to arrangements where 
individual rationality predominates: "human gesellschaft is conceived as mere 
coexistence of people independent of each other" (Tonnies, 1887, p. 34). 
Gemeinschaft marks close knit relations between interdependent members of a
25
community, placing a strong emphasis on the desirability and value of this. It is 
expounded in Nisbet's (1967, p. 47) belief that the concept of community denotes "all 
forms of relationship which are characterised by a high degree of personal intimacy, 
emotional depth, moral commitment, social cohesion and continuity in time".
Nisbet and Tonnies’ understanding of community sees it as not merely a descriptive 
term of social organisation but as a desirable form of social relations: to be part of a 
community is to be part of socially and morally cohesive forms of relationships where 
individuals cooperate for a common good. As Noddings (1996, p. 245) states: 
"community is an important social good - perhaps the very foundation of moral life". 
To talk of "bad gemeinschaft" - bad community - "violates the meaning of the word": 
it is by definition a positive condition of existence (Tonnies, 1887, p. 34). 
Gesellschaft is opposed to this and considered an arena in which individuals are 
atomised rational actors, and are engaged in weak social relations within the market 
and political arenas where the priority is to further individual ends rather than 
contribute towards a communal good.£ It is a condition differentiated from 
gemeinschaft due to its movement from communal belonging to individual autonomy 
where social bonds, kinship and loyalty to both family and locality begin to be 
neglected. Gemeinschaft is understood as all kinds of social co-existence where 
people are united for better or worse, whereas gesellschaft is a "strange country" 
where these ties are forgotten and individual priorities predominate (Tonnies, 1887, 
p. 33).
Here, community automatically equates to close knit and desirable social and 
geographical relationships, while individuals in gesellschaft are engaged in 
"essentially boundaryless, contractual relationships; the ties between them are 
merely convenient" (Day, 2006, p. 6). Although Tonnies was most concerned with 
the abstract properties of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft and the difference between 
these broad patterns of social organisation - in his work they did not necessarily 
denote concrete social entities - he clearly notes that the spatial context of the village 
or town are the settings where close knit ties are formed and preserved, while the
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industrial shift to urban life and 'society' rather than 'community' was to lead to a 
decline in this communality and defined the shift to gesellschaft. Therefore, smaller 
localities are seen to encourage greater social cohesion and belonging among its 
members, as opposed to the perceived andnymity and short-term rationality of mass 
society.
For Tonnies, industrial change had begun to erode the gemeinschaft - and therefore 
'community' as the ideal and predominant type of social organisation: "elements of 
life in the Gemeinschaft, as the only real form of life, persist within the Gesellschaft, 
although lingering and decaying" (Tonnies, 1887, p. 227). As this quotation 
illustrates, the idea of community as a particularised and positive form of social 
organisation was perceived to be incompatible with industrialised urban life. 
Furthermore, it assumes that a web of interdependence, mutual obligation and 
reciprocity emerges as a fait accompli within a small locality. While this may come 
under threat from the transition to an industrialised and (allegedly) individualised 
society, 'community' is perceived to naturally flow and thrive when individuals are 
engaged in interdependent relationships af the micro level. This provides the moral 
grounding individuals need to live their lives to the full.
Smith (2002, p. 109) describes this standpoint as one where community is seen to 
be "a static, bounded cultural space of being where personal meanings are 
produced, cohesive cultural values are articulated, and traditional ways of life are 
enunciated and lived". The theoretical contribution made by Tonnies had clear 
resonance with the 20th Century concern with communitarian political agendas that 
bemoaned the decline of traditional community life and saw the tight social bonds 
and mutual regard it was seen to generate as requiring restoration:
Throughout twentieth-century America, as the transition to gesellschaft 
evolved, even its champions realized that it was not the unmitigated blessing 
they had expected. Although it was true that those who moved from villages 
and small towns into urban centers often shed tight social relations and strong
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community bonds, the result for many was isolation, lack of caring for one 
another, and exposure to rowdiness and crime.
Etzioni (1995a, p. 117)
These concerns were echoed in Putnam's work on social capital (1993; 1995; 2000) 
which contended that a decline in features of social organisation such as social 
networks, common norms and trust - those markers of social capital - had eroded the 
willingness of individuals to cooperate and engage in civic endeavour for mutual 
benefit (Putnam 1995, p. 66). Social capital was seen to yield substantial social and 
economic benefits including lower crime, reduced anti-social behaviour, enhanced 
economic development and a more effective government (Stolle, 2003, p. 19).
For Putnam, growth in citizen distrust of government in the 20th Century - a state of 
"democratic disarray" - was linked to the decline of social capital and civic 
engagement in voluntary organisations and community activities (Putnam, 1995, p. 
77). He argued that associational activity between citizens in voluntary societies 
creates social capital and generalised norms of reciprocity, trust and mutual 
obligation, creating similar webs of interdependence described by Tonnies. As such 
decline in the extent to which people participated in these activities paralleled a 
reduction in the political engagement of citizens, questioning both the extent to which 
people were connected to government and whether they are willing to cooperate for 
a communal good (Putnam, 2000). In short, social capital is seen as an essential 
underpinning of a democratic government whose quality and effectiveness is linked 
to strong traditions of political engagement within populations. From this, Putnam's 
body of work has advocated investigation as to how social connectedness among 
communities - and therefore civic engagement and civic trust - can be restored and 
contribute to an improved system of government (Putnam, 1995, p. 77). Here we see 
community both as an abstract social quality in itself, in the sense of the interlinked 
networks of mutual dependence and reciprocity, and as the geographical site and
entity where the normative standards of community life are created and sustained to 
improve the operation of government.
This thesis has been disputed by many. Levi (1996) and Stolle (2003) questioned the 
extent to which participation in voluntary organisations necessarily leads to 
engagement in the political system, not least due to the possibility that those 
involved in voluntary networks may be deliberately operating outside the formal 
political sphere in an oppositional manner. Concerns over the production and 
maintenance of social capital also relate to the potentially exclusive nature of trust 
and association, creating boundaries between those who share the norms that social 
capital is composed of - who are typically those already well connected with existing 
access to resources - and those that lack strong community ties and are excluded 
from civic participation (Foley and Edwards, 1999; Ostrom, 2001).
Nevertheless, Putnam's concern for this perceived decline in community life and 
responsibility has been shared by many, particularly those subscribing to 
communitarian political thought. In particular, Etzioni (1995a; 1997a) and Tam (1998) 
bemoan the loss of civic engagement and trust among individuals and argue for a 
new political agenda that encourages the revival of social webs in which people are 
attached to one another through crisscrossing relationships of mutual dependence 
rather than leading atomistic lives (Etzioni, 1997a, p. 123).
However, the task of restoring community life extends beyond the mere restoration 
of tight knit social bonds to the reaffirmation a moral culture in communities: "there is 
a need not just to revitalise civil society, but the more urgent and difficult task is to 
remoralize civil society" (Etzioni, 1997a, p. 96). For Etzioni (1997a, p. 142) the 
benefits of close knit community life are not restricted to a reinvigoration of civil 
society which in turn can improve the operation of the state, rather community is 
seen as the primary mechanism of maintaining social order and moral standards, 
making governmental authorities work less as a provider and more as an enabler 
and facilitator (as will be described in the following sections). Communitarianism
represents an attempt to redraw the political map and suggests a "third social 
philosophy" that leapfrogs the traditional divide between left-wing and right-wing 
political standpoints, eschewing an emphasis on either individual autonomy or 
authoritarian dictat in favour of a balance between individual rights and social 
responsibilities to a common good (Etzioni, 1995b, p. 91). The aim is to build among 
communities "a profound commitment to moral order that is basically voluntary, and 
to a social order that is well balanced with socially secured autonomy" (Etzioni, 
1997a, p. 257).
Although this presents an ideal of balancing individual rights with moral 
responsibilities, the communitarian literature leaves little doubt that, much like the 
earlier work of Tonnies, a perceived shift from the romantic notion of community life 
to a society based on individual autonomy has weakened citizen commitment to fulfil 
reciprocal and mutual duties that constitute 'good citizenship' (Etzioni, 1995a, p. 3). 
Etzioni (1995a, p. 161) bemoans the existence of "too many rights, too few 
responsibilities" and the post-war decline of community life is depicted as 
precipitating a weakening of values of hard work, thrift and compliance with informal 
rules of social conduct, creating a "rising sense of entitlement and a growing 
tendency to shirk social responsibilities" (Etzioni, 1997a, pp. 64-65). In short, society 
is allegedly based on a "celebration of the self' (Etzioni, 1995a, p.25) and the 
communitarian paradigm seeks to remedy the "cancerous effects on community life" 
this individualistic outlook has created (Tam, 1998, p. 3), with a definite view that the 
decline of community life and the normative values of reciprocity and mutuality it 
provided breeds a society lacking social virtue and morality (Etzioni, 1995a, pp. 24- 
25). While communitarians aim to balance rights and responsibilities, there is little 
doubt that the primary concern is that more responsibility and prescribed ties to 
community are required rather than the creation of new rights that promote individual 
liberty (Heron, 2001).
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The moral voice of community
An emphasis of communitarianism is, therefore, on reining in the autonomy of 
individuals and encouraging greater commitment to imagined shared values of 
mutuality, reciprocity and interdependence in the name of social cooperation 
(Etzioni, 1995a, p. 7). The solution to "the absence of order, regulation and 
normative guidance" is to allow a degree of 'bounded autonomy' for individuals and 
subgroups, permitting a range of "legitimate options" for individuals to lead their lives 
within an affirmed normative framework that encourages responsibilities to 
community life (Etzioni, 1997a, p. 71).
Autonomy is to be bounded in accordance with a set of shared community values 
that compose a normative framework to guide communities. Etzioni (1997a, pp. 199- 
211) describes a set of core values relating to: inclusive democratic processes, 
individual loyalty to both one's community and the wider community at large, socially 
responsible behaviour, respect for (and responsibility to) other people and 
commitment to ongoing moral dialogue within the community that debates which 
values are to be shared and judges their'normative value. Tam (1998, pp. 13-15) 
sees the existence of common values relating to the value of love, wisdom, justice 
and fulfilment as providing a clear basis for defining the mutual responsibilities 
people hold to each other. So for Tam, the value of justice is defined by the rather 
prosaic motto: 'do as you would be done by' in order to uphold reciprocal 
relationships, while principles of open exchange through 'co-operative enquiry' and a 
reformation of power relations should ensure that all citizens are able to contribute to 
the identification of specific values on which community life will be anchored. The 
idea of co-operative enquiry is based on the idea that claims to truth are only valid if 
consensus is reached by all those in the community:
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The communitarian principle of co-operative enquiry requires that any claim to 
truth may be judged to be valid only if informed participants deliberating 
together under conditions of co-operative enquiry would accept that claim.
Tam (1998, p. 13)
Etzioni's moral dialogues refer to debate over the "normative standing of one 
suggested course as compared to another" (Etzioni, 1997a, p. 102) and involve 
reaching consensus over the shared values of community. However, while 
consensus provides empirical legitimacy - in terms of what people think is legitimate 
- the substantive content of this consensus is not imbued with sufficient 
accountability (Etzioni, 1997a, p. 241). For Etzioni, in searching for the substantive 
legitimacy required, there is a limited core of select 'higher order' values which act as 
a reference point for any consensus based on their obvious normativity: "certain 
concepts present themselves to us as morally compelling in and of themselves" 
(Etzioni, 1997a, p. 241). These are self-evident truths that speak directly to all 
human beings, often shaped by traditions (Etzioni, 2011, p. 116), and provide a 
reference point for the values and principles communitarian order abides by. As an 
example, Etzioni (2011, p. 117) describes how telling the truth is self-evidently 
morally superior to lying, except in "extreme situations where the lie serves others 
and not oneself', using the protection of the vulnerable from discrimination as an 
illustration. These morally compelling values are self-evidently right, beyond 
contestation and provide the normative framework for communitarian living.6 
Ultimately, for the communitarian movement, the 'golden rule' by which all values 
should adhere is to: "Respect and uphold society's moral order as you would have 
society respect and uphold your autonomy" (Etzioni, 1997a, p. xviii).
6 This argument will be critiqued in the following sections.
The upholding of this moral order is to be done by drawing upon the community 
itself. A major function of communities and the apparent qualities that emerge from 
the interdependent and close knit social relations that characterise them is to 
reinforce the character and conduct of individuals, a technique achieved through the 
'moral voice' of community built into these relationships in accordance with values 
that ought to be shared by all. Communities share these common sets of values and 
reaffirm them by encouraging members to abide by these values, while censuring 
those that behave in a manner that violates them (Etzioni, 1997a, p. 123). Those 
who breach normative standards of socially responsible conduct are to suffer 
informal social sanctions channelled through the community's moral voice and "daily, 
routine social underwriting of morality" (Etzioni, 1995a, p. 35). Community becomes 
defined as the arena in which shared meanings, sentimental attachments and 
interpersonal networks of recognition and reciprocity are established, and to object to 
these values and the moral voice that sustains them through informal censure is to 
oppose the social glue that quintessential^ underpins the social and moral order of a 
communitarian society (Etzioni, 1995a, p. 36).
The communitarian vision then is one that envisages a strengthening of the social 
order through the moral voice of community rather than solely law and order. Etzioni 
(1997a, p. 139) argues that social conduct should be regulated by reliance on the 
moral voice rather than through laws, giving primacy to the shared moral values that 
members affirm and arguing for a reduction1 in the involvement of government:
In effect, the more a society relies on the government per se, the more both 
the moral order and autonomy are diminished, the less communitarian the 
society becomes. The more a society relies on members' convictions that their 
community has established a legitimate and just order, and the more they 
conduct themselves voluntarily in line with the order's values because they 
themselves subscribe to them, the more communitarian the society.
Etzioni (1997a, p. 140, original emphasis)
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The virtue of the communitarian society is therefore perceived to be its ability to 
"persuade errant members to change their ways" (Etzioni, 1997b, p. 72) through 
voluntary conviction as opposed to state-led coercion. The idea is not simply to 
revitalise civil society but for it to provide a moral culture that enhances social order 
while significantly reducing the need for state intervention in social behaviour 
(Etzioni, 2000, p. 15). Once established, this moral voice is "highly incorporated into 
daily life" working through informal censure and encouragement between individuals 
and groups to not only adhere to behaviour that reflects shared values but to avoid 
behaviour that offends or violates the moral culture of community (Etzioni, 1997a, p. 
124). It is these webs of interdependence and encouragement at the micro level that 
promote 'community' as both the site and tool of effective governing. As Etzioni 
describes, a laissez-faire nation state of government appears to leave people to their 
own devices as opposed to the way community continually reinforces normative 
standards of character and behaviour and as such encourages the self-government 
of individuals and groups:
The incontestable fact about human nature is that the good and virtuous 
character of those who have acquired it tends to degrade. If left to their own 
devices, going through the routine of life, individuals gradually lose much of 
their commitment to values - unless these are continuously reinforced.
Etzioni (1997a, p. 187)
Therefore of critical importance for communitarians is the reformation of government 
to accord more weight to the role of community in the way society is governed. 
Communitarian politics requires the development of citizens who participate in co­
operative enquiries that determine a wide range of issues, who recognise shared 
common values and accept the social and behavioural responsibilities these imply, 
and who actively support the transformation of power relations for a common good 
(Tam, 1998, p. 8). Tam places much emphasis on transforming power relations, 
recommending decentralised units of communitarian governance as a remedy to a
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remote centralised government that breeds feelings of alienation and powerlessness 
and fails to recognise civic pride as a key incentive for governance. Despite 
grounding this in language of economic inequality (and as a corollary the inequality 
in power and influence this is seen to bring for particular groups), central to the 
communitarian politics of Etzioni and Tam is the idea of individual responsibility for 
socially acceptable behaviour within the nest of community:
Central to the communitarian message is the notion of responsibility. How 
individuals behave affects the well-being of others. No citizen of an inclusive 
community can be allowed to entertain the delusion that responsibility cannot 
be properly ascribed in the world in which we live ... there are no grounds for 
denying that each individual is responsible for his or her behaviour and its 
effect on others.
Tam (1998, p. 121)
The task for communitarian politics is therefore to recast citizens as responsible 
members of moral communities, achieving a technique of governing that operates 
through individual subscription to moral values. This is to be done by diminishing the 
role of the state and increasing the role of community through decentralised forms of 
community empowerment and participation that can build forms of citizenship that 
build and sustain self-governing communities.
2.2 Communitarian politics: shifting from government to governance
This emphasis on communitarian responsibility gained popular political currency
towards the end of the 20th Century. Although New Labour's reinvention of
government through collective action in the community was posed as a remedy to
the preceding culture of Conservative market rationality and individualism (Driver
and Martell, 1997), the Conservative governments that predated New Labour had
also utilised ideas of 'community' and the role of the active citizen in governing
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processes. Kearns (1995) noted the passing of welfare responsibility from state to 
individual citizens in the early 1990s, compelling people to 'get active' on the basis of 
their personal morality and the prospect of the approbation of others. This 
combination of personal effort and moral judgement by fellow citizens "facilitated the 
linking of active citizenship to the longer-term project of reforming, curtailing and 
cheapening the welfare state" (Kearns, 1995, p. 157) - in other words it was a key 
political process and tool for reforming government.
In this sense the political project of 'community' implemented by New Labour (a topic 
discussed extensively by Jordan, 2011) continued the reshaping of governing 
processes. Giddens (1998, p. 65) applied the motto "no rights without 
responsibilities" to his influential 'third way' politics, emphasising a communitarian 
perspective that any expansion of individual rights ought to be accompanied by a 
parallel rise in communal obligation, a view also invoked by Tony Blair (1998, p. 4) in 
arguing that the rights individuals enjoy should also reflect the duties of citizenship. 
The imperative for individual and mutual responsibility illustrated the influence of 
Etzioni's communitarianism upon New Labour and continued the shift described by 
Kearns (1995), where state-led rights-based approaches to welfare were reduced in 
favour of a more mixed economy of welfare where devolved management, individual 
choice and collective action channelled through civil society would promote citizen 
responsibility and active citizenship (Driver and Martell, 1997, p. 33). As the following 
sections describe7 , community becomes not only the geographical site of 
governance but a technique where norms of individual and collective action are 
promoted to encourage self-governance of the social sphere.
7 This is not intended to be an exhaustive review of New Labour's approach to community. Rather, it is a 
review of the concept of community using some examples from their approach to illustrate the growth of the 
'rights and responsibilities' community agenda. ■
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Community as a terrain of governance
A crucial element of these ideas is that much less emphasis is given to the state's 
role as an active welfare agent, and instead citizen involvement in community-level 
structures is seen as the most appropriate method for achieving desired goals 
(Heron and Dwyer, 1999, p. 95). Leading'from the communitarian agenda of rights 
and responsibilities, this is also based on the belief that centralised nation states 
have become too distanced from the communities they serve (Taylor, 2007). The 
role of the state and the idea of representative democracy upon which its sovereignty 
rests is problematised by the scale and complexity of modern-day society. The state 
is seen as unable to respond to the policy problems the complexity of society poses 
and unable to meet and support localised values, interests and problems, breeding 
feelings of citizen alienation from political structure and a decline in the legitimacy of 
representative democracy and the institutions it creates8 (Bloomfield et a/., 2001, p. 
501; Newman, 2005, p. 119). From a communitarian perspective the issue has been 
the retention of too much centralised control by governments that legislate on such a 
large scale that the complexities of their governing minimise public understanding 
and exclude grassroots participation and influence, breeding citizens who are merely 
passive in receiving government rather than active in its creation and operation 
(Tam, 1998, p. 154).
Communitarian advocates have argued for alternative forms of political governance 
as a remedy to this, shifting decision-making from the centre to decentralised 
structures at a local level that allow citizens to participate in decisions that affect 
them as "equal and responsible members of a shared community" (Tam, 1998, p. 
154). Local people should have the power to decide how their own communities are 
governed and civic pride should be recognised as a key incentive alongside market 
individualism, the idea being that this will then incentivise all members of a
8 This subject is returned to in the following section. f
it
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community to participate in determining and resolving local issues if their 
deliberations are accorded sufficient political value (Tam, 1998, p. 154-156). This 
aims to enlarge the idea of civic participation beyond the traditional electoral 
procedures of representative democracy and into Tam's conception of a co-operative 
enquiry where all citizens are able to participate in decision-making over specific 
issues at an equal and decentralised level (Tam, 1998; Magnette, 2003, p. 144).
n
The idea, then, is not solely to draw government closer to the people it serves but to 
create engaged citizens who are active in the self-government of themselves and 
their community through civic participation. New Labour's approach to community 
leant heavily on this idea, often referring to "neighbourhood renewal" or "civil 
renewal" (SEU, 2001; Blunkett, 2003) to denote efforts aimed at increasing civic 
participation and responsibility. The idea of active citizenship became part of this, 
the facilitation of which was thought to create:
strong, empowered and active communities, in which people increasingly do 
things for themselves and the state acts to facilitate, support and enable 
citizens to lead self-determined and fulfilled lives.
n Blunkett (2003, p. 43)
t
This continued a promotion of active citizenship, locating local people as the solution 
to local problems, that Amin (2005) terms a shift from a culture of top-down universal 
policies available to all towards an enabling frame of provision for bottom-up and 
locally negotiated priorities. Programmes centred on neighbourhood renewal aimed 
to shift influence and opportunities to the local level, setting and prioritising the 
neighbourhood as the most appropriate place to tackle issues of social exclusion (as
opposed to the level of city or town) and allowing greater influence for active 
communities to influence policies and governance arrangements that affect them.9
These ideas were taken further in the Communities in Control white paper, 
promoting an extensive programme of community empowerment and motivated by a 
commitment to the creation of self-governing communities:
There are no limits to the capacity of the British people for self-government, 
given the right platforms, mechanisms and incentives. Empowering citizens 
and communities is an urgent task for us all.
CLG (2008, p. 129)
This proposed a raft of reforms aimed at allowing communities to gain greater power 
through mechanisms that allow them to hold politicians to account, to influence 
decisions made on their behalf, and to participate in the operation and ownership of 
local services (CLG, 2008a). As Somerville (2011a, p. 97) describes, the image 
conveyed in the white paper was one of an active, empowered citizen who 
volunteers in the community, who is prepared to assume responsibility for local 
services and political issues and who is engaged and influential in policy decisions.
rAs later sections will describe, similar platforms for communitarian governance have 
manifest in other areas of social life and policy, with their operation in the field of 
housing of particular interest to this thesis.
9 Yet the paradox of this agenda is that programs such as the New Deal for Communities, an area-based 
initiative that exemplified the neighbourhood approach, have been critiqued by some for being undermined by 
national policy demands and targets that contradict neighbourhood-focused agendas (Lawless, 2007; Wallace, 
2010). Indeed, Wallace's (2010, p. 816) analysis argued that one NDC case area offered "little more than an 
opportunity to participate in circumscribed and myopic projects of quasi-empowerment" as local decisions 
were constrained and usurped by central dictat and priorities.
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Essentially, the idea of community as a new terrain of governance illustrates how the 
state is no longer required or able to answer all of society's needs; instead 
individuals and localities are expected to assume responsibility for their own well­
being through processes of empowerment (Rose, 1999, p. 142). It is in this way that 
community becomes not only a space of government but a technique through which 
citizens are governed not by centralised control but by using mechanisms that 
promote individual responsibility, community empowerment and mutual adherence to 
norms of behaviour.
The self-governing community
Nikolas Rose's work on political power beyond the state (Rose and Miller, 1992) and 
the "death of the social" (Rose, 1996) is important to consider in reviewing these 
arguments. Community is not simply the territory of government but a means of 
governing where collective relations are reconstituted in ways that reduce the 
salience of 'the social' - the unitary domain of the traditional nation state and welfare 
system - in favour of the community and its networks of allegiance and mutual 
obligation to family, neighbourhood and locality (Rose, 1996, p. 330). Community is 
not primarily a geographical space but also a field in which ethics and responsibility 
are embedded into the social relations that occur within it (Rose, 2001, p. 7). The 
ties, bonds, forces and affiliations of community are, much as communitarian 
scholars describe, to be celebrated, nurtured and instrumentalised to produce a form 
of self-government with desirable consequences for both individual and community 
(Rose, 1996, p. 335). The terrain of community and the high probability of repeated 
interaction between its members mean that people have a strong incentive to act in 
socially responsible and beneficial ways to avoid breaking the obligations attached to 
citizenship (Somerville, 2005, p. 122). Therefore, the regulation of individual conduct 
in line with the moral voice of community becomes a method of maintaining order at 
community-level (Etzioni, 1997a, p. 139; Rose, 2000a, p. 1409).
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This does not imply a deletion of the state's role in society; instead it denotes a shift 
from government's position as an active welfare provider and agent to an enabling 
role where active citizens are encouraged to support themselves:
W e need to avoid thinking in terms of a simple succession in which one style 
of government supersedes and effaces its predecessor. Rather, we can see a 
complexification, the opening up of new lines of power and truth, the 
invention and hybridization of techniques. But nevertheless, the ideal of the 
'social state' gives way to that of the 'enabling state'.
Rose (1999, p.142)
The ideal of the 'enabling state' described here needs to be placed in context. It is 
closely linked to the New Public Management (NPM) system of organising the public 
sector that took hold through the 1990s, a method of economic organisation that 
emphasised greater cost efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector which was 
to be remodelled on private sector and business-like values (Dunleavy and Hood, 
1994). In particular, lines of power and governance were to be diffused and 
improvements in public service delivery secured by the return of public services to 
citizens by creating more choice and more power for the citizen (as seen in John 
Major's Citizen's Charter - see Cooper, 1993). This was to be achieved by securing 
better access to information, providing more scope to influence change in the 
management and delivery of public services and by reconstructing formerly 
bureaucratised provision into quasi-markets of services consumer by active and 
empowered (by choice) citizens (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Flint, 2003, p. 613).
Parallel to this, the diffusion of public service delivery was to encourage participatory 
and democratic programs that activate citizens to act in their own self-governance 
and self-interest (Cruikshank, 1999). Citizens are encouraged to aspire to autonomy, 
to interpret welfare provision and sufficiency as a matter of individual responsibility, 
and to shape life through acts of choice and consumption that become the hallmarks
41
o
of citizenship (Rose, 1996).The citizenship of an individual is analysed by their ability 
to self-govern, and failure to act politically, to participate in individual empowerment 
and self-governance is to disengage with the social obligations of 'responsible 
citizenship' (Cruikshank, 1999, p. 95).
An example of this is found in the housing literature where governmental emphasis 
on homeownership as a preferred form of tenure simultaneously constructs the 
homeowner as a model, self-sufficient and self-governing individual while linking 
alternative tenure choices (such as social renting) as deviant forms of housing 
consumption undertaken by flawed consumers lacking in autonomy and unable to 
exercise choice (Flint and Rowlands, 2003). Thus, programmes of empowerment 
and self-help both promote and encourage autonomy and seek to alter or shape 
(rather than control or force) the actions of citizens towards this goal (Cruikshank, 
1999, p. 3). Empowerment is therefore seen to be "both voluntary and coercive" 
(Cruikshank, 1999, p. 48) in providing both opportunities for self-government and 
self-help, and encouragement for citizens to engage with this by constructing model 
forms of citizenship for them to aspire to.
Governmental strategies of community empowerment fall under this umbrella of 
opening up new lines of power and organisations of government. The foreword to 
New Labour's Communities in Control white paper spoke of providing the "right 
support, guidance and advice" to unlock the "huge, largely latent, capacity for self- 
government and self-organisation" within communities (CLG, 2008a, p. iii). For Rose 
(1996), strategies offering the guidance and advice that the previous quotation 
speaks of require scrutiny for the way they redefine methods of governing. While 
communities that have previously been under the tutelage of the social state are to 
be empowered and set free to find their own destiny through self-organisation and 
determination, at the same time this involves citizens being made responsible for 
their own welfare and government. So while empowerment may be grounded in 
governmental discourses of handing 'power to the people', with power comes 
responsibility:
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Empowerment, with all its emphasis on strengthening the capacity of the 
individual to play the role of actoV in his or her own life, has come to 
encompass a range of interventions to transmit, under tutelage, certain 
professionally ratified mental, ethical and practical techniques for active self­
management.
Rose (1996, p. 348)
For Rose the empowerment of communities denotes the transmission of active 
subjective capacities pertaining to self-management that build a moral code of 
individual responsibility and community obligation by which citizens are encouraged 
to shape their lives (Rose, 1996, p. 347). These capacities become the means of 
distinguishing between moral, responsible ijiembers of a community and those non­
active citizens lacking the skills required for self-management (Rose, 2000b, p. 331).
VAs such empowerment involves a "double movement of autonomization and 
responsiblisation" where the ties and associations within communities are used to 
engender individual and mutual self-government (Rose, 2000a, p. 1400).
The shift of power and control to community does not therefore mean that the state 
has withdrawn from social life, but rather that it assumes a more nuanced role where 
these practices of government are seen as "deliberate attempts to shape people's 
behaviour in conjunction with certain objectives" (Lee, 2010, p. 114) which are to be 
achieved not through direct intervention but via the implication of self-regulation and 
obligation within governmental aims (Flint, 2003, p. 612-613). This self-regulation is 
to be achieved within a framework of 'bounded autonomy' (Etzioni, 1995a) which is 
"built on a moral dominant discourse shaped by government ... of what constitutes 
required, appropriate and 'correct' behaviour" (Flint, 2006, p. 20).
Following sections will link more thoroughly the concepts of community discussed 
here and the way they are enacted in the governance of housing, but at this point it 
is worth illustrating the rise of the community governance described above in social
housing provision. Flint (2003) describes how tenant empowerment programmes(
offer residents of social housing greater opportunities to participate in the 
governance of their homes and community- Clapham and Kintrea (1994) and McKee 
(2007) document the opportunities afforded by community ownership10 and tenant 
management of social housing, rescaling the governance of housing in order to 
empower tenants. The emancipatory prospects for devolved and rescaled forms of 
housing ownership are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, yet within 
this context it is important to note the 'ethopolitics' of the reshaped relationship 
between social housing providers and residents as described by Flint (2003). Tenant 
behaviour is reshaped, moving from identities of alleged flawed dependency on 
bureaucratic decision-making to enhanced agency where tenants act as rational 
consumers 'empowered' to hold landlords to account, exercise choice and actively 
improve their standard of living. This enhanced agency ran concurrently to an 
agenda of responsibilisation channelled through contractual arrangements detailing 
behavioural duties towards families, the geographical community and the upkeep of 
property.11
Elsewhere, McKee and Cooper's (2008) Foucauldian analysis of tenant participation 
in Glasgow found that programmes of empowerment hold both regulatory and 
liberatory possibilities, as active citizens who behave 'responsibly' and get involved 
are contrasted with those 'problematic' individuals who opt out of participation 
processes and become constructed as apathetic, alienated and excluded. The use of
10 The phrase 'community ownership' describes the majority control or ownership of housing stock by its 
residents. Popular examples include housing co-operatives and community-based housing associations that 
have formed to manage social housing.
11 One example of such contractual arrangements is the use of 'Good Neighbour' agreements by social housing 
providers. These explicitly iterate normative standards of behaviour expected by tenants in order to "promote 
positive behaviour and reinforce community values" (CLG, 2006). Tenants are obliged to abide by the 
agreements and refrain from the 'nuisance behaviour' they prohibit, creating a contractual relationship 
whereby tenancy is no longer framed merely in terms of the maintenance of individual conduct but reframed 
in communal terms that expand the behaviour and obligations required by tenants.
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community as a technique of governing becomes a process of framing the conduct 
of citizens in relation to their contribution - or lack thereof - towards the 'strength' of 
the wider community which itself becomes a crucible of behavioural and moral 
scrutiny (Wallace, 2010, p. 809). Citizens are encouraged to 'do the right thing' - that 
is, to meet the conditions of citizenship that encourage self-government and 
responsibility for meeting their own needs, with potentially punitive punishments for 
those who opt out of the process (for example withdrawal of welfare provision for 
unsuccessful jobseekers) (Heron, 2001). Adherence to the behavioural obligations 
demanded by the community is of paramount importance in discourses of morally 
responsible communities and has become one of the key targets of academic 
critiques for the potential effects the imposition of such obligations could have on 
different groups. This furthers an understanding of governmental projects that are 
constructed around community deliberation and decision-making: they are not 
necessarily constituted or presented neutrally and are instead influenced by the 
objectives and economic imperatives that underpin and influence governmental 
decision-making.12
r
The communitarian vision of a co-operative enquiry in which all participate to 
contribute to the community's normative framework can be critiqued both for failing to 
reconcile differences in power and for producing the authoritarian framework of 
governing that communitarians, such as Tam's (1998, p. 154) rejection of centralised 
authoritarian states, actually claim to avoid. Central to the communitarian argument 
is that governing through community is done by reliance on the voluntary conviction 
of members to align their behaviour with the image of a communitarian society, with 
the moral voice of community acting as both an encouragement to behave in
12 A good example of this is stock transfer of social housing from council ownership to housing associations. 
McCormack's (2009, p. 401) case study described the paradox of stock transfer that can only go ahead if 
approved on the basis of a ballot of tenants, yet in reality tenants were given little choice at all if they wished 
their homes to be maintained to a high standard. The council presented a 'bleak alternative' to transfer, one 
typified by reduced investment in housing maintenance (due to a need to reduce public expenditure) as 
opposed to a transfer that would inject greater finance into improving housing standards for tenants.
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accordance with certain values and as a censure when these obligations are violated 
(Etzioni, 1995a, p. 38). Etzioni insists that this is not done through coercive means 
and that "if a person does not accede to the community's moral urgings, nobody will 
make that person 'behave'" (Etzioni, 1995a, p.38).
However, as Robinson (2008, p. 20) points out, communitarianism centres on 
identifying valued forms of community, designing policies to promote and protect 
such communities where they already exist and to reconfigure forms that stray away 
from the ideal of community. To argue that social pressure of this kind is not coercive 
would be to question the abilities held by a self-governing community, as if 
communities are to rely on moral pressures to maintain social order, they can only 
do so if these pressures have some degree of coercive effect in reconfiguring the 
behaviour of potential dissidents (Levitas, 2005, p. 95). 'Community' can construct 
essentialist categories of difference - the included and excluded, the responsible and 
irresponsible, the deserving and the undeserving - and to appeal to a homogenous 
common culture is to obscure the divisions, exclusions and inequalities that pervade 
community life (Cain and Yuval-Davis, 1990, p. 22).
The shared values that define this commoft culture, for example the value of justice 
put forward by Henry Tam and those values that Etzioni argues are self-evidently 
moral, are contested in themselves. Philpott (2011) points out the manner in which 
the subjectivity of these values questions their basis for providing a normative 
framework for communities - what is deemed fair and just to one group of people 
could easily preclude others - and that to assume that people are inclined to treat 
each other as equals within this framework is to avoid the complexities of everyday 
life.
This is problematised not just because of the potential exclusion of those who fail to 
conform to the idealised construct of community but due to the neglect of power 
inequalities among community members. Levitas (2005, p. 95) questions which
members in the community will have the power to impose normative values and
v
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standards and highlights the difficulties of ensuring just, equitable and accountable 
outcomes through informal community ties. Elias and Scotson's (1965) work on the 
members that were designated as 'insiders and outsiders' of community life 
highlighted the process of exclusion of outsider groups, where strong associative ties 
between those who had lived in a community the longest were used as a means to 
stigmatise and marginalise the 'outsiders' - those that had moved in last with weaker 
and less established social relations. These configurations became a means not only 
to create an idealised positive image of the established group in the community but 
as a way of conferring negative human attributes to "members of a group which they 
considered collectively as different from, and as inferior to, their own group" (Elias 
and Scotson, 1965, p. xx).
Jordan (2011, p. 50) also explores the possible inequalities in power, arguing that 
policies aimed at governing through community are actually more orientated towards 
reinforcing images of active entrepreneurial individuals rather than building 
community solidarity. These usurped ideas of providing equality of opportunity as the 
rhetoric around devolving power and influence to communities may suggest, and 
instead assisting abler and more ambitious individuals to differentiate themselves 
from communities where community membership and belonging - defined by
individual self-responsibility and self-management - was lacking. There is, therefore,va need to be alive to the variable outcomes policies aimed at 'empowering 
communities can create, considering who is empowered and at the expense of 
whom. As Allen (2003, p. 5) puts it, power (and the associated concept of 
empowerment) is not a neutral tool for associational collective action that facilitates 
mutual aims and interests, but it is also an instrumental vehicle through which power 
can be held over others and used to obtain leverage at the expense of others. 
Expanding this, the communitarian vision of associational power between citizens 
should be understood not only as having the potential for mutual action in the name 
of community empowerment but also for the possibility of others gaining leverage 
over those that fail to conform to the valued form of community life.
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This section has provided an introduction to the potential application of 
communitarian ideology to everyday life. Through the decentralised units of 
governance endorsed by Etzioni and Tam, communities become both the site and 
mechanism through which individual and communal self-government is harnessed. 
While the section has concluded with an analysis of the regulatory possibilities of 
community, those that may exist through the potential stigmatisation or exacerbation 
of inequalities of those that sit outside a valued construct of community, the following 
section advances to discuss varied understandings of the way community 
empowerment and participation can operate. This follows Rocha's (1997) 
understanding that, while it is necessary to question the purpose of who is being 
empowered and why, not all types of power are experienced as the actualisation of 
influence or force and may hold out the prospect for mutual action towards improved 
conditions for less powerful citizens.
2.3 Understanding Empowerment and Participation
The concept of community empowerment, often premised on strengthening 
community ties and building collective influence, is one that has been open to regular 
contestation in the academy. As Section 2.2 argued, it is vital to gain an 
understanding as to who is empowered and for what purpose, yet empowerment 
often remains "mired in romantic notions of neighbourliness" (Colenutt and Cutten, 
1994, p. 241) and used indiscriminately with a positive meaning "uncritically 
assumed to be universal" (Rocha, 1997, p. 31). This section aims to further an 
understanding of the varied definitions of empowerment and its prospects, providing 
the context for a thorough exploration of the creation and facilitation of new forms of 
community governance.
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Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation13 in neighbourhood renewal programs 
provides a useful introduction to the variable possibilities held by the empowerment 
of people to participate in public life.
In Arnstein's eyes, citizen participation is a process through which power relations 
are, to variable degrees, altered between those who hold power in determining the 
operation of public policies and those excluded from participating in these processes:
It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently 
excluded by the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included 
in the future ... In short, it is the means by which they can induce significant
social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent 
society.
Arnstein (1969, p. 216)
The dynamics of citizen participation as conceptualised by Arnstein (1969) are 
shown in Table 1.
13 While Arnstein's work obviously precedes much of the literature already discussed in this chapter, it 
provides a valuable introduction to this discussion of empowerment and participation for the contestation, 
debate and alternatives it has generated and its continued use in the social science literature (Burns et a!., 
1994; Cornwall, 2008; Hall and Hickman, 2011).
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Table 1:A ladder of participation (Arnstein, 1969)
8 Citizen Control Degrees of citizen 
power
6 Partnership
5 Placation
Degrees of
4 Consultation tokenism
3 Informing
2 Therapy
Nonparticipation
1 Manipulation
Citizen participation in social reform is seen as "the cornerstone of a democracy - a 
revered idea that is vigorously applauded by virtually everyone" (Arnstein, 1969, p. 
215) and is actualised by the powerful, though its exact implementation is 
experienced differently dependent on the extent to which power relations are 
redefined. There are "significant gradations of citizen participation" (Arnstein, 1969, 
p. 217). The eight rungs and three levels of Arnstein's ladder describe how the 
involvement of citizens at one end of the spectrum is defined by levels of 
'nonparticipation' that are contrived by those with power as a substitute or illusion for 
genuine shifts in influence. Those in power 'educate' or 'cure' participants and 
manipulate them to behave in a certain way in line with particular objectives. Above 
this, the rungs relating to consultation and placation are understood as tokenistic 
forms of community involvement: citizens are allowed an advisory role in the
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operation of policies that affect them but there is no requirement for their views to be 
heeded: there is the right to participate but not the right to decide. Finally, at the top 
of Arnstein's ladder sits those instances where citizens can enter into partnerships or 
arrangements that allow scope for significant decision-making or full managerial 
power.
Arnstein is unequivocal in arguing for higher degrees of citizen participation, arguing 
that the top rungs represent a more adequate way of representing the opinion of 
local communities than traditional forms of representative democracy and that 
disadvantaged communities require further scope for influencing local decisions 
because reliance on traditional forms of government to end their disadvantage and 
powerlessness has failed" (Arnstein, 1969, p. 224).14 There are, however, a number 
of limitations with Arnstein's ladder. Each rung on the ladder is not necessarily 
equidistant with higher degrees of citizen participation becoming progressively more 
difficult to obtain (Burns et a/., 1994), while each rung designates degrees of power 
that could encompass disparate experiences among citizens. For example, the 
context in which consultation and debate between government and community takes 
place may vary as will the suitability of consultation being allowed to fully alter the 
course of political decision-making.
Burns et al. (1994) expanded Arnstein's ladder of participation and aimed to provide 
a more nuanced understanding by distinguishing between different forms of control 
at the top (independent, entrusted and delegated) to more cynical forms of 'selling' 
citizen participation and empowerment that aim to safeguard or manipulate 
relationships of power between the powerful and the powerless. However, the main 
issue with the work of both Arnstein (1969) and Burns et al. (1994) is the assumption
14 It should be noted that Arnstein's work related partly (though not exclusively) to black and ethnic minority 
communities in 1960s America; a period of history where these communities suffered significant social and 
economic disadvantage in society. Her faith in greater citizen voice and control and corresponding distrust of 
government should therefore be contextualised by this.
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that to progress to the top of the ladder, moving from a state of manipulation and 
coercion at the bottom to independent citizen control at the top, is both eminently 
possible and desirable.
Table 2: A revised table o f citizen participation (Burns et al., 1994).
CITIZEN CONTROL 6. Genuine consultation
12. Independent control 5. High quality information
11. Entrusted control CITIZEN NON-PARTICIPATION
CITIZEN PARTICPATION 4. Customer care
10. Delegated control 3. Poor information
9. Partnership 2. Cynical consultation
8. Limited decentralised decision-making 1. Civic hype
7. Effective advisory boards
Western democracies are typically structured on systems of representative 
government where political elites are elected to represent citizens and the acquisition 
of significant citizen power in these environments is not easily achieved (Stoker, 
2010, p. 58). Somerville (2011b, p. 421) details the rise of elitism and 
professionalisation in political life, leading to weakening citizen attachment to political 
parties and, as a corollary, a lack of willingness to participate in exerting influence on 
governmental decision-making perceived to be the domain of 'those who know best'. 
People have become disenfranchised and unwilling to be involved in decision­
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making at either a local or national level (Fox, 2009) and tensions may exist between 
the triangulation of efforts to encourage citizen participation, the extent to which 
citizens wish to be involved in this, and the extent to which elected governments are 
willing to cede control (Somerville, 2011b, p. 421). Hall and Hickman's (2011) 
analysis of resident participation in French housing regeneration illustrates both the 
reluctance of residents to assume high degrees of influence in decision making, 
preferring instead a consultative role rather than substituting the work of 
professionals, and the way in which these professionals were in any case orientated 
towards designating circumscribed 'types' of participation than ceding total control. 
The belief that to progress to the top of the ladder and assume independent citizen 
control is both straightforwardly possible and desirable is an "erroneous normative 
assumption" (Hall and Hickman, 2011, p. 835).
Furthermore, the endorsement of greater citizen control appears to assume a 
"single, indivisible public" speaking as one, when instead it could be argued that 
there is a "plurality of publics" each speaking with different voices that reflect variable 
conditions and concerns (Somerville, 2011b, p. 419).
The task for democracy, therefore, is to aggregate the many voices that make up this 
plurality in such a way that decisions can be made that take account of these voices 
equally and are regarded as authoritative by all those likely to be affected by them 
(Somerville, 2011b, p. 425). Traditional forms of representative democracy are 
increasingly seen as lacking legitimacy due to disaffection with political decisions, 
domination of elites in shaping and representing public opinion and decline in 
electoral and party political citizen participation, leading Somerville to discuss four 
approaches to deepening democracy and participation in order to improve the
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influence of public opinion and mitigate the problems with representative 
democracy15 (Somerville, 2011b, p. 422):
•  Participatory democracy. This goes beyond representative democracy by 
creating and supporting participatory mechanisms of citizen engagement, 
which in turn are built upon and support communitarian views of the rights and 
responsibilities of democratic citizenship. Political power should be devolved 
to citizens individually and collectively so they can work directly with elected 
officials in making a significant difference to the way policy is implemented.
•  Civil society and associative democracy  The concern with this approach is 
with how an independent civil society - a voluntary sector of self-governing 
associations - holds government to account rather than how it directly 
participates in processes of co-governance. Participation in public life, but not 
directly in governmental decision-making, is the essential ingredient for an 
autonomous public opinion which allows citizens methods of holding the state 
to account. This provides a defence, against the formation and dominance of 
elite opinions, for example 'big business' or 'big government', and allows a 
"bubbling up of opinion from the grassroots" (Somerville, 2011b, p. 426). As 
Hirst (1994, p. 20) describes, associative democracy aims to correct the "little 
capacity [citizens have] to redirect a failing bureaucracy toward meeting their 
needs".
•  Deliberative democracy  Deliberation, in the sense of public reasoning to 
come to collective decisions, deepens democracy by ensuring that 
government actions and inactions are actually determined by, and not just
15 Somerville's work is presented here for its comparative value between different approaches to democratic 
renewal, providing further evidence of how community involvement may be valued for a particular form of 
authenticity and legitimacy in decision-making. It is important to note that this partly draws on the work of 
others, in particular the work on associative democracy by Hirst (1994; 2002) and Amin (1996).
54
responsive to, the conclusions of the public. The emphasis is on an informal 
public sphere, transmitted through a range of techniques including protest, 
petitions, lobbying and public meetings, which are translated into policy 
proposals and arguments for the formal political sphere. It is akin to John 
Dryzek's (2005) popular vision of deliberative democracy that is constituted by 
a public sphere that is semi detached from a power-sharing state. Rather than 
going beyond representative democracy, it is a means of strengthening it by 
achieving a more informed and inclusive expression of public opinion, though 
it is dependent on the commitment of political parties to "empowering the 
disempowered" (Somerville, 2011b, p. 428).
• Enhanced representative democracy. This advances the limitations of 
participatory democracy, namely the danger of failing to secure representative 
public opinion, by proposing the creation of deliberative public forums with 
elected representatives to represent different interests and stakeholders. 
These forums could improve the articulation and aggregation of public opinion, 
working alongside traditional elected governmental authorities to inform 
decision making that reflects the will of the people.j
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These four approaches are broadly aimed at creating and supporting autonomous 
political spaces for the opinions and concerns of less powerful citizens to gain 
greater traction in decisions that affect them (Somerville, 2011b, p. 431). It is argued 
that non-electoral citizen representation can improve the operation of government, 
as the 'untaintedness' of community representation in relation to state-led institutions 
and procedures allows them to represent the authentic grassroots views of those 
interests that are "marginalised or excluded under the present structure or operation 
of electoral politics" (Saward, 2009, p. 19). Essentially, community involvement can 
provide an authentic form of democratic decision-making as it provides a bottom-up 
(as opposed to top-down) approach that is more responsive to the needs, concerns
and local knowledge of citizens, and acts as an antidote to the disenchantment felt 
with representative democracy:16
Civil society appears here as a space, defined by its 'otherness' to both state 
and market, and as such can readily be filled by different kinds of politics. This 
space is therefore imagined in contradictory ways: as empty (of politics) yet 
full (of values, norms and community belongings). Its promise, then, rests on 
its apolitical, yet 'authentic' character.
Newman and Mahony (2007, p. 57)
There is, though, a broad consensus in the literature that civic participation is a 
'messy business' (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004) with the complexities of its meaning 
and precise purpose posing many challenges to its effectiveness (Irvin and 
Stansbury, 2004).
If we are to understand community as a concept that can simultaneously be used to 
describe groups of people tied by identity, place, interest and aspiration, it follows 
that these definitional problems pose challenges for initiatives that place an 
emphasis on greater individual and collective participation and representation: 
communities are not homogenous masses and their members do not have the same 
beliefs or needs (Smith, 2008, p. 147). The question of who speaks on behalf of a 
community is not easily reconciled and, as Somerville (2011b, p. 430) points out,
16 Co-operative housing is a useful example here. In 2009 the Commission for Co-Operative Housing released a 
report under the title of Bringing Democracy Home, making the case for an expansion of the co-operative 
sector based on "the importance of community" and encouraging a realignment of the housing sector to "help 
facilitate ordinary people and communities to take control... the UK co-operative movement is a powerful part 
of our national democracy" (Bliss, 2009, p. 7).
mere 'untaintedness1 from the state is not enough to claim community 
representation, as to be embedded in the authentic views of the grassroots is to be 
tainted by the particular views, interests and priorities that this environment nurtures. 
As such this is merely a different and an additional form of particularised expertise 
and knowledge.
These issues are exacerbated by the demands of participation in determining or 
operating governmental decision-making or policies. Opportunities for community 
involvement, particularly in articulating and implementing their interests, are often 
impeded by professionalised structures th£t oblige participants to invest high levels 
of skill and time (Fung and Wright, 2001; Robinson et al., 2005; Smith, 2008). As 
such those who participate in civic action tend to be those with higher levels of social 
capital, education and stable and secure living conditions, as well as the time to 
devote to such activities (Reed and Selbee, 2001; Skidmore et al., 2006; Mohan, 
2011): a 'civic core' of empowered and engaged individuals that tend to provide the 
bulk of civic participation (Wells et al., 2011, p. 93).
Therefore, efforts to deepen democracy and increase citizen participation will 
depend not only on the willingness of those in power to involve the powerless, but 
also on the ability and engagement of those deemed to require greater 
empowerment in decisions that affect them. The idea of full independent citizen 
control of local decisions, which parallels with the communitarian vision of breeding 
decentralised forms of citizen participation'that are active rather than passive in the 
way they are governed (Tam, 1998, p. 154), is therefore one likely to take hold 
mainly in areas where a civic core is evident, community ties are strong and 
representatives are able to effectively determine and articulate locally-based 
interests and priorities.
Even where a civic core is strong, the extent of community involvement may be 
contingent on the political will at local and national levels. Governmental emphasis 
on public participation has been dismissed as 'government by focus group' by critics
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who argue that participation usually amounts to encounters with "officially defined 
structures and approved forms of involvement" that short circuit rather than enhance 
the groundswell of public opinion (Lowe, 1997, p. 153; Newman and Mahony, 2007, 
p. 54). The view described above that civil society is empty of political meaning and 
influence may therefore be an illusion; instead civic participation becomes aligned 
with state aims, charged with service delivery and morphs into a strategy of 
governing the social at a distance, as per the work of Rose (1996) and on 
communitarianism described in the previous section (Newman and Mahony, 2007, p. 
61).
Paradoxically, such instances can also give rise to alternative forms of civic action 
that aim to resist these governmental techniques. Shapely (2011) documents how 
neighbourhood groups emerged spontaneously in the 1960s as a response to 
perceived deficiencies in local authority planning policies. Planning had long been 
seen as a domain where extensive community participation and consultation was 
seen as unnecessary and wasteful by a centralising planning system, and therefore 
any forms of participatory democracy actually involved educating the public into the 
planning process, avoiding conflict and securing consent for governmental policies: a 
technique that controlled and diminished the power of public opinion rather than 
broadening forms of urban governance:
Citizens were, apparently, being invited to participate actively in the creation 
of public policy. Promoting consultative democracy would, theoretically, 
encourage greater involvement and enhance citizenship. But generating 
publicity in practice still meant telling people what was going to happen. It 
involved holding exhibitions and public meetings, but it did not necessarily 
mean active participation whereby people's views were sought and absorbed 
into the decision-making process.
Shapely (2011, p. 79)
Resident action groups involved in community action formed as a reaction to the lack 
of voice provided by traditional participation policies, articulating the concerns of 
residents alienated from the policy-making process and setting out to challenge the 
assumption that residents would give passive consent to local authority policy 
decisions rather than to gain and share power over a period of time. Shapely (2011, 
p. 81) argues this was particularly evident in oppositional activity against slum 
clearances in the 1960s and 1970s, with community action groups emerging to 
adequately reflect and transmit public opinion.
We can see in this instance that community activity can emerge as an oppositional 
activity fighting against state and market forces that threaten the interests of the local 
neighbourhood. Collective action is a means through which individuals can defend or 
achieve a valued form of living (DeFilippis et al., 2006). Yet, in line with the literature 
review of communitarianism, the key dilemma for research on forms of collective 
action to confront is precisely what is being defended and for whom.
If collective action is the means through which the values, norms and notions of 
community belonging are determined and transmitted, placing community as an 
influential stakeholder in the governance of society (Etzioni, 1997a, p. 141), it is also 
necessary to interrogate the underpinning rationales, analyses and stakes that this 
collective action reflects. In line with DeFilippis et al. (2006), a platform from which to 
advance such enquiry is to view community as neither a romantic 'social good' 
(Tonnies, 1887; Etzioni 1995a) nor as a regulatory mechanism for governing thei
social (Rose, 1996), but as an imagined product of both their larger and external 
contexts and the practices, organisations and relations that take place within them. 
Communities may emerge as vital arenas for social change and important 
mechanisms for challenging the weight of elite governmental thinking dominated, yet 
the potential problems of power relations and oppression within communities can 
make community in and of itself a dubious goal (DeFilippis et al., 2006, p. 685).
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Conclusion
The preceding discussions have sought to highlight and unravel understandings of 
'community' - particularly those that have influenced recent governments - its 
potential definitions and manifestations and the fault lines within these. Communities 
can be simultaneously defined as a site for social change, a desirable form of 
organising social relationships, a strategy through which citizens can be governed, a 
technique of collective resistance and a vehicle through which grassroots public 
opinion can be expressed. They can reflect communities of shared interest, place, 
concern or behaviour and offer both liberatory and regulatory possibilities. The 
following chapter provides an analysis of how spaces for community influence are 
practically institutionalised, looking particularly at the reformation of housing 
governance that extends responsibility for decision-making and management to the 
level of community. Levitas (2000) argues that research that unpicks these issues 
necessarily involves:
A critical orientation to notions of 'community' and to all forms of 'we-speak' 
asking what differences or conflicts of interest or experience are suborned 
within the assertion of collectivity.
Levitas (2000, p. 192)
The analysis of the emergence of community governance in housing therefore leads 
into a framework for analysis that allows room to critically explore what the interests 
are that underpin collective action expressed through a CLT and furthermore the 
rationales that affect the ways in which (and the extent to which) its complexities are 
negotiated among and within the broader range of actors and processes community 
governance demands.
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Chapter 3: Housing governance and the 
politics of community
This chapter seeks to further examine the realm of community governance to explore 
the relationship of collective action to the governance of housing. It begins by 
providing some clarity as to our understanding of what governance entails, 
particularly when it is expanded to the level of the neighbourhood. This provides the 
backdrop to our understandings of how community governance in housing can be 
instigated and how it is negotiated among public and private stakeholders. An 
account of relevant literature that has explored CLTs in other countries is provided, 
arguing the research published to date on developments in the United States and 
Scotland has failed to engage with the politics of community woven into the 
formation, development and existence of CLTs as a form of housing provision and 
governance.
This links to the core theme of this thesis: namely how and why communities come 
together from the ‘bottom up’ to attempt the implementation of new tenurial and 
organisational arrangements in order to meet the needs of a defined locality, and the 
negotiations and challenges that are undertaken to facilitate new forms of housing 
governance.
3.1 Governance, co-governance and housing
The enlargement of civic participation discussed in the previous chapter, whether it 
be through encouraging people to fulfil certain social responsibilities in accordance 
with a valued form of living or through efforts to extend democratic power to wider 
populations, is indicative of what many term the shift from centrally controlled 
government to dispersed processes of governance. Although the concept of
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governance is disputed for being 'slippery' (Pierre and Peters, 2000, p. 7) and has 
been critiqued for its lack of a universally accepted and understood definition (Jordan 
et al. (2005, p. 478), the term has gained1 popular currency in describing the drive 
towards the involvement of institutions and actors that are drawn from, but also 
beyond, elected nation state governments:
Contrary to the classic form of 'government', contemporary governance is not 
imprisoned in closed institutions and is not the province of professional 
politicians. Though rarely defined with precision, it refers to patterns of 
decision-making taking place in a larger set of institutions, with a broader 
range of actors and processes.
Magnette (2003, p. 144)
Processes of governance are premised on their capacity to cover the widest possible 
range of institutions and relationships in the procedures of governing (Pierre and 
Peters, 2000, p. 1). The boundaries and responsibilities for influence and decision­
making become blurred between actors and the potential for governance through 
self-governing networks of actors is recognised as an effective strategy as opposed 
to merely through the central command, power and authority of government (Stoker, 
1998, p. 18). As the efforts to deepen democracy and encourage communitarian- 
minded behaviour reveal, the level of the neighbourhood becomes the site where 
community engagement and participation in political life can be harnessed through 
dispersed governance, as opposed to citizens merely participating in electoral 
processes. Based on the view that centralised government is no longer capable of 
governing effectively at a local level without the cooperation and participation of its 
citizenry, governance involves the creation of new institutional spaces and decision­
making opportunities in which previously! excluded parts of the population can 
influence and challenge policy formulation and delivery (Taylor, 2007, p. 297-298).
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This narrative conceptualises civic involvement in governance as an activity 
formulated and defined by the state. Much in line with Taylor's description, 
Somerville (2005, p. 121) sees community-based governance as the process 
through which the activities of government are democratised and as a necessary 
condition for the democratic legitimacy of representative democracy. The efforts to 
'deepen democracy' described at the end of the previous chapter are a means 
towards making the decisions that emerge from these processes work more fairly in 
favour of citizens: they aim to enhance rather than undermine elected government 
(Somerville, 2011b, p. 421).
Governance is therefore said to be embedded into governmental structures and 
takes place 'in the shadow of hierarchy' (Scharpf, 1994, p. 40). Yet, Somerville 
(2005, p. 120) points out that community governance can also be understood as a 
process of decision-making that takes place on a scale that is both appropriate for 
the demands of, and regarded as legitimate by, identifiable communities.
This suggests a key role for those to be empowered with the ability to shape and 
affect policy decisions, suggesting that the power of government and the scale at 
which governance is to be implemented is subject to negotiation and influence from 
actors at community level. Collective action in governance processes could be to 
defend, oppose or achieve a particular policy or mode of governing rather than to 
legitimise its existing formulation (DeFilippis et al., 2006). This is not to suggest that 
the role of government is significantly curtailed nor that practices of empowerment 
fall outside their gaze. Indeed efforts to deepen democracy still represent a space 
where power is exercised in some form to a particular end and this is highlighted by 
the definitional problems and debate surrounding who and what 'community' may be 
composed of or seeking to achieve. Rather, as the analysis of literature and research 
on CLTs internationally presented later in the thesis will illustrate, it is important to 
note that collective action will not always emanate from, or be aligned with, 
governmental structures and the objectivessthey are orientated towards.
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The multiple possibilities offered by new* governance spaces are to be realised 
through techniques of co-governance in spaces autonomous from conventional 
political systems and structures:
The new governance spaces that' are opened up as a result of these 
reconfigurations enable 'performing citizens' to become directly involved in the 
co-production of particular policy outcomes that matter to them, their 
contributions to specific policy projects combining to generate a system of co­
governance. Co-governance may be enacted through networks created either 
by the state for the purpose of improved system effectiveness or by citizens 
themselves operating outside conventional political systems and structures.
Lowndes and Sullivan (2008, p. 55)
The networks through which co-governance may be enacted are differentiated as 
"invited spaces" and "popular spaces" by Cornwall (2004), distinguishing between 
opportunities where the involvement of the powerless is contingent on being offered 
a chance to participate by the powerful under defined boundaries of engagement 
and 'popular' autonomous forms of action* through which citizens create their own 
opportunities and terms for engagement (Cornwall, 2002). Invited spaces can bring a 
wider network of non-state actors into policymaking, though the decision as to who is 
permitted to participate and under what terms lies with those already holding power 
and may be used to legitimise governmental priorities rather than reconcile 
differences in inequities and status (Cornwall, 2002, p. 24). Popular spaces, 
however, can be created and claimed by less powerful actors and emerge as a result 
of popular mobilisation around issue-based concerns or as a way for like-minded 
people to join together in common pursuits: they are arenas in which "people join
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together, often with others like them, in collective action, self-help initiatives or 
everyday sociality" (Cornwall, 2004, p. 76).17
While these are not static concepts and it is acknowledged that spaces created with 
one purpose may be used by those who engage in them for something completely 
different (Cornwall, 2004, p. 81), the key point is that popular spaces are to be 
distinguished from invited spaces as their creation permits a bottom-up constitution 
of the "rules of the game" as opposed to community involvement being configured in 
line with governmental strategies and objectives.
The role of community as both the geographical site and collective means of 
transmitting citizen participation may in different ways depend on the constitution of 
the spaces for community governance. The institutional framework of government 
can develop the structures and possibilities of engagement, while these can be 
simultaneously accepted, negotiated or undermined via dispersed forms of 
governance at the local level:
External 'higher-level' institutional constraints structure the range of 
possibilities for developing new rules and are expressed through legislation, 
policy frameworks, resource regimes and the regulation of 'standards'. At the 
same time, locally specific institutions either reinforce or undermine 
institutional 'templates' circulating in the wider environment.
Lowndes (2001, p. 1965)
17 It should be noted that although useful in describing some of the prospects for mutual action, these 
activities listed by Cornwall are different in both their purpose and value. Furthermore, the notion that 
'everyday sociality1 is intrinsically or necessarily linked to citizen participation or involvement in the public 
realm is contradicted by some of the literature questioning Putnam's social capital thesis described in the 
previous chapter (Levi, 1996; Stolle, 2003).
Therefore the process of structuring and embedding community involvement into 
governance is key as its acceptance or negotiation gives rise to varied outcomes. In 
other words, rather than assuming the role of community governance to be one of 
invited participation with pre-configured rules of engagement, the widening of 
opportunities for collective action can emerge both as a result of and in opposition to 
the state-led legislation, policy frameworks and resource regimes that structure 
policy formulation and objectives. Thus, the 'institutional differentiation' that occurs 
as patterns of decision-making and responsibility for governance become delinked 
from bureaucratic hierarchies, giving rise^to a greater variety of institutions and 
institutional arrangements for local governance (Lowndes, 2001, p. 1961).
Housing has become a key terrain for this, particularly in the context of the 
demunicipalisation of council housing which gave rise to a new mixed economy of 
provision typified by an enabling role for the state as opposed to one focused on 
providing material resources and direct management. Social housing has moved 
away from a singular model of traditional hierarchal organisation channelled through 
local government towards combined forms of governance and co-ordination that 
draw not only on hierarchy but on market and network principles too, reflecting 
policies of modernisation elsewhere in the public sector (Mullins et al., 2001).
This change was precipitated both by governmental support for the housing 
association sector, demonstrated by the injection of significant state funds in the 
1970s aimed at creating a 'third arm' of housing policy that could challenge the 
hegemony of local authority rented housing (McDermont, 2010, p. 37), and by the 
diversification of tenure and management of council housing from the 1980s 
onwards. Housing became progressively delinked from local authorities, with the 
right to buy taking significant proportions of rented housing into owner occupation 
(King, 2010) and stock transfer offering changes both in who manages social
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housing and opportunities for tenants to actively influence their choice of landlord.18 
Stock transfer involved the transfer of housing stock into the ownership of housing 
associations seen as more capable of innovating in the investment and management 
of property (through their ability to raise private finance), while this was also 
grounded in providing a platform for an improved range of opportunities for tenants 
to influence the management of their homes and therefore provide a more 
responsive landlord service to tenants (Malpass and Mullins, 2002). Stock transfers 
have typically involved balloting tenants affected by the proposal to alter their 
landlord and, if it goes ahead, reserving places on the governing body of the housing 
stock to assist with governance decisions pver investment, rent levels and tenancy 
conditions. McCormack posits that on face value stock transfers have offered:
a site of active citizenship, with tenants in effect determining the future 
provision of a key welfare service in their area ... tenants in stock transfer 
areas can not only vote on a major area of public service, but also help to 
develop its shape, and participate in its governance.
McCormack (2009, p. 393)
Yet, these spaces of invited participation (Cornwall, 2002) for communities - 
expressed via tenant involvement - are characterised by multiple tensions and 
competing narratives. Lowndes and Sullivan argue that the creation of these new 
governance spaces is inherently unstable due to the potential variety of desires and 
expectations of these processes:
18 Although the way social housing is funded is not the focus of this analysis, it should also be noted that the 
decoupling of social housing from local authorities was also seen as desirable for reducing public sector 
expenditure and allowing private finance to be invested into improving the quantity and quality of housing 
stock (Whitehead, 1999; McDermont, 2010, p. 41).
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the instability of 'new governance1 means that any strategies employed by the 
state will be subject to challenge and contestation and their attempted 
application will generate new sources of agency for citizens to act on their 
own terms.
Lowndes and Sullivan (2008, p. 55)
r
The challenge, contestation and need to acknowledge the varied possibilities for 
community governance have been exemplified within stock transfer processes. 
Reflecting on the initial experiences, Clapham and Kintrea (1994) were critical of the 
large-scale nature of stock transfer to housing associations in England, particularly in 
comparison to the experience in Scotland where transferred stock was dispersed 
into small units of management via community ownership co-operatives or 
community-based housing associations. These served to provide greater scope for 
resident involvement and influence, providing more positive outcomes for tenants in 
terms of satisfaction and choice than larger landlords would provide (Clapham and 
Kintrea, 1994). These tensions over size have been found elsewhere in the housing 
association sector. Mullins (1999) spoke of the paradox between housing 
associations 'sensitively serving the needs of society' on one hand, based on their 
traditional image of being locally based and accountable to their communities, and 
on the other increasing their size through merger activity on the basis of business 
logics such as economies of scale (see McDermont, 2010 for a detailed account of 
this).
More recent research has concentrated on the extent to which stock transfer 
processes truly represent devolution of power to community level. McCormack 
(2009) has been highly critical of stock transfer ballots, arguing that the participation 
of tenants is influenced by dominant narratives that reinforce existing relations of 
power. McCormack argues that oppositional behaviour to transfer processes is 
submerged by the imposition of landlord perspectives and manipulation of already-
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subsidiary tenant voices in governance processes in order to achieve the desired 
ends of existing governmental structures:
A local authority is ostensibly working in 'partnership' with its tenants to reform 
a key welfare service, whilst at the same time ... oppressing its tenants, 
principally through its attempts at suppressing critical consciousness [of 
tenants].
McCormack (2009, p. 408)
This concurs with other analyses of stock transfer that see it as a process of 
privatisation aimed less at encouraging citizen choice and local democracy and more 
at widening the scope for private profit-making, generating a series of anti-transfer 
movements (Mullins and Pawson, 2009). Indeed, the concept has been described as 
"more akin to voice than choice" (Mullins and Pawson, 2009, p. 94) as tenants are 
usually faced with prescribed options between a specified new landlord or remaining 
with local authority control rather than acting as the source for shaping the entire 
structure, with financial incentives or disincentives prominent in the framing of 
decisions.19
McKee's analysis of stock transfer in Glasgow also illustrates the complexities of 
creating new opportunities for communities to become involved in local governance 
structures, particularly when faced by the pragmatic realities of the constitution of 
these spaces. Stock transfer in Glasgow was to involve two stages: the transfer of 
ownership to a citywide housing association, who devolved the day-to-day 
management of the housing to a citywide75 network of small-scale and community-
19 The experience of stock transfer in Glasgow demonstrates this, where additional financial inducements 
relating to the elimination of debt were provided to encourage a 'yes' vote. Daly et al (2005) contrasted this 
with a "no" vote in Birmingham where suspicion over the eventual outcomes a change in landlord would bring 
led tenants to reject stock transfer in a ballot.
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controlled local housing organisations (LHOs) that would be governed at a micro­
level; and then the eventual 'second statje transfer' of these properties into full 
community ownership of the LHOs (McKee, 2007). In practice, however, the aim of 
achieving full community ownership of the properties has been impeded by the cost 
of doing so and a range of organisational barriers as to how best to practically 
manage the housing stock, with some stakeholders desiring a revised governance 
model consisting of fewer and larger organisations in the name of cost efficiency 
(McKee, 2009). Similarly, McKee (2008, p. 194) observes the "contradictory co­
existence of decentred and centralising modes of governance" whereby the local 
knowledge and capacity for action of communities is mobilised in the governance of 
housing, yet the scope for this to have significant influence is circumscribed by wider 
policy contexts in which the state shapes the parameters of local control, for example 
over the allocation of housing in the local area.
The concept of community ownership is pr6blematised further by the complexities of 
ownership itself. Legal ownership confers exclusive or absolute rights over the things 
that are owned - in the case of CLTs this is land and housing - and, within the wider 
socio-political rules and legislation, allows full rights of use, income and decision­
making as to its function. It takes on different forms and to be an owner is complex 
due to the variety of ideas and practices to which it refers. It may be individual 
ownership of property, private ownership of business, state ownership or, as may be 
the case in the housing sector, ownership by an intermediary within civil society. 
Different forms of ownership can therefore denote a variety of relationships between 
individuals in respect of the mechanisms for the acquisition, transfer and distribution 
of ownership in society (Gamble and Kelly, 1996, p. 72).
Housing is a good example of this. It is widely acknowledged that individual private 
ownership of property is something that confers and transmits an expression of the 
personal identity, autonomy and social position held by the owner (Gurney, 1999; 
McKee, 2011b). In particular, private homeownership has been elevated to, and 
normalised as, the tenure of choice with governmental acts seeking to encourage
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owner-occupation while at the same time reducing the social housing stock (King,
2010), based partly on the modernisation of the public sector (and associated 
reduction in expenditure) but also on the basis that the ownership of one's home is 
thought to create a range of tangible and intangible socio-economic benefits as 
summarised below by David Boaz and endorsed by the findings of others (Munro, 
2007; King, 2010, p. 6):
People have known for a long time that individuals take better care of things 
they own ... Just as homeownership creates responsible homeowners, 
widespread ownership of other assets creates responsible citizens. People 
who are owners feel more dignity, more pride, and more confidence. They 
have a stronger stake, not just in their own property, but in their community 
and their society.
Boaz (2011, p. 263)
Premised on providing people with a stake in their community and neighbourhood, 
governmental promotion of this type of ownership aimed to build responsible citizens 
built around moral norms of consumption that denote self-sufficiency rather than 
dependency and responsibility for one's welfare. Governmental emphasis on 
homeownership and its associated benefits is thought to construct alternative tenure 
choices, particularly social renting, as a deviant choice of consumption undertaken 
by flawed consumers lacking the self-responsibility and financial stake in the 
community that owner occupiers are thought to hold20 (Flint and Rowlands, 2003; 
McKee, 2011b). This illustrates that the ownership of an asset and the discourses 
that surround it do not operate merely in a vacuum; they are instead both a product 
of and constitutive of relationships between individuals, communities and the state.
20 McKee's (2011b) work on low-cost homeownership challenges these constructions, arguing that the 
recipients of governmental promotion to become homeowners challenge and reject these stereotypes.
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These discourses are indicative of the communitarian discourses that place 
individuals in a social context where their responsibilities to community are to be 
fulfilled. Alongside this, forms of community ownership that are instigated on terms 
lying outside the structures of 'invited participation' - those instances where new 
sources of collective agency are generated for communities to pursue mutual 
interests - may seek the sovereign rights and powers that ownership can confer.21 
This is often premised on the view that smaller units of housing governance are able 
to extend the powers of ownership to a greater proportion of local populations, 
tapping into their attachment to place rather than their intrinsic financial stake in a 
neighbourhood (Rowlands, 2011). Yet if ownership extends full rights of use, of 
income and of decision-making within the nest of the wider society and economy, it 
is important to disentangle the aims and potential scope of community ownership 
and its relationship to these wider social, political and economic contexts if we are to 
understand what it is that legal ownership of land and housing may confer to a CLT 
and the implications for its wider community.
t
Alongside this, the centre-local tensions in' localised housing governance described 
by McKee (2008) illustrate the need for an analytical approach that takes into 
account the fact that community ownership of housing takes place within a wider 
policy environment rather than in a vacuum. Simply assuming that community 
ownership translates into full unencumbered local control is insufficient, instead it 
must take into account the aims and process through which this is negotiated and 
the terms under which it is achieved. As Lowndes and Wilson describe, it is 
important to assess the process of involving communities in the design of governing 
institutions rather than assuming the 'content' - their involvement - inevitably leads to 
significant alterations in power, influence and autonomy:
21 For example, Satsangi (2009) argues that community ownership via a CLT in Scotland was instigated by a 
desire for communities to take control of their own destiny, itself driven by unhappiness with the impact of 
existing feudal ownership and the power that conferred fo a single individual. Satsangi and Murray (2011) also 
detail the role of Walterton & Elgin Community Homes, a community based housing association that took 
control of their social housing stock in order to ward off privatisation.
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t]he prospects for 'organising frorn below' (and 'from above') are likely to 
depend as much upon the process as upon the content of institutional design.
Lowndes and Wilson (2001, p. 645, original emphasis)
Furthermore, given the multiple understandings of the construct of 'community' and 
the varied possibilities these hold, the question of exactly who and what the 
'community' is composed of, and more specifically, the rationales that underpin the 
apparent need for collective action require scrutiny. This is particularly the case 
when community involvement is instigated on terms lying outside the structures of 
'invited participation'; those instances when new sources of agency are generated for 
communities to pursue mutual interests. If ownership is premised on the pursuit and 
acquisition of certain powers, it is important to explore the genesis of this collective 
action and inclination to directly participate in local housing governance. The 
following section furthers our understanding of how these decentred modes of 
community governance in housing may emerge and the ends they are orientated 
towards, laying the foundations for the framework that landscapes the research into 
CLTs in England and Wales.
>
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3.2 Collective action and housing
Davis (1991) argues the genesis for collective action at the neighbourhood level 
arises from the identification of common interests that may at any time require 
defending, promoting or achieving. Davis argues that communities of place need to 
be understood by the way they act collectively on the basis of local interests:
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Place-bound 'communities' do act - sometimes out of a common interest in 
improving local safety, services, or amenity; sometimes out of a special 
interest in protecting local property values; sometimes because not to act is to 
acquiesce in the community's own destruction.
Davis (1991, p. 6, original emphasis)
There are numerous examples of this within the literature. McKenzie (1994) notes 
the rise of common-interest housing in the United States that has flourished in an era 
of reduced faith in government and reliance on market logic. Targeted at those 
unhappy with existing governance arrangements, common-interest developments 
offer the opportunity for people to join planned communities by buying a property 
subject to adherence with rules, regulations and covenants relating to the use of the 
property, the idea being that this will protect valued forms of community life 
(McKenzie, 1994; 2003). These are run by private governments, or homeowners' 
associations, which are run by residents to enforce deed restrictions. Similar projects 
have emerged in the UK - gated communities - as part of a 'splintering urbanism' that 
extends and reinforces the segregation of social groups (Atkinson and Flint, 2004), 
while on a larger scale some municipalities have engaged in secession movements 
in the United States have reacted against globalised forces and attempted to rescale 
urban governance in order to claim and enhance independence and democratic 
governance within the city as well as provide and benefit from place-bound public 
services (Boudreau and Keil, 2001). These examples illustrate how place-bound 
communities can act on the basis of common interest and, as will be described later 
in this section, how collective action and ownership can hold reactive possibilities as 
well as progressive prospects.
With individuals engaged in collective action on the basis of shared interests, it is 
necessary to assess why groups form or fail to form, why they mobilise or fail to 
mobilise, and how they cooperate and conflict, with the aim of explaining the 
formation, mobilisation and conflict of community groups by identifying and defining
the interests rooted in their locality (Davis, 1991, p. 15-16). Davis' analysis of 
disadvantaged urban social movements in the United States, including some of the 
earliest CLTs, rooted itself very much on the side of Cornwall's 'invited spaces': 
those created and defined by collective action that may aim to oppose or influencei
traditional forms of governing. It explored the 'housing consciousness' of 
communities that undertook collective action provoked by threatened or unstable 
property interests in a locality,22 with different levels of collective consciousness 
resulting in the creation of different types of community-influenced housing 
organisation (Davis, 1991, p. 85). ^
Although we may expect collective action in 1980s urban United States to differ from 
that of 21st Century rural England (the predominant geographical focus of this 
research), the three broad forms of consciousness presented by Davis provide a 
useful conceptualisation of how the formation of community groups may be 
precipitated by housing issues and the ends to which they may be orientated 
towards. While a summary is provided of each, of critical interest and importance 
here is the ‘radical’ form of community mobilisation which is based on collective 
action orientated towards reforming institutional arrangements that are perceived to 
be inadequate and insufficient in meeting the interests and needs of a locality.
Housing consciousness in the community
• Collective consciousness: This level of consciousness involves collective 
acknowledgement that individuals in a community are similarly situated and 
affected by the condition of the local neighbourhood. It follows Somerville 
(2011a, p. 186) in perceiving property interest to be closely related to notions
22 For example, Davis (1991) describes the formation of a CLT (and other forms of co-operative housing 
organisation) that formed as a response to threats such as gentrification and aimed to preserve low-income 
housing under threat from property development.
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of community by virtue of shared attachments and concern for the mutual 
geographical space in which housing is located. There is no effort to shape or 
challenge market and state forces external to the neighbourhood, and instead 
where collective activity exists it is aimed at engaging in activities that will 
marginally improve the property and place in which members have a common 
stake (Davis, 1991, p. 86). The type of housing organisation that emerges 
from this may be a form of neighbourhood improvement association aimed at 
restoring and rehabilitating local housing 23 (Davis, 1991, p. 86), or 
neighbourhood watch schemes that?mobilise voluntary action to tackle social 
problems of crime and behaviour in a neighbourhood.
• Conflict consciousness: Collective action provoked by a conflict 
consciousness tends to focus on activities that politically defend or promote 
one group's property interests in the face of attack or threat by another group 
(Davis, 1991, p. 83). Housing organisations that are formed on the basis of 
this tend to organise in an oppositional and confrontational manner, engaging 
in activities that protest, disrupt, restrain or block the actions of an antagonist. 
Examples of this could include opposition to unwanted development in a 
neighbourhood, rent strikes (such as the ones organised against profiteering 
landlords in Glasgow in 1915) and anti-stock transfer campaigns organised by 
tenants of council housing to fight the sale of their homes (Mooney and Poole, 
2005, p. 29). While these involved the mobilisation of community around a 
shared identity and interest, the aim is typically to defend and oppose 
particular policies or actions rather than to engage in the creation of 
alternative community-led organisations led by more radical housing groups. 
Conflict consciousness is therefore more orientated towards exerting 
influence rather than obtaining long-term power and leverage.
23 A good example of this type of organisation in England would be self-help housing groups; groups of local 
people that bring empty properties back into use by renovating them on a voluntary basis (BSHF, 2011; Mullins 
et a!., 2011). ,
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• Radical consciousness: More radical housing organisations, those engaged 
in the formation of alternative institutional structures, are likely to be spawned 
by a perception that existing property relations are inherently inadequate, 
inequitable, and/or illegitimate as they restrict or fail to meet the aspirations of 
a given population. This type of consciousness argues for a reorganisation of 
the structures and rules governing the possession and use of domestic 
property in order the secure the well-being of a particular group, and is 
therefore based on securing new powers and advantages on behalf of this 
collective. Radical groups are usually founded on the belief that to secure 
these new advantages a new structure of property relations must be 
introduced that allows the implementation of new forms of tenurial and 
functional arrangements of housing. These allow new conceptions of the way 
housing is managed and the purpose it serves to emerge and permit a 
change of "the rules of the game under which domestic property is owned and 
used" (Davis, 1991, p. 88). In short, the collective action of a neighbourhood 
in this instance would permit a greater devolution of power and control to the 
local level and allow the group to implement a new set of organisational 
arrangements on their terms.
This may typically involve particularised views on the nature of the control and 
function of housing. Examples of this may be the co-operative movement, with its 
emphasis on democratic management and accountability, or squatting as a reaction 
to deprivation or as a political statement against a housing system failing to meet 
particular needs:
Radical consciousness becomes even more likely if, at the same time that 
people are becoming convinced that the current system of property relations 
is no longer 'delivering the goods', an interest group discovers or develops a 
new conception of property and place - that is, an alternative system of ideas, 
beliefs, and expectations that explain and justify a new set of tenurial and
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functional relations. This counter-ideology says what is 'wrong' with the 
institutional arrangements under which people currently control and use 
domestic property. Furthermore, it says what kinds of control people ought to 
exercise, and what new functions property ought to serve.
Davis (1991, p. 269, original emphasis)
All three levels of consciousness are aimed at mobilising people around a common 
identity, interest, aim or experience which is intrinsically linked and rooted in interests 
that are endemic to a particular locality. They reflect particularised views about the 
role of communities, the role of the state and how best to achieve particular 
outcomes for that area. So, as Birchall (1988, p. 51) describes, small-scale 
independent housing co-operatives owned and managed by residents are preferable 
to local authority housing provision because "they underpin local democracy with a 
tangible constituency of independent associations, which cannot be reduced to the 
'municipal tutelage' of the local state". This follows a long-held tradition in the co­
operative sector whereby co-operative forms of housing are distinguished by their 
adherence to particular values and principles relating to independent and democratic 
member control:24
The essential characteristic of a co-operative is that it is a democratic 
organisation engaged in the market place, providing goods and services. It is 
nevertheless based on people, not on capital or government direction. In its
24 It is worth noting that the extent to which these values and principles are preserved over time is questioned 
in the literature. While Rowlands (2009) notes the effectiveness of housing co-operatives and their grounding 
in mutualism, he also notes that the 'rules of the game1 that structure housing provision - finance, professional 
knowledge, skills and expertise, and political support - have often left the sector susceptible to change. The 
history of co-operative housing is punctuated by demutualisation and privatisation as a result of these factors. 
Birchall (1992, p. 11) summarised these problems: "[co-operative housing] will always slip into a form of 
owner-occupation or landlordism, succumbing to the wider social forces which sustain these dominant 
tenures".
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essence, it can never escape, even if it wanted to, the capacity of members to 
exercise control whenever they wish to do so.
McPherson (1994), quoted in Bliss (2009)
Co-operatives are categorised by Davis as a form of radical consciousness, often 
basing their operation on limited equity models of ownership or affordable rents, as 
well as on principles reflecting an independence from the state and organisational 
autonomy that encourages extensive resident and community involvement in 
housing management rather than merely top-down managerialist control (Davis, 
1991). A wide array of literature has contended that community-owned housing can 
provide more equitable economic arrangements for housing by ensuring affordability 
as well as providing a management service that is better placed to respond to the 
needs of residents. Community-owned housing is also thought to provide them with 
greater opportunities to influence their environment and instil greater attachments to 
the local neighbourhood through the small-scale 'sensitive service' offered through 
community ownership (Clapham and Kintrea, 1994; Conaty et a/., 2003; Rowlands, 
2009; Satsangi and Murray, 2011). Rowlands summarises this view:
Even clearer is the positive benefit of localism in the delivery and governance 
of housing and neighbourhood services. Locally based housing co-ops and 
mutual organisations are more responsive to their consumers needs than 
some other housing organisations ... The main message which emerges is 
one where locally focused and neighbourhood-based organisations can offer 
a distinct advantage in meeting the needs and demands of the communities 
that they serve.
T
Rowlands (2011, p. 252)
These studies, which describe the positive effects of community ownership, are 
grounded in extensive empirical work, often emerging from comparative studies with
other housing providers and assessing multiple contexts in which they operate.25 
However, while improved outcomes may be achieved through this form of grassroots 
communitarianism, it is important to acknowledge that the new forms of community- 
led housing organisations that fall uhder the umbrella of Davis' 'radical 
consciousness' are provoked by interests and perceptions of who and how housing 
is controlled, in addition to the function it should serve. As such, if structures of 
housing management and governance are to be reorganised to serve the interests 
and well-being of a particular group (Davis, 1991, p. 84) or the needs and demands 
that Rowlands (2011) speaks of, it follows that the interests of those involved in 
community-led action require identification and analysis if we are to understand the 
subject's purpose and value. This reminds us that, in line with Lowndes and Sullivan 
(2008) simply assuming that a badge of 'community' or 'neighbourhood' on 
governance results in similar outcomes is risky. Instead, communities do not exist in 
"isolated capsules" and are instead intertwined with neighbouring communities of 
both place and interest who may be impacted by new arrangements for local 
governance (Lichfield, 2011, p. 28). Flint (2006b, p. 183) uses the example of social 
landlords providing alternative public services to benefit their own communities (such 
as policing), which while benefiting one community may serve a two tier public 
policing service between local areas with and without this extra service.
CLTs in the United States and Scotland
This section looks at research conducted on CLTs in the United States and Scotland. 
This is justified on the basis that, as the introduction to this thesis describes, 
community land ownership via what we know as a 'CLT' has not only developed to a
25 For example, Satsangi and Murray (2011) finds that, in comparison to areas with similar demographics, 
residents of a community-based housing association in London have higher rates of tenant satisfaction, a 
stronger sense of belonging to their neighbourhood, and feel much more able to influence decisions affecting 
their local area. This led to the hypothesis that: "collective ownership is associated with measureable benefits 
to life quality" (Satsangi and Murray, 2011, p. 6).
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greater extent than in other Western countries, but the limited academic research on 
CLTs has primarily focused on the contexts of these two nations.26
As discussed, Davis (1991, p. 269) locates the genesis of community-led action in 
the failure of existing institutional arrangements to fulfil the expectations and 
interests of those instigating new forms of neighbourhood governance. This 
dissatisfaction with (and opposition to) existing arrangements can create new 
community-led structures that reflect desires and beliefs as to the most appropriate 
use, governance and purpose of housing in a local area. The collision between the 
different interests and priorities of neoliberal local governments and inner-city urban 
communities led to the instigation of many CLTs in the United States, where a CLT 
was created as a response to the perceived threat municipal priorities posed to that 
community's roots in the area:
In many a neighbourhood like the West End of Cincinnati, the main impetus 
for starting a CLT was to protect the community against municipal priorities, 
projects, or plans. The same people who played the lead role in organising a 
CLT had spent years fighting city hall before the CLT appeared ... Opposition 
to local government has remained a motivating factor in many low-income 
communities ... where CLTs have continued to be erected as an institutional 
barrier against market pressures made worse by the actions or indifference of 
city hall.
Davis (2010, p. 35, original emphasis)
26 CLTs have also been considered as a way of securing land rights for the urban poor in Sub-Saharan Africa, as 
documented by Bassett (2005), though the different economic and cultural context limits the relevance of this 
research to CLTs in England. Furthermore, as Bassett's work describes, the CLT model was rejected as a viable 
model due to legal complexities.
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The organisational structure of the CLT was seen as a way of allowing a 
neighbourhood to implement a new set of tenurial and functional relations that permit 
an alteration in the way in which domestic property is owned and used (Davis, 1991, 
p. 88). Taking low-income housing and the land sat beneath it into community 
ownership provided an organisational structure that could defend the land andi
property rights of the community served by a CLT from the threat of displacement 
posed by market pressures. As such, American CLTs placed a strong emphasis on 
holding land in trust, treating it as a communal resource through which community 
interests could be protected, rather than as a commodity designed for individual 
possession, with the CLT providing a non-profit ownership of land on behalf of a 
particular community for the present and future (Gray, 2008; Davis, 2010).
Therefore, stemming from threats such as the displacement of communities and the 
unaffordability of housing, the CLT serves as a vehicle for the empowerment of 
communities defined by their relation to place (Davis, 2010, p. 38). New 
organisational arrangements were implemented to encourage the "active voice of 
residents" in directing and governing the CLT's affairs (Davis, 2010, p. 38) and new 
structures of tenure were formed to ensure 'permanent affordability' of the CLT's 
homes by limiting the equity gains of residents to subsidise future house prices 
(Davis and Demetrowitz, 2003; Davis and Stokes, 2009). The original purpose of the 
CLT's formation in the US was to provide a structure for owning housing that 
balanced the rights of the individual with the interests of the wider community, but to 
do so in a way that provided a "comprehensive approach to community development 
and community empowerment" (Davis and Jacobus, 2010, p. 537). As the quotation 
below describes, the purpose is not solely to develop non-profit housing but to 
protect the interests and assets of the local community:
Nothing makes a CLT a better developer than any other nonprofit or for-profit 
entity that has municipal support to produce affordable housing or other 
community facilities. Instead, the model's real strength lies in protecting a 
municipality's investment and a community's assets, and in preserving access
8 i
to land and housing for people of modest means. It is in the period after a 
project is developed that a CLT makes its most durable and distinctive 
contribution to a community's well-being.
Davis and Jacobus (2010, p. 538, original emphasis)
Mirroring the claims of "untaintedness" described by Saward (2009), CLTs claim to 
represent the authentic views and interests of a local community which are 
channelled through ownership of land and housing. As Warren and McKee (2011, p. 
19) describe, the ownership of land can confer forms of economic, social and 
political power, allowing those landowners to have certain degrees of influence on 
how and for what purpose land is used. Therefore, a CLT owning land has the ability 
to effect significant measures over the use and resale of the housing that stands 
upon it.
While the initial impetus for the CLT sector in the United States may have been to 
provide an alternative institutional set-up for the ownership of land, allowing for 
greater community influence in local governance, more recent developments in the 
last decade have not been solely cast in opposition to the work of government. Davis 
and Jacobus (2010, p. 535) argue that the relationship between CLTs and their local 
governments has shifted from "adversarial to collaborative", often involving the 
provision of state funds to create or expand the work of a CLT. Yet, despite this, the 
limited literature on these partnerships largely speaks of CLTs facing a challenge in 
persuading government to 'let go' in the local governance of these affairs, with a 
need to preserve the identity and community base of the organisation. While the 
advantages of financial subsidies and planning permissions may be linked to these 
partnerships, Davis and Jacobus (2010, p. 538) argue that this also equates to a 
"major change in what it means to be a CLT". In other words, becoming too closely 
aligned with government may threaten the communitarian ideal of self-governance 
and the predominance of community priorities and interests that champions of CLTs 
see as the model's watermark.
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Similar beliefs have underpinned the growth of CLTs in Scotland. Land ownership in 
Scotland has been historically dominated by private feudal landowners who possess 
significant control over the direction and welfare of local communities as an indirect 
consequence of their ownership. Satsangi. (2007, p. 42) describes the case of the 
island of Gigha, where the decision of the individual owner of the island not to invest 
in housing stock or allow new development saw a decline in housing standards and 
minimal business and economic activity to provide employment opportunities. Similar 
scenarios have been witnessed elsewhere'in Scotland, with community land reform 
given added impetus by the Scottish Government's Land Reform Act (2003) that 
introduced a community right to buy private land, provided a CLT organisational 
structure was created to oversee, own and manage these processes.
As Warren and McKee (2011, p. 27) put it, this legislation has put landowners on 
notice that the "needs and aspirations of local people can no longer be ignored". The 
motivations for forming a CLT were driven by dual aims of establishing new patterns 
of land ownership free from the jurisdiction of speculative and absentee landlords - 
based on a collective desire for the community to direct their own destiny through 
control of local governance - and by a simple belief that community ownership would 
be the most effective means of safeguarding local socio-economic sustainability and 
producing outcomes that greater reflect community priorities (Warren and McKee,
2011, p. 20).
i
The desire for new institutional arrangements as an instigating factor for Scottish 
CLTs was documented by Satsangi (2007; 2009) whose work described the shift in 
power relations brought about by changes in land ownership, moving from a system 
of feudal decision-making and control to a "pluralistic structure that allows for full 
member participation in decision-making" (Satansgi, 2007, p. 43). Chiming with the 
communitarian ideal of a decision-making process that allows all to participate and 
influence in decisions that affect them (Tam, 1998), the CLT on the island of Gigha 
has been led by a management board selected by all residents of the island through 
a democratic process, creating a resident-led governance model that in itself reflects
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the long history of community ownership in Scotland (Bryden and Geisler, 2007; 
McKee, 2011a). This model was seen as best suited to achieve the aspirations and 
defend the interests of the local community, with the CLT rehabilitating existing 
housing, constructing new properties and extensively engaging local residents in the 
design and planning stages (Satsangi, 2007).27
The new spaces for community governance in this instance were created as a 
reaction to the market forces perceived to have failed communities in the past. 
Namely, that private landownership excluded community interest and influence and 
failed to meet local aspirations as to how their locality should be governed. 
Community ownership was therefore a strategy not only to facilitate local 
development but a method of safeguarding the long-term interests of the local public 
(Warren and McKee, 2011, p. 21). In Scotland, the bottom-up drive towards creating 
structures of community governance by forming a CLT was primarily antagonistic 
towards speculative private landownership and the threat this posed to the interests 
of the local community, while the state was seen as a collaborative partner rather 
than an opponent as in the United States. As Bryden and Geisler (2010, p. 489) 
observe: "Scotland's land reform is simultaneously top-down (state authorized and 
assisted) and bottom-up (privileging communities)." While there is significant scope 
for communities to create new institutional structures that facilitate alterations in the 
use and purpose of local land and housing, this is authorised and assisted by state- 
led legislation that offers communities the right to purchase land.
it
Furthermore, the creation of a Community Land Unit by the Scottish Government 
played a key role in providing expert advice and - for a limited time - funding to 
provide a context in which community land ownership could thrive. This has been 
described by Warren and McKee (2011, p. 35) as a new 'middle ground' of
27 It should be noted that the case of Gigha has been described as both the worst case scenario, in terms of the 
previous landowner's behaviour, and as an example of community land ownership at the 'extreme end' of 
success which may not be indicative of the wider experience (Warren and McKee, 2011).
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governance, providing a different perception to the formulation of spaces for 
community governance whose parameters are shaped either by the community or 
the state. Instead, new multi-stakeholder partnerships are formed to create "a 
creatively expanding 'middle ground' in which new models of ownership and 
management are being explored".
The land reform legislation in Scotland has been praised for being both "vital tools for 
community empowerment and enterprise" and "a long overdue land reform with 
explicit provisions for community-based acquisition of land" (Bryden and Geisler, 
2010, p. 486). Yet, in some quarters the creation of these new governance spaces 
has been critiqued for offering forms of quasi-empowerment that fail to either offer 
genuine opportunities for empowering community self-governance or reconcile the 
dynamics of power inherent to any construct of 'community' (Wightman, 2009; 
MacLeod e ta l., 2010; Warren and McKee, 2011).
Warren and McKee (2011, p. 27) argued that the introduction of a community right to 
buy was not as radical as it first appeared. Instead land reform was based on 
"unexceptional and popular ideas of community empowerment as a means of 
reaping political capital" which failed to reconcile the problematic definitions of 
community and the demands this 'middle ground' of governance placed on 
volunteers (see also MacLeod et a/., 2010). Concerns over the bureaucratic and 
resource-intensive process undertaken by communities purchasing land echoed 
similar criticisms over rural governance structures. MacKinnon (2002) highlighted 
that the effect of endogenous community-ied governance of local services can be 
circumscribed by the need to demonstrate accountability to the plethora of public, 
private and community stakeholders involved. In the context of Scottish land reform, 
Wightman (2009) argues that the "time-consuming and impenetrable process of 
micromanagement by officialdom" has diminished both the radical intent and 
potential of land reform in favour of community ownership, resulting in low 
community take-up of the community buyout legislation (Macleod et a l, 2010).
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The facilitation of community organisation
These outcomes suggest that there may be different rationales held by stakeholders 
in the implementation of new structures and relationships for the governance of local 
land, and that there may be contrasting expectations as to their outcome. Berner and 
Phillips (2005, p. 18) describe that there may be three underlying rationales for forms 
of community self-help:
• as an end in itself, where the freedom for individuals and communities to 
make meaningful and autonomous choices is a precondition for wellbeing and 
development;
• as a means of improving service delivery which involves local people in the 
design and production of facilities and services;
• as a means of increasing efficiency and cutting costs on behalf of the state, 
mobilising the contributions of community to plug gaps in service provision 
and delivery.
All three rationales make an assumption over the ability of communities to 
demonstrate “tremendous entrepreneurial potential” (Berner and Phillips, 2005, p. 
18) in leading community initiatives. The question attached to this assumption is the 
extent to which the perceived latent energy and demand for control within 
communities is facilitated and realised or blocked and untapped, which may be 
answered by the way community governance is implemented. The idea and scope of 
using community as both a site and means of governing the locale and implementing 
services is one that is open to definitional cbntestation:
if
What is immediately clear is that the idea of neighbourhood is highly charged, 
able to generate considerable debate about its definition and constitution as 
well as its potential contribution to the achievement of policy goals.
Lowndes and Sullivan (2008, p. 56)
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There is much debate over the definition and constitution of community organisation. 
Archer and Vanderhoven (2010) note that it is difficult to apply fixed definitions to 
concepts of community self-help, as the label is attached to groups that are engaged 
and consulted in decision-making and to others that are leading the delivery of 
services and are not reliant on the labour, skills and knowledge of third parties. 
Similarly, Teasdale’s (2012a, p. 99) work on social enterprise argues that there are a 
“bewildering array of definitions and explanations for the emergence of social 
enterprise”. The label of social enterprise had initially been used as a way of 
promoting socially-minded cooperative models of trading enterprise, with its profits 
used for social purposes and the badge of being a social enterprise attached to 
community groups, only for its meaning to be expanded as actors in other circles 
(such as professional and larger organisations) adopted its language to compete for 
resources. Summarising this, Teasdale states that:
Social enterprise is a fluid and contested concept constructed by different 
actors promoting different discourses connected to different organisational 
forms and drawing upon different academic theories.
Teasdale (2012a), p. 99)
Along with the issues of definition, the constitution of community organisation is 
affected by the rationales that are adopted by different stakeholders and the 
resources they invest. While allowing communities greater control and influence may 
involve the state stepping back, Archer and Vanderhoven (2010, p. 11) argue that 
this is not a cost-neutral solution to social problems and instead requires significant 
input and support from third parties if community initiatives are to flourish. Returning 
to the rationales described by Berner and Phillips (2005), if community contributions 
are to plug gaps in service delivery and provision where public and private 
stakeholders have withdrawn, there remains a need for “stable, long-term, targeted 
financial and technical support” to facilitate these initiatives (Berner and Phillips, 
2005, p. 20).
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Although community contributions can be important in challenging and sometimes 
replacing inadequate top-down or private solutions to local problems, their 
mobilisation faces significant challenges, las highlighted by the experiences of the 
community right to buy. Financial and technical difficulties were seen to stunt the 
potential of community ownership of land (Macleod et a/., 2010). Berner and Phillips 
(2005), p. 18) argue that these challenges can arise in strategies of community 
empowerment because of strong assumptions about the skills and capacities of 
communities and intervening support agencies. Archer and Vanderhoven (2010, p. 
4) share this view. They posit that the underlying arguments in favour of community 
participation in or leadership of service delivery and local governance differ due to 
the preconceptions and assumptions different stakeholders carry based on their 
experience:
Self-help groups often push for a change that is based on their lived 
experience of a problem. This is frequently at odds with the analysis and 
actions of those delivering the related public service, who have a different 
relationship to the problem. This can put professionals and self-help groups in 
opposition. The result is that groups fail to get the support and resources they 
need, and the state fails to harness groups’ energy and experience -  to the 
detriment of services and service users.
Archer and Vanderhoven (2010, p. 4)
For Archer and Vanderhoven, it is the reconciliation of these different perspectives 
that can articulate the possibilities and limitations of community-led initiatives, with a 
particular emphasis on fostering closer working relationships between communities 
and the professionals in public and private sectors that may hold power. They 
suggest a role for intermediary organisations, often referred to as capacity-builders 
or umbrella organisations, which can mediate between professionals and 
communities by bridging the lived experience of local communities with the 
professional experience and expectations of public bodies (Archer and
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Vanderhoven, 2010). These intermediaries should hold technical knowledge and skill 
as well as a commitment to creating the conditions in which substantive community 
participation, influence and control can be realised.
vj-In particular, they identify three key functions of intermediary bodies: to identify 
circumstances where communities can provide particular benefits in the delivery of 
local services; to mediate between the state and communities and balance their 
sometimes contrasting pressures and priorities; and to assess the support and 
resource needs of community groups (Archer and Vanderhoven, 2010).
In essence, their role is to assist in creating the ‘middle ground’ of governance 
between communities and the state in a similar fashion to the Community Land Unit 
that provided expert advice and support to communities in Scotland. They are seen 
as important as communities often lack the technical expertise and economic 
resources to address local issues and can exist as independent entities or within 
existing organisations. The value of their role has been highlighted not only in the 
case of CLTs in Scotland, where the resource-intensive process of land reform
'•i
stunted the potential for community ownership (Macleod et a/., 2010), but in other 
fields of community organisation and ownership such as self-help housing (BSHF,
2011), community energy schemes (Walker, 2008) and the ownership of community 
amenities and facilities (Aiken et al., 2008).
There is, however, no uniform model for intermediaries. As Aiken et al (2008) 
describe, forms of community ownership that have often been facilitated by umbrella 
organisations or capacity builders can be diverse in their origin and ambition. The 
term ‘intermediary’ is used to point towards certain roles and tasks undertaken, such 
as the provision of technical advice and support, rather than a set job description or 
role. Their role is likely to be dependent on different contexts, localities and 
orientations within communities, precisely because different rationales may be 
underpinning the local context for community action. Returning to the three 
rationales described by Berner and Phillips (2005), it is likely that different
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intermediation and support would need to be provided for communities assuming full 
responsibility for decision-making rather than perhaps being engaged and consulted 
in state-led agendas. Furthermore, the role of capacity building and intermediation is 
embedded with wider socio-economic systems that can help or hinder their 
implementation. Berner and Phillips highlight this in relation to community 
governance of disadvantaged neighbourhoods
Most notably, the community self-help paradigm needs to be refined by a 
recognition that the poor cannot be self-sufficient in escaping poverty, that 
‘communities’ are systems of conflict as well as cooperation, and that the 
social, political and economic macro-structure cannot be side-stepped.
Berner and Phillips (2005, p. 20)
i
There is, then, considerable debate surrounding the potential for community 
contributions to local governance and ownership of assets. In particular, the different 
ways this is rationalised, defined and constructed by and between stakeholders 
including communities, the state and potential third parties such as intermediary 
bodies highlights the importance of scrutinising the rationales and expectations of 
particular types of community governance. Furthermore, even forms of community 
organisation that are adversarial and challenging to existing paradigms cannot be 
divorced from the social, political and economic macro-structures that demand 
technical expertise, economic resources and a system of cooperation within and 
between communities and governments.
Organisational dilemmas and isomorphism
There is considerable debate as to how voluntary and community organisations are 
defined, constructed and institutionalised within existing tiers of governance. The 
participation of communities in public life/can be valued in different ways as the 
rationales presented by Berner and Phillips (2005) illustrated, ranging from the
empowerment of communities as an end in itself to a situation where their efforts are 
valued in relation to contributions to service delivery and provision.
These definitional issues exist throughout the voluntary and community sector, also 
referred to as the third sector, as it encompasses a range of different types of 
organisations and providers. Indeed, though these terms are used interchangeably 
to refer to a wide range of organisations, Alcock (2012, p. 212) states that “defining 
the third sector is intrinsically problematic” as the organisations and activities it 
encompasses “do not necessarily see themselves as part of a single entity.” This can 
include small-scale community groups which form in relation to their lived experience 
of a problem and large-scale organisations that may be contracted by government to 
deliver specific services. (Kendall, 2009). This difference is in part a product of the 
promotion of a top-down government to an enabling governance in the latter part of 
the 20th Century, with the state increasingly seeing communities as major partners in 
the reform and delivery of social policies and welfare provision. Successive 
governments actively pursued the idea of community organisations being involved in 
the design and delivery of policies and services, with new forms of citizen and 
community engagement seen as essential to democratic government (Taylor, 2012).
/
Taylor (2012, p. 20) argues that the invohfement of communities moved from being 
a ‘community movement’, typified by informal networks that shared collective but 
distinctive organisational identities in political and/or cultural conflicts and formed to 
meet niche needs, to a mainstreamed ‘community sector’ where community 
engagement was built into decision-making structures and was often actioned, 
funded and monitored by government bodies. This brought with it a clear 
organisational infrastructure for voluntary and community organisations, with 
lobbying groups and national membership bodies formed to champion the needs of 
their members and becoming major points of reference for the development of 
government policies that promoted and mainstreamed community empowerment.
While in many respects welcoming this as it gave communities and their 
representatives political recognition, resources and a place, Taylor (2012, p. 15) also 
warns of a “counter-narrative that told of the co-option by the state of community 
resources and energies, endangering the distinctiveness and independence of the 
community voice.”
McDermont (2010) and Purkis (2012) apply this counter-narrative to housing 
associations, describing the paradox between their original formations as local 
voluntary societies served to sensitively meet niche housing need, to their increasing 
role as “mass contractors for delivering mainstream government-funded services” 
(Purkis, 2012, p. 93). This refers to the increase in funding they received from 
government in the 1990s, as housing grants traditionally given to local authorities 
were diverted to housing associations alongside the stock transfer of housing and 
growth in private finance which increased the size of housing associations. Purkis 
argues that this changed the dynamic of the relationship between housing 
associations and the state, as their independence became circumscribed by their 
partial reliance on government who dictate rules and regulations over grant use, fix 
rent levels and control the Housing Benefit regime that makes up two thirds of 
housing association income (Purkis, 2012, p. 95). In this sense, housing associations 
have a “highly qualified kind of ‘independence’” that limits their ability to 
independently determine priorities and creates a more dependent relationship 
between associations and the state (Purkis, 2012, p. 96).
In other parts of the community sector, critical commentary and research has 
focused on the professionalisation of collective action, with skills, standards and 
accountability required by governments, regulators and funders for community 
engagement to thrive (Berner and Phillips, 2005; Archer and Vanderhoven, 2010; 
Flinders and Moon, 2011; Taylor, 2012). Archer and Vanderhoven’s (2010) analysis 
of the role of intermediary bodies in supporting community self-help argued that 
communities can be wary of and resistant to discourses of professionalisation and 
the activity monitoring of third parties, as they prioritise particular ideological values
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related to democracy, social justice, independence and accountability to their local 
community and service users.
The extent to which this is possible is contested in the literature. Flinders and Moon 
(2011, p. 661) argue that government-designed programmes of community 
empowerment are “trapped and limited to some extent by its implementation within 
the confines of a centralized parliamentary state” that demands accountability and 
conformity within existing structures of political and ministerial governance. Others 
argue that agendas of community empowerment in processes of governance can 
standardise practice, where the ‘rules of engagement’ are set by the state, and is 
likely to favour ‘expert citizens’ that are engaged with professional discourses and 
vocations, leaving communities lacking these resources on the margins of power 
(Bang, 2005; Taylor, 2012).
Other theoretical positions have supported these arguments. A strand of 
organisational theory focuses on the institutional isomorphism of organisations, 
addressing the structuration of the organisational fields in which they operate. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that organisational fields tend to become more 
structured and more homogenous in their approach, culture and outputs in order to 
attract resources and recognition. In short, institutional isomorphism posits that 
organisations in the same field (or ‘sector’) will over time adopt similar operational 
practices to competitors within the same or Similar fields. This occurs from the efforts 
of individual organisations to “deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint in their 
field”, which leads to “homogeneity in structure, culture, and output” (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983, p. 147) due to isomorphic pressures.
DiMaggio and Powell’s work contends that there are three overlapping types of 
isomorphism that organisations experience: coercive, mimetic and normative.
Coercive isomorphism involves organisations being encouraged or required to adopt 
particular characteristics by more powerful5 actors. This can result from both formal
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and informal pressures that are exerted on organisations by those upon which they 
may be dependent on (for example through funding) and by cultural expectations as 
to organisational purpose and behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 150). 
Mimetic isomorphism is grounded in the recognition that not all organisational 
behaviour and structure derives from coercive forces; instead organisations may opt 
to model themselves on those who are successful in their field. Mimetic processes 
can occur when “organisational technologies are poorly understood, when goals are 
ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty” (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983, p. 151). Normative isomorphism is associated with organisations that 
adhere to dominant forms in a field. In particular DiMaggio and Powell link normative 
pressures with professionalization, where organisations are encouraged to develop 
internal hierarchies of status, centre and periphery to realise their goals.
These isomorphic pressures can overlap and are likely to emerge in organisational 
fields that require what DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 151) term “direct authority 
relationships” that impose clearly defined responsibility and managerial authority on 
organisations. They also acknowledge that this can create tensions within 
organisations, particularly for neighbourhood and community organisations that may 
be driven to collectivist and egalitarian forms of governance:
i
The need to lodge responsibility and managerial authority at least 
ceremonially in a formally defined role in order to interact with hierarchal 
organisations is a constant obstade to the maintenance of egalitarian or 
collectivist organisational forms.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 151)
Isomorphic pressures, particularly of the coercive type where organisations are 
directly encouraged to act in a certain way, can help us understand the wariness of 
and resistance to the professionalisation of community organisations highlighted in 
the research discussed above (Bang, 2005; Archer and Vanderhoven, 2010; Taylor,
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2012). Taylor (2012, p. 22) points out that, similar to theories of resource 
dependency, coercive isomorphism can illustrate the significant influence 
government funding has on the community sector, with substantial sums being 
invested under particular terms and conditions over the management and use of 
funding.
Other research has also highlighted the effect isomorphic pressures can have on 
organisational behaviour. In particular, Mullins (1999) describes the tensions evident 
within the non-profit housing sector, focusing on the merger activity of housing 
associations into large group structures perceived to be more economically efficient 
by delivering economies of scale and facilitating greater access to specialist skills 
and resources. While such activity may enhance the organisational effectiveness of 
housing associations in economic terms, Mullins argues that merger activity 
highlighted increasing mimetic isomorphism with the for-profit private sector which 
focuses on procuring cost advantages and economic efficiencies. This change to 
organisational behaviour was seen to “undermine some of the unique selling points 
of the non-profit sector such as localism, accountability and voluntarism” (Mullins, 
1999, p. 350) and alter the “style of operation and its relationship with local 
communities and service users" (Mullins, 1999, p. 361). In short, isomorphic 
pressures that change organisational behaviour can lead to tensions in the purpose 
and mission of organisations in the broad spectrum of the voluntary and community 
sector.
Similar processes have been observed elsewhere. Teasdale’s work on social 
enterprise has highlighted the isomorphi6 tendencies in this field, where social 
enterprises may be initiated to trade in ordbr to meet social objectives but gradually 
reshaped as they adapt to the realities of a neoliberal system that may favour 
dominant market logics and cost efficiencies. In particular, his work on social 
enterprises engaged in the homelessness field has shown that there are tensions in 
their work as they try to balance both social and commercial considerations. Looking 
at social enterprises that are formed to help homeless people into employment,
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Teasdale (2012b) found that isomorphic pressures were important factors in pushing 
these organisations towards dominant market logics, mimicking the practices of the 
private sector.
In particular, while their social mission was to assist homeless people into 
employment, the practicalities of an outcome based model where state funding was 
provided according to performance meant that there existed a tendency to ‘cream 
off’ those who were easiest to place in employment rather than those with different 
levels of social need. Teasdale (2012b, p. 13) concluded that “to survive as 
enterprises they will need to mimic the behaviour of private firms in their industries”, 
questioning the extent to which competing social and commercial goals can be 
successfully reconciled within a wider system that valorises dominant market logics.
CLTs and the politics of community
As Shaw (2008, p. 34) argues, the opposing discourses, constructions and 
expectations of community governance - 'the politics of community' - articulate the 
concept's possibilities and limitations. As such, it is necessary to recognise that 
communities can not only be vital arenas for social change precipitated by bottom-up 
collective action, but can also be constrained in their capacities to host such efforts 
or limited by the constitution of the spaces in which this action operates. There is 
furthermore at any time the potential for key stakeholders in these processes, 
whether it is "the powerful or the powerless", to accept, reject, manipulate or 
negotiate the formulation and operation of community governance (DeFilippis et al., 
2006).
W e can see these processes with the emergence of CLTs in the United States and 
Scotland. Initially formed as a bulwark to protect communal interests against market 
pressures and a perceived adversarial local government, the role of American CLTs 
has been renegotiated with local governments becoming partners in both the funding 
and governance of the organisations, recognising its practical ability to develop
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housing as opposed to its orientation towards community development and 
empowerment via collective ownership. In Scotland, the emergence of CLTs has 
been subject to both top-down and bottom-up negotiation as to their role in 
managing land and the extent to which legislation should facilitate this.
However, the literature on the emergence of CLTs in these two countries has failed 
to directly engage with the 'politics of community' described by Shaw (2008). If we 
are to understand CLTs, as Davis (1991) describes, as an institutional structure that 
creates a new form of tenurial and functional relationships capable of protecting the 
interests of a community, then it follows that competing definitions, conceptions and 
negotiations of 'community' require examination. As Gray (2008) notes in her review 
of American CLTs - one of a handful of academic articles that explore the subject - 
there is a multitude of documents extolling the virtues of CLTs but a dearth of critical 
investigation and empirical evidence of the challenges faced by these organisations 
in their formation and operation. If the most effective role of a CLT, as a form of 
community ownership, is not as a developer of housing but as an institutional 
protection of a community's assets and interests (Davis and Jacobus, 2010, p. 538), 
an analysis of what these assets and interests are is required if we are to understand 
what the offer a CLT makes is.
Davis (2010, p. 38) argues that CLTs can act as a geographically-rooted "bulwark" 
that empowers and defends the interests of a community defined in relation to place, 
broadly mirroring Kintrea ef a/'s (2010) definition of territoriality:
Territoriality is a social system through which control is claimed over a defined 
space and defended against others ... Place attachment provides access to a 
community of neighbours through social networks and, in turn, it can reinforce 
a sense of common identity, particularly through shared experiences or a 
common culture or lifestyle. ’*
Kintrea et al. (2010, p. 449)
98
The use of territoriality across a defined geographic space includes and excludes 
according to location of residence and the common identities, lifestyles and interests 
collective action may seek to reinforce (Yarwood and Edwards, 1995, p. 457). While 
much of the literature surrounding CLTs is grounded in a discourse of progressive 
politics and emancipation, with CLTs forming to capture land value for local 
community benefit (Diacon et a/., 2005, p. 4), the communitarian ideal of socially 
cohesive relations generated through shared property and locality interests has been 
notably critiqued within the context of gated communities and common interest 
developments in the United States (McKenzie, 1994; 2011; Atkinson and Flint, 
2004). Gated communities are residential areas that are fenced or walled-off from 
their surroundings, usually built by developers and marketed on the attractiveness of 
the sense of neighbourhood identification and community belonging they can offer 
residents: they guarantee a community of people with shared identities and lifestyles 
for residents, as well as a mechanism of social control in response to fears of crime 
(Blandy, 2007).
Rather than merely meeting the desires of residents, Atkinson and Flint (2004) reject
the representation of gated communities ajs a communitarian ideal that lacks wider
social repercussions. Instead, they are conceptualised as an attempt by other social
groups to insulate against perceived risks, unwanted encounters and as a
mechanism which enables these risks to be managed by elite social groups.
Although not instigated and developed by residents themselves, the development of
gated residential areas offers a form of communal living that, rather than enhancing
collective efficacy and self-governance, actually engenders a privatised form of
cohesion that is based both on a determination of residents to withdraw from spatial
interaction and also to exclude 'outsiders' that threaten the particular lifestyle and
culture of residents with the gated realm (Atkinson and Flint, 2004; Blandy and
Lister, 2005; Blandy, 2007). It is a form of territoriality which, as in Kintrea et a/.'s
(2010) definition, allows a community of interest and status to claim control over a
defined space and defend this against external threats, while sharing a common
space characterised by homogeneous interests. This creates a wider "club realm"
between the private and public realms, with affluent consumers making their own
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private arrangements to provide "club goods" such as security, exclusivity and the 
maintenance of property (Atkinson et a i, 2005)
These critiques are not unique to the concept of gated communities - Sturzaker 
(2010) documents the reactive role played by parish councils in rural housing 
development, where housing is allocated according to local need in an effort to 
preserve the stylised image of a 'rural idyll' that demands the presence of certain 
types of people - locals who understand the behavioural expectations of rural life - 
and the exclusion of others who fail to conform to this ideal. This has led to criticisms 
of policies that allocate housing according to local connection which will require 
consideration in any analysis of CLTs. Rogers (1985) criticised local needs policies 
for the way in which insiders and outsiders are explicitly delineated, a criticism 
endorsed by Sturzaker's analysis of rural housing:
it appears that in some cases, the local connections policy is acting in an 
exclusionary, and hence indirectly discriminatory, way. Some powerful 
residents of villages are using power, through the parish council, to protect 
their rural enclave from outsiders. *
Sturzaker (2010, p. 1014)
The claim here is not that CLTs, with their territorial focus and identification with 
locally-specific interests, necessarily represent a form of inward-facing community 
aimed at excluding 'outsiders' and outside interests; more that this is one of a 
plethora of potentialities for forms of community governance of the public realm. 
Much depends on the rationales and incentives for forming a CLT as an alternative 
provider of local housing, who is included and excluded from these purposes and the 
interests endemic to that locality that the CLT is formed to represent. Crucially, the 
way in which these interests and priorities interact with those of other forms of 
governance (such as local or central government) will impact on the outcomes the 
protection or pursuit of local interests prodiibe.
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3.3 Rationales for neighbourhood governance
(
The review of communitarian theory and the literature surrounding community 
empowerment and participation in civic affairs illustrates that there are infinite 
possibilities and outcomes when 'community' is used as a construct to in some way 
contribute to the effectiveness of pubjic governance. There are numerous
conceptions of the term as Mayo (1994) observes:•?
It is not just that the term has been used ambiguously, it has been contested, 
fought over and appropriated for different uses and interests to justify different 
politics, policies and practices.
Mayo (1994, p. 48)
The separation forms of community governance have from public and private 
institutions has been seen to legitimise its operation by virtue of its 'untaintedness' 
(Saward, 2009), a concept particularly evident within the emergence of CLTs in the 
United States and Scotland. Davis' (1991) conception of CLTs as a form of housing
i
organisation that seeks to implement a new set of tenurial and organisational 
arrangements in order to prioritise and preserve the needs and interests of a defined 
geographic community highlights this, as their emergence is based on the perception 
that existing institutional arrangements are insufficient and inadequate. The reaction 
to patterns of private landownership in Scotland may also be indicative of this.
Yet the literature that exists on these forms of land ownership has so far failed to 
engage with the politics and questions that forms of community governance provoke: 
the reasons for its emergence, its definition and scope and the practicalities and 
challenges in its implementation and sustainment. A suitable framework for 
analysing these issues is provided by Lowndes and Sullivan (2008), acting as a 
heuristic device to answer the research questions. First, the framework below 
provides the glue between the literature that has been explored in this chapter and
the one that has preceded it, and the research questions that shape the presentation 
of the empirical analysis later in this thesis.
Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) present four rationales that may underpin governance 
at the level of the neighbourhood or community. They can be seen as an attempt to 
"bring conceptual order to messy realities" (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008, p. 63), 
reflecting similar debates around the fractured and disparate ideologies that underpin 
civil society and the community sector (Kendall, 2009).28 Each rationale may give 
way to variation within and between institutional arrangements for community 
governance by identifying distinctive motivations and choices for its formation and 
facilitation.
The four rationales are civic, social, political and economic. They are each 
underpinned by different objectives, facilitated by different democratic devices, and 
have different citizen and leadership roles in the design of neighbourhood 
governance according to its purpose. These rationales are presented in Table 3 
overleaf.
28 Kendall (2009) identified unfolding ideological differentation emerging within the third sector, reflecting 
discourses based on a quasi-market consumerist ideology, a state-led civil revivalist discourse as a mechanism 
towards promoting civil order, and a community-focused democratic renewal discourse that focuses on group 
action and community empowerment.
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Table 3: Rationales fo r neighbourhood governance fram ework (Lowndes and Sullivan, 
2008)
Neighbourhood Neighbourhood Neighbourhood Neighbourhood
empowerment partnership government management
Primary
rationale Civic Social Political Economic
Key
objectives
Active citizens and
cohesive
communities
Citizen well-being 
and regeneration
Responsive and 
accountable decision 
making
More effective local 
service delivery
Democratic Participatory Stakeholder Representative Market democracydevice democracy democracy democracy
Citizen role Citizen: voice Partner: loyalty Elector: vote Consumer: choice
Leadership
role Animateur, enabler Broker, chair Councillor, mini-mayor
Entrepreneur,
director
Institutional
forms
Forums, Co­
production
Service board, mini- 
LSP
Town councils, area 
committees Contracts, charters
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While each rationale and ideal type that emerges from its implementation share key 
characteristics of governance, namely that the boundaries and responsibilities of 
governing become blurred as more institutions and actors are drawn into governing 
from beyond government, differences arise in the way this is institutionalised.
The civic rationale, leading to a form of neighbourhood empowerment, aims to create 
units of governance based on extensive citizen participation in the co-production of 
policy. Self-governance is encouraged as the neighbourhood is turned to as the site 
where shared values, beliefs and goals are developed through communal ties, which 
are used to address collective social problems. It is a form of communitarian 
endeavour in which citizens perceive a relation between their own interests and the 
opportunity to influence the public realm, and accordingly invest in civic relationships 
marked by participation and high degrees of communal loyalty and attachment. By 
encouraging this self-governance, the way policy is made, exercised and 
experienced is improved through processes of co-production.
The form of community governance that emerges when a social rationale is 
prevalent is one of partnership. The neighbourhood is a focal point for a citizen- 
centred approach to governance, though the participation of communities is not an 
end in itself as per the civic rationale. There is emphasis on the potential bottom-up 
influence has for adding value to and facilitating the delivery of public services. 
Under this rationale, community groups are not self-governing but are instead 
partners and stakeholders with policymakers. The creation of holistic and joined-up 
approaches to local policymaking is done via collaboration between citizens, 
government and other public and private stakeholders. The tailoring of services to 
local needs identified by communities is an important but not dominant outcome and 
consideration.
The political rationale encourages modes of neighbourhood government, though this 
is avowedly under the terms and conditions set by existing hierarchies of 
representative democracy. The intention is not to reform or overthrow processes of
governance but more to demonstrate accountability and provide a responsive 
service to existing work. Examples of institutional forms of this within the field of 
housing may be tenant participation schemes that allow housing organisations to 
provide a more accountable service. Decision and policy making is informed and 
influenced by the direct experience of citizens.
Finally, the economic rationale is used to create a system of neighbourhood 
management. The emphasis is entirely on making efficient and effective use of 
available resources. Community empowerment is not an independent outcome 
under this type, instead it is linked to discourses around individual choice and 
consumerist behaviour that allow entrepreneurial citizens and organisations to 
influence and contribute to service delivery. This is to be delivered through 
institutionalised contracts and charters between service delivery agents and the state 
or relevant funding bodies.
There are some issues to consider in applying this framework to CLTs. First, as 
Lowndes and Sullivan (2008, p. 72) confess, it has a heavy emphasis on state-led 
forms of neighbourhood governance - those 'invited spaces' of participation that 
Cornwall (2002) describes that are defined and created by government. As has been 
described, CLTs fall outside of these parameters and the trajectory of the CLT sector 
in England has until recently operated on the margins of government and instead 
faced a challenge in becoming embedded into institutional structures. Reflecting on 
the CLT pilot demonstration programme in 2006, Aird (2010) argued:
At that time, there were only one or 'two recognised community land trusts in 
the entire country and they were virtually unknown among government 
officials ... CLTs have [now] built up such momentum that politicians have 
been forced to sit up and take notice.
Aird (2010, p. 449)
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While this to some extent overstates the contribution of CLTs to the national housing 
stock, it does tally with the emerging institutional framework of the CLT sector 
propped up by political support that led to a legal definition of CLTs being inserted 
into the Housing & Regeneration Act 2008. The policy landscape that CLTs operate 
in has changed significantly from 2006 to 2011 as a result. This does not limit the 
framework's usefulness as it still allows for a consideration and assessment of the 
way reconfigured forms of housing governance interact with governmental 
objectives, particularly in considering the reasons why new spaces of governance 
may be created by and for community groups. As Lowndes and Sullivan (2008, p. 
72) describe, new forms of governance also offer the possibility of citizens deciding 
for themselves how to contribute to governing and how this should be configured 
within new 'governance spaces' that may be outside those of government. The 
framework of rationales allow for an exploration not only of why people have formed 
a CLT and what the civic interest is for doing so, but to investigate how this is 
received and negotiated by public and pfrivate stakeholders and the institutional 
forms that are proliferated as a result.
The second and linked issue is that not all the rationales described in the framework 
will be of use. In particular, the economic rationale is one that is heavily reliant on 
being instigated by and in line with governmental objectives. The primary motivation 
for forming a CLT is unlikely to emerge from a burning bottom-up desire to run or 
operate a governmental contract or service, while the experience of CLTs in the 
United States and Scotland tells us that governmental involvement in CLTs is likely 
to result in legislation that facilitates rather than manipulates the activities of CLTs, or 
as in the United States, CLTs may be adopted as partners in the development of 
housing programmes.
V,rWhat the framework does allow for is an analysis of the contextual variation that 
affects the formation, operation and potential of community governance. Applying the 
same framework to the regeneration of urban neighbourhoods, (Durose and 
Lowndes, 2010) found significant contestation and application of rationales between
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local authorities and community level actors. Local authorities tended to be 
inherently ambiguous about the potential of institutional forms bred by civic 
rationales, possibly due to the challenge that the creation of self-governing 
communities may pose to their traditional role, while at the neighbourhood level civic 
rationales expressed the collective aspirations and political agency of a small locally- 
rooted unit of governance (Durose and Lowndes, 2010, p. 355). There are also 
challenges to neighbourhood governance that Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) 
describe, relating to the capacity, competence, diversity and equity of new 
governance structures. As described below, it is posited that a series of trade-offs 
may have to be made if structures of community governance are to be created.
• Capacity: Neighbourhood governance is likely to mean that citizens are able 
to influence a smaller number of issues at a localised level: is there a trade-off 
between the extent and potential of participation and the scope of control?
• Competence: Neighbourhoods may find it difficult to recruit a sufficient 
number of participants for community-led governance, and furthermore there 
may be a lower calibre to draw upon given the small pool of people willing to 
become involved: is there a trade-off between the accessibility and 
effectiveness community governance is thought to provide and the 
competence of the participants?
• Diversity: In comparison with larger units, the localised focus of 
neighbourhoods may lead to single issue and interest groups dominating, with 
participation depending on homogeneity rather than difference or pluralism. Is 
there a trade-off between improving decision-making and policymaking at a 
local level and the potential for powerful groups to dominate?
• Equity: Neighbourhood governance suggests greater local differentiation in 
the localised processes of co-governance and encourages communities to 
draw upon their internal resources. If resources of human, social and
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economic capital are low, what is the fate of these communities? Is there a 
trade-off between facilitating the opportunity for local choice and the equity of 
these processes?
I
This chapter has concerned itself with framing the study theoretically. It has analysed 
constructs of community governance, differentiating between those that are formed 
from the top-down and bottom-up, and reviewed the background literature on the 
relationship between housing and processes of community. This highlighted a need 
for an analytical approach and organising device which connects theory to practice. 
The framework provided by Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) provides this connection, 
linking theories of communitarianism and community governance with a method of 
analysis that takes account of the varied rationales, dilemmas and trade-offs that 
may exist in different circumstances and from different positions.
i
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Chapter 4: Methodology: a qualitative 
study of CLTs
This chapter provides a critical reflective account of the methods deployed in this 
research. The lack of a substantial history of research on CLTs posed issues for the 
research design not only in identifying what to study within the topic in question but 
also how to study it. With only a few small-scale case studies to draw upon in the 
academic literature, I was presented with a largely unexplored field in which to 
design an empirical study into CLTs. In the context of the theoretical linkages made 
in the previous chapter, a qualitative research agenda was selected to answer the 
research questions. While useful in exploring depth, context and meaning, the 
qualitative tradition has often been critiqued for its lack of transparency, rigour and 
subjective nature in processes of data collection and analysis (Bryman, 2004; Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2011).
In this chapter I aim to address these concerns by explaining how this research has 
been conducted, detailing the procedures undertaken to collect data and the 
rationales that underpinned these decisions. By illuminating these decisions I aim to 
explain exactly how I have generated the findings presented in the empirical 
chapters that follow, providing a justification for the methods used to collect data. 
The chapter also provides a reflective commentary on my relation to the research 
topic and its participants, and the ways in which these relations may have influenced 
my interpretation and presentation of the data.
I begin by offering a justification for following the qualitative research tradition,
including a description of the methods employed and the process of generating a
sample. In doing so, I uncover some of the strengths and weaknesses of the quality
of data that this research has generated. I then discuss how fieldwork was
conducted, with reference to the politics of gaining access to research participants,
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the process of implementing data collection methods and the relations that were 
struck between the researcher and the researched. Finally, I reflect on the process of 
data transcription and analysis before pffering some reflections on the research 
process as a whole. Consideration of these issues aims to acknowledge that the 
procedures undertaken to acquire and construct knowledge in qualitative research 
projects are intrinsically linked to how the data and findings that follow are 
interpreted and presented.
4.1 Selecting research strategies, methods and subjects 
The rationale for qualitative research
Before reflecting on the practicalities of organising and conducting fieldwork, as well 
as the process of analysing the data that this study has produced, there is a need to 
reflect upon and justify the choice of qualitative research as the primary means of 
exploration.
The main intention of this study was to thoroughly explore the role of CLTs in 
housing development and management in England. The language commonly usedi
to promote CLTs frames them as an organisation with legitimate claims to be 
representative of their geographic community, claiming ownership and use of land 
for people within a defined space (Davis, 2010). Grounded in theories and debates 
as to the purpose and value of community governance, this study has been designed 
to interrogate the individual and organisational rationales underpinning the 
emergence of CLTs. It interrogates why and how CLTs have emerged and for what 
purpose, seeking to identify not only the commonalities between different CLTs but 
also the divergence in both their acquisition of resources and their relation to existing 
structures of housing provision and systems of democratic organisation.
My study, therefore, aimed to capture what Alcock and Scott (2005, p. 2) describe as
the “differentiated detail and dynamic of social life at organisational, group and
no
individual levels”. Qualitative research lends itself to such an approach. It is focused 
on the context, interpretation and meanings conveyed by individual actors and how 
these complexities affect behaviours, as opposed to a quantitative approach which 
seeks numerical data from which generalisations can be found to explain the rules of 
the social world (Rubin and Rubin, 1995; Blaikie, 2000). While an alternative 
approach to studying CLTs may have involved the accumulation of quantitative data 
as to the model’s cost efficiency and numerical contribution to housing stock, the 
tradition of qualitative research encourages investigation into “why?” and “how?” 
questions as opposed to “what?” (Marshall, 1996, p. 522), thus enabling a study of 
the subtleties and negotiations of the underlying rationales and strategies that have 
led to the recent growth of CLTs. In studying these issues, a qualitative approach 
allows for the dynamics of time and context to be explored, as well as investigation 
into the unknown hidden variables that may be masked by quantitative data.
Qualitative research, with its focus on examining the unfolding of events over time 
and emphasis on “pluralism, understanding, contextualism [and] personal 
experience” (Greene, 2000, p. 984), seemed the most appropriate approach given 
the evolving world in which CLTs were operating at the outset of this study. As this 
thesis describes, CLTs were not understood as a model with consistent and stable 
characteristics. Even within the CLT sector their reasons for formation were not 
always clearly defined, they did not acquire resources in the same manner and did 
not strike the same relationships between their individual CLT and external 
stakeholders. The task of this research was to investigate how and why the structure 
and dynamics of these organisations differs and to explore the dilemmas and 
compromises faced by those involved in creating and facilitating CLTs. Therefore, a 
qualitative research project in the vein that Miles and Huberman (1994) describe 
seemed the most suitable research strategy to pursue:
A source of well-grounded, rich descriptions and explanations of processes in
identifiable local contexts ... one can preserve chronological flow, see
i n
precisely which events led to which consequences, and derive fruitful 
explanations.
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 1)
Research methods: Semi-structured interviews
The semi-structured interview is a popular choice of qualitative research method. 
Unlike other methods such as participant observation and documentary analysis, the 
qualitative interview enables the researcher to directly question interviewees as to 
the meanings and interpretations they attach to the social interaction in which they 
have been involved (Blaikie, 2000, p. 234).
It is, of course, possible to question interviewees directly under quantitative 
traditions, for example through the administration of structured questionnaires with 
predefined answers. Here, the emphasis is on the standardised measurement of key 
concepts and the reliability of this data, whereas the qualitative tradition encourages 
an approach that is flexible and responsive to the answers respondents provide as 
opposed to being pre-formulated (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). Semi-structured 
interviews encourage a dialogue between the researcher and the researched, 
probing new topics in response to the answers that are given and placing less 
emphasis on the standardisation of the interview:
The researcher has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be covered, 
often referred to as an interview guide, but the interviewee has a great deal of 
leeway in how to reply. Questions may not follow on exactly in the way 
outlined on the schedule. Questions that are not included in the guide may be 
asked as the interviewer picks up on things said by interviewees
Bryman (2004, p. 321)
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However, a certain amount of arrangement does exist to the semi-structured 
interview. An interview guide29 is formulated in order to list the topics and questions 
that the conversation should cover, though leading off into tangents is to be 
encouraged. Indeed, the “conversational partnerships” (Rubin and Rubin, 1995, p. 
93) that are struck between the interviewer and the participant can elicit informal 
views and contradictory opinions that may not emerge in the formalised settings and 
interactions of everyday life or the official documentation used to describe a topic.
Conversely, the flip side to this is, of course that the interview is removed from its 
natural setting and the social situations in which participants operate (Blaikie, 2000, 
p. 234). However, the extent to which this was a problem in selecting semi-structured 
interviews as my preferred research method was limited in this specific research 
context. Blaikie’s critique seems more orientated towards the use of qualitative 
methods to directly observe human behaviour rather than to elicit the opinions and 
complexities that underpin the chronological unfolding of events and relationships.
That is not to say that this method is without its practical problems. By their nature 
research projects such as this, conducted by an individual within a set time frame 
and on a limited budget, focus on small-scale cases, settings and individual 
accounts. The challenge is to generate findings that have resonance and 
implications beyond the immediate arena in addition to their explanatory power of the 
local context. Additionally, in the interview setting the qualitative researcher and the 
participant place a degree of faith in each other. From the perspective of the 
researcher, they ask the participant to provide open and honest information from 
their perspective, even though the possibility exists for the truth to be deliberately 
distorted or evasive answers to be given (Rubin and Rubin, 1995, p. 218). From the 
standpoint of the research participant who provides such answers, they are placing
29 The interview guides used for this research are provided in the appendices. A loose guide was designed for 
interviews according to the position of my participants, with bespoke probe questions devised prior to each 
interview.
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\faith in the researcher to represent their perspective correctly, respect requests for 
anonymity or confidentiality, and ensure that the data is used for only the purposes 
stated when their participation was agreed. There is therefore a delicate relationship 
formed between researchers and those who participate with several dilemmas 
thrown up through the formation and evolution of the study. It is to these issues that 
the later sections of this chapter attend.
Research methods: documentary analysis
One way of overcoming the flaws of a research method is to supplement its use with 
different methods that can complement the data collection process. As Denzin 
(2009, p. 297) argues, the flaws of one method are often the strengths of another, 
allowing researchers who mix their approach to achieve the benefits of each while 
overcoming some of their deficiencies.
I elected to undertake a limited amount of documentary analysis to supplement my 
interview data. The emphasis is placed not on documents produced at the request of 
the researcher but instead on primary sources of data that exist regardless of 
whether the research is ongoing or not. They record or relate to some aspect of the 
social world and can assist in understanding the chronological flow of events and 
social interactions (Bryman, 2004, p. 381). Documentary analysis as a method 
differs from the practice of literature reviewing as the material it generates can be 
used to supplement findings and support the arguments of the research.
5
Two main strategies were used to identify relevant documentation. Firstly, I 
accessed documents such as seminar reports, evaluations or presentations that 
were publicly available through the official CLT website.30 Additionally, I either
30 This website can be found at: http://www.communitvlandtrusts.ore.uk. It is managed by the National CLT 
Network and provides information as to the nature of CLTs in England and Wales, publications and resources 
used to inform and educate key actors in CLT processes.
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researched independently or was directed towards publicly available documents 
published by local and national governments. Secondly, I included a request for 
further documentation or sources of information at the conclusion of each interview. 
This elicited few responses, though one interviewee sent me an internal history and 
evaluation of a previous development that the CLT had undertaken. This document 
was not freely available in the public domain but the participant was happy for its 
content to be used to cross-reference and supplement the account he had provided 
in an interview. Another interviewee responded by sending me a raft of electronic 
files including long-term business plans, budgets and architect visualisations of their 
proposed development.
While pertinent to the wider context and critical to his CLT, not all of this information 
necessarily possessed the qualities or explanatory power I was seeking with 
reference to my research questions. To overcome such concerns, as quoted in 
Bryman (2004), John Scott (1990) poses four criteria assessing the worth of 
documentary research relating to the authenticity, credibility, representativeness and 
meaning conveyed by the document.
In terms of authenticity, all the documents were of what Bryman (2004, p. 381) 
describes as “unquestionable origin”. They were either provided directly by 
respondents as representations of their reality and therefore endorsed by them, or 
‘sponsored’ by the official CLT website that makes these documents freely available 
to all. Similarly, the credibility of the evidence in terms of distortion and bias did not 
provoke any major concerns. Indeed, when conducting documentary analysis such 
evidence can be interesting precisely because of the biases that they reveal: the 
danger may only be posed by the extent to which the meaning they convey is a true 
depiction of reality (Bryman, 2004, p. 387).
It is with these issues that the criteria related to representativeness and meaning are 
concerned, questioning both whether the evidence is representative and typical of its 
kind and whether the meaning it conveys is clear, comprehensible and above all
placed in context. The danger of using seminar reports and particularly presentations
is that they are removed from the context in which they are given. Seminar reports
may include quotations from a speech rather than the whole text and narrative itself,
while the use of presentations can be ^ scrutinised as it is divorced from the*
presenter’s speech and reliant on its electronic composition. Analysis of these may 
overextend the artistic licence of the researcher in interpreting and analysing the 
information. I was therefore extremely selective about the material used from these 
resources and the extent to which I represented them as a true depiction of reality. In 
the end, just one reference to presentation material has been made in my analysis 
and only then because it was written as a whole sentence from which the meaning 
could easily be grasped. Similarly, although I attended the seminars in question and 
consider the material I have used to be representative of the context it was placed in,
I have used the material sparingly. This has primarily been to reinforce rather than 
shape the arguments of the thesis, for example by adding some chronological flow to 
events that occurred outside the time frame of my interviews or to provide 
comparison with primary data generated from my interviews.
In sum, the documents that were used were as follows:
• An unpublished internal review provided by Holy Island CLT.
• Affordable housing statements and reports from local authorities (North 
Wales).
•  A fully-authored narrative of the relationship between a CLT and a housing 
association, available from the CLT website (Kelly, 2011).
• A presentation given to the national CLT conference 2011 (Graham, 2011).
•  A transcribed question and answer session between a CLT and its local 
community, coordinated and provided by a local interest group.31
31 This question and answer session was transcribed and Uploaded to the village interest group's website. An 
interviewee provided me with the document but it is anonymised here for the purpose of confidentiality.
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• A parish council annual report, which has been anonymised for the purposes 
of confidentiality.
• A local press cutting reflecting on the outcome of a local referendum. This is 
anonymised for the same reasons as the question and answer session.
• Hansard reports documenting the proceedings of debates in the House of 
Commons and House of Lords. This^  publicly available source has been used 
to provide the perspective of politicans that have made public pronouncement 
as to the role and purpose of CLTs.
Identification of research participants
Having justified the reasons for using a qualitative research methodology, it is 
necessary to consider how and why the people who participated in my interviewing 
fieldwork were selected. The data collected during any research process, along with 
the analysis and findings that emerge as a consequence, are intrinsically linked to 
the decisions made at the outset of the study as to the kind of data to be collected 
and who, how and why these sources are identified and selected (Blaikie, 2000, p.
i
183). Furthermore, conducting qualitative research is a dialogical process. 
Qualitative researchers form relationships 'to the topic and people under study and 
these relationships - alongside the procedures undertaken to contact participants 
and elicit their accounts - can influence the findings that are produced (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2011, p. 663). Justifying the identification of participants and reflecting upon 
the connections that have been formed can therefore help overcome the critiques of 
qualitative research that question the role of the researcher, the influence of their 
personal subjectivities and the transparency of the research procedures and 
ultimately the data they generate.
i
In terms of identifying potential participants, I took a decision early in the study to 
immerse myself in the field of CLTs as quickly as possible, attending several
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practitioner seminars and conferences from September 2008 onwards.32 As a small- 
scale and emerging social arena with few structures of formal representation beyond 
the local context, there were no obvious databases with a list of CLTs and their 
contacts, unlike for example the National' Housing Federation's publicly available 
database of housing associations. As such attending these events, which were 
usually residential and attended by a relatively small number of people,33 provided 
not only a forum to learn the key debates and complexities of CLTs but also a 
significant opportunity to contact and build relationships with those involved in their 
formation and development.
I was also keen to avoid the perception of what England (1994, p. 84) describes as 
“parachuting] into the field with empty heads ... ready to record the ‘facts’”. During 
this study I was aged 22-25, a relatively young age for a researcher and significantly 
younger than the vast majority of people involved with CLTs.34 I was also residing in 
a large Northern city geographically distant from the rural villages in which CLTs 
were mainly based. This distance gave me a heightened awareness of the way I 
would be perceived by CLT representatives, especially having encountered a 
message for researchers such as myself on the website of one CLT:
32 See Appendix 2 for a list of these events.
33 The events were usually attended by between 30 and 50 people, though this number would include several 
representatives from a single CLT or merely people with an interest in the subject,
34 Other issues of our personal circumstances can establish rapport and affect interactions due to common 
backgrounds. Cultural markers and identities relating to gender, social class, accent and occupation can dictate 
whether close relations are established with research subjects. For example, one interviewee had previously 
lived in Sheffield and our conversation began with a laidback discussion as to the recent regeneration of the 
city centre and areas of the city in which we had both resided. Ellis (2005) provides an interesting account of 
how these issues affected her research into rural community development in Wales.
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We're sorry, but we cannot provide ready-written theses or projects for 
anyone - sixth formers or idealists!
Stonesfield Community Trust website (undated)
I was keen to avoid perceptions of being a distant, detached researcher with only an 
instrumental interest in CLTs and aimed to establish some common ground with 
those who would participate in the study. Qualitative research is characterised by 
interpersonal relationships between the researcher and the researched with the flow 
of knowledge dependent on the successful negotiation of these interactions. Rubin 
and Rubin (1995, p. 12) argue that if researchers are to elicit open and honest 
accounts from their subjects over a long period of time, they are unlikely to achieve 
that openness by being closed, disengaged and removed from the topic and persons 
of study. Attendance at these events, though by no means designed as a source of 
fieldwork, went some way to overcoming these concerns and opening the gate to the 
world of CLTs. For example, by the second event I was on first name terms with 
some fellow attendees and able to show an interest in the particularities of their local 
context, helping to not only identify potential participants but to advance my early 
theoretical ideas in relation to the work of CLTs at these events.
To further engage with the topic, I also conducted a scoping interview in November 
2008 with a senior figure at an umbrella CLT. This, alongside attending the regular 
events, helped me gain a greater understanding of the variance that exists among 
CLT structures and their acquisition of resources, especially given the limited 
literature on the subject. For example, I quickly learnt that Satsangi’s (2009, p. 260) 
observation that CLTs in England and Wales are “based more on community 
acquisition of local authority land than on that of private land” was not necessarily 
true and that extensive efforts were underway to locate and acquire land from a 
variety of sources including land in local private ownership. While this may seem a 
minor practical point, awareness that a variety of stakeholders could be involved in
the acquisition of land would feed into the design of interview guides and sampling\
strategies.
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During any research plan, no matter how well conceived or intentioned, 
unanticipated challenges that pose ethical and methodological questions can be 
thrown up through engagement with participants, subjects or fellow researchers 
(Iphofen, 2011, p. 443). This study was no different in that by September 2009, 
having established a familiarity with research participants and common ground with 
many of the key protagonists in developing CLTs, I was offered temporary 
employment to promote and research CLTs with Community Finance Solutions (a 
policy and research unit responsible for facilitating CLT development in England and 
Wales). Having begun on the periphery of the CLT sector, this position placed met
very suddenly ‘inside’ the field of CLTs. This post involved assuming responsibility 
for promoting CLTs to policymakers, devising and researching strategies to raise 
awareness of their role as an affordable housing provider, and providing advice and 
assistance to CLT volunteers. Clearly, this raised some dilemmas in relation to the 
dual roles I was fulfilling: promoter of (and advisor to) CLTs on one hand, and critical 
researcher and commentator on the other. Section 4.2 discusses the ways this may 
have impacted upon the research process and relationships with participants. 
Practically, this role lent itself to a productive sampling strategy and facilitated a 
channel through which key protagonists could be easily identified as fieldwork 
progressed. *
Sampling participants: recruitment strategies and sample compositions
A purposive sampling approach was taken, a process whereby the researcher 
samples on the basis of wanting to interview people who are intrinsically relevant to 
the topic and most capable to answer the research questions (Bryman, 2004, p. 
333). While this is a common approach in qualitative research, I also applied two 
more distinct sampling methods in order to access participants.
One tactic was to pursue an approach of theoretical sampling. Emerging from the 
work of Glaser and Strauss (1967) on grounded theory, this approach contends that 
the selection of research participants should be governed by the extent to which theyi
maximise theoretical development as opposed to being concerned with 
representativeness of populations. Respondents are initially selected on the basis of 
their relationship to the research questions and further interviewees are identified 
strategically by the researcher in order to confirm or refute the emergent theoretical 
focus and hypothesis (Arber, 1993, p. 74). The role of the researcher is to "go to 
places, people, or events that will maximize opportunities to discover variations 
among concepts" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 201). The approach is iterative, 
moving backwards and forwards between data collection and reflection until 
'theoretical saturation' has been reached: the moment when new findings and 
insights are no longer being revealed by participants (Arber, 1993, p. 75).
The knowledge and contacts garnered from the CLT seminars and conferences I 
had attended, along with my position at Community Finance Solutions, lent itself well 
to such a strategy. One of the first forms of fieldwork I conducted was with the main 
CLT engaged in accessing funding from the Homes and Communities Agency (the 
national funding agency of social housing in England), selected on the basis that I 
knew they were further advanced into negotiations than their counterparts and could 
therefore provide greater detail as to the challenges and criticisms levelled at the 
HCA by CLT practitioners.35
Similarly, in attempting to find out the enabling factors and fault lines in the efforts 
CLTs make to access land, I was able to sample strategically using the basic facts I 
had learnt at the CLT events; for example which CLTs had acquired land via private 
means and which were seeking to use local authority land. This was an ongoing 
process and adopting this approach led mb to conduct two interviews in December 
2010 as new data came to light regarding a CLT that had held a referendum over 
local land use. Although this was actually after the main fieldwork had been 
concluded, the discovery of these circumstances at a CLT seminar offered an
35 These criticisms are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 8.
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opportunity to develop both the practical' and theoretical analyses of how CLTs 
deliberate over land use with their wider community and the competing definitions 
and interpretations of the role played by community-based organisations. I decided 
to conduct these two interviews as the final stage in my fieldwork, responding to the 
shifting landscape and evolving operations of CLTs which necessitated this sort of 
dynamic sampling approach to the research in order to capture the most pertinent 
theoretical data possible.
The second tactic was to use a method of snowball sampling in order to overcome 
some concerns I held over the effectiveness of theoretical sampling alone. Although I 
was coming into contact with the key actors in CLT formation through my position at 
Community Finance Solutions, I was conscious that my sample could be accused of 
being selected on the basis of mere convenience and accessibility, a common 
critique of theoretical sampling (Bryman, 2004, p. 100). I was also concerned that the 
number of respondents willing to participate could be exhausted very quickly. The 
CLT National Demonstration Programme that ran from 2006-2008 had provided 16 
CLTs for me to initially contact along with those that I encountered through my 
attendance at CLT events and employment (with significant overlap between the 
two). Of the 16 CLTs featured in the National Demonstration Programme, ten either 
failed to respond to my e-mails (which in many case was the only means of contact 
available) or replied to explain that they did not wish or feel capable of participating 
in the study, showing the limitations of relying solely on external secondary data 
sources and/or individual knowledge as recruitment methods.
In addition to this, many of the CLTs and stakeholders that I was coming into contact 
with through my employment with Community Finance Solutions were at the very 
early stages of formation, often seeking basic advice and legal and technical 
information with no preconceived ideas or rationales that extended beyond an initial
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interest.36 This situation was exemplified when I received an unsolicited e-mail at*
work from a planning officer in a local authority area with a formative group of CLTs.
I had already identified this person (or soYneone with similar responsibility in that 
local authority area) as a potential interviewee for my future fieldwork, only for these 
plans to be pre-empted and challenged as the e-mail asked me what CLTs were, 
how they operate and are managed, and how the dynamics between communities 
and strategic stakeholders are arranged in other areas: essentially the very 
questions I intended to ask him. As an emerging and novel approach to affordable 
housing development and community empowerment, the identification of participants 
on the basis of my own connections and knowledge was therefore likely to be 
limited.
There were therefore only limited opportunities to identify interviewees beyond the 
small core of people interviewed between November 2009 and March 2010 .37 
Snowball sampling offers the opportunity to broaden the field of enquiry when the
4
ability to identify respondents is limited. Essentially, it is reliant on the study's existing 
sample frame as it involves asking participants whether they know anyone with the 
characteristics of interest, who are then interviewed in turn and asked the same 
question until theoretical saturation is in reach (Arber, 1993, p. 74). I made a point of 
concluding each interview with a more informal question as to whether interviewees 
knew of anyone else within their local context that would be able to offer an 
interesting perspective on CLTs, as well as proactively responding to the introduction 
of key actors by respondents during the course of my interview with them (such as 
landowners or the role of specific individuals within local authorities).
36 Indeed, my employment often brought me into greater contact with those who were extremely new to the 
concept of CLTs and seeking advice as to the model's potential, characteristics and use, as opposed to those 
that were 'fully formed', closer to completing development and therefore best placed to answer the research 
questions.
37 See Appendix 3 for the full list of interviewees.
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The strategy's reliance on the goodwill of respondents poses obvious problems. It is 
reliant not only on their cooperation but targets only those involved in a connected 
network of individuals, leaving itself open to accusations of bias and the possible 
creation of an unrepresentative sample of those who may be indirectly affected by or 
involved with CLTs. Asking interviewees whether they can recommend someone 
who would contribute additional insights is also a process that lends itself to the 
subjectivities of individuals who may have negative perceptions of the role played by 
others involved with local CLT development. When asked whether he could 
recommend someone from local or national government able to comment on the 
development of a local CLT, one respondent commented:
I don't think it would be worth speaking to them because they'll give you a 
typical civil servant view, you won't get an honest viewpoint like you will off 
me. Too positive a picture will be painted and the barriers I've spoken to you 
about today won't be mentioned.
V
When I probed further, the respondent failed to identify a particular individual and I 
eventually used my own initiative to contact an affordable housing officer at the 
relevant local authority. Despite these drawbacks, sampling in this way was 
successful in identifying further participants, particularly those occupying strategic 
positions such as rural housing enablers38 and officers within local authorities. 
Combined with my commitment to locating sources of data that could offer insights 
into different circumstances and relationships, snowball sampling seemed to provide 
an effective fit with theoretical sampling and resulted in an intensive period of
38 A rural housing enabler is an individual employed to raise awareness of the need for rural housing and to 
work with stakeholders - communities, local authorities, landowners and planning authorities - to enable the 
development of rural housing. Posts are usually funded by local councils, often cutting across geographical 
areas, though they operate at arms-length .They are therefore seen to be an independent party when 
discussing housing issues.
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fieldwork between April and June 2010. The eventual sample was composed of 30 
interviews.
This sample was, however, limited in its composition. The nature of CLTs and their 
varying stages of development meant that it was not always possible to study each 
local context in the same manner. To illustrate, the relevant person within local 
authorities who felt able to comment on CLTs ranged from being located within 
community strategy departments to housing and planning departments, each 
approaching the topic from a different background. While efforts were made to 
triangulate as many different data points as possible, in some instances diverse 
perspectives and positions were difficult to identify and/or recruit to participate in the 
study.
The sample also failed to cover some potential rationales and hypotheses that fell 
outside the umbrella of CLTs and the people actively involved in their facilitation. As 
an example, a significant gap in analysing the role of rural CLTs in local governance 
over housing is the absence of interviews with parish council representatives, 
particularly in light of the literature documenting their role and influence in decision­
making over local housing developments (Yarwood, 2002; Sturzaker, 2010). As a 
result it is most accurate to describe this study as one that examines the dual issues 
of a CLT's claims to prominence in local housing governance and its reception by 
strategic stakeholders, as opposed to one that frames how these claims and this role 
plays out on an intra-community basis.
The emergent and changing nature of the CLT sector itself made it a difficult subject 
to study. At the outset of the study CLTs had only just been inserted into legislation 
and recognised by policymakers, but by its conclusion in 2011 they had been 
endorsed by an array of policymakers and their numbers had greatly increased. 
Theoretical sampling helped combat this to some extent, emphasising an iterative 
and ongoing research process, but the' time and resources available to me 
necessarily limited the extent to which I could fully explore many emerging concepts.
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For example, the provision of professional support and expertise by umbrella CLTs 
and housing associations was a phenomenon gaining increasing importance as 
fieldwork drew to a close. These issues are documented in the thesis but a wider 
variety of representatives would have been included in the sample had the study 
commenced at a later date.
j
Finally, the voice of CLTs is afforded significant weight in this thesis, a consequence 
of the sample being heavily weighted towards those actively involved in CLTs. This 
was partly because many potential stakeholders related but external to the direct 
facilitation to CLTs were reluctant to provide insight or comment on them due to a 
rudimentary understanding of their structures. If the study were to have begun and 
concluded later, it is possible that these people would have been more willing and 
able to participate as the CLT sector expanded. Furthermore, the extent to which the 
CLTs that participated in the study are representative of the present and future 
climate of CLTs could be questioned, largely due to the increased prominence and 
institutional support that is now available and documented in the analysis that 
follows. There is also a reliance on data from rural CLTs, something that is reflective 
of the greater development made in these locations in contrast to those in urban 
areas (Aird, 2010). Two urban CLTs were bxplored towards the end of fieldwork as 
their situations came to light but unfortunately the way their objectives were received 
and negotiated either by local authorities, community representatives and 
stakeholders or by financiers could not be explored due to time constraints. There is 
therefore a gap in the sample related to urban CLTs and, as a consequence, a 
limitation to their role and contribution made to the arguments in this thesis.
This section has aimed to justify the selection of qualitative research and the 
sampling strategies within this. In reflecting upon these issues I have aimed to 
acknowledge that the knowledge produced by qualitative research is "partial, 
provisional and perspectival” (Mauthner and Doucest, 2003, p. 416). It is contingent 
on the decisions taken by the researcher and its findings can be influenced not only
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by the way in which data is sought but also by the relationships formed between the 
researcher and the researched. It is to this subject that Section 4.2 turns.
4.2 Out in the field: studying CLTs
The fieldwork was conducted between October 2009 and December 2010, with a 
particularly intensive period undertaken between March and July 2010 (documented 
in appendix 3). In total 30 interviews were undertaken. While the data I use in this 
thesis is drawn only from the interviews I conducted and the documentary analysis 
that complements it, in this section I aim to reflect on the "social and intellectual 
baggage" (Rubin and Rubin, 1995, p. 14) I brought to fieldwork as a result of my 
personal involvement with the topic of study. Fieldwork was conducted concurrently 
to my period of employment promoting and working on CLTs and this had an 
inevitable effect on my ability to gain access to research participants and the field 
relations that were struck as a result.
Gaining access and conducting interviews
While generating a sample was ultimately successful for the purposes of this 
research, the process of gaining access to" potential participants was not without its 
problems. These are common challenges faced in social research: participants may 
be concerned as to the intended use and dissemination of the information they 
provide, they may stipulate certain requirements on their involvement (for example, 
assurance of anonymity) and fundamentally they may not wish to provide sensitive 
information or opinions to a stranger (Hornsby-Smith, 1993).
One method of overcoming these concerns is to form access relationships with
gatekeepers; those individuals who are well connected to the research topic and
area of study and with whom researchers strike a relationship. Contact with these
people should be constituted as an ongoing relationship rather than a one-off event
and their importance in validating the role of the researcher in the eyes of others
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should not be underestimated (Denscombe, 2007, p. 72). The relationships I had 
formed by initially attending CLT events and through my later employment working 
on their development helped facilitate the recruitment of participants along with the 
snowball sampling strategy. When I asked my first group of participants whether they 
were able to recommend contacts that could provide me with alternative viewpoints, 
most were willing to assist and would either provide names and contact details or act 
as a conduit between myself and the person they were recommending by contacting 
them on my behalf. Gatekeepers were usually happy to provide this informal 
sponsorship of my study on the basis tfiat they were familiar with me and my 
intentions (having met me either through employment or at CLT events).
Some contacts were also keen to participate for instrumental reasons. One person 
initially suggested that their individual CLT could form the entire basis of my study 
and, misinterpreting my intentions effectively asked me to undertake a 
comprehensive economic analysis of how their model was to be structured. Another 
CLT volunteer sent me an effusive e-mail expressing his happiness that research 
would be undertaken that would "bring the' barriers that are put in our way to light". 
The latter comment can also be traced to my employment working on CLTs and is 
illustrative of the multi-faceted role I was performing: promoter and campaigner on 
one hand and a neutral observer and objective researcher on the other. Having been 
introduced to me through my employment with Community Finance Solutions, this 
volunteer seemed to see my research as a piece of work that could lobby for 
obstructions to CLT development to be removed.
The period of fieldwork conducted between September and November 2009 involved 
field trips to the local areas in which CLTs were based. These were arranged mainly 
by telephone conversations with gatekeepers who were asked if they could help 
identify a suitable and secure venue for the interview. These ranged from the offices 
of local authorities and housing associations to village halls and a staff room at a 
local voluntary-run museum. Due to the remote locations of many rural CLTs, 
ranging from the North East to the South West, these trips were usually residential
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and involved an intensive period of two or three days interviewing key protagonists. 
Consent to record interviews was sought and granted in all cases, while I also 
introduced each interview by repeating the objectives of the research, the use of the 
data that would be recorded and by offering anonymity and confidentiality to 
respondents.
One of these trips involved conducting four interviews over two days as I sought to 
make the most of my time in a location that was difficult to visit. Although there may 
be benefits to such an intensive approach, not least deep engagement with the topic, 
in hindsight the pace of this fieldwork posed practical challenges. Rubin and Rubin 
(1995, p. 110) recommend that researchers build in 'buffer time' between the 
scheduling of interviews. This can aid not just the researcher's mindset, as 
interviewing involves high levels of interaction and concentration over extended 
periods of time, but also the research itself as periodic breaks allow for consideration 
and revision of the research design, set of questions and theoretical development 
based on the answers of other related interviewees
While still valid and useful data, I certainly felt that the value of these time limited and 
intensive trips away could have been improved had more time been available for 
reflection and iteration of the research design. When I began transcribing and 
analysing these interviews at a later date, I realised that I had failed to probe or 
address some key issues, especially in relation to themes that were cross-cutting 
across the interviews that had been conducted on the same trip. This was partly a 
product of my own inexperience and confidence as a student embarking on my first 
substantive piece of primary research, but also due to the exhaustive demands 
placed on my time and concentration during these trips. For example, questions 
could have been phrased differently or new topics introduced in order to cross- 
reference and corroborate important issues if there had been more time and space 
for reflection and analysis between interviews. This was a tactic that aided the 
research process from March 2010 onwards when telephone interviewing was 
introduced.
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Telephone interviewing yielded several practical and theoretical benefits. Practically, 
it quickly became apparent that field trips to multiple rural CLTs were not going to be 
financially possible. With a research budget of £750 per annum, the cost of the 
aforementioned field trips spiralled into three figures each as the remote location of 
CLTs demanded costly travel expenses and sometimes residential stays. By 
November 2009 I was in the formative days of fieldwork and still grappling with the 
complexities of conducting qualitative research and the topic itself, yet according to 
my budgetary constraints I was approximately halfway to concluding what could be 
realistically achieved in terms of field trips. Clearly, a more cost effective approach 
would be required if I wished to conduct interviews with a substantial number of 
CLTs.
The benefit for my theoretical development offered by telephone interviewing was 
the reduced turnaround time between conducting the interview and translating it into 
meaningful data that could then be interrogated. Rather than conducting an intensive 
period of fieldwork over a small number of days, which typically involved travelling 
long distances and returning with a large amount of data to transcribe and analyse, I 
was able to dedicate particular days and portions of my time to individual interviews. 
Dependent on other commitments, I would often schedule an interview for the 
morning and begin its transcription that afternoon, allowing a process of research 
design and analysis that was much more responsive to emerging topics and 
theoretical development than my previous efforts.
This proved to be a productive strategy and the first set of people interviewed in this 
way were people that I had previously met and formed a relationship with, though as 
my sample snowballed my relationship with interviewees began to change. Access 
to interviewees was now not done on a face-to-face basis but via telephone or, more 
commonly, e-mail. My preference was to e-mail participants where possible as it 
allowed me to clearly and concisely articulate the nature of the research and attach a 
sample interview guide so that respondents could easily ascertain the nature of the 
research, but while in the past the outcome of this would be a face-to-face interview
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the process was now one of arranging a convenient time to talk over the telephone. 
Sturges and Hanrahan (2004, p. 115) cast doubt on the viability of this approach as 
visual familiarity can help strike relationships and rapport during the interview 
process, something which telephone interviewing can never accomplish if the two 
parties have never met. The problem becomes less one of the researcher being an 
unknown face asking for potentially sensitive information and more one of becoming 
an 'invisible voice' that seeks information and does not establish the same reciprocal 
personal relationship that meeting someone in person can provide. This, however, 
did not appear to pose any significant problems in recruiting individuals, bar the 
occasional failure of a participant to respond to requests for their participation, a 
challenge common to sample recruitment no matter what the interview method is.
One area where telephone interviewing pales in comparison to meeting people in 
person is its lack of subconscious visual aids and clues that can impact upon data 
quality. When speaking face-to-face, respondents will often respond with verbal cues 
- hesitations, sighs, facial expressions - that can signal their comfort or confidence 
with the answer they are giving, while these physical responses can also indicate 
whether the researcher should ask a follow-up question or probe the subject in more 
depth. Alongside these aids, when conducting fieldwork in person I had been able to 
demonstrate my interest in the CLT and its local area by asking questions about the 
physical environment we found ourselves in. One participant showed me around a 
local museum on the way to the interview venue to show me an image of the local 
area before their housing development had been completed, while another had 
brought along a local architect to give me a tour of the CLT's construction site. These 
trips all helped establish a previously non-existent rapport and placed the 
relationship between the participants and myself at ease, as well as familiarising 
myself with the background and tenets of their scheme. One effect of this was that 
the discourse of the interview was more fluent than I had anticipated, becoming less 
rigid and reliant on the interviewer introducing and maintaining dialogue and instead 
allowing the participant to do the majority of the talking and lead discussion in line 
with the semi-structured interview guide.
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An initial concern with telephone interviews was that this fluency may be lost. Having 
described my research clearly in an e-mail and provided a list of the questions I 
wished to ask, there were instances were respondents became reliant on the order 
of the questions and would provide rigid responses to each question. The process 
was contingent on me asking the questions which would in turn garner a sometimes 
inflexible response that barely scratched the surface of the research questions.
This became less of a problem as I became more comfortable and experienced with 
interviewing. I developed better lines of questioning by developing bespoke probe 
questions prior to each interview depending on my relationship with the interviewee 
(the extent to which their circumstances were already known to me). Probe 
questions encourage the interviewee to provide specific examples, evidence or 
scenarios of events as well as encouraging elaboration and clarifying ambiguities 
(Fielding, 1993, p. 144). A common issue was to explore the relationship between 
the purpose and advantage of community-led organisations and the provision of 
affordable housing, so when many respondents stated with no ambiguity that their 
aim was to "develop housing that is more affordable" my probe questions would turn 
to the subjects of how they may define affordable, for whom the housing should be 
provided and what the advantage was of a voluntary group providing affordable 
housing in comparison to another provider. This would usually elicit more in-depth 
and colourful accounts of the perceived benefits of a CLT, though sometimes greater 
inquisition was required (as described in more depth in the following sub-section).
Furthermore, when interviewing over the telephone I sometimes felt more capable of 
reacting spontaneously to issues raised by the interviewee. In particular, one 
telephone interviewee led the conversation and provided a grand narrative of his 
involvement with a local CLT that lasted for approximately 30 minutes with very few 
questions being asked. During this time I was sat at a desk and able to make 
extensive notes of which questions I had been unable to ask and topics I wished to 
probe further in the interview without disturbing his narrative. While it is possible to 
do this during a face-to-face interview, I found that note taking would sometimes
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disturb an interviewee's monologue or make them feel uncomfortable. In one 
instance an interviewee stopped talking and asked me outright what it was that I was 
writing so extensively. I explained that it was nothing incriminating and merely some 
issues that I wished to follow up, but the flow of her argument was lost and the
f
interview restarted with me asking another question and potentially valuable data 
lost.
There is, therefore, no reason why telephone interviewing should impact significantly 
on the quality of data in comparison to interviewing in person. Rather, all methods of 
qualitative data collection are themselves fraught with several challenges posed by 
the predispositions of the parties involved and the visual and oral signals that each 
express. These issues contribute to the messy, non-linear and rarely ordered nature 
of qualitative research in practice; the intimacy it involves and the interpersonal 
relationships that are struck will always pose many dilemmas related to data quality 
and data use (Ellis, 2005).
»
The role of the researcher: supporter or detractor?
One dilemma I faced was the extent to which my close involvement with the topic 
under study would determine the configuration of my interviews. I was conscious I 
had to adopt an impartial stance during interviews, making it clear that I was acting 
as a researcher in my own right39 rather than for the organisation that had employed 
me to promote CLTs. I was also keen to try and preserve my interviews as an area 
of critical space, to suspend my own postulations and assumptions of the subject 
and encourage interviewees to open up and give their personal interpretations and 
accounts. This conduct is commonly referred to as bracketing (Holloway, 1997, p.
39 Although researching independently, I did of course hold an institutional affiliation to Sheffield Hallam 
University as my place of study. I was therefore also keen to try and distinguish between my respective roles as 
CLT promoter and graduate researcher to try and avoid Confusion as to which institution I was directly or 
indirectly representing.
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29) and is designed to ensure the researcher is at least conscious that their 
knowledge, interests and prejudices have the potential to direct the responses given 
by interviewees if they become too overt.
The extent to which this is possible may be questioned; we do not plan, design andi
conduct social research projects without some sort of interest or idea of what it is we 
want to explore (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Yet, bracketing is at least one of the 
many facets of the “reflexive turn” in qualitative research. Researchers are 
encouraged to continually reflect on the way knowledge is created and scrutinise the 
external influences and contingencies that may affect these constructions, including 
the role of their own knowledge, assumptions and biographies (Mauthner and 
Doucest, 2003). In this sub-section and the one that follows my aim is to unpack my 
own positionality and the way this may have directly or indirectly manipulated the 
processes of data collection and analysis'. While I reflect on the impact my own 
perceptions and expectations may have influenced the research in the section that 
follows, here I focus on the researcher’s powerlessness in bracketing the 
perceptions and expectations research subjects have of both the researcher and the 
research itself, particularly when the personal identity and biography of the
f
researcher is well known.
As an insider to the world of CLTs, my interviewees could be crudely divided into two 
groups of people: those who knew me and those who did not, of which there was 
roughly an even split. The former category were usually people I had originally met 
at the CLT seminars at the outset of my research and had become further known to 
them through employment at Community Finance Solutions. Both groups of people 
performed a mix of roles, including not just CLT representatives but those from local 
authorities or other strategic backgrounds. It was my role as a campaigner and 
supporter of CLTs that became predominant in their eyes, even if they themselves 
were external to the formation and operation of a CLT. I often felt as if I was seen as 
someone working alongside CLTs towards a common goal, which from one 
perspective I was as a paid employee, but on the other I was seeking to maintain
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impartiality and neutrality as much as I could when conducting my research. As the 
study progressed, interviews with people l: had already met would often begin with 
relaxed and friendly conversations about issues that were inconsequential to the 
research as a result of the commonalities struck through my employment. With the 
second group of interviewees -  those who had never met me and did not know me -  
I revealed my background in explaining that I had been employed to work on CLTs 
but stressed that I was aiming to speak With them as an independent observer of 
CLT events as opposed to someone promoting the CLT concept.
It was easier to maintain this critical space with the latter group. That is not to say 
that interviews with people that were known to me were of no use; more that some of 
this group of people had particular expectations of what my research should be 
which required subtle research management. Some saw me as a supporter and 
campaigner and as a person who could utilise my (in their eyes) secondary position 
as a PhD researcher to get inside influential circles such as policymakers. One 
member of a CLT in particular saw my research as an opportunity to gain access to 
people within national government in a way that he couldn’t:
t
I would be very interested if you could use your PhD to see these people, to 
speak to these people, because you can get and push the view whereas 
people like me are seen as advocates.
My response to this was to try and temper such expectations, usually by 
downplaying both the impact my research could possibly hold -  not many PhD 
theses are likely to be read by the government’s Housing Minister - and the extent to 
which I would actually be able to arrange interviews with people as influential and 
socially distant as government ministers. This type of scenario is illustrative of 
England’s (1994, p. 249) argument that researchers cannot conveniently hide their 
personal biographies behind their professional research process, as it is often the 
personal relationships struck in qualitative research that gain access to the material. 
I often supplicated potential research participants by accentuating my commonality
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with them in order to smoothly arrange interviews, for example by mentioning a 
person that was a mutual contact or by introducing myself in relation to a common 
experience (“This is Tom Moore, we met over coffee at last month’s CLT conference 
in ChesterJ). )'
It is then perhaps no surprise that some people may have held these expectations, 
yet the extent to which I continued to stress these commonalities throughout the 
interview varied according to the answers I was given. Wengraf (2001) distinguishes 
between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ interview strategies. The former strategy involves a line of 
questioning that seeks to build narration, often through questions that elicit a grand 
tour of the subject with a series of probe questions to add colour to the participant’s 
account. My interview guide was usually designed on this basis in order to introduce 
topics and open up discussion. Often, however, I found myself leaning towards a 
harder interview strategy whereby a question is in a way that poses alternative 
scenarios or contradictions in relation to the respondent’s account. While respecting 
the confidentiality of other participants and attempting to avoid leading participants, I 
would sometimes juxtapose the interviewee’s account in reference to this material by 
beginning a sentence with “One alternative point of view could be that allocating 
housing purely according to local connection may not be the most effective strategy; 
what do you think of this?”
The tendency towards hard interviewing strategies would usually be a spontaneous 
decision, sometimes borne out of frustration at linear narrations that failed to offer 
much insight into the placement of CLTs either locally or within wider social, political 
and economic contexts. These scenarios Were much more common with people I 
knew who seemed to assume that I shared their knowledge and view of the CLT 
world, whereas the participants with whom I had no previous relationship were often 
more nuanced in their accounts. For example, throughout one interview my 
respondent repeatedly bemoaned that the wider CLT sector was suffering from
.V
“mission creep” and had become “indistinguishable from the values underpinning it 
that went before” without ever detailing what these values were or meant, often
136
finishing sentences with phrases such as “y °u know what I mean” presumably in 
reference to my assumed level of knowledge.
Eventually, my response was to provide a counter-argument that the values I 
recognised as inherent to CLTs -  of being formed and led by volunteers in a local 
area -  were still evident and that I didn’t necessarily recognise the “mission creep” 
he mentioned. This stimulated discussion as to the values upon which the 
respondent had based his efforts in forming a CLT: a structure that emphasised 
“social value rather than economic value” and one that orientated towards “good 
community governance and responsibility over representative democracy”.
This harder line explicated the values he had previously mentioned and provided 
valuable perspective on CLTs that extended into the wider theoretical framework, 
though this reflexive interviewing strategy was also as problematic on occasions as it 
was successful. In particular, I was conscious of the need to balance the quest for a 
good quote with a fair and impartial line of questioning, reminding myself that I was a 
qualitative researcher rather than a “tabloid journalist” (Ellis, 2005, p. 30). A 
legitimate criticism of introducing these cbunter-scenarios could be that they are 
designed to incite reactions from participants and represent a research tactic that 
leads the respondent and opens the door for them to provide a specific response. 
Additionally, posing these counter arguments to people who saw me as a supporter 
of CLTs occasionally shifted the role of interrogator to the respondent who would 
question the origin of this argument and whether it was my own opinion. During one 
interview the respondent became unreceptive to my line of questioning and tried to 
instigate debate as he had interpreted my introduction of a counter argument as a 
direct dispute of his point of view. In these instances a tactful response was 
necessary, perhaps relating my point to a line of argument mentioned as a barrier to 
CLTs at a public event or to a piece of publicly available work. This was important 
not only to smooth the interview process but to respect the anonymity and 
confidentiality of alternative data sources that may have expressed similar points of 
view to my counter arguments. '
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While the dual role I have discussed in this sub-section is perhaps related more to 
the purpose and eventual use of the data this research generates as opposed to its 
quality, these challenges ultimately validate the views of Marshall and Rossman 
(1989, p. 21) that, although presented as pristine and logical, qualitative research is 
typically “confusing, messy, intensely frustrating and fundamentally non-linear”. The 
textbook approach may describe a process that moves from the definition of 
research questions, to identifying and recrujting participants, to conducting interviews 
and analysing data in a seamless arrangement, but the reality of this study has been 
different.
This was partly due to the unfolding local and political situations in which the majority 
of CLTs, and therefore my study, were engaged in, but equally it was related to my 
immersion in the topic of study. This raised practical dilemmas not just in relation to 
my data collection but as to how I transformed this data from interesting information 
to meaningful academic conclusions. Bryman (2004, p. 411) warns against the 
practice of acting as a “mere mouthpiece” for research subjects by simply reporting 
what they said and did, a practice that can occur when a researcher is concerned 
that their interpretations may “contaminate their subjects’ words and behaviours”. It 
was easy for me to relate to this possibility ;due to my immersion in the topic and the 
expectations others had of my research, yet the move from qualitative data collection 
to analysis is significant as it is when the process of interpretation and theorising 
occurs. I was therefore conscious of the need to demarcate the boundaries between 
my role as a promoter of CLTs and my independence as a researcher, and of the 
academic obligation to translate the richness of my empirical data into findings with 
theoretical and intellectual import.
4.3 Constructing a narrative: transcribing and analysing data
Data analysis is the stage of the study where research work begins to acquire 
significance, as the array of empirical data is coded into meaningful themes and 
broader explanations of the phenomena under study can be produced (Bryman,
2004, p. 410). It is, though, a practice and art of interpretation led by the researcher 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 909) and it is therefore important to justify and explain 
the analytical procedures I undertook to reach the cross-cutting themes described in 
the empirical findings of this research.
In writing this thesis I have been confronted with the challenge of making sense of 
over 50 hours of recorded material collected during my fieldwork phases. While this 
sounds like a significant task, in reality the analysis and interpretation of data has not 
merely been a pragmatic step that is undertaken after fieldwork has taken place but 
before putting pen to paper, and has instead been an ongoing process embedded 
into the study since my first interview was completed. I began to grapple with my 
data from the formative days of my study, reflecting on the quality and pertinence of 
the material that was emerging and amending my strategies of data collection 
accordingly. This responsive approach was particularly useful early in the study 
when I shifted from intensive interviewing periods that were divorced from data 
transcription and analysis, to an approach that built in periods of time for me to 
identify and consider themes that may cut across interviews.
All participants agreed to be recorded and all interviews were transcribed in full, bar 
two that were unintelligible when the recording was played back due to the acoustics 
of the room used for interviewing. In these instances I was reliant upon the 
handwritten notes I had made during and after the interview, and in one case 
decided to conduct a second interview with one of the participants in order to explore 
further issues. I found that transcribing data as soon as possible after interviews was 
a useful tactic in establishing my familiarity with the data, acting as a continuation of 
the engagement and “conversational partnerships” stuck with participants (Rubin and 
Rubin, 1995, p. 121). It also enabled me to identify cross-cutting themes that could 
be introduced or explored in more depth in future interviews. Transcription and the 
initial analysis of data did not occur in a vacuum from data collection itself; instead it 
was an inductive approach whereby the analysis and collection of data overlapped 
and fed into each other.
Having transcribed interviews, I typically began analysing data by coding portions of 
text and quotes to categories related to the research questions. Coding is the 
“process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing and categorizing 
data” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 61). This was done electronically, usually using 
tabulations for each broad category with different columns for rudimentary themes 
and subjects within these. For example, under the category “financial arrangements”i
I had “access to public subsidy” as a theme to which various portions of text were
fcoded, while other categories were created to classify data related to subjects such 
as allocation policies, perspectives on local and national government facilitation, and 
the role of planning authorities. I also created categories for loose theoretical 
references, for example “desires for CLT autonomy”, “degrees of empowerment” and 
categories for each rationale for community governance provided by Lowndes and 
Sullivan’s (2008) framework, each of which relates loosely to some of the theoretical 
propositions outlined in Chapters 2 and 3.
This provided a way into exploring the data I had generated, making it more 
manageable and as more interviews were conducted, transcribed and analysed I 
was able begin to compare and contrast the accounts provided by different 
participants. Coding was an iterative process that involved adding, dropping and 
renaming categories as fieldwork progressed, producing more nuanced categories 
as extra data revealed itself to sharpen initial observations. This progression also 
involved returning to the interviews conducted at the outset of fieldwork in line with 
the evolution of my coding. Importantly, this task did not just identify patterns and 
similarities between interviews but it also identified convergence between themes 
within existing categories. As an example, when coding under the headings of 
“planning”, “relations with local authorities” and “financial arrangements”, I regularly 
detected dissatisfaction with strategic stakeholders in each of these disciplines 
among CLT representatives.
This highlights a key aspect of the coding process. At the beginning of data analysis, 
codes were quite descriptive, for example with reference to ‘enabling factors’ and
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‘barriers’. As data amassed over time, these codes became more interpretive as my 
understanding of and familiarity with the context in which CLTs were operating in 
developed. This involved moving away from simply coding a portion of text from a 
transcript and citing it as a ‘barrier’, towards an interpretation of why that may be the 
case related to the theoretical literature that influenced the pathway of the research. 
For example, it became clear that the barriers stakeholders were citing may relate to 
perceptions of the competency, capacity and effectiveness of forms of community- 
led organisation that required regulation and accountability, which in turn influence 
the institutionalisation of CLTs and the types of organisations that are created. As 
such, coding elucidated themes that not only stated that community development 
may be incompatible with the requirements or usual methods of working of external 
stakeholders, but considered why this might be the case in relation to the theoretical 
analysis that framed the study.
While a useful tactic in breaking down a vast amount of data, coding is not without its 
pitfalls. Strauss and Corbin (1998) warn that the richness of much qualitative data 
can be lost as researchers come to their analysis stage “wearing blinders” and with a 
baggage of assumptions, experience and immersion in the literature that limits their 
perspective.
Reflecting on this, it is certainly possible that my own immersion in the field could 
have brought my personal assumptions a'nd knowledge to the fore when coding. 
Indeed, it is these assumptions upon which the choice of theoretical sampling was 
based, as the researcher uses their knowledge to identify participants in relation to 
events and places of particular interest to the subject. When it comes to coding data 
the researcher’s familiarity with the interview, participant or situation can place an 
expectation in their mind as to the type of material they should be looking for. While 
acknowledging there is a selective element in deciding what to code and in relation 
to which theoretical propositions, I was conscious of returning to my data on multiple 
occasions, often reading through transcripts in their entirety several times in order to 
try and capture all the relevant insights that were there. Furthermore the evolution of
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my coding strategy involved revising or discarding topics and themes, a process that 
was responsive to my growing familiarity with the data and alert to the need for a 
transparent outlook as to the varied ways of interpreting and understanding the vast 
amount of data I had gathered.
These ongoing processes were also aimed at addressing the problem of dividing 
portions of text from their context. When coding data, the researcher is essentially 
looking for several bitesize chunks that hold explanatory power for the research 
questions, yet qualitative interviews are not always configured in such a manner. 
Rubin and Rubin (1995, p. 231) note that interviewees often provide their answers in 
the form of narration or story designed to make a point that either cannot or will not 
be made by them in a direct way. Clearly using chunks of text and quotes that paint 
a picture of their argument is problematic where this occurs, as it removes them from 
the context of narration. While some interviewees provided small narratives of 
particular scenarios, for example a meeting with a funding agency, only one 
participant elected to provide a grand narrative of his involvement with CLTs from 
start to finish. This account was given chronologically and primarily related to a vote 
that had occurred over the plans of the local CLT. Recognising my preoccupation 
with composing themes built around the comparison of segmented text from different 
interviews, I analysed this interviewee’s narrative alongside accounts from the same 
circumstance (i.e. those involved with the same CLT) in order to maintain a sense 
and knowledge of the context in which it was based. This also links to the issue of 
interpretation by the researcher.
As described, coding also involves a significant element of interpretation by the 
researcher. It moves from being descriptive of the issues raised in interviews to one 
that interprets transcripts in relation to emerging categories and themes. While this is 
done in relation to the theoretical literature used to frame the research, I was 
conscious of not imposing personal assumptions and theoretical interpretations on 
my data, but to look at how this data could support or question the theoretical
literature and interpretive propositions that emerged. It was therefore a two-way
■ i 
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process where the theoretical background and assumptions I brought to data 
analysis were also scrutinised in terms of their validity and worth to the material. This 
process was also done in tandem with my attendance at several CLT practitioner 
seminars and events which enabled me to reflect on the interpretations I was making 
in relation to my understanding of processes on the ground.
Ethical considerations
The care around the use of data in the analytical process was also borne out of a 
desire to avoid misrepresenting the words of individuals. Qualitative research is 
mired in ethical dilemmas relating to the interpretation and accurate representation of 
the data it generates (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). Furthermore, in researching an area 
subject to unfolding debates and negotiations between stakeholders concurrent to 
the study, as opposed to studying historical events, there was added political 
sensitivity in analysing and disseminating this data. This sub-section addresses the 
underlying ethical procedures of this research. While ethical implications of research 
are commonly assumed to relate to research involving intrusion in areas of personal 
privacy, ethnographic methods of observation, and the study of vulnerable 
populations, for any study to be fully transparent to its participants it must make clear 
the implications of their collection and use of data and establish a "climate of trust" 
(Israel and Hay, 2006, p. 3) between the researcher and participants.
When approaching participants to seek their involvement in the research, I was 
seeking not only their fundamental agreement to take part but to obtain their 
informed consent. To obtain informed consent, the social researcher is required to 
articulate the subject and purpose of the research, the expectations of participants 
and how the data is to be used and disseminated. The purpose of obtaining informed 
consent is to address "relationships with research participants, sponsors, funders, 
covert research, anonymity, privacy and confidentiality" (Hornsby-Smith, 1993, p. 
63). I attempted to achieve this throughout the course of interview relationships with 
participants. First, when initially approaching them I sought to clearly articulate the
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focus of the research, the reason for approaching them and how I had identified 
them as a potential participant. I also attached an interview schedule to indicate the 
precise issues I hoped to explore. Second, at the outset of every interview (both in 
person and over the telephone) I sought permission to record the conversation. 
Finally, it was made clear to participants that I was undertaking a doctorate and that 
the purpose of gathering data was to contribute to the research itself.
With this in mind, participants were offered anonymity and confidentiality in the 
interview process. Only one interviewee expressly stated he did not wish for his 
name to be attached to anything he said, though others would often slip in phrases 
such as “you’d better not quote me on that actually” or “is this going to be made 
public anytime soon?” after discussing what they thought to be sensitive issues. The 
world of CLTs is a small one at a national level, let alone on an intra-community or 
intra-organisation basis, and participants were in these instances concerned about 
saying anything incriminating that could threaten their plans for development. As 
these were sometimes ambiguous statements and it was not always clear which 
parts of the transcript they were referring to, I felt it was important to allow 
participants to comment on the transcript of interviews. This was e-mailed to 
participants after the interview and in circumstances where I felt there may be 
concern or sensitivity over excerpts of the text I would specifically refer to this part of 
the text and ask if I was able to use the material. The standard response to this was 
for me to be granted permission to use the material provided it was referenced under 
a pseudonym, though some individuals also replied to say they did not wish me to 
use specific excerpts at all.
The use of pseudonyms is by no means a failsafe tactic as the particular 
circumstances by which CLTs have obtained land or secured funding will be known 
to those involved with their development. In many cases they have also been 
reported in local and national press and, as the subsequent findings argue, each 
CLT is relatively unique in itself as its organisational structure and development is 
reflective of particular local circumstances. However, for the purposes of discretion
144
and respecting the wishes of some of my participants, I have taken care to hide the 
identities of many of the people and places in this study. Presenting the data in this 
way presents challenges in itself, with the potential loss of context being most critical 
in relation to the arguments that are made. In particular, I have anonymised the 
identities of stakeholders in Wales, for example by referring to a local authority in 
North Wales simply as "North Wales Local Authority". This was a personal decision 
taken to avoid the creation of possible future conflict: CLT development in Wales had 
stalled and some of the interview data was highly critical of the role individual 
stakeholders had played in this. Furthermore, the purpose of CLTs in these areas 
was still being defined and debated during the study and I felt that, while very useful 
to the research, presentation of which participants said what could create 
unnecessary political sensitivity were it to find its way into the public domain.
Additionally, a scenario involving intra-community contestation is presented in the 
analysis chapters. Here, a CLT is presented as a "Village CLT in the South West", 
with an interest group that is integral to the findings is described as a "Village Interest 
Group". One interviewee had specifically requested anonymity, but his views are 
presented alongside others within the community. Therefore, to identify even one 
participant in this situation would have led to easy identification of them all, including 
the person who had requested to be anonymised.
All transcripts and audio files were stored electronically and were password- 
protected in order to avoid inappropriate access to (and misuse of) the data.
In addition to the ethical procedures that I considered during the course of fieldwork, 
I felt it important to feed back the findings of the research to participants at its 
conclusion. This was particularly the case as participants were not given the 
opportunity to comment on the final use of the data in the thesis. A research briefing 
paper was written and circulated to participants in spring 2012. This outlined the key 
findings of the research, linking them to existing policy and practice that CLTs are 
concerned with. A presentation was also given to the elected board of the National
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CLT Network, a membership-based practitioner organisation formed to represent 
CLTs at a national level. 6
Conclusion
This chapter has aimed to make explicit the decisions and procedures undertaken 
during the design, implementation and analysis of my research.
It began by justifying the selection of qualitative research as the primary means of 
investigating CLTs, arguing that the unfolding landscape of the CLT sector 
necessitated an approach that was sensitive to time, context and individual 
perspective in assessing the conditions under which particular events led to 
particular outcomes. Semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis were thei
methods used to undertake the study with a combination of theoretical and snowball 
sampling used to generate a sample of participants.
Conducting research into CLTs during this time frame was not without its 
complexities. The context in which CLTs were operating was evolving and the 
majority of participants were positioning their CLTs to acquire resources and be seen 
as legitimate community representatives and providers of local housing. As such, 
many respondents had expectations of what the research may bring, particularly due 
to my prior involvement with the CLT sector in other aspects of my life. Adjoined to 
the expectations of those who did take part was the issue of those who didn’t. The 
composition of the sample is disparate and heavily weighted towards the voice of 
CLT representatives. This was due in part to the emergent nature of CLTs and the 
research itself; in many instances potential participants viewed me as holding the 
requisite knowledge to answer their own questions on CLTs, which were sometimes 
precisely the issues I was trying to explore.1
There are therefore some methodological imperfections with this study, though its 
strength has been its responsiveness to the changing social and political climate in
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which CLTs are placed. Far from following the logical research path that effortlessly 
glides from a research question and review of the literature, to research design, data 
collection and analysis, my own process of knowledge production has been one of 
complexity and ambiguity. Data sources have been sometimes difficult to identify, 
while those who have participated have sometimes seen me not only as an ‘insider’ 
but also as someone who can give something back to their mission, raising several 
dilemmas as to the analysis and use of material.
However, in many senses the non-linear nature of the methodological approach 
presented here remains best suited to understanding the unsteady terrain within 
which the topic has been placed during this period. Much like the process of studying 
them, CLTs have been riddled with complexities and ambiguities with the clear 
demarcations presented in the literature as to their purpose and function often 
overlapping and colliding with wider structural forces. The flexible and responsive 
nature of qualitative research is what allows us to explore why and how thesei
complexities exist and are tackled within their local contexts, allowing an approach to 
sampling and fieldwork that is as dynamic is  the topic of CLTs itself.
T
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Chapter 5: The rationales underpinning 
CLT formation
As the introduction of this thesis suggested, CLTs are premised on their ability to 
increase the supply of affordable housing in areas where this is lacking due to a 
combination of high house prices and the tensions between high demand and low 
supply. However, there remains a lack of clarity regarding the processes that may or 
may not achieve this, a shortage of information as to what constitutes local housing 
need as defined by CLTs and little investigation into the manner in which the 
devolution of authority and decision-making to CLTs will play out.
The empirical chapters of this thesis aim to unpick these issues, beginning with an 
investigation into the underlying rationales that lead to the formation and 
development of CLTs. In order to investigate these, this chapter focuses on the 
creation of CLTs in rural and urban locations and the engagement of strategic 
stakeholders, illuminating their fundamental reasons for forming and engaging with a 
CLT. It is argued that communitarian values relating to the value of locally identified 
need, local knowledge and local community governance and democracy are 
influential factors. The formation of CLTs is based on giving communities a greater 
say in how housing is decided, provided and governed at a local level.
To illustrate this, the chapter is split into three main sections. The first of these
focuses on the motivations and drivers for CLTs. This uncovers the 'push' factors
that have provoked individuals to form a CLT, and the 'puli' factors that attract them
to doing so. In short, it finds that disillusionment with the implementation of
government housing and planning policies have been a key factor in the instigation
of CLTs, who respond by seeking to localise decision-making and governance of
housing. This often manifests as a form of local organisation that is thought to
provide a competitive advantage over other forms of provision because of a CLT's
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local knowledge and capacity to effect local change. It argues that CLTs are 
premised on their ability to protect local needs over and above external influence, 
based on a constellation of significant community influence, independence and the 
fostering of civic relationships built on community consensus.
The final section considers the strategic response to CLTs from elected officials,
i
gaining an insight into the potential role? and influence of community. Here it is 
argued that the examples of Cornwall and High Bickington show local authority 
support for the role of CLTs, though community consensus is not assumed to be a 
panacea nor an end in itself. The chapter then concludes by discussing the 
implications of the adoption of rationales are underpinned by communitarian 
philosophies. Here, the supremacy of community in identifying and meeting the 
needs of its members is emphasised due to its proximity and ability to build 
consensus.
5.1 The motivations: "government inaction and market failure"
The rise of community land ownership schemes in rural Scotland has been led by an 
instrumental motivation of reversing traditional patterns of private feudal land tenure. 
This system was perceived to confer too much power over land use decisions to 
private owners to the detriment of a geographic community (Satsangi, 2007). In 
England and Wales, the initial drivers appear to have focused more on land valuation 
than patterns of land ownership, and more specifically the impact land values have 
on housing supply and affordability. Large (2009) argues that while contemporary 
CLT developments take their lead from philosophical ideals of community land 
ownership, tangible socio-economic factors are key instigating factors:
t
The starting point is the preservation of land for the benefit of the community 
in which it is situated. However, the overwhelming weight of the impetus 
behind the contemporary movement lies in the housing crisis and the lack of 
affordable housing for working people and those on low incomes. The context
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is government inaction in the face of massive housing market failure and 
inequity. So forward thinking neighbourhoods, villages and towns decide to 
provide housing themselves.
Large (2009, p. 195)
The two dimensions of market failure and the lack of corrective government action 
described by Large were commonly cited b^ research participants as push factors for 
CLT start-ups. Of particular concern was the failure to ensure a steady supply of 
affordable housing, especially since the sale of council housing through the right to 
buy:
Rural development in Thatcher's day with the introduction of the right to buy 
meant that a lot of villages ended up with no affordable housing in them and 
affordable housing was limited anyway, a lot of homes that would have been 
affordable have been sold as second homes.
Chief Executive, Housing Association, North East
The housing association represented by this interviewee was partnering with Holy 
Island CLT, based on the island of Lindisfarne. The right to buy had changed the 
status of a proportion of the local housing stock in the community, from sub-market 
rental properties to ones that were now available on the open market. As a popular 
tourist destination and designated area of outstanding natural beauty, this led to 
inflated house prices as a result of high demand. Of the 11 council homes in the 
community, nine had been sold in this way:
In the early 1990s we felt the way we were going, a community of 150-160
people, we fell into the same category of most rural areas now where homes
come up for sale and they go to city people who want a second home or
holiday home, and they're paying higher prices than local people could afford.
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The council housing had stopped being built. There was, I think, 1540 council 
houses but when the Conservatives went and said "well you can buy your 
council house", well they did, and now there's only two which belong to the 
new housing association that took over in April this year [2009].
Chair, Holy Island CLT
The general perception was that the original council housing stock had performed a
social function in the community, guaranteeing affordable allocation of housing toIpeople in housing need and ensuring a demographic balance was maintained in a 
high value area popular with seasonal visitors. Policy that allowed the use of these 
properties to be determined by free market forces through the right to buy was seen 
to favour those with the financial capabilities to purchase their home on the open 
market and disadvantage local households seeking affordable rental 
accommodation. Therefore, the free market may have been functioning in a way 
seen to fail local households:
We do a lot of rural housing. W e try to put back housing that in a way 
shouldn't have been sold and hold it in perpetuity, so in that way you're 
holding housing there that should be available. I think that the government 
policy in terms of affordability in the rural areas is not particularly good, the 
Taylor report highlights that, something has to be done.
Chief Executive, Housing Association, North East
40 There is a discrepancy between the figure quoted by the interviewee and the figure described in the 
paragraph that precedes this quotation. The latter - available in an internal review provided to me by the CLT - 
was gleaned from official publicly available data.
It's a wider political view in that ultimately most government policy drives 
people towards home ownership. That's the key isn't it, for decades we've 
driven home ownership as the answer to prove you're getting on in society, 
you're getting on the ladder, so I think ultimately probably right to buy was 
more better than worse but it's had some really bad effects like here.
CLT support worker, Holy Island CLT
According to an internal review provided to me by the CLT, no home had been 
purchased by someone born in the community since 1995 and second home 
ownership was estimated to account for .55 per cent of the local housing stock. 
During my field visit to the CLT I heard several anecdotes as to the escalating ratio 
between property values and local incomes.
The internal review summarised the "bad effects" the CLT support worker spoke of:
In 1993, high house prices, restricted housing stock and low seasonal 
incomes combined to paint a very sorry picture for residents wishing to buy or 
rent a home on the island. It was this desperate need for affordable rented 
accommodation which acted as the catalyst leading to the creation of the 
trust.
Holy Island CLT Internal Review (2005)
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This accommodation was needed to rebalance the island's demographics which 
were thought to be imbalanced by a high number of second homes populated by 
retired occupants that made seasonal use of their properties:
When we set off we hoped for younger families [to stay] because we felt the 
population was ageing a bit because people were coming here to retire, we
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felt that unless we did something on our own we're gonna lose the young 
people from the island.
Chair, Holy Island CLT
The idea of local people independently and positively attempting to address this 
housing issue partly originated from the inability of local authorities to meet the local 
needs. This inability was created not only by the right to buy and the accompanying 
diminishment in council housing stock, but also through the redefined role local 
authorities played in housing, moving from direct provision and development to a 
strategic enabling role by the end of the 1990s (Ginsburg, 2005).41 Furthermore, it 
had been felt that the time, expertise, funding and economies of scale (or lack 
thereof) involved in developing small-scale rural housing had dissuaded housing 
associations from developing rental housing. As such the CLT began to see the 
remedial action needed to restore population demographics as its responsibility:
I think if I were to talk about the CLT, it's emerged because of a lack of a local 
authority offer at the time. They were finding that a lot of the affordable 
housing had been sold, so to retain younger people and families and the 
school, their view was they needed to create more affordable housing. 
They worked with the local authority to try and facilitate that but it didn't 
happen so they decided they would do it on their own.
Chief Executive, Housing Association, North East
v
41 It should also be noted that local authorities were unable to reinvest the money generated by the sale of 
council housing under the right to buy into housing stock; instead it could only be used to redeem debts.
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It is possible to identify the push factors of housing policies thought to disadvantage 
low income households and government inaction in the formation of the Holy Island 
CLT, though clearly the ability of local government to act was constrained by 
financial circumstances and their reduced involvement in housing delivery. There 
were also pull factors emerging as a consequence of the community's situation. 
Firstly, rental housing which could be protected from the market and held in 
perpetuity was seen as key to meeting the needs of local residents and key workers. 
Secondly, the CLT sought to exercise some influence over the allocation of these 
properties and meet the needs of a specific clientele. These points were illustrated 
by stakeholders in interviews:
There needed to be a very sharply focused lettings policy that was specific to 
encouraging existing families and young families with children et cetera, that 
was where the target needed to be and that's the way it has been followed.
CLT support worker, North East
We've got it so the houses cannot be sold. That's a key thing as well, that 
these houses belong to the community and cannot be sold, and we felt that 
was important because what was the point in doing all this work if the tenants 
had the right to acquire or right to buy them.
Chair, Holy Island CLT
The CLT adopted the view that they were there primarily to meet the needs of ay
specific local population in response to the push factors outlined above. The 
sentiments expressed by the Holy Island CLT were common to CLTs in other rural 
areas:
Most of the areas where we work are already highly gentrified where there is
very little at all on the open market. If you look around here, if there's anything
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at all and you're very lucky you might find something for £350-400,000. A total 
lack of things on the market, or if they are on the market they're incredibly 
expensive. The social housing stock has virtually disappeared.
Director, Cornwall CLT
The CLT was originally formed purely for affordable housing, aiming to meet 
need unmet by others such as housing associations and councils. The CLT 
did not see these bodies as able or likely to deliver for the local area.
Board member, Lands End Peninsula CLT
The main motivation for forming a( CLT? Well, government weren’t doing 
anything. Local government just aren’t empowered to do it, so we thoughtu
we’d do it ourselves if you like. Civil society can do it and social enterprise.
CLT volunteer, South West A
In a village in the South West, a CLT was reported to have formed as a result of a 
local housing needs survey led by the parish council. A relatively high demand for 
affordable housing was identified in the village for sections of the population who, as 
in the North East, were otherwise unable to access the type of local housing on offer:
It's a village of large and expensive houses. As soon as a small bungalow 
comes on the market it's snapped up by a developer and turned into a four or 
five bedroom house. *
Board member, Village CLT in the South West
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We took note of quite a lot of response that, perhaps not in terms of numbers 
but in terms of volume and sincerity that the affordable housing people 
wanted for the youngsters was rent.So that immediately swung us to moving 
onto the rental side with shared ownership as an option than the other way 
round. We also made the point that it was open to anyone; for example if a 
family had split up, leaving someone - typically a wife and children - in hard 
straits, then the idea of affordable housing would include people like that as 
well, not just trying to stop [young] people leaving the village.
Board member, Village CLT in the South West
The instigators of this CLT also felt existing policies and routes to achieving new 
housing developments were unlikely to yield any resolution to the problem. A 
transcribed question and answer session42 between the CLT and members of the 
village community revealed pessimism with regard existing policies:
Community member: Lack of a Village Design Statement43 seems to be at the 
root of the problem. This would be a mechanism to provide a holistic 
approach to issues in the village, and would allow everyone to express a view.
CLT response: An interesting point but in view of the National Housing 
Plan/Edict/Target, which lists villages such as ours as non-viable for future 
development, we doubt it would be able to produce anything very productive.
Village Interest Group (2011)
42 This question and answer session was transcribed and uploaded to the village interest group's website. An 
interviewee provided me with the document but it is anonymised here for the purpose of confidentiality.
43 A Village Design Statement is a community-led planning initiative designed to provide a tool for local 
planning authorities to consider community desires in their decisions. They are often instigated by parish 
councils with the express purpose of allowing community members to express their views.
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These narratives bear a similarity to the problems described by Shucksmith (2007) 
and Gallent (2009): existing policies aimed at creating socially and environmentally 
sustainable communities may mark peripheral rural villages as "inherently 
unsustainable" due to their remote location (Gallent, 2009, p. 264), concentrating 
housing in towns and cities and discouraging rural investment. This led Gallent 
(2009, p. 264) to conclude: "These villages have therefore become ... the parts of 
the countryside where existing housing policies seemingly cannot reach".
Out-migration of residents - and particularly young people - from the local area as a 
result of pressures caused by high property values and a deterioration of local 
services were evident in rural Wales,44 provoking interest in the potential use of the 
CLT model:
CLTs have been seen as a breakthrough in trying to get through this feeling 
of, you could say animosity really, between communities and authorities 
because they can't see a way through the problems that they face from small 
and low incomes, the high house prices, the inevitability of local people and 
young people leaving the area because there wasn't any potential living in the 
community and no work as well. Lots of issues like that highlighted the 
need for a CLT.
Rural Housing Enabler, North Wales
The further west you go you become even more remote, you've got the Welsh 
speaking communities and then you've got a lot of locals. There is support for
44 As described in the methodology chapter, Welsh stakeholders are anonymised here (and in later chapters) 
due to the ongoing nature of CLT development in these areas and the potential the data may hold for creating 
sensitivities. :-
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CLTs there and because there's been no affordable housing delivery they're 
willing to try anything.
Rural Housing Enabler, Mid-Wales
/
In these instances part of the concern held by a CLT is the presence of a certain 
segment of the population, often linked by local connection, and the way in which the 
availability and affordability of housing has challenged this population's ability to live 
in rural areas. These are not new concerns: the nub of Mark Shucksmith's prescient 
work No Homes for Locals? (1981) was that low income rural households were being 
systematically excluded from the countryside by inadequate housing and planning 
policies that looked unfavourably on rural housing development. As such it should 
not be of great surprise that the rural CLTs discussed here can be interpreted as a 
response to the effects such policies have had on housing supply, affordability and 
allocation.
Urban CLTs
Although the triggers for starting urban CLTs inevitably differed from their rural 
counterparts, for example regarding the concerns and claims to land use, the 
motivation of altering the use of housing to benefit a specific segment of the 
population remained prevalent. Of the two urban CLTs that directly participated in 
this study, Headingley CLT was orientated towards the management and change of 
the local population. The second urban CLT featured in the study is discussed later 
in the chapter.
The Director of Headingley CLT was intrinsically involved in its initial formation. 
While the affordability of housing was a motivating factor, the principle aim of their 
activity was to rebalance the local demographics of the area:
I
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Like every big city, we have a shortage of affordable housing so there is the 
general motivation of restoring affordable housing, but there is also the 
more specific motivation of rebalancing the community, attempting to 
bring some of these student houses back into family occupation.
Director, Headingley CLT
i '
The area in which the CLT emerged was a particularly popular area of residence for 
the city's student population. The instigators of Headingley CLT perceived their area 
to be suffering from studentification, a term coined to identify the process and 
product of concentrated student settlements in university towns and cities. 
Studentification has been described as follows:
The substitution of a local community by a student community. Here, 
'substitute' means displacement of one community, and replacement by 
another, 'community' means a group of people with a common ground and 
continuity through time, 'local community' means one whose ground is their 
locality, and 'student community' means one with a vocational ground.
National HMO Lobby (2008, p. 8)
The concern in Headingley was the effect a transient student population had on local 
services and the existing community. The CLT Director reflected these concerns 
bemoaning the effect the instability and transiency of the local population had on the 
social configuration of the neighbourhood:
In order to have any sort of community you need a stable population. When
you have a high percentage of students you get an increasingly destabilised
population. At the moment it is a bit like a ghost town, there's a street round
the corner from us with 54 houses, 51 of which are student houses, and
they're all empty now. The street is completely dead. You get that all through
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the summer and also at Christmas and Easter. It's particularly depressing at 
Christmas because you expect places to be lit up, you expect to walk down 
the street and see little Christmas trees in the window and things like that. If 
you go down our street at Christmas most houses are in complete darkness 
because they're just empty. ,
Director, Headingley CLT
In addition to these effects on community spirit, the transience of the student 
population was also thought to create local economic pressures. An argument akin 
to that of rural complaints around second home ownership supported the case in 
Headingley:
It strikes me that in principle our situation is quite similar to rural honey pots 
which are vulnerable to houses being bought up as second homes. W e argue 
that basically student homes are second homes. Students go home at 
Christmas and Easter and in the summer, and in the term time they're, as it 
were, camping out in houses in Headingley .
It affects all sorts of other things, especially the local economy, local schools 
and as a result of the flight of families one local school in particular was 
closing down. At the same time the shops were under pressure because they 
lose a year-round market. Basically the market for shops in our area 
collapses when the students move out because there's just nobody here.
Director, Headingley CLT
To remedy this apparent lack of community cohesion and its negative impact on
local businesses and residents, the Headingley CLT sought to alter the use of
existing properties. Student landlords werq perceived to exercise greater financial
muscle in the property market than those seeking property for family occupation and,
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combined with a lack of social housing, Headingley's property market was seen to 
disadvantage those sustaining a mortgage on normal household incomes:
If you can stuff half a dozen students into a three-bed semi, which isn't very 
difficult if you're an unscrupulous landlord, the rate of return you can get on 
that means you can sustain a much higher loan than if you're a simple 
straightforward family. There's very little social housing in Headingley and 
everything else is extremely expensive.
Director, Headingley CLT
With this in mind the CLT's strategy aims to assist those seen to be disadvantaged in 
local access to housing by changing the use of existing property rather than building 
new properties:
Primarily what we're thinking of all the time is not new build, which is what 
differentiates us from most CLTs. The issue in is not a shortage of properties, 
in actual fact it's a densely developed area. The problem is who the properties 
belong to and how they're used. Our priority is not so much building new stuff 
as getting hold of existing stuff and turning it back into family occupation.
Director, Headingley CLT
This strategy involved two courses of action:
• The CLT leasing properties from local residents or people that have moved 
away from the area and letting them onto families rather than to students. The 
CLT effectively operates as a conduit between people who wish to lease their 
property. At the time of the study Headingley had struck three agreements 
with property owners and leased these to three families.■ f
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• The CLT raising funds and purchasing properties on the open market in order 
to utilise them as either affordable rental homes or shared ownership 
properties. The CLT would retain an equity stake in the property in order to 
retain influence over its use. At the time of the study Headingley CLT had yet 
to achieve this aim.
Ultimately the creation of the CLT vehicle in Headingley was influenced by the 
current use of the properties, the way this moulded the local population and the 
impact this had on the local community, rather than a primary or sole concern of 
affordability. The reasons for creating the CLT, essentially relating to the impact a 
transient or seasonal population has on a local area, bear similarities to the refrains 
of inequity in access to housing, residualised services and poor community cohesion 
outlined in rural areas. This became evident when interviewing the Director of 
Headingley CLT, as discussion deviated away from traditional ideals of community 
ownership in comparison to other interviews I had conducted. Although the Director 
was strongly supportive of the principles of community ownership, co-operativism 
and local community action when questioned, these were not the principle drivers of 
the Headingley CLT, as illustrated by the following exchange:
Researcher: So to what extent is community ownership actually one of the 
drivers of your project, or is it just the only possible way to achieve your 
strategy?
Director: The latter really. We're in a situation where the indigenous 
community, if you like, are being pushed out by people who move in just for a 
seasonal part of the time. One way of defending ourselves against that is for 
the community to become owners of the properties.
In this instance, then, community ownership appears to be a means to an end and a 
practical response to a local problem identified by the CLT, with the potential for the 
CLT structure to be used as a mechanism of defence against external pressures.
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This is resonant with the radical housing consciousness described by Davis (1991), 
where the CLT acts as a method of defending particular interests of an indigenous 
geographic community, and emerges as the dominant theme of this chapter so far. 
CLTs originate partly as a form of social protectionism against government policies 
and market forces perceived to have disadvantaged local people in accessing 
housing and, as a corollary, had a dehabilitating effect on the functioning of a 
community.
Communities unhappy with existing government policies and the way these manifest 
may form a CLT to remedy the problems, which may specifically relate to the ability 
of a certain segment of a local population to access housing. Taking control of the 
situation through the vehicle of a CLT is seen as a potential solution in the absence 
of alternative provision or political action. Community control is seen as a way of 
achieving what are believed to be more democratic and just outcomes in the field of 
housing, but there are not necessarily overt desires to empower citizens through co­
operative ownership and use of land. Instead it appears that CLTs are used as a tool 
that reaffirms the supremacy of community influence and identification of the local 
need.
This position was summarised by a strategic stakeholder who requested anonymity:
What is important to communities? Why do they really set up a CLT? Not for 
the utopian idea of co-operative ownership and control but instead to achieve 
affordable housing and other things in a way that gives a community 
significant influence over three things: design, tenure and allocations.
But despite the evidence presented so far, it would be disingenuous to say that there 
are no CLTs that see value in community ownership beyond a rudimentary exercise 
of influence over the key issues described by the stakeholder. CLTs are in some 
instances aimed at positioning their organisations as more effective and better
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placed to identify the needs of their locaf community than the work of traditional 
forms of provision and understandings of democracy.
5.2 Reviving local democracy and involving the community
High Bickington CLT
High Bickington, a village in Devon with a population of around 700, formed a CLT in 
response to the problem of "local young people ... being forced out of their 
community because there's nothing for them" as described by the Chairperson of the 
CLT. As such, the CLT model became a vehicle for protecting a specific localised 
interest:
We wanted to set up an organisation that would protect the interests of local 
people ... our thinking locally was that we wanted to be able to provide 
facilities that would sustain our village and community, but also that we 
wanted to take local control. Particularly around affordable housing, it 
was about having housing that was ours in perpetuity.
Chair, High Bickington CLT (my emphasis)
The italicised passages of this quote are intended to illustrate the importance of 
community control to the CLT in High Bickington. Local control was seen as the most 
effective mechanism for local village interests to be protected:
We've got about a third of the households in the village involved in the 
membership [of the CLT] in one way or another. That again was saying "we 
wanted local control", not for any power base basis, but just as it was right 
from our point of view that we find a way of sustaining the village in terms of
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the sustainability agenda, in terms of how we protect our services, pubs et 
cetera.
Chair, High Bickington CLT
This identifies the local interests the CLT is seeking to protect as similar to the issues 
highlighted by other CLTs: the common rural problems of ageing and declining 
populations, housing unaffordable to local people and the residualisation of local 
services. The scheme at High Bickington aimed to reverse the apparent decline with 
an extensive scheme involving the development of affordable and market housing, 
workspaces for local businesses, a new school and a community energy scheme.
The aim was to achieve this through local leadership and community control and a 
high rate of local resident membership was perceived as essential to the CLT's 
potential. Membership of the CLT was available for the nominal sum of £1 and the 
CLT's legal structure provided regular opportunities for members to become involved 
in the organisation's governance, for example through the election of a management 
board:
The whole thing was [about] how can we involve the maximum number of 
people in the community in holding onto this [affordable housing] and one 
difference between us and other CLTs is that we went for the membership 
model on the basis that the board would be elected by the membership.
i
Chair, High Bickington CLT
Their structure was then contrasted with a local community organisation in order to 
illustrate the CLT's philosophy: .
I think one has to try and get the whole community involved in some way and
it may be you can only involve them by keeping them informed. Local
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membership is key. Our neighbouring parish took the view that they didn't 
want anyone else involved so they've got a company limited by guarantee 
which just has six members and that's the board. I think that's wrong because 
that says "we're the important people and the rest of you don't really matter". 
It says "we'll do to you" rather than "we'll do with you"... a successful CLT will 
be those who work with and alongside the local community, those who 
work with rather than do to.
Chair, High Bickington CLT
The principles of local control adopted in High Bickington combined with a 
commitment to co-operative enquiry also bear several similarities to the perceptions 
that communitarian endeavour should be encouraged and prioritised at a local level. 
The community should adopt mutual responsibility for the management of the local 
area while local priorities should be identified by consensus, and decision making 
over these taken according to the understanding and priorities of the local 
population. Broadly speaking, community governance is preferred to traditional forms 
of representative democracy higher up the political order (Tam, 1998, p. 13-17). The 
local potential of this is especially highlighted by the following quote:
I always feel that every community has a lot of capacity in it, what angers me 
personally is the professionals who talk about 'building capacity' as opposed 
to 'releasing capacity'. To me it's about releasing capacity, it's about enabling 
people to recognise they do have the skill and they can do it ... we had a 
group of experienced people and you get people coming along from local 
authorities who have absolutely no idea but try to tell us how to do it.
Chair, High Bickington CLT
Justified by the capacity perceived to exist in the community, along with the 
commitment to building a co-operative consensus in the village over the CLT's plans,
community governance located at a local level is deemed to be as effective as 
representative forms of democracy (if not more so). This mirrors the civic rationale 
for neighbourhood governance discussed in the analytical framework. The 
community should be able to exercise voice and choice over how they operate and 
how their objectives are realised; civic relationships are fostered through high levels 
of community involvement and participation and the CLT's close proximity to their 
village makes it easier to identify and resolve collective social problems.
However, it should be acknowledged that despite the assertion that community 
governance is preferred to structures of representative democracy, the High 
Bickington scheme actually grew from consultations with and between relevant local 
bodies such as the parish, district and county councils, all of which are traditional 
forms of representative democracy elected by local people. As such it could be 
argued that the local control provided by community governance and the 
participatory democracy it wishes to encourage is only possible with support and 
advocacy provided by more traditional democratic governing structures. The 
intricacies of some aspects of this relationship will be examined later in this thesis, 
but as the following example illustrates the High Bickington case was not alone in 
attempting to create a local body that could be a more appropriate representation of 
community needs.
East London CLT
The East London CLT emerged from a campaign orchestrated by London Citizens, 
the capital city's branch of the community organising body Citizens UK, whose 
mission is to:
build the power of communities who work together for the common good. Its 
focus is the development of leadership within our social institutions, and within 
our local communities. In accordance with this, our affordable housing
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campaign ... is one that agitates for social reform and seeks to create 
circumstances conducive to community-led developments across the city.
Citizens UK (2011)
In order to understand the type of social reform that the affordable housing campaign 
(and the broader work of the organisation) seeks to create, it is vital to note the 
philosophical approach taken by Citizens UK. The organisation is rooted in the 
philosophy of Saul Alinsky, the figurehead of a particular type of community 
development. Alinsky (1969, p. 22) argued that "only through the achievement and 
constructive use of power can people better themselves". As such, community-based 
social reform should be achieved under conditions characterised by shifts in who 
holds power, typically from the state to the community.
The methods of reform they adopt have these ideals at their heart. Bunyan (2010) 
and Little (2011) both document how independence and autonomy from the state is 
at the core of the approach, which is summarised as follows:
Citizens UK works on Alinskyan' principles. The method is very specific: 
creating a 'power organisation' made up of other groups. Most commonly, 
these member groups are faith organisations - churches, mosques or 
synagogues. But community groups, schools and trade union branches can 
also be members.
The method is confrontational and political ... Though groups negotiate and 
compromise, separation and independence are cherished. There is no 
collaboration with other voluntary and community organisations. The idea is
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not to run services, or to get local people to take them over, but to challenge 
those in the corporate and public sectors that deliver the services.45
Little, 2011
The idea of independence and autonomy from the state was therefore at the nub of 
the affordable housing campaign led by Citizens UK and led to the creation of an 
independent CLT. This differentiated itself-from both the private market and social 
rental sector on the basis that the independence and autonomy provided by the CLT 
would provide individual and community benefits precipitated by a shift in power:
These things only work if they're set up in opposition to something ... if we 
think "oh this is a good idea" and roll them out en masse that they become 
'government land trusts' ... the key benefit of them for me is the degree of 
ownership that they can bring to people on low incomes, living in more 
affordable housing and the difference that will make to the aspirations of 
people, and if you lose that and it's just another government model...
Housing Organiser, London Citizens
Although independence was cherished, the group were not necessarily against the 
concept of social housing or seeking to prevent further council housing being built. 
The organiser described the CLT proposals as a "complementary measure which is 
not intended to replace or reduce the numbers of council housing getting built" and 
argued that the economics of the model represented a form of "pragmatic socialism"
45 The end of this quote, where the control of services by local people is not a desired aim, may seem 
contradictory to the creation of a CLT. However, the quote is actually a description of the broader Citizens UK 
campaign and philosophy. London Citizens helped set up the East London CLT as a result of its campaign and 
the two organisations are now divorced and have an arms-length relationship. While not having a direct role 
in the CLT's management, London Citizens continue to promote its interests and the virtues of a CLT.
169
V
which could manipulate the market to achieve permanently affordable housing. 
Furthermore, the quotation highlights the desire to extend and confer the rights and 
powers of ownership to low-income households, grounded in similar rhetoric to the 
belief that homeownership can bring stakeholding benefits and provide autonomy 
and aspiration to people. The quotes below are intended to illustrate this, describing 
the interviewee's perception of the Burlington CLT in Vermont, America (one of the 
largest and longest-running CLTs in North America) and the potential usefulness of 
the CLT model in the English housing market.
There was the economic pragmatism of the whole thing. They run commercial 
premises where it suits them, I said to them "do you ever sell houses if you 
think you could do more good with the land if you took the value out of it and 
plough it into a different area" - they said "yep, absolutely, we've done that 
before". So it started on the back of benevolent, progressive thought and still 
stays very very true to that, but yet it's combined with this American 
understanding of the market and complete clever playing of it.
Housing Organiser, London Citizens
We needed a mechanism that we could build around, one that would negate 
once and for all the great gap and dichotomy that has arisen between 
depressed council estates and the free market that so few can reach.
i
Housing Organiser, London Citizens
The content of the second quote presented here was itself partly provoked by the 
lack of social housing being built and the intensive need for shelter in East London. 
The CLT was to be based in Tower Hamlets, a part of East London which had 24.5 
per cent of its households on the local authority social housing waiting list in 2010:
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the second highest rate in England (CLG, 2011b).46 Therefore the CLT organised 
itself around the issue of local housing supply characterised by an approach that 
held true to the values of Citizens UK.
This particularly came to the fore as the CLT liaised with the Greater London 
Authority in response to a Mayoral promise made by Boris Johnson to facilitate a 
CLT in London by 2011. The location of the CLT was debated between the two 
parties:
The Mayor's housing advisor is very keen to do it on an estate regeneration 
project because he thinks the community is already defined that way; you've 
got a community you can work with, which is far from our idea of community 
really. It's just people who happen to live next door to each other a lot of the 
time and not an organised community in a sense.
Housing Organiser, London Citizens
In this view, CLTs should not just be facilitated and located anywhere, they should 
instead be a product of community effort to create an independent institution 
characterised by particular values. This is supported by the following quotes which 
highlight the centrality of community influence and independence if CLTs are 
developed in this context. In particular CLTs are differentiated from other forms of 
provision on the basis that they offer greater autonomy for communities to gain 
power and use it to improve their standing: V
46 Using local authority waiting lists as an individual measure of housing need and/or demand can be 
problematic as local housing associations may operate their own lists for the housing they manage. However, 
the significantly high number of local households on the waiting list in Tower Hamlets in comparison to the 
rest of England provides an indicative idea of need and/or demand for social housing.
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The amount of money that's been into estates through the New Deal47 is just 
nobody's business. I can't even remember how much now but it's just not 
done anything for it because it's not got the sense of it being earned by people 
and owned by them and that's the absolute crucial thing as we move forward. 
And that's why it's nonsense when Boris [Johnson, Mayor of London at the 
time] says they're looking at sites up in the Gateway or in North London or on 
the outskirts. Well, 'why are you looking there?' and who's asked them to get 
in touch with them? Unless somebody comes to you about it, it's a waste of 
time.
I think they see CLTs as something they can - I'd say "inflict" and they'd say 
"help place" in certain parts - but if it's going to be about community ownership 
it's got to be about a sense of ownership being earned and built by local 
people as well, so it's a struggle to persuade them of the virtues and ability of 
those groups of people.
Housing Organiser, London Citizens
The community's desire for change - and their autonomy to achieve this - marks the 
London Citizens approach, with the emphasis on their independence and ability to 
make decisions on their terms at the forefront of their development. In the cases of 
both London and High Bickington, communities should be able to exercise voice and 
choice in their developments in order to realise both practical outcomes and subtle
v
47 The interviewee's opinion of the New Deal for Communities (NDC)programme highlights the tensions in 
assessing the value of resident involvement in area-based initiatives. NDC was a state-funded area-based 
initiative programme that aimed to regenerate disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Wallace (2010) argued that 
NDC failed to have a positive effect, while Lawless et al. (2010, p. 269) took the view that increasing resident 
involvement in NDC was positively associated with a range of outcomes, including perceptions that the area 
had improved as a result of NDC activity, and feelings of being "part of the community". Therefore the 
interviewee's view here should not be taken as a matter of fact and more as a subjective opinion on how 
community development should be facilitated.
172
individual and community benefits such as! a sense of citizen ownership, aspiration 
and power. W e can relate this rationalisatidn of CLTs back to the foundations of the 
American CLT movement whereby the effort a community places in forming a CLT is 
as much an accomplishment as the physical housing development the effort creates:
we can best measure the success of newly formed CLTs not in terms of 
total acreage or total housing units but in terms of the constructive community 
activity being generated. Without this sort of activity - and the sense of 
community that goes with it - no amount of institutional change can solve our 
problems. The open and democratic structure of the CLT is thus a centrally 
important feature of the model. A community land trust cannot succeed as 
something created merely for a community. It must represent an effort of and 
by the community.
|S
Institute for Community Economics (1982, p. 256, original emphasis)
5.3 The potential role and influence of community
At the beginning of section 5.1 it was noted that CLTs may form in the face of 
"market failure and government inaction" (Large, 2009, p. 195). This leads to CLTs 
forming to take local control and influence qf the production and management of their 
locality.
The instigators of the CLTs described so far all had in common the local value that 
should be attached to their efforts (both in partnership with and on behalf of the 
community, which makes CLTs better placfed to meet needs) and the desirability of 
the end product they would deliver. Large makes the case for community 
engagement through CLTs as they offer a vehicle through which people can see 
tangible outcomes emerge from their efforts and engagement:
173
The more people see a direct connection between their efforts and the 
community benefits they value, such as more affordable homes, safer 
neighbourhoods, better community facilities, more jobs and a better 
environment, the more they will be likely to engage - especially if they see a 
direct connection between their efforts and the results.
Large (2009, p. 27)
This idea invokes the civic rationale described by Lowndes and Sullivan (2008): 
citizens will identify a relationship between their own self-interest - or as Large puts it 
the "community benefits they value" - and wider public policy developments, and 
invest their time and participation accordingly. This theme has been evident 
throughout the analysis which has identified the desires CLTs hold in providing 
housing for a particular portion of the population, which is usually those local to the 
CLT's area of operation. This is justified on the basis that the CLT is closest to the 
housing problems in their area and is therefore best placed to create the necessary 
solutions. Rory Stewart, Conservative MP for Penrith and the Border, described the 
apparent advantage CLTs hold over traditional providers:
Why, if someone comes to Cumbria, can they see in Crosby Ravensworth48 a 
better affordable housing project built by a community than would have been 
built by the county council on its own? It is because those projects are 
different from those done by the state ... in the degree of knowledge, in scale 
and in their relationship to the risk io  the vulnerable. These are projects in 
which communities have a competitive advantage over the state because 
local knowledge matters in those projects. The people who live there know 
about the place and they care about it. They come up with creative solutions,
48 It should be noted that the CLT in this village did not participate in this study. The quotation here is for 
illustrative purposes as to the potential purpose and function of CLTs more generally.
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street by street, on where to place a school, on how much housing to allow 
and on who will live in the affordable houses and where they will be located.
Stewart (HC-Deb 2010-11)
This argument contends that local knowledge matters in affordable housing projects 
because they are best placed to identify the local risk posed to vulnerable 
populations, how much housing there should be in a local area and crucially who 
should live in the housing. These were all prevalent issues for the CLTs described in 
the previous section and were the instigating factors for the engagement of 
communities in housing: to summarise, the community benefits that are valued relate 
to the quantity and allocation of local housing.
Furthermore, Stewart's view of CLTs indicates not only the adoption of a civic 
rationale in encouraging community members to invest in issues that matter to them, 
but also introduces elements of the social rationale in identifying the potential 
community involvement has for adding value to conventional forms of housing 
decision-making and delivery. The idea is akin to that of rationales for localisation in 
general: the more influence and autonomy that exists at a local level, the more 
accurate and socially just policies will be (Purcell, 2006).
The discussion above has identified that CLTs themselves are often likely to adopt a 
similar position to that of Stewart, claiming to offer a more effective form of housing 
delivery for local communities in their local area. However, opportunities and 
constraints for community-based governance are as dependent on the institutional 
design of this involvement as they are upon the involvement of communities. In other 
words, the relationships that community-based actors and organisations have with 
local governing bodies may be crucial in more comprehensively understanding the 
localised processes CLTs are engaged with in attempting to deliver housing. These 
relationships will be explored in detail later in the thesis. First, to aid this
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understanding, the following section considers the way in which CLTs may be 
rationalised by strategic stakeholders within local authorities.
5.4 The strategic response to the claims of CLTs
In Cornwall, where CLTs had formed in response to the traditional pressures on rural 
housing such as insufficient supply, high demand and high house prices that dwarf 
local incomes, the unitary local authority was keen to support local CLT 
development. In particular the spatially-specific strategies adopted by individual 
village CLTs were thought to offer a more effective identification and perception of 
need due to their proximity to local circumstances:
[CLTs] are relatively unique in themselves. Yes, they have a common legal 
structure but you'll not find two alike. But that's the point of localism, isn't it? 
They should reflect local circumstances; they may reflect the views of local 
well-wishers, people trying to make a difference. So in a way it would be 
disappointing if they were all identikit, that's not the point and we should 
always call them local community land trusts with a big emphasis on the 
local. And then they can be fine-tuned and adapted, responding to a 
perception of local needs which is closer than we may have at that planning 
level.
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
The official's advocacy of CLTs was premised on the sentiment that Rory Stewart 
MP expressed in the previous section: engaging local communities in identifying the 
local circumstances and action required could be beneficial to local authorities due to 
a CLT's proximity to the issues. The benefit of this in the council's eyes was two-fold. 
Firstly, although they were keen to ensure correct and appropriate governance - that 
is, that the CLT is set up to be non-discriminatory - the principle benefit of CLTs was
i
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their ability to link the needs and knowledge of a defined community to the delivery of 
housing within their boundaries:
it
The other side to it is sort of fine tuning the site more to local needs. You have 
to be slightly wary that CLTs don't get colonised, so they're getting the articles 
[of association] with an anti-colonisation clause: i.e. the company cannot be 
suddenly taken over by the folk who live in the houses. But principally 
when you're designing and specifying the development in terms of tenure mix 
and housing, you ensure there's fine grained local knowledge about the needs 
of that local community.
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
This "anti-colonisation clause" referred to relates to the governance measures taken 
to ensure the CLT remained charitable. Essentially the council was keen to make 
sure that residents of CLT homes could not simply take over the running of the CLT 
and completely eliminate external influence, instead maintaining it as an organisation 
that is operated by a wider community rather than solely its residents. The concern 
related to the diversity of the organisation and whether single interest groups - the 
residents - could usurp that of the wider community and dominate the organisation. 
In this view the CLT is not intended to become a self-governing mechanism, instead 
it is intended to facilitate a degree of community influence rather than overt resident 
control. This was partly aided by the introduction of a 'constitutional custodian', a 
topic returned to later when discussing the role and influence of umbrella CLT 
bodies.
Secondly, the council believed that the impact of the CLT's activity and localised 
notion of need would ensure that the wider community would be more forthcoming to
i
a housing development. This would help overcome localised resistance to housing 
developments often found in rural areas (also identified by Shucksmith, 1990; 
Milbourne, 1997).
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The second thing - and this sounds a bit altruistic but it's also hard nosed - is 
that it's also much more embedded in the local community. So when it comes 
to local planning issues and whatever ... there is the acceptance that it's a 
good thing amongst the majority. It's understood why they are doing it, it's 
been promoted as coming from the community, it's not been imposed on them 
and generally people do see it as a good thing.
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
The council's rationalisation of CLTs stems from a perception that they provide a 
more responsive form of housing that is consistent with the local community's needs 
and understanding of housing need. In High Bickington, where the CLT had 
amassed a high membership rate among their local community, the county council 
were very much aligned to the localist approach that CLTs pursued. In particular, the 
social rationale of neighbourhood governance emphasising a holistic citizen-centred 
partnership approach was invoked as one interviewee described what he saw as the 
advantages of a CLT:
They are of course a community-led body, they're rooted in the communities 
they originate from, they're protecting local community facilities for 
generations to come.
Community Strategy Officer, Devon County Council
However, while there was latent support for the philosophical elements of a CLT, 
pertaining to local influence, autonomy and protection of local interests, the council 
were also of the mind that attention should not deviate from the practicalities of 
delivering a CLT scheme. For example, the Community Strategy Officer identified an 
interesting dichotomy between the communitarian need for a representative 
organisation rooted in the community and the practical need for skills and expertise.
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Researcher: One thing that strikes me about High Bickington is the very high 
membership rates. I can see why that might appeal to the council. Would you 
have found it difficult to support a CLT which didn't have such high 
membership?
Interviewee: I'm not so sure. We have relationships with numerous third sector 
organisations which aren't necessarily very high on member numbers, but 
where so long as they have the strength and capacity to deliver something 
that we're interested in being a partner with them on, then we'd be quite 
prepared to be in partnership. I don't think that membership numbers per se is 
the most critical thing.
This issue was explored further, raising a dilemma faced by many CLTs. There is a 
need for particular skills and expertise that are often found outside the local area, but 
this has to be balanced with seeking local legitimacy by involving the community as 
much as possible:
For an outfit like a CLT, if they have a very high membership rate like the High 
Bickington one does, then it reinforces its sense of endorsement by local 
people and that would strengthen our willingness to engage with it. So it's a 
help but I wouldn't think it's the only factor. You can have a high volume 
membership but a rubbish organisation, so you've got to make sure it's got the 
right balance of the right skills, the right people and the right community 
involvement. Our councillors have liked that [the high membership rate] 
because it gives it some legitimacy, it's not just a few people speaking on 
behalf of the local populous, it's very well rooted in the community and in the 
parish council.
Community Strategy Officer, Devon County Council
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The widespread support for the High Bickington model (illustrated by the high 
membership rate) appealed to local governing bodies in that it legitimised the CLT's 
proposals at a community level. However this was not the sole determining factor 
and high levels of community involvement were required to translate into 
organisational competence, rather than community involvement being a persuasive 
tool in itself. Again, the social rationale of partnership rather than civic self- 
governance and the emphasis on bottom-up influence facilitating rather than 
usurping housing delivery comes to the fore:
We've been a very critical friend as well; we haven't just got into bed with 
them willy-nilly. We've had a very careful approach to it because of the public 
money and the accountability that goes with that.
Community Strategy Officer, Devon County Council
Nevertheless, the inclusive approach to participation within their community and the 
high membership rate this helped generate persuade the local authority of the CLT's 
value and purpose. A balance had to be struck between community involvement and 
the danger of a minority speaking on behalf of the local population, in other words at 
the outset the locally-specific strategy of the CLT held potential both for positive 
outcomes in terms of participation and effectiveness, and also for the less desirable 
outcome of a minority claiming to speak on behalf of the 'community'.
Yet, while these issues appear resolvable in the relationships between CLTs and
>
strategic stakeholders, what this chapter has not yet explored is how the legitimacy 
the claims CLTs make to community voice, representation and power are contested 
within local areas. The attempts by CLTs to remould the populations and 
configurations of their local areas may be received and negotiated in a variety of 
ways according to the rationales, organisational forms and strategies in which they 
are pursued. The following chapters address these issues in the context of the
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attempts CLTs make to acquire land and finance and the structural support that may 
underpin their development at wider geographic scales.
Conclusion
The intention of this chapter was to identify the rationales underpinning the formation 
of CLTs and to explore the prevalence of communitarian values in their emergence. 
In doing so the chapter aimed to uncover attitudes towards how housing should be 
decided upon, provided and governed at a local level.
CLTs have generally emerged in response to the failure of existing housing and 
planning policies to cater for particular parts of the population. In rural locations this 
related to the flight of young people from rural areas due to a lack of affordable 
housing. However, there is a subtle difference in the language used to justify CLTs 
as housing affordability per se was not the single trigger for their formation. Instead 
the inability of local people to access existing housing provoked concern with a CLT 
formed as a vehicle to correct this perceived disadvantage. The case of Headingley 
illustrated how the presence of a particular segment of the population may be 
important to an urban CLT, with the CLT's efforts primarily concerned with ensuring 
housing can be used for family occupation and a population with perceived greater 
attachment to the local community demonstrated through permanent residency.
In this sense we can begin to see the civic and social rationales emerge from the 
analytical framework. The civic rationale, where citizens identify a relationship 
between their interests and wider public policy developments and invest time and 
influence accordingly - is appropriate to describing the way CLTs have emerged in 
response to the effects of existing policies. This also links us to the proponents of 
communitarianism who argue that governance at a local level needs to be harnessed 
as a remedy to the powerlessness and alienation citizens feel as a result of their 
inability to exercise influence over policies that affect them (Taylor, 1998, p. 47). W e  
can clearly identify this philosophy among the CLTs described here, who position
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themselves as being most capable of effectively identifying the specific needs of their 
local community.
Additionally the social rationale, emphasising the potential community involvement 
has for improving services, takes us back to considering processes of community. 
Community participation was at the heart of approaches such as those in High 
Bickington and East London, bearing similarities to the communitarian perception of 
community as the place where personal proximity, locality and personal 
responsibility for society can be pulled together to generate consensus over 
community governance (Delanty, 2010, p. 69). Taken together, the adoption of these 
rationales can be linked to a central theme of communitarianism: the supremacy of 
community in identifying the most effective way to structure their local area:
the theme of communitarians is the supremacy of community, where 
members, through active engagement, create a direct democracy that is 
united around shared core values - considered to be indistinguishable from 
facts - thereby constraining authoritarianism, nurturing mutuality and 
promoting a more egalitarian society.
Dixon etal. (2005, p. 14)
If we relate this to CLTs, we might see that the consensus that unites a CLT consists 
of the provision of housing to a specific group of people, for example those with a 
local connection to the area. However in any form of localised community
governance it is imperative to avoid falling into what Purcell (2006, p. 1921)
describes as "the local trap"; that is the assumption that there is something 
inherently positive about devolving governance to the local scale:
it is dangerous to make any assumption about any scale. Scales are not 
independent entities with pre-given characteristics. Instead, they are socially
constructed strategies to achieve particular ends. Therefore, any scale or
scalar strategy can result in any outcome. Localisation can lead to a more
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democratic city, or a less democratic one. All depends on the agenda of those 
empowered by a given scalar strategy.
Purcell (2006, p. 1921)
Therefore a CLT's operation at the local scale should not be seen as inevitably 
resulting in a set of democratically-determined socially just outcomes, though it may 
hold out this possibility dependent on the objectives underpinning it and the process 
through which these are realised. As Parvin (2009, p. 355) suggests, "what is right or 
wrong may not always be consistent with what the local community thinks is right or 
wrong" (original emphasis). Rather than make any assumptions as to the inherent 
value of scale, academic scrutiny needs to be alive to the fact that, as Purcell 
describes, locally-specific methods of governance are socially constructed means to 
achieve particular ends. The legitimacy and effectiveness of CLTs will therefore in 
part depend on their agendas, strategies and interactions with those stakeholders 
affected by their operation both within and beyond the local area.
A useful distinction on which to conclude is provided by Delanty (2010, p. 70). 
Delanty argues that communitarianism focuses on the conflict between community 
and society, a picture that we can identify in the emergence of CLTs acting against 
the perceived inequity that government policies have created. However Delanty 
argues that this focus means that enquiry into conflict within and between 
communities becomes marginalised by advocates of a stringently local approach 
who focus on the conflict between community and external pressures. This does not 
negate the possibility of CLTs making an effective contribution to, as Dixon (2005) 
put it, nurturing and promoting mutuality and egalitarianism, but equally it highlights 
that the implementation of community as a process of housing delivery may be 
subject to competing outlooks and interests;
This is a key theme in the following chapters. As the Affordable Housing Officer in 
Cornwall commented, each CLT is likely to be unique reflecting local circumstances.
The following chapter aims to explore the development of CLTs with regards to their 
acquisition of land, finance and governance of housing, and will further explore how 
the adoption of particular rationales and values may shape the CLT sector in 
England and Wales.
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Chapter 6: The importance of land:
acquisition and influence
The previous chapter described the underlying rationales and aims of CLTs, which 
were related to the effects of perceived government and market failure in local 
housing provision. However, it only touched briefly on the role of land use and 
planning policies that constrain the use of land for housing. Considering these issues 
is crucial not only to considering how and why a CLT may have formed, but also to 
understanding the enabling factors and constraints that landscape the current CLT 
sector. As Johnston (2009, p. 1) describes, "the primary focus of community land 
trusts is to acquire, own and never sell, and steward land for particular social 
purposes". It is therefore logical to assess precisely how CLTs acquire land and 
investigate the purposes for which it is to be used, particularly in light of the 
questions raised in the previous chapter's conclusion relating to the role and exercise 
of community influence over self-defined social purposes.
Aird (2009, p.11) argued that CLTs in rural areas have emerged "against a backdrop 
of few employment opportunities, low incomes and a planning system biased against 
development". The constraints of the planning system in both rural and urban areas 
has been well documented in recent years by a range of academics and government 
commissioned research reports (Barker 2004; Quirk, 2007; Davies et a!., 2009; 
Gallent 2009; Satsangi et al., 2010). A unifying observation of all these studies is that 
a fundamental issue affecting housing supply is the failure of the planning system to 
release a sufficient supply of land. Barker's (2004, p.11) observation that "it is clear 
that more greenfield and brownfield land will be needed if an adequate supply of 
houses is to be delivered" summarises this issue well. This restriction of land for 
housing development has paralleled a rising demand for housing, contributing to the 
impact an undersupply and high demand of housing has on high property and land 
values (Taylor, 2008).
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As such, a key issue for all CLTs is where the land necessary for their creation is to 
come from and how its purchase is to be funded (Diacon et a/., 2005, p. 33). Three 
mechanisms have been proposed to bring forward more land both for affordable 
housing development and CLT ownership: the introduction of incentives for 
landowners to bring forward more land for affordable housing (CLG, 2009a), the 
transfer of surplus public sector land into community ownership (Quirk, 2007) and 
the introduction of local community referendums that determine the use of local land 
over and above local planning authorities (CLG, 2010).
Each of these has relevance to CLTs in explaining how some have advanced their 
developments quicker than others and the following section will discuss each 
mechanism in turn. In doing so the prevalence of certain attitudes and inter- 
organisational relationships will help explain how the underlying rationales of CLTs 
may be negotiated within and between communities and stakeholders in strategic 
positions.
6.1 Incentivising local landowners: local assurance over land use
One of the main impediments to affordable housing delivery has been the reluctance 
of local landowners to sell land for development. The Taylor Review (2008, p. 107) 
identified two key concerns held by landowners in rural areas. Firstly, landowners 
hold onto land due to the 'hope value' that it will be granted planning permission for 
market housing and increase in economic value. Secondly, landowners may hold 
residual fears as to the future use of their land after selling it, in particular due to the 
danger that land sold for affordable housing at low value will be later sold on the 
open market and allow someone else to reap substantial financial benefits.
Several studies have found that landowners may release land for affordable housing 
if they could retain control over who lives in the homes or retain a long-term financial 
stake in the development (Flint et a/., 2009; RICS, undated), leading to English 
government guidance suggesting mechanisms be put in place to allow landowners to
nominate family members or employees to live in the homes via a referral system 
(CLG, 2009a). Furthermore Flint et at. (2009, p. 32) found that local opposition to 
affordable housing often recedes when a landowner with local connections is actively 
involved in the process, indicating a crucial role for landowners not only in potentially 
releasing land for affordable housing at low values but in assuaging the concerns of 
local populations.
In some quarters CLTs have been recommended as a potential vehicle through 
which landowners can have their concerns over future use eased due to the 
covenants placed on homes that restrict their occupancy and future value (Taylor, 
2008). The St Minver CLT in Cornwall is commonly used as an exemplar for this and 
has been subject to much media coverage due to the nature of the scheme (BBC, 
2010; Birch, 2011).
The CLT was instigated by a local builder and a local landowner eager to see local 
families and employees able to live in the village affected by high rates of second 
home ownership (43 per cent of the housing stock according to anecdotal evidence) 
and high property prices that, according to the landowner, had earned the village the 
nickname "Millionaire's Row". The landowner sold land for the development of 12 
affordable homes for £120,000 (in comparison to the recent sale of similar land 
nearby for £950,000; Birch, 2011). Throughout the two interviews I conducted with 
the landowner, he emphasised how the potential to help people with local links to the 
area in the housing market was at the root of his economic altruism, while continually 
emphasising the way in which the CLT structure and covenants applied to the homes 
ensured they would always "belong" to the CLT, rather than having resale 
restrictions removed.
These motivations were at the heart of the landowner's decision to sell the land for 
affordable housing, and it was suggested that its use for affordable housing would 
not have been possible if it were not for the CLT's perceived ability to protect use of
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the homes. This is supplemented by the following quotes from the Affordable 
Housing Officer from the local council that supported the scheme:
W e did see what they [the CLT] were doing as potentially additional to 
other work ... they were freeing up some land which otherwise might not 
have come forward. I think we felt that it was addressing a particular small 
subset of affordable housing market which isn't easily dealt with or delivered.
Where the CLT helped with land particularly is that it sort of 'double banks' it 
to keep it affordable in perpetuity, so rather than simply relying on planning 
agreements the fact its effectively vested in the local community means that 
there's this ongoing supervision of the land. I think that can be quite important 
to farmers or whoever when asked to sell land, as the big worry they have is 
they've sold the family silver and someone's going to be laughing at them in 
20 years time as it's leaked to open market use.
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
The "small subset of the market" referred to in the first instance indicates the 
difficulty of delivering affordable housing in villages where land is costly and scarce 
and where traditional developers are unlikely to develop due to both the expense 
and inability to achieve economies of scale. As such the CLT's efforts and the 
qualitative "supervision of the land" (as referred to in the second quote above) were 
perceived to address these difficulties. These efforts were seen to tackle the problem 
of land availability for local residential development and the creation of affordable 
housing with covenants attached upon it was viewed as a long-term measure to 
preserve the affordability of housing in the village:
Our interest was in ensuring all [applicants] needed affordable housing, all 
were eligible, but that this is built for 100 years and that time and time again 
it'll be the revolving door of affordable housing. I'm sure people here don't see
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it like that, they will be thinking 'this is my lifetime home now' ... [but] unless 
there's a vast change of economics in this country, housing will always be 
very very expensive there. It's not just for them.
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall County Council
It is clear the idea of permanently affordable housing, a tagline often attached to the 
potential of CLTs and referred to by practitioners in the previous chapter, was of 
great appeal to the council.
Combined with the council's view that CLTs may embed acceptance of the need for 
housing development into the community, it is clear that the localised operation of a 
CLT was seen as a vehicle for unlocking land for affordable housing that may not 
otherwise become available. In this sense the CLT's closeness to local issues and 
"competitive advantage" (to return to Stewart's quote in the previous chapter) over 
other forms of provision is acknowledged. This persuaded the then District Council49 
to provide a £544,000 interest-free loan to the CLT to help fund the land purchase, a 
source of money that was critical to their progress.
A CLT in the village of East Portlemouth in Devon was created as a result of a local 
landowner's willingness to gift the CLT four existing cottages and a piece of land on 
which a further six homes were built. The landowner had inherited four cottages and 
maintained them as low cost rental properties, but became increasingly concerned 
as she aged that the cottages would be sold to the open market on her death. As the 
quotation below illustrates, the landowner felt tied to the community and keen to 
assist local families:
49 North Cornwall District Council (NCDC) provided St Minver CLT with the financial support described in 2007 
and 2008. On 1 April 2009 Cornwall's district councils, including NCDC, were abolished and the county's 
administration became the responsibility of the unitary authority Cornwall Council. The Affordable Housing 
Officer quoted here worked for NCDC pre-April 2009 and Cornwall Council afterwards.
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Though I spent my working life living elsewhere, [the village] for the past 70 
years been my home and I returned regularly to my parents house and later to 
the house I inherited. I have a deep affection for the place. It has always 
saddened me how few of my contemporaries with whom I grew up have been 
able to do the same. Village families have moved away, forced out by the 
ever increasing rise in house prices and lack of affordable accommodation.
Founder, quoted in Waterhouse Housing for East Portlemouth Ltd (2008, p. 4).
This affection for the local community links us to the importance within communities 
of "affective bonds as counterweight to centrifugal forces that seek to disperse 
communities" (Etzioni, 1995a, p. 156). Within the cases of both St Minver CLT and 
East Portlemouth we can detect the presence of communitarian rationales linked to 
the attachment to place and responsibility local landowners hold to their local 
community, particularly as a reaction to external market forces. In the case of East 
Portlemouth the landowner reached the conclusion that "in order to protect the 
cottages not only for the existing tenants but for the future I needed to gift them to 
the village in the form of a trust" (Waterhouse Housing for East Portlemouth Ltd, 
2008, p. 4). In this sense the CLT appeared to offer a vehicle through which the 
ability of local people to live in the village could be protected, a motivation clearly 
expressed in the CLT's application for planning permission:
The Trust is designed not only to ensure that the cottages are maintained as 
low cost accommodation for local people, but that the village, via the trustees, 
control who is housed with reference to local connection/work and the 
contribution such people bring/give t& the village.
Waterhouse Housing for East Portlemouth (2008, p. 7)
This validates the finding of the previous chapter that CLTs are often explicitly 
orientated towards providing a vehicle through which local influence and control can
be expressed over local housing allocations. Pertinently, the quotation above also 
emphasises the importance of the role prospective incomers to the village will play in 
their local community. It may be obvious how local employment will influence the 
contribution people give to the village, but the use of local connection as an explicit 
criterion indicates that certain people may be deemed to make some form of 
subjective contribution simply by virtue of 'being local', perhaps through permanent 
residency and attachment to the area.
This supports the finding that the low-cost transfer of land from local landowners to 
CLTs draws upon idyllic perceptions of community as the site where "shared 
meanings, sentimental attachments, and interpersonal networks of recognition and 
reciprocity ... are slowly established among the proximate inhabitants of a common 
territory" (Davis, 1991, p. 12). The network of reciprocity, in this instance, is between 
the CLT and the landowner in matching the concerns of local landowners that relate 
to future use of their land, along with their sentimental attachment to a locality, with 
the objectives of a local CLT, which utilises this symmetry to deliver resale-restricted 
housing for local people.
These instances show that there is scope for CLTs to incentivise some local 
landowners to bring forward land for affordable housing development. The second 
method of obtaining land that this chapter focuses on is the possibility for asset 
transfer from the public sector into CLT ownership. Whether or not the concerns and 
aims of public sector landowners involved in asset transfer match the objectives of a 
CLT in a similar way to landowners is the topic of the following section.
6.2 The politics of public asset transfer
y *
The transfer of public assets into community ownership has increased in recent 
years, a rise that can partly be attributed to the Quirk Review published in 2007. The 
review provided a series of recommendations for transferring assets to community- 
led bodies (including, but not limited to, CLTs) and directly influenced the formation
of an Asset Transfer Unit (ATU) led by the Development Trusts Association (SQW, 
2010). The release of Quirk's recommendations in 2007 ran parallel to a period of 
growth for CLTs marked by the national CLT demonstration programme (2006-2008) 
and the introduction of the dedicated CLT Fund created by charitable investors, so it 
is of little surprise that asset transfer was of increasing interest during my fieldwork 
given the difficulties an increasing number of CLTs faced in accessing land for 
development.
Of the CLTs featured in this study, the main example of asset transfer involved a 
partnership between High Bickington CLT and Devon County Council. Rather than 
the traditional approach of a CLT approaching a council for assistance, in this 
instance the CLT emerged as a result of extensive local consultation over the use of 
an unused piece of farmland:
We didn't start off by saying "we want to do this with the land, let's see who's 
out there to achieve that ambition";Twe said "do the community have a view 
about how it can be used for their sustainable future?" so it evolved from 
there. It's been ten years [of] partnership working of which the CLT has only 
been in existence for 3-4 years of that.
Community Strategy Officer, Devon County Council
The council wanted to do a pilot scheme on how they might dispose of the 
farm in a way that was better for the local community. Their previous policy 
had always been to -  when a farm became available -  put it on the market 
and take the highest bidder... effectively the community lose out all round 
because proceeds went into the council’s central capital pot and was spent 
wherever [in the region], and the [local] community lost the asset they had for 
hundreds of years.
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Chair, High Bickington CLT
The consultation had begun with the parish council, which decided that although it 
supported the potential for community-led development it did not wish to undertake 
development itself, leading to the formation of an independent working group and the 
eventual constitution of the CLT in 2004. Having devised proposals for a large-scale 
scheme involving the development of affordable and market housing, workspace, 
community facilities and woodland, in 2010 the land for development was conveyed 
to the CLT for the initial sum of £1, with the full land value of £750,000 to be paid 
upon completion of the scheme. This method of transfer was praised by interviewees 
from both the CLT and the council for its economic pragmatism: rather than having to 
raise the sum in advance, the price of the land could be paid as the CLT began to 
generate some revenue through the completed homes and workspace. Clearly this 
required the council to place a degree of trust in the CLT's operations but supporting 
local initiatives in their area was seen as something that the council should be doing 
in the context of government rhetoric around community empowerment, 
notwithstanding the need to act as a "critical friend" in ensuring the CLT would be 
capable of delivering:
All the philosophical elements that underpin a CLT's raison d'etre, if you like, 
are very much in line with the way in which our council should be supporting 
communities to take local responsibility and support their leadership. I 
suppose it fits in philosophically as well as a practical vehicle for the project 
delivery.
We're not saying that it should be done everywhere, we're saying where an 
opportunity that arises that fits with our priorities and our philosophy and way 
of working, here's one vehicle for delivering it.
Community Strategy Officer, Devon County Council
Therefore a critical factor in acquiring public land was the alignment of the CLT's 
objectives with the strategic priorities and philosophies of the public sector
landowner. However despite this partnership between the CLT and county council, 
transfer of land was significantly delayed due to problems gaining planning 
permission. An outline planning application had been placed in 2003 and approved 
by the local planning authority but 'called in' for public inquiry by the Government 
Office for South West and eventually rejected in 2006 on the basis that it did not 
meet national priorities. There was obvious frustration at this delay and the way in
which centralised decision-making appeared to overrule local democracy:
W e had the parish council that was part of the whole thing and saying "yes, 
we're up for this", the district council as the local planning body who looked at 
it long and hard ... but thought that it merited approval. The county council 
was fully supportive and we had people from right across the board - bishops, 
ministers, God knows - involved in conversations giving it support, and then a
single planning inspector kicks it put having taken 8-9 months to get to
government office to appoint the person, then another 12 months as they 
went through a long-winded process of investigation.
It just seemed like an incredibly protracted process to reach a decision that 
everyone else that has some form of democratic legitimacy in the area were 
supportive of, and then they rejected' it!
Community Strategy Officer, Devon County Council
When the planning applications went in there were very very few objections 
and all the ones were either from people who live within 50 yards of the 
development -  so you understand their position as they don’t want something 
built on their doorstep -  or from a neighbouring parish council who didn’t want 
any extra traffic going through their village. At the point when we put this latest 
application in the planners said to us that they would have expected over 200 
letters of objection and they had a total of 19 which actually emanated from 
six people. I think that says it all really.
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Chair, High Bickington CLT
At the micro level of the community the breadth of the CLT's network of connections 
was evident, encompassing the traditional hierarchies of democratic legitimacy along 
with a dispersed network of latent support within the local population (evidenced by 
the CLT's high rates of membership). Yet, there appeared to be frustration in the way 
the communitarian ideal of a participatory local democracy in conjunction with 
representative forms was constrained by pentralised decision-making. The "latest 
application" referred to in the latter quote references the resubmission for planning 
permission that was eventually granted in 2010, allowing the acquisition of land to be 
completed. The experience of the CLT's struggle to gain planning permission has 
partly influenced the English government's plans to devolve land use planning 
decisions to community level, a process considered in Section 6.3. With reference to 
the potential for acquiring land, it appears that the council's philosophical 
commitment to supporting local community ownership and enterprise was influential 
in facilitating this, leading to a beneficial economic arrangement allowing the CLT to 
progress. Indeed, as the Chair of the CLT commented, without this arrangement the 
CLT's plans would have struggled to progress:
They've [the council] been very supportive and the ultimate support has been 
that they are transferring the land for the housing for nil cost initially on the 
basis that we'll pay them back with the income from the development, so 
they've actually enabled us to do it. If we'd had to raise the money for the land 
first we wouldn't have been able to achieve what we're going to achieve.
Chair, High Bickington CLT
However, it should not be assumed that this commitment and alignment of a 
council's priorities and a CLT's objectives is easy to achieve. The High Bickington 
case is but one among many and it is interesting to contrast the development of 
CLTs in Wales, where the public transfer or subsidisation of assets has been a 
recurrent theme subject to different tensions and negotiation.
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North Wales Local Authority had identified CLTs as a potential mechanism through 
which affordable housing delivery could be increased. A 2007-2011 Affordable 
Housing Delivery Statement provided to me for the research explicitly stated this 
support, with the caveat that CLTs were seen as a complementary measure to 
existing forms of provision:
North Wales Local Authority acknowledges that Community Land Trusts 
(CLT) can play a part in providing affordable homes in their communities in 
those circumstances where the CLT option is the most appropriate to deliver 
affordable homes. It is important however that from a strategic housing 
perspective that any CLTs do not dilute the impact and role of Registered 
Social Landlords (RSLs). Any CLT's activities should therefore be focused on 
new provision in locations where RSLs are currently not operating through 
either the inability to access suitable sites or lack of funding.
! North Wales Local Authority (2009)
In May 2010 CLTs were again briefly mentioned in a Council progress report:
The Affordable Housing Officer continues collaborating and offering guidance 
to community groups who want to establish and implement the Community 
Land Trust model of providing affordable housing on sites in the Council's 
ownership.
North Wales Local Authority (2010)
CLTs in this area were clearly at an early stage as indicated in this statement,
though the opportunity for asset transfer had clearly been identified. The council had
a history of releasing land in its ownership for affordable housing development,
reporting in the same progress report that £360,000 had been indirectly invested into
development via the disposal of land for less than open market value to housing
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associations throughout the county (North Wales Local Authority, 2010). Therefore, 
bearing in mind these statements, it was somewhat of a surprise during fieldwork to 
encounter concern with CLTs "having their eye" on obtaining public land:
If the view is that with the public purse tightening you need to get best value 
out of land ... I think from our perspective they [the local authority's estates 
department] found it difficult to justify why you would potentially release land 
for nil value when you know you could sell it on the open market and 
make a bit of money there, or develop similar products yourself.
Affordable Housing Officer, North Wales Local Authority
When probed further, the opportunity for asset transfer was hindered not only by the 
economic value of land and pressure from the council's estates department, but also 
by the wider issue of who the council's work assists. Unlike in the South West of 
England, where councils were unperturbed by the possible perception of giving 
preferential treatment to an area, North Wales's council seemed to be wary of 
assisting one CLT group with access to land in case CLT development 
"mushroomed" around the county:
There was a concern initially when we started receiving requests to be helping 
and releasing land for these groupsThat we would be displaying a preference 
to certain areas and that groups within other neighbouring parishes would 
latch onto this ... the concern then [would be] that land trusts would be 
popping up like mushrooms all over the county ... if you're going to go forward 
with these type of schemes in North Wales [it is important that] you don't just 
concentrate on certain areas, that the remit of such a group may be to cover 
quite a broader area in its constitution, maybe to convey that it doesn't favour 
just one small locality.
Affordable Housing Officer, North Wales Local Authority 
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The end of this quote introduces a degree of trepidation at the CLT's locally-specific 
remit. As the previous chapter demonstrated, CLTs are often premised on the basis 
that localised community governance should be positioned to make decisions over 
how housing should be decided upon, provided and governed at a local level. 
Although the county's rural housing enabler argued that CLTs were seen from the 
community-level as a mechanism of overcoming animosity between local authorities 
and communities (quoted in section 6.1), he also identified scepticism among local 
strategic stakeholders (such as local authorities and housing associations) at how 
CLTs may operate on this premise:
I think there is a tendency that - it's not mistrust as such - but scepticism 
regarding what their [CLT's] real incentive is to do this. In some communities 
there is a more biased feeling towards helping those who are slightly better 
o f f ... [so] there is a tendency to be aware of what's the agenda behind these 
ideas and the CLT is something that people are feeling a bit cautious of 
helping too much in developing.
Rural Housing Enabler, North Wales
Joining the dots between the rural housing enabler's comments and existing 
literature, Flint et a/.'s (2009) review of barriers to delivering affordable housing in 
Wales found several concerns in rural communities related to interrelated issues of a 
stigmatisation of affordable housing and its allocation to non-locals. The rural 
housing enabler expressed the opinion that previous experience of housing 
association allocations to people without a connection to a community had previously 
caused problems in one of the areas where CLT interest had been located:
When I started working with the CLT they were quite reticent to 
encourage working with a housing association due to the fact that they had 
slightly bad experiences with tenants who had no connection with a certain 
community and they had brought some problems which had increased over
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the years. So it was slightly seen that the CLT was seen as something as an 
alternative to housing associations because of that feeling, but since then 
CLTs haven't really taken off because of various problems in getting land, the 
fact that transfer of public-owned land hasn't been that well received.
Rural Housing Enabler, North Wales
The study by Flint et al. (2009, p. v) also found that affordable housing was mainly 
facilitated when it was "explicitly linked to the sustainability of local communities and 
the protection of services and facilities, and in some areas, the Welsh language". 
While the validity of the need to protect local services and facilities is not under 
question, there was clearly suspicion among interviewees that the CLT model could 
be used as a vehicle to differentiate precisely who these services were for: i.e. the 
locally-based or geographically linked "slightly better off' who may be perceived as 
more deserving of assistance than those outside the immediate locality. It was for 
these reasons that, as the rural housing enabler describes above, the transfer of 
public-owned land was not well received.
This feeling was endorsed by the council's Affordable Housing Officer, who 
expressed a concern that the potential for locally-specific strategies to focus too 
tightly on a "certain type of clientele" meant that public land transfer may not be the 
fairest course of action for a local authority to engage in. Indeed, a further view from 
the rural housing enabler that "people would like to have houses built for specific 
types, of people" (my emphasis) was a predominant concern as illustrated further in 
the quotations below:
A lot of the scepticism comes from that fact that these people are seeking to 
secure local authority land for a nominal value and that the whole thing is 
being developed for the purpose of a potentially tight knit community and 
potentially within very tight allocation criteria as well ... I think locally here in 
terms of the groups who are developing, they do seem to be very much
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tailored to the needs of a certain type of clientele, you know, people who are 
really local.
Affordable Housing Officer, North Wales Local Authority
The models that have been shown to authorities; there's a feeling that it's a 
slightly, possibly elitist, type of development in that people would like to have 
houses built for specific types of people.
Rural Housing Enabler, North Wales
This analysis brings forward a concern at the way CLTs could manifest. An aim of 
allocating housing to people possessing particular characteristics via the adjudication 
of the CLT - in this case being "slightly better off' - holds obvious potential for 
excluding those who do not meet or possess those qualities. The council's 
reluctance to release land for groups holding these objectives led to the 
aforementioned groups disbanding or adopting new organisational forms and ways 
of working during fieldwork. While the opportunity for asset transfer in Devon had 
been harnessed by a social rationale adopted by the council emphasising a citizen- 
centred partnership approach to "protecting local community facilities for generations 
to come" (in the words of the Community Strategy Officer quoted in the previous 
chapter), the developments in North Wales were tempered by the question of exactly 
who affordable housing would be "protected" for. This was illustrated in the council's 
affordable housing statement referenced above, emphasising that CLTs should not 
dilute the impact of housing associations, and endorsed by both interviewees who 
described the preference for providing housing through more conventional and 
trusted models:
It's a situation where CLTs in my neck of the woods are finding it difficult to try 
and persuade people that the way forward is through a CLT and not through 
conventional models like housing associations or private developers.
200
Rural Housing Enabler, North Wales
People have been more used to the model of the housing associations 
developing and the fact you've got a small group of local people coming 
together ... I think it's important you understand this from the perspective of 
models using public sector property ... public sector land that we've sold for 
less than best value to housing associations over the past 5-6 years [has 
been accepted because] ... we know that the housing associations have their 
duties [with] regulation governed by the [Welsh] Assembly, so I think they are 
a more tried and tested and trusted (my emphasis) model.
Affordable Housing Officer, North Wales Local Authority
The word "trusted" is emphasised in the latter quote as, though not explicitly stated, 
it is possible to identify some concern at the development of CLTs and the 
motivations, aims and desired ends of those behind them, especially in comparison 
to traditional forms of provision. As the rural housing enabler commented earlier in 
this section, the incentive for communities to form and develop CLTs was questioned 
and the extent to which it could be considered altruistic was obviously under scrutiny.
While the idea that community can be a scene for conflict as much as much as for 
co-operation is not new (Taylor, 1992, p. 2; DeFilippis et a/., 2006), this is a 
particularly interesting finding of this research given the English government's plans 
to introduce a community right to build (CRTB). The CRTB proposes that 
communities should be permitted to develop their own housing schemes through a 
CLT without gaining planning permission from local authorities provided they secure 
more than 50 per cent of a vote in a community referendum (CLG, 2010). Speaking 
at the 2010 national CLT conference, the government's minister for housing Grant 
Shapps explained the fundamental principles for introducing the CRTB:
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For the first time it will be communities, not central Government, who decide 
what happens in their local area. W e want local people to decide what 
happens in their community ... I want communities to have the freedom to 
decide on the type and quantity of housing without external restrictions 
imposed by a centralised planning system. The English villages that captivate 
the world's imagination were largely built at a time before a planning system 
existed. They were built by local people to meet their needs. I want to unlock 
the passions and drive of communities. I want to free them to realise their 
vision.
Shapps (2010b)
This permits communities the freedom to decide on the type of housing that is 
provided, who it should be allocated to according to "their vision"50 and is based on a 
premise that government intervention has stunted the drive and desires of 
communities. Indeed, much of the talk at various CLT conferences and events 
attended during the fieldwork related to the influence the case of High Bickington had 
had on the CRTB plans, where a centralised planning system had apparently 
threatened to override local democracy and impede the CLT's access to public land 
through asset transfer.
Yet, although placed in a different national context and concerned with the basic 
transfer of public land rather than the granting of planning permission itself, the case 
of North Wales highlights that the drive and vision of communities seeking to form 
CLTs may not easily translate into outcomes that meet the strategic responsibilities 
of elected tiers of government. While the concerns and objectives of a local authority 
and CLT matched up in High Bickington, partly due to the weight of community 
support and consensus that facilitated the willingness to support asset transfer, in
-------------------------------------------  t
50 Notwithstanding accountability to funders and regulators, this will be discussed in the following chapter.
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North Wales the access to land was constrained by the divergent aims and 
objectives of the respective parties. This reminds us that, despite the utopian ideals 
described by Grant Shapps, community involvement alone does not automatically 
translate into improved policymaking or housing delivery. It is instead subject to a 
range of different interpretations of the way CLTs may be utilised to particular ends 
contingent on local circumstances and rationales.
6.3 Taking it to the community: local referendums over land use
The third proposal to bring forward land for CLTs discussed here is the CRTB's idea 
that land use can be decided by community consensus determined through a local 
referendum. Interestingly, though the CRTB is presented as a novel approach, there 
is a precedent for local community referendums over development issues. Operated 
through parish councils, parish polls have been legislated for since powers for their 
instigation were granted in the Local Government Act 1972 (HM Government, 1972). 
Parish polls require a minimum of ten people at a parish council meeting to call for a 
poll on any local issue. Although the result is non-binding, they provide a mechanism 
for local people to democratically express their view over a particular local issue (for 
example, local development or use of parish resources). Having become aware of 
the plans for the CRTB in early 2010, a village CLT in the South West instigated a 
parish poll over whether or not the CLT should build affordable housing on a piece of 
land owned by the parish council, providing a useful example of how CLTs may 
organise and negotiate over local referendums.
Like many of its counterparts described in this thesis, this CLT51 had identified a 
beneficial financial arrangement over a piece of local land, negotiating with the 
parish council to acquire it for a nominal sum. Early communications with the local
51 Participants in this part of the study (and in later chapters) are anonymised at the request of an interviewee.
203
planning authority indicated they were content for property to be built on the land 
and, as the CLT's development plans progressed, a public meeting was held to 
ascertain local opinion:
We'd talked to the planners along the way, getting close to getting planning 
permission, we felt that we really ought to let the village know what we're 
doing and get the village behind us. So we had a big meeting, 98 people 
turned up, it was a good meeting. We outlined our full proposals, there were 
a lot of objections but we had another plot at the far end of the land, so we 
said 'what about this?' There was a big vote in favour of that, we got a big 
majority.
Board member, Village CLT in the South West
i
While this indicates a degree of community consensus achieved through negotiation, 
opposition was then exercised at a subsequent parish council meeting as the plans 
developed:
We [then] went along to the parish 'council meeting and told them what we 
were intending doing ... and there were people in the audience who stood up 
and trotted out all sorts of things like "we don't want the riff raff from 
Birmingham coming here" and "why should we subsidise people to make big 
profits on houses when we've had to struggle to get ours" and all sorts of 
ignorant questions started coming out ... it did highlight an awful lot of 
ignorance as to what affordable intermediate housing meant.
Board member, Village CLT in the South West
The prevalence of community concern was also articulated by an interviewee from a 
local voluntary group in the village, particularly with regards to the ambiguity of the 
relative term "affordable housing":
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I think this is an issue of transparency. The simple answer is that the CLT 
have never made clear, it was not defined, what affordable housing really 
was meaning. In other words, this loose term affordable housing was all that 
was being thrown around.
Office Holder, Village Interest Group
These concerns were reflected in a series of questions gathered from the community 
by a village interest group, acting as a conduit between the local community and the 
CLT. While many of the community's questions related to common concerns as to 
the impact housing will have on local infrastructure (for example car parking) and the 
physical environment, others quoted below illustrate that articulating a community's 
vision with regards to the development and allocation of housing is subject to a host 
of views and interpretations as to who should benefit, especially when the 
development is led by others in the community:
I fear the secretive attitude of the CLT.
Consultation on such an important matter for the village has been rushed, and 
the speed is cause for concern and sufficient to challenge and further 
question the CLT.
Why are there no options using private land? Perhaps because the proposal 
doesn't make sound economic sense and only works if we the parishioners 
agree to give up our rights to our land without compensation.
I am bemused at the whole idea of public funds being used to tinker with 
market economics and for the benefit of quite a small minority.
I fear there are many cans of worms being opened up here which could cause
decades of friction within the village if the development is rushed into being.
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Can the houses be sublet? Who is permitted to occupy? Just [local] 
residents or anybody? What safeguards are there to prevent them being 
occupied by problem families who could damage our village life and security?
Village Interest Group (2011 )52
With reference to these concerns, the Chair of the interest group commented that 
"there was a fair amount of consternation around [but] equally there was a view held 
by a lot of people that the CLT should proceed as voted for [at the initial public 
meeting]". It was this divide in public opinion that led to the decision to hold a parish 
poll.
The poll posed the question: "Are you in favour of the CLT progressing the 
development of affordable housing on the site in the grass keep field north of the 
community garden?" to which 127 voted in favour and 148 against. From the CLT's 
perspective, "ignorance as to what affordable intermediate housing meant" was to 
blame for this outcome and the result was influenced by the mobilisation of an 
oppositional campaign:
There was a group which started up, didn't publicise themselves, but 
conducted a whispering campaign. There were two or three people who made 
it clear their business whenever talking to their neighbours, to say how terrible 
they thought the affordable housing was and that we shouldn't have it in the 
village. There was a whispering campaign going on which we didn't know
52 This question and answer session was transcribed and uploaded to the village interest group's website. An 
interviewee provided me with the document but it is anonymised here for the purpose of confidentiality.
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about. That was again part of the reason why we lost the parish poll ... You're 
always going to get a "no". Anyone who is not sure is going to vote "no".
Board member, Village CLT in the South West
Based on this description, the CLT found it difficult to counteract opposition to both 
their plans for development and traditional perceptions as to what affordable housing 
equated to. As if to illustrate the tensions and competing interpretations of the 
legitimacy and fairness of the poll, a similar attitude towards its organisation was 
described to me from the opposing viewpoint:
If it's an election equivalent, for every vote in favour there's going to be an 
element against it, but how would a "no" vote be mobilised? Because the 
CLT are well and truly mobilised along with members of the parish council, 
but how do individuals pull together a "no" election campaign at short 
notice? Unlike the CLT who have been thinking about this for months.
Office Holder, Village Interest Group
The Chair was quite adamant that the "no" vote was, in his view, the correct and just 
result of the poll, but even despite this the experience of the poll cast doubt on the 
potential for the CRTB to generate an accepted consensus:
In terms of these referendums, there's got to be an even playing field and that 
certainly wasn't an even playing field in terms of having a parish poll.
Office Holder, Village Interest Group
The organisational power of the CLT was therefore perceived to be of benefit in 
organising and campaigning for the local vote over the potential use of the land for
207
affordable housing, even though the result of the vote eventually went against the 
CLT's plans. As a consequence, a CLT board member stated that the parish council 
withdrew the offer of land due to the weight of the community vote, even though the 
parish council themselves remained supportive, as illustrated in the parish council's 
annual report published a year after the vote:
Probably the single most worrying obstacle to the sustainability of our 
community is the lack of a balanced housing stock ... W e are fortunate to 
have the Community Land Trust, which has been working hard to provide 
affordable housing for the community ... We must show our appreciation for 
their efforts.
Village Parish Council (2011)
The exact nature of the housing stock in the village, and pertinently its allocation and 
value, was the subject of contestation during the poll and the diverging views that are 
evident here illustrate exactly why community-led housing should not be cast as a 
process that will effortlessly glide to utopian and harmonious outcomes. The 
ambiguity over what the development and definition of affordable housing would 
mean in practice was palpable, both in ; the concerns of some of the village's 
residents and in the interview with the Chair of the village interest group.
In particular, the transfer of publicly-owned land for a nominal fee was perceived as a 
subsidy helping a small minority, especially within the intermediate housing market:
There is a particular view within this parish as to why we should be 
subsidising houses when ... individuals with an income of up to £50,000 can 
apply for 'affordable housing'. That's where the cynicism now kicks in. They 
[the CLT] were then talking about not letting people with income over £28,000 
[apply]. That's still slightly above the national average. Although it won't get
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you a property here that easily, if they can't get one then what about the 
individuals lower down on £15-17,000?
Office Holder, Village Interest Group
The reference to why "we" should subsidise property indicates a communal claim to 
land, despite it being in the parish council's ownership, a view picked up on by the 
CLT in their response to the village's concerns:
The "parishioners" as such have no rights to the land; it belongs to the parish 
council and the objective of providing affordable housing is to ensure that the 
community as a whole benefits by maintaining the vitality of the village ... I 
hope the day never comes when the majority stops aiding the minorities.
Village CLT in the South West
However, as the Chair picked up on, the definition of who the "minorities" are is 
contested and his personal view was that intermediate housing targeted at middle- 
income households was not an adequate way of meeting the needs of the local area:
[The CLT's initial objectives] aligned totally with my view on supporting those 
at the less resourced end of the spectrum, but the other thing that struck me 
was how on earth does that that mean [they're] only prepared to go for 
intermediate housing. I was told that if someone wants to organise social 
housing for the community they can do it themselves, they're not interested.
Office Holder, Village Interest Group
However, when probed on this the contrasting opinions on the type of housing that 
should be provided became less polarised. A housing needs survey conducted for
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the village had identified housing need for both intermediate and social rented 
housing. Social rented housing is traditionally provided by housing associations and 
local authorities who often allocate housing according to social and economic need 
and family circumstances in addition to local connection. When questioned whether 
the Office Holder of the local interest group would prefer the CLT to place greater 
emphasis on these traditional understandings of need, defined aspatially as opposed 
to in relation to locality, a conflicting view came to the fore that revealed an emphasis 
on meeting need defined purely by geography rather than economics was of greater 
importance:
This is an important point that balances out to some degree the concerns of 
the parish council and the CLT in terms of keeping it tight for the community. If 
one of the large national housing trusts or even one of the more local housing 
trusts seeks to build social housing here and then en masse, the biggest 
concern is miscreants are brought fa from the city, to cause mayhem in the 
village then that is not the best use of village land.
Therefore the issue of social housing, and the definition of who has the 
greatest need within the district, is a big one and a sensitive one and one that 
could ultimately have me saying that the need should be for the parish alone. I 
believe social housing should be particularly focused on the needs of the 
particular community and if they've identified 16 units are needed [we should] 
just build 8 that can be easily filled within the community and not by those with 
a greater need with the points totting up system. I say that because family 
connections are very important.
Office Holder, Village Interest Group
There are clearly different interpretations as to what constitutes the "best use of 
village land", which led to the community vote going against the CLT's plans and, as 
discussed, the parish council withdrawing the offer of land. This finding raises
pertinent issues relating not only to the potential outcomes held by the CRTB but 
also to the transfer of public land into community ownership for the purpose of 
developing housing. The type, value and allocation of local housing are strongly
Vicontested issues as borne out by the emotive quotations above and community 
consensus over how housing should be provided and governed locally is not easy to 
generate. This illustrates the assertion of Davis (1991, p. 5) that territorially based 
collective action does not necessarily involve a single neighbourhood group united 
around a shared interest. Instead there may be multiple interests conveyed by 
multiple interest groups interacting conflictually rather than cooperatively.
This conflict can generate uncertainty as to the best use of local assets and the 
accountability of locally-elected authorities such as the parish council in this 
instance. They are accountable to their local electorate and their willingness to 
transfer land may be affected by the dominant narratives and opinions within the 
local community whether they align with strategic priorities or not, as evidenced by 
the parish council's concurrent withdrawal of land to, but continued support for, the 
CLT. Reflecting on the result of the poll and the subsequent withdrawal of the parish 
council's offer of cheap land, a CLT board member identified a tinge of regret at 
taking the issue to a community vote:
There are three or four people on our board who say we ought to treat this 
whole thing just like a developer who comes in, sees a bit of land and just 
puts in planning permission, full stop, and ignores everyone else ... I suppose 
in today's terms - 'big society'-wise - we tend to feel it would be nice if we had 
everyone behind us. But there is a strong feeling on our board we should just 
go ahead, get the land - blow it - go ahead and do it.
Board member, Village CLT in the South West
It should be stated that this has not happened at the time of writing (October 2011) 
and that the CLT is exploring the potential of developing on an alternative piece of
local land. However, not only does the hint of regret at taking the issue to a 
community vote cast doubt on the lasting value of attempting to generate consensus 
through local referendums, but the strength of feeling within the village that this 
analysis has described could entrench attitudes towards local development. Based
ron this qualitative evidence, one future scenario for localities unable to generate 
consensus through the CRTB may be to attempt to gain planning permission via 
conventional means, ignoring the result of a poll that may or may not have gone in 
their favour.
If the CRTB is to allow local people to meet their needs, unlock the drive of 
communities and free them to realise their vision (Shapps, 2010b), then it appears 
that reliance on communities to co-operate and reach decisions by consensus may 
be blighted by different understandings of, and motivations for, community-led 
action. Within this, localisation of decision-making, often assumed to link to mutuality 
and egalitarianism (Dixon et al., 2005, p. 14), does not necessarily result in 
inherently democratic outcomes. We can see this in the final quotation from the 
Chair of the village interest group, where the responsibility and priority of the
i
community's activity is not only focused op who it will help - i.e. those with a local 
connection - but on those who it should not and will not help. Despite the opposition 
to the CLT's aim of building intermediate housing, the primary concern of the 
community seemed to be the retention of local community control over allocations. 
This led to the conclusion that:
If I knew enough about it all so that I was well aware that you could not run a 
CLT to do anything other than provide intermediate housing because the 
social housing could only be handled by national bodies or the district council, 
and would certainly mean in the village that those undesirables from other 
parts of the county came into it, then I'd well and truly be behind the 
CLT with its current form and objective.
?
Office Holder, Village Interest Group
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Therefore, despite the opposition to the CLT and conflicts within the community over 
the process of the parish poll, the CLT's aim to provide a form of housing that would 
be subject to local control over occupancy was deemed to be preferable to any lower 
value accommodation that may be subject to outside influence and external 
pressures. The importance of local connection in defining housing need outweighed 
any other concern. These concerns were in fact also backed up by the CLT. After 
losing the community vote, a CLT board member stated their desire to continue to 
find a way to meet the local housing need identified in the housing needs survey due 
to their concerns over how housing is provided and governed by external agencies.
We're concerned if the need's not met from within the community it would be 
met by an external agency. That could mean losing not only our ability to 
decide who would occupy the properties but also the pride that comes from 
doing it ourselves and, ultimately, the considerable financial benefit that will 
flow to the community from unencumbered rental income.
Board member, Village CLT in the South West, cited in local press53
This case validates the construction of rationales for CLT development described in 
the previous chapter: CLTs are a vehicle through which communities can begin to 
exercise choice over how housing should be provided and who it should assist. The 
civic rationale provided by Lowndes and Sullivan's (2008) framework provide an 
explanatory tool for this: communities involved in neighbourhood governance can 
develop shared values, beliefs and goals which can be mobilised to address the 
identified collective social problems, exercising voice and choice over decisions that 
affect them. In this case, while the parish poll may have debated the validity of the 
'voice' - i.e. whether a CLT is the appropriate mechanism to deliver - there appeared
53 This quotation is taken from a local press cutting that reflected on the outcome of the parish poll.
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to be little discrepancy between the common 'choice' of the community; that is the 
creation and preservation of land and housing for local people.
i
We can trace these concerns back to the concerns over the CLT's use of land. Some 
village residents were concerned at the perceived threat housing development would 
pose to their “village security” and a particular way of life, while others were 
particularly wary of the proposed homes being allocated to people without a 
connection to the village. Despite the conflicts between village members and the 
CLT, they were united around the need to control the allocation of housing for local 
people. The analysis evokes Elias and Scotson’s (1965) seminal work on the 
"established and outsiders", where an established group in a community (established 
by virtue of its generational and local attachment, generating a source of collective 
power) experience the influx (or potential influx in this case) of ‘outsiders' as a threat 
to an established way of life. This causes the established to close ranks against the 
outsiders, thus preserving what they felt to be of high value, protecting their identity 
as a group and asserting local power against outside influences.
Here, the CLT was seen by people in the community both as a threat to an 
established way of life (by those wary of who the homes would be allocated to), and 
as a route towards asserting the rights of local people in housing governance above 
outside influence. The power provided to communities here is evident and questions 
the desirability of devolving decisions over land use to community level. The claims 
of CLTs -  and the ideology of the CRTB policy described at the outset of the chapter 
-  are orientated towards shifting the locus of power in housing provision in order to 
prioritise the local needs as defined by the community. By definition this excludes the 
‘outsiders’ - the non-local - and as such the desirability of this could be debated for 
its impact on particular social groups that fall outside the population a CLT is set up 
to serve: namely those with no local connection to an area and a differential 
collective power compared to those within an established community.
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6.4 Negotiation of communitarian civic rationales
If the argument is that the emphasis on local control and management over and 
above external influence equates to a civio rationale, it could be questioned whether 
or not this is actually any different from the priorities of other CLTs featured so far in 
this thesis. Has the analysis above created a 'straw man' of logic by overstating or 
misrepresenting the subject's position (Pirie, 2006, p. 156)? After all, the ability of 
CLTs to help retain and boost particular -parts of the population was a common 
theme in the model's rationalisation discussed in Chapter 6.
Indeed, when compared with the rationales held by other CLTs described in Chapter 
5, on face value there may not appear to be much difference. All unite around the 
common value of local control and by their very nature subscribe to the 
communitarian view that "enabling people to participate openly and directly in 
making the decisions that govern their lives" (Etzioni, 1995a, p. 142) holds 
regenerative potential for their local area.
This chapter began by demonstrating the way in which CLTs may help tackle 
constraints upon the supply of land by aligning their objectives with the 
communitarian concerns of local landowners. The provision of resale restricted 
housing for people with a local connection appealed to the attachment landowners 
held to their local area and thwarted concerns that the land would be leaked to the 
open market. The ability of CLTs to seemingly protect community facilities through 
local control was also a key factor in harnessing the potential for asset transfer in 
High Bickington, allowing their local authority to meet philosophical commitments to 
community empowerment and provide critical economic support to the CLT. In these 
instances, the structure and underlying aim of a CLT has provided the opportunity for 
people to invest in civic relationships marked by participation in their local community 
(Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008), a process communitarian philosophy sees as 
imperative to reforming the relationship between individuals, communities and the 
state:
215
The more opportunities we provide ... to allow people to apply their civic 
commitment, the more powerful it will grow to be, and the more the moral and 
social order will be carried by the community rather than the state.
Etzioni (1995a, p. 160)
Interpreting this process in the context of CLTs, the emphasis of CLTs is not 
necessarily on community usurping the state in carrying out the "moral and social 
order" per se, but also in gaining a degree of control and influence over local housing 
over and above housing associations, market forces and traditional conceptions of 
housing need, all of which may in some instances be interpreted as conflicting with 
CLT desires for local autonomy. This was certainly evident in the village CLT in the 
South West, where despite conflicts within the community there were common 
agreements as to the need for local control through a CLT rather than an external 
agency such as a housing association. Similar desires for local control over housing 
allocations were also identified in North Wales, partly influenced by previous 
experiences of housing association allocation policies which had placed tenants with 
no local connection into communities and led to problems in community relations.
Yet, the extent of these desires is not evident in every area where a CLT has 
emerged. In some areas stating that CLTs are entirely focused on local control and 
protection from external influence would be to ignore the local circumstances that 
frame and assist their development. For instance, the desire to provide local needs 
housing for the benefit of a clearly defined section of the community in High 
Bickington can be tempered by the CLT's proposal to build adjacent housing to sell 
on the open market and cross-subsidise the affordable homes and community 
facilities. As the CLT described in a submission to the Affordable Rural Housing 
Commission in 2005, the aim was to complement and supplement existing provision:
Our housing survey identifies many needs which would not be identified
i
through a local authority waiting list: people in work with average or below
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average wages; couples living at home; single people; people securing 
employment in the village but without accommodation ... we aim both to 
supplement affordable housing provision and to meet needs that social 
housing would not be able to respond to but which are critical for the 
economic life and vitality of our community.
High Bickington CLT (2005)
Therefore while there may have been a powerful commitment to participatory 
democracy and the weight this should carry in comparison to elected forms of 
governance (as described in the previous chapter), there was a clear 
acknowledgement that CLTs do not operate in isolation from existing structures of 
housing provision and local governance. Indeed, the tentative argument presented in 
that section - that participatory democracy may only be possible with the support and 
advocacy of more traditional tiers of representative democracy - appears to be 
validated by the analysis in this chapter whereby the council's commitment to 
supporting the CLT provided access to land on beneficial terms. Furthermore, as the 
following chapter will illustrate, many CLTs have engaged with housing associations 
in joint developments, funding arrangements and knowledge transfer, illustrating that 
positioning CLTs merely as a reaction to the perceived inadequacy of the operation 
of housing associations would be far too simplistic. Instead, a CLT's desire for local 
control and influence over how housing is decided upon, provided and governed may 
be conveyed through different forms and developments and varied working 
relationships. These may reaffirm the supremacy of community in influencing 
decision making on housing but they do not necessarily dismiss external forces and 
interests.
If anything it is these working relationships that have influenced the development of 
the CLTs described in this chapter. While in Wales there appeared to be a degree of 
divergence between the incentives and objectives of CLTs and the priorities of local 
councils in ensuring fair and correct governance to all sections of the population, the
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adoption of social rationales described by Lowndes and Sullivan (2008), typified by 
partnership and joined-up approaches to delivery, emphasis the importance of 
beneficial arrangements. While the CLT structure and its objectives incentivised the 
local landowner in St Minver to bring forward land for development, of critical 
importance to realising this was the local council's conveyance of a £544,000 
interest-free loan to help the CLT purchase the land. Without this it is obvious that 
the CLT would have found it much more difficult to capitalise on the attachment held 
to the local area held by the landowner and his associated willingness to release 
land for local needs housing.
This was assisted not just by the local authority's realisation that localised 
accountability was needed - and provided by the CLT to the landowner through their 
commitment to holding the land in trust and restricting access to homes - but that 
community involvement had the potential to add value to their operation. As typified 
by the social rationale for neighbourhood governance, collaboration and partnership 
was needed to tailor services to local needs in an area where traditional ways of 
working would be difficult to effect:
Local authorities are not omnipotent. They don't have exclusive rights to 
common sense, far from it. What's got to be understood is what a partnership 
is. It's about both parties giving up control relative to what they would in order 
to get a greater whole out of it, and recognise it's not us telling them what to 
do and them telling you what the wicked council ought to give to them. It's 
about coming together and recognising that you give up authority relative to 
what you might normally want, but you get something greater out of it.
v
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
Similar rationales were described in the relationship between High Bickington and 
Devon County Council where ties between local institutions appeared to facilitate the 
scheme's local acceptance and development. So while the councils in the South
West of England were happy to strike beneficial arrangements for land transfer and 
put forward money for land purchase respectively, CLT development is inevitably 
more difficult to achieve in areas where these rationales were rejected or the CLT's 
desire for civic commitment override the potential for compromise or development of 
partnerships. This was highlighted by the difficulties faced in striking beneficial 
arrangements for the transfer of public land in Wales.
These working relationships have been harnessed where a synergy has existed 
between the priorities and operation of local authorities and the CLT's concerns and 
objectives. For example, in Cornwall the council recognised the validity of the CLT's 
concerns for affordable housing in St Minver and assisted accordingly. Where there 
are different understandings and conceptions of what community consensus and 
control can and should do or influence, CLTs may not prosper. This suggests that 
the communitarian conception of co-operative enquiry and deliberation is not as 
effective as it is portrayed either by theorists (Tam, 1998, p. 17) or by policymakers 
in the creation of the CRTB (Shapps, 2010b). Henry Tam succinctly describes the 
ideal behind co-operative enquiry in that universal 'truths' do not exist as 
independent commonly understood facts; they are instead products of human 
consensus:
The communitarian principle of cooperative enquiry requires that any claim to 
truth be judged to be valid only if informed participants deliberating together 
under conditions of cooperative enquiry would accept that claim ... The 
objectivity of claims to the truth can only be secured through open 
communication between people engaged in a common enquiry.
: Tam (1998, p. 17)
It is through this process of generating consensus that shared beliefs, values and 
decisions are generated. However, as this chapter has demonstrated, in the context 
of CLTs these may sometimes relate to the primacy of local community control over
access to housing at the expense of others. Therefore the consensus in the poll held 
in the South West was that affordable housing should only be built if correct 
safeguards are put in place to prevent specific types of people from accessing it. It is 
in this way that CLTs may be rationalised in a context other than the utopian 
community-led picture painted in their advocacy and literature.
Conclusion
At a political level we can see that CLTs and the proposed CRTB process designed 
to facilitate them are endorsed as a mechanism which frees communities to realise 
their vision as to how housing should be decided, provided and governed at a local 
level:
People power is all about giving autonomy to individuals and trusting that with 
this responsibility the right decision will be made for the benefit of the 
community. W e do not see local people shunning the chance to get involved 
in shaping their community when it is in their interests to do so and it is clearly 
explained to them why they should seize the moment.
CLG (2010, p. 4)
The parallel with the civic rationale outlined by Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) is stark: 
communities will invest time and participation accordingly when they identify a 
relationship between their self (or, as a group, collective) interests and opportunities 
to shape or influence public policy. Advocacy of CLTs and the CRTB is based on a 
firm belief that people power can successfully plan and shape development and 
realise a common vision, yet as aspects of this chapter have demonstrated the "right 
decision" may not always be compatible with traditional understandings of economic 
equity and fairness as these definitions are inherently contested at a local level.
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The question of exactly what is equal and fair is subject to interpretations of who 
should be assisted by community activism and under what terms. Some of the 
objectives described in this analysis have highlighted desires to delineate precisely 
who should (and pertinently who should not) benefit from local community influence, 
with community-led action seen as a route to self-governing these issues in a 
vacuum from external influence, though these issues are by no means applicable to 
all CLTs.
CLTs clearly do not operate in a vacuum and instead influence from external 
stakeholders such as local authorities involved in asset transfer can be critical to 
advancing schemes. Where genuine partnerships are created to realise the mutual 
self-interest of communities and local authorities, such as the transfer of land into 
community ownership at beneficial economic rates, CLTs seem to prosper. Where 
there is a greater emphasis on increasing self-governance at the expense of external 
influence and/or particular segments of the population, the acquisition of land 
through processes such as asset transfer will be more difficult to achieve.
Furthermore, the idea that community consensus can be easily generated over a 
common vision fails to address the competing interests and priorities that are 
inherent to creating new systems of co-governance where people may seek to 
leverage power over others. Rather than existing in a unique self-governing space, 
CLTs are subject not only to the interests of others in the community but also to the 
intertwined issues of acquiring finance for their project, associated regulatory 
procedures and the ability to exercise free choice over who homes are allocated to. 
As the following chapter's analysis of these issues will affirm, the ability of CLTs to 
progress their schemes and meet their objectives depends as much on the provision 
and acquisition of certain resources as it does on desires for local control and 
autonomy.
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Chapter 7: Dilemmas, compromise and 
trade-offs: financial arrangements for
Under community governance, the community functions as the largest 
'stakeholder' in the decision-making process. Other stakeholders could 
include those providing public and private goods and services to the 
community and stakeholders at other levels of governance ... to whom the 
community is accountable.
Somerville argues that community governance does not operate in isolation to 
stakeholders at other levels of governance, even where the community or its 
representational form such as a CLT aims to function as the largest stakeholder in 
the decision-making process. Given some of the issues raised in the previous 
chapter related to the interaction between CLTs and external agencies such as local 
authorities, this provides a useful introduction to this chapter's focus on the role of 
external financial stakeholders, their relationship to the formation and facilitation of 
CLTs, and how CLTs are legitimised in the eyes of funders as a potential housing 
provider.
The quotation also provides a useful bridge between the preceding chapter and the 
analysis that follows. So far this thesis has identified the way in which CLTs have 
formed on the basis of a desire to facilitate the provision of housing, meet need and 
become key stakeholders in decision-making processes over local housing. These 
desires for degrees of local control and influence have been supplemented in some
Somerville (2005, p. 120)
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areas by a desire for autonomy seen as integral to ensuring the CLT is the primary 
decision-maker over the provision and governance of local housing. As the previous 
chapter illustrated, this communitarian emphasis has in some instances involved 
claims to carrying out civic commitment over and above housing associations, 
market forces and traditional conceptions of housing need, all of which were seen as 
potential threats to CLT control and locally-bounded objectives. It is in this way that
t
community governance attempts to redefine and redraw the perceptions of what 
constitutes an appropriate area for local influence to be exercised, often conflicting 
with or reinterpreting traditionally recognised boundaries of governance such as the 
area of a local authority's jurisdiction (Somerville, 2005, p. 120).
Yet, as Somerville's description of community governance states, these aims do not 
operate in a vacuum removed from stakeholders to whom the community is 
accountable. Depending on its organisation and context, a CLT may be accountable 
to a host of stakeholders: its local area, funding bodies, regulators, tiers of local and 
national government, private and voluntary sector societies and potential partnering 
organisations. The focus here is on the accountability CLTs hold to potential funders, 
namely national housing funding agencies and local government. Housing providers 
are typically accountable to, and require legitimisation from, these stakeholders due 
to the former's concern that public subsidy is used effectively and efficiently and the 
latter's strategic responsibility to ensure ah adequate supply of housing and meet 
housing need across their area of governance (Clapham and Satsangi, 1992). The 
need for legitimisation of a CLT's objectives in housing provision is especially 
pronounced due to their self-positioning as representatives of their local community. 
As Connelly (2011) describes, the extent to which these claims are accepted as valid 
by external stakeholders can be integral to the success or failure of community-led 
organisations:
they claim to be legitimate representatives of their communities, able to 
speak for them in other arenas and spend public money in line with the 
community's priorities ... [Therefore] the effectiveness of community-led
regeneration to some extent rests on the ability of new governance structures 
to establish legitimacy in the eyes of 'their' communities and of other actors in 
the wider policy and practical processes within which they are embedded.
Connelly (2011, p. 929-930)
In line with this, the focus of this chapter is on exploring the way in which CLTs aim 
to spend public finance in line with their priorities. Public finance refers here to that 
which is provided either by state-sponsored funders of affordable housing 
development or by local authorities. Finance is a key area of enquiry as a CLT's 
efforts can depend on successful acquisition of financial resources, as seen in the 
previous chapter whereby the access to land for the CLTs in question was 
dependent on the creation of beneficial financial arrangements through asset 
transfer or low-cost sale.
How CLTs are financed
First, it is necessary to briefly describe how CLTs may be funded and to justify why 
the chapter focuses on public money in particular. CLTs generally require funding for 
three stages of the formation and development of their organisation and scheme:
r
• Stage 1: Start-up and pre-development finance to assist with company 
incorporation, fees for expert advice and costs for obtaining planning 
permission.
• Stage 2: Land purchase
• Stage 3: Development capital
The creation of a specialist CLT Fund in 2008 by charitable and ethical banks and 
investors provided a source of small-scale finance to assist CLTs with the first stage 
of funding. The latter two stages have typically been funded by local authority grants
and loans, public subsidy or long-term loan finance from charitable sources. Private 
funding of CLTs through mainstream banks is rare due to high interest rate.
The following sections describe the way in which CLT development has been 
negotiated between CLTs and their funders, investigating the way CLTs are 
legitimised by external stakeholders who may hold competing objectives or priorities. 
Of particular importance to this is the debate over how the process of forming and 
developing a CLT should influence the end outcome, developing arguments in the 
previous chapter over the primacy of local control and importance of autonomy.
It is for this reason that charitable finance is not explored in great depth. CLTs that 
have accepted long-term charitable and ethical loan finance to fund land purchase 
and/or housing construction have done so from charitable and ethical lenders who 
expressly support and aim to advance agendas of charity, community organisation 
and social enterprise.54 As such, although CLTs may be financially accountable to 
these organisations, this is unlikely to tell us much about the processes of 
legitimisation undertaken by CLTs. However, as Section 7.2 demonstrates, 
charitable regulation is a relevant and important issue, as the conformity of a CLT to 
charitable regulation has contributed to the willingness of local authorities to provide 
finance.
The chapter argues that financial relationships that have guided or influenced CLTs 
do not constitute total acceptance of a CLT's purpose of ensuring they are the 
primary decision-maker over local housing provision, allocation and governance, but 
nor do they necessarily act as a mechanism of oppressive control aimed at thwarting 
these ambitions of local governance. Legitimacy is gained by conformity to 
identifiable sources of trustworthiness, such as charitable regulation, and through
54 As a point of clarification, charitable and ethical banks such as Charity Bank and Triodos do not solely finance 
charities; rather they finance non-profit organisations with 'social' objectives.
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compromise of objectives and/or partnership with organisations such as housing 
associations. If public funding is dependent on such criteria, it is argued that it is in 
this way that finance can direct the behaviour of CLTs. The way finance may 
influence CLTs in the allocation of the homes they develop is discussed. It is argued 
that the primary objective of CLTs - to create a 'local security of tenure' for the 
community it wishes to serve - is subject to a degree of framing and permittance of 
how this is delivered by the state and its agencies through access to funding and 
associated regulations. The development of CLTs can therefore be understood not 
just as an ideological process, but as a relational and politicised process that 
involves positioning and compromising for resources.
7.1 The dilemmas and compromises in acquiring public subsidy
Financing low-cost housing that is not to be sold on the open market has been a 
perennial challenge for any provider specialising in this provision, with a need for 
financial subsidy often created by the gap between the costs of development and 
what lower income households can afford (McDermont, 2010, p. 19). This situation 
has been especially exacerbated for CLTs due to their embryonic nature, lack of 
track record and position of relative organisational distance from conventional 
structures of housing provision and associated funding. As one CLT support worker 
put it, "CLTs are cash poor but resource hungry" which implied a financial need not 
only to fund housing development but to help access human resources such as 
technical skills and expertise. The ability of a CLT to unlock sources of finance has 
been one of the fundamental factors affecting their ability to gain local control and 
governance of housing.
Yet, as McDermont's (2010, p.19) analysis of housing associations illustrated, money 
can govern at a distance by creating relationships between funder and recipient 
which may direct or influence the use of that money and consequently a CLT's 
objectives. It became apparent during this study that CLTs were - generally speaking 
- wary of these governing relationships and the way in which the use of public
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subsidy may be directed in ways that diverge from the CLT's philosophy. This was 
reflected by a press article featuring a prominent CLT activist in 2008:
Government money usually comes with strings attached. It's what happened 
to housing associations. They used to be community-led, but have been taken 
over by government regulation. That could happen to land trusts too. W e need 
to define the boundaries between government and civic society carefully.
CLT activist, quoted in Donovan (2008)
In reality this view exaggerates the impact of government regulation and overlooks 
the role private finance has had on shaping the housing association sector's change 
from being a group of voluntary-led organisations based on philanthropy to a sector 
of "social businesses" where the lines between profit-making and not-for-profit are 
blurred (McDermont, 2010, p. 127). In particular, a reliance on private finance to 
raise development capital has created a relationship of dependency for housing 
associations who could be seen to be as accountable to the needs of private funders 
as to tenants, for example ensuring regular payment of rent and an elimination of 
"risky tenants" that threaten this (McDermont, 2004, p. 871). Nevertheless, it 
demonstrates the desire to carefully delineate the responsibilities of government and 
civic society - expressed through the vehicle of CLTs - in order to ensure that the 
priorities of the latter are predominant in the provision of local housing. The 
perception that public subsidy could create unwanted governing relationships 
between the state and its agencies and CLTs was acutely expressed in an article 
authored by a CLT practitioner:
The major strengths and unique selling points of the CLT model are 
independence and an ability to tailor housing to meet specific local needs ... 
We should think carefully, however, about what we are asking when we call 
for CLTs to be given public housing grants. The unique features of the CLT
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model could be threatened if government moves to regulate CLTs and to 
merge them into the conventional social housing sector.
Aird (2010, p. 461)
This highlights the desire for local control and autonomy to be held by CLTs, 
particularly with regards to independence in decision-making in order to pursue the 
objective of tailoring the allocation of housing to, first and foremost, the needs of the 
CLT's local population. This was echoed by other CLT practitioners when the topic of 
finance arose during the study. While many CLT practitioners and volunteers took a 
pragmatic view that public subsidy constituted "free money" (in that it would not have 
to be repaid, thus allowing greater financial security to the CLT), others followed the 
view that acceptance of subsidy could blur the community-led process and primacy 
perceived to be the CLT's competitive advantage in housing provision:
It remains a challenge not to take the 'Queen's Shilling'. Our original vision 
was to unleash the potential of private citizens to provide social goods without 
having to have support of the state ... The ideal position is to achieve our 
aims without social housing grant. As a movement we need to leave the 
emphasis on HCA behind a bit. The model should be self-financing with the 
help of other subsidy so that [the equation is] CLT = Land + Public Support + 
charitable or private funding.
CLT Technical Advisor, quoted in Ward (2009)
The perception that strings would be attached to the receipt of public subsidy
i
indicated a desire to stay true to a community-led ethos of self-help outside the 
mainstream of government provision. This position does fail to acknowledge the 
possibility that strings could be attached to private and charitable finance, but it 
furthers the argument that the key concern of many CLTs is their ability to carry out 
activity that demonstrates their attachment to place occurs over and above state
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concerns. Although private and charitable loan finance would attach strings to CLTs 
through, for example, the need to repay long-term debt, they were not seen as 
colliding with an aim of creating a vehicle fotr communities to act outside conventional 
political systems, structures and priorities, as opposed to being enacted through 
networks formulated by the state for particular targets.
This was backed up by one interviewee who, as a strong advocate of ensuring CLTs 
were led by community-defined processes, argued for the need to avoid becoming 
"just another government model" based on a perception that this would collide with 
the CLT's ability to identify and meet local needs. This was echoed by a CLT 
technical advisor who spoke of the fundamental philosophy of CLTs being that they 
represent a structure for locally-defined problems and solutions: they represent local 
communities rather than acting as "agents for government". In this sense, the 
independence of CLTs was seen as paramount and becoming "just one of a range of 
housing providers that need to be controlled" (CLT technical advisor, quoted in 
Ward, 2009) was seen as a potential threat to this. It was, therefore, not only a 
concern that CLT ambitions could be directed by financial relationships per se, it was 
a concern of being directed by financial relationships that would convey the priorities 
of other forms of governance (such as state-sponsored national funding 
programmes). As the response Community Finance Solutions made to the 
consultation held by Communities and Local Government put it:
any practical support provided by government should have a ‘light touch'... by 
definition the aims of a CLT are defined by local needs and while they 
contribute to several national policy priorities, they should not be used to 
deliver regional or national agendas or targets.
CFS (2008c, p.7)
t
The preservation of independence described here can best be understood as 
obtaining a state of separation from regional structures in order to ensure the
primacy of locally-defined and community-led objectives. Essentially, CLTs should 
work for local people. Alongside this existed a pragmatic concern related to the 
application of existing legislation to CLT homes. Rental housing funded with public 
subsidy provided by the HCA becomes subject to the Right to Acquire which allows 
tenants a legal right to buy the home they are renting from registered providers of 
social housing. Homes developed on rural exception sites are exempt from these 
requirements, which can be of benefit for CLTs in attempting to assume local control 
over housing. However, as one of the fundamental missions of a CLT is to hold 
assets in perpetuity for the benefit of a defined community, the fear of the CLT's 
assets becoming subject to the right to acquire was seen as a deterrent to accepting 
subsidy for those acquiring land not designated as an exception site. It can be 
argued therefore that becoming subject to existing legal and regulatory procedures 
was seen as a threat to both the philosophical foundations and practical ambitions of 
CLTs.
Nevertheless the need to finance schemes meant that accessing subsidy from the 
HCA was not problematised by all practitioners, particularly for those CLTs exempt 
from the right to acquire due to development of shared ownership products or on 
rural exception sites. Indeed, CLT attempts to access subsidy predate the existence 
of the HCA and instead date back to its predecessor the Housing Corporation. The 
majority of fieldwork was conducted after the dissolution of the Housing Corporation, 
but it is worth providing a brief summary of their involvement with CLTs. Firstly, this 
summary illustrates the divide that has existed between the ambitions and 
capabilities of CLTs and those of the Corporation, and secondly it explains how 
differing standards, priorities and expectations of this funding relationship were 
overcome. This describes the evolution of the relationship between the body 
responsible for funding affordable housing development in England and CLTs, and 
provides an indication of how it may develop in the future.
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This description is contextualised chronologically.55 It takes the period from 2008-09 
as its starting point, based on the author's view that the legal definition of a CLT 
during this period alongside a state-led consultation on how to support the model's 
development provided an impetus to the sector. Despite this impetus, relationships 
between CLTs and the Housing Corporation/HCA were strained due to a perceived 
lack of public legitimisation of the CLT concept. The period of 2009-10 follows as this 
is when a CLT was first granted subsidy from the HCA. This section charts the 
development of relations between the HCA and CLTs, highlighting the emphasis 
played on a role for housing associations to facilitate the process of funding CLTs. 
Finally, the period from 2010-11 describes how the role for housing associations may 
be formalised in future funding arrangements between the HCA and CLTs and 
discusses how this may be negotiated between stakeholders in the process.
2008-2009: funding negotiations
The emerging CLT sector was in a state of flux during this period (coinciding with the 
beginning of the research study). CLTs had been legally defined in July’s Housing & 
Regeneration Act 2008, leading Communities and Local Government (CLG) to 
launch a consultation in October on how they may support the development of CLTs. 
Added to the transitory state of the wider housing finance sector due to the 
impending dissolution of the Housing Corporation, as new providers CLTs found 
their efforts to gain subsidy thwarted due to a lack of knowledge and awareness 
among external stakeholders as to their place in the housing sector. As a 
representative from the Housing Corporation commented at a seminar in January 
2009:
55 Although this sub-section is intended to chronologically describe the evolution of this relationship, the 
material used is often drawn from different periods of time in order to either reflect on or reinforce the 
relevant arguments.
'r
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The Housing Corporation ... did not deliver investment in CLTs. The 
bureaucracy and rules relating to CLTs are not yet sorted out, or even who 
should own CLT policy within the organisation. For instance they could sit in 
the new investments and partnerships division, the policy division or the 
finance and renewal division.
Housing Corporation Policy Officer, quoted in Ward (2009)
This apparent confusion trickled down to CLTs attempting to gain subsidy, as 
reflected by CLT practitioners interviewed at the time. Speaking in November 2008, 
the director of Cornwall CLT expressed his frustration at a bid for subsidy being 
turned down due to a perceived lack of understanding:
The rejection letter we had basically had nothing to do with value for money, it 
was saying they hadn't actually worked out a system for dealing with CLTs 
from an administrative point of view.
I think support is building but the issue is whether it’s in a concrete way and if 
they’re going to do it. It’s been two* and a half years now and they’ve been 
talking but we haven’t seen anything:
Director, Cornwall CLT
The perception that CLTs were yet to be understood within the administrative and 
regulatory systems of the Corporation was a view shared among many practitioners 
and stakeholders. In Cornwall a local authority officer speaking in September 2009 
shared the umbrella CLT's frustration at the apparent state of confusion:
Interviewee: As you may know the HCA56 have not covered themselves in 
glory. They talk a good deal and actually do nothing. You’ll have heard that ad 
nauseum!
Researcher. Have you got anything more to say about their involvement?
Interviewee: Only that the local authority has filled the void ... only that we’ve 
been lobbying for them to get their act together. Anyone who pretends these 
were an initiative of central government is fooling themselves. They weren’t. 
It’s been the local councils who’ve picked this up as an idea.
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
“Filling the void” referred primarily to the council’s provision of interest-free loans 
which aided land purchase among CLTs and was vital in easing the financial 
pressures they commonly face (this is discussed in more depth in the following 
section). The perception of inertia was partly attributed to the consultation held by 
CLG. Some interviewees working on CLTs rather pessimistically feared that the 
consultation may represent “delaying tactics” and a reluctance to facilitate CLTs, 
while the Housing Corporation officer above attributed their inability to fund CLTs to 
the consultation “stalling things ... [we] need to consult CLG on policies but CLG say 
they are still analysing consultation responses” (quoted in Ward, 2009).
In particular, the CLG consultation was concerned with the regulatory regime that 
would be implemented for CLTs and how their use of public funds could be 
monitored and considered transparent. The paper proposed that CLTs providing
56 Although the interviewee refers to the HCA, this passage refers to both the funding regime of September 
2009 (when the interview took place) and the HCA, and to previous efforts to gain subsidy via the Housing 
Corporation before its dissolution in December 2008.
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rental accommodation using subsidy would be required to register as a formal 
housing provider with the Tenant Services Authority (TSA) via the process used by 
housing associations:
The [Housing and Regeneration] Act requires that if the HCA proposes to 
provide financial assistance for low cost rental accommodation, it must ensure 
that the landlord is a provider registered with the TSA ... Therefore CLTs 
wishing to provide low cost rental accommodation, with financial assistance 
from the HCA, would need to be registered with the TSA and be subject to the 
regulation regime.
CLG (2008b, p. 12)
This would mean a CLT becoming an accredited housing provider (a pre-requisite of 
qualifying for subsidy for rental housing), yet many practitioner responses to the CLG 
consultation viewed the process of registration to be overbearing and too demanding 
for volunteers to undertake. This was summarised by the Development Trusts 
Association's response.
Though the detail of the proposed registration process is not yet clear, the 
consultation document does not identify what support CLTs might receive to 
undertake the process of registration or recognise the substantial burden this 
would represent to what are essentially volunteer-driven delivery vehicles. 
Indeed, the emphasis on a regulatory regime similar to that of RSLs is likely to 
undermine and deter future community-owned housing developments.
Development Trusts Association (2008, p. 12)
This accusation was repeated by many participants in the study with a widespread
perception that CLTs were not seen as legitimate by those in authority. Although
independence was cherished by CLTs, they acknowledged that receiving subsidy
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would make their financial situation much easier, though as the quotation from 
Community Finance Solutions in the previous chapter described, the CLT sector 
demanded this would be "light touch" and proportionate to their capacity, aims and 
objectives rather than those of funders, regulators or governments. In this way the 
desired autonomy would be preserved. As the quotation below describes, the 
objective of the CLT sector was to carve out a new space for governing that would 
no longer be seen as an exception to mainstream affordable housing provision, and 
instead community-led and orientated housing provision, defined by and for the 
community, would be seen as the norm:
The Government will not be able to fulfil an enabling role in relation to CLTs if 
they continue to be represented by government and its agencies as 
exceptional, and thus potentially more difficult, risky or expensive. We are 
keen to see CLTs placed in the mainstream of housing providers working with 
central and local government and their agencies and partners.
CFS (2008c, p. 15)
!
This perception of government and "their agencies and partners" (such as the HCA) 
was summarised by a leading CLT advocate in a press article in 2009. The inability 
to access funding and the desire to regulate CLTs by the same standards as 
conventional providers was thought to undermine the potential for community-led 
localised development.
f
By being heavily regulated and seen as difficult to proportionately incorporate into 
funding regimes, CLTs felt they were represented as exceptional, risky and 
expensive with their actions therefore not seen as legitimate by those with the 
finance to enable CLT development:
Citizens are frequently met with condescension, suspicion and irritation at 
their presumption in wanting to meddle in the production of their homes.
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These residents are conveniently depersonalised and disempowered with the 
catch-all label of "communities".
Hill (2009)
2009-2010: the first subsidy is granted
i
In April 2009 Holy Island CLT became the first CLT to be granted subsidy by the 
HCA. The process they undertook to access subsidy was to provide an example of 
some of the frustrations described above while concurrently providing a potential 
template for future CLT development. Given the context described previously, if 
CLTs did not wish to register with the TSA, they were encouraged to bid for fundingf
in conjunction with a housing association (CLG, 2008b, p. 12).
Encouraging CLTs to partner with the housing association sector was based on two 
reasons: its expertise in facilitating and completing funding processes, and its track 
record as the main provider of social housing in England.
Firstly, expertise was seen as a necessary component of any partnership. CLTs 
were required to complete a pre-qualification questionnaire (PQQ) in order to access 
funding. The technicalities of completing this questionnaire, alongside the periodic 
progress reports required by the HCA during the construction of homes, were the 
primary reason why accessing subsidy was interpreted to be demanding of small 
scale voluntary organisations such as CLTs. Holy Island CLT partnered with a local 
housing association to assist in accessing .subsidy and help fulfil these tasks, which 
were viewed as particularly stringent:
You have the HCA's systems which I have to say are not easy even as
ourselves working with them day to day. W e fill in the PQQ form to get these
houses, then it goes onto an Information Management System and it gets
logged all way through - housing quality indicators et cetera - it's got a whole
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lot of things which are terminology which would faze people thinking "what on 
earth is that?" And [the PQQ is] a form of 250 pages ... that's ludicrous, you're 
almost signing your life away to do three or four homes.
Chief Executive, Housing Association, North East
This critique essentially argues that the model of accessing funding does not take 
adequate account of the capacity and expertise of applicants, nor does it take a 
proportionate approach to risk. That CLTs found a professionalised process difficult 
to navigate should be of little surprise as the HCA's affordable homes programme is 
one more designed for housing association providers whose size and resource (both 
human and financial) can have more in common with multi-million pound business
than many voluntary organisations (McDermont, 2010, p. 127).
v
As described above, the administrative systems for embryonic organisations such as 
CLTs were still being negotiated during this period of time and the partnership 
arrangements were seen as a pragmatic way of allowing CLTs to access subsidy, 
while simultaneously providing the HCA with confidence in delivery. The PQQ itself 
contains a section on the financial viability of the applicant based on their previous 
track record of delivering and managing housing developments on time and on 
budget. A guide produced for CLTs seeking to access HCA grant published in 2009 
stated that:
Given their formative nature (and therefore limited financial track-record), 
prequalification of CLTs is conditional on receipt of a letter of intent from a 
suitable guarantor that a Performance Guarantee or Bond will be provided ... 
For CLTs, we suggest the Performance Guarantee could be provided by the 
partner RSL.
Cotton, quoted in Brettell (2009, Appendix B of the document)
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The inclusion of a performance guarantee was the second mechanism for 
encouraging the partnership between CLTs and housing associations. As Brettell 
(2009, p.5) describes, the performance ^guarantee places an obligation on the 
housing association to ensure the scheme is delivered and obliges them to step in 
and complete the development in full if the CLT were to fail to deliver. The housing 
association involved in the North East partnership were willing to accept this 
performance guarantee, largely because the CLT had already proven they had a 
track record.57
For them [the HCA] risk is a big element and of course it's risky to stand 
guarantor for someone you don't know, but having said that the North East 
situation was quite unique. They'd built seven of their own properties; they 
had already managed [rental housing], so in a way they fitted the criteria really 
well. Our board had met them and their view was that they'd done it once, got 
a clear indication that they'd be absolutely fine and there's nothing 
particularly risky so we will go throligh that process. But that won't be the 
same for every CLT and I don't think that's quite been spelt out to the trusts.
Chief Executive, Housing Association, North East
Despite the housing association's willingness to fulfil this part of the bargain, it was 
not accepted that this was the most appropriate course of action, only that it was the 
most pragmatic in order to achieve the desired outcome. In interviews Holy Island 
CLT volunteers described their history of developing and managing their first housing 
scheme since 1999 and viewed the partnership merely as a pragmatic way to 
accessing a critical source of finance, describing the housing association as "more of 
an agent than a partner". They fulfilled complex tasks in assisting with the
y
57 Holy Island CLT had a track record of housing development, yet due to changes in legal structure was unable 
to satisfy the requirements of the PQQ, hence the need for a housing association partnership.
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bureaucracy of the PQQ and have since provided a useful housing management 
service while allowing the CLT to maintain independent control over the 
organisation's finance and housing allocations, but there was a definite feeling 
among volunteers that they should not be dependent on the housing association's 
involvement. The common call was for a simplified process proportionate to the 
number of houses being built (four homes in the case of this particular scheme) 
which could allow communities to do it themselves. Returning to the end of the 
previous section, the view that CLTs required stringent monitoring and control 
characterised the grant process, suggesting a lack of trust or legitimacy in the eyes 
of external stakeholders:
And it's a bit cheeky to expect the RSLs to do that when in fact the HCA are 
saying "these people are perfectly capable of building this as a CLT" then to 
attach some sort of quasi-view that someone else has to stand guarantor is a 
bit odd to say the least.
Chief Executive, Housing Association, North East
v
There were several concerns over these arrangements among volunteers of many 
other CLTs. With regard to finding a partner, there was a concern that this was 
simply setting CLTs up to fail. As new organisations with no track record, they would 
be unlikely to access subsidy individually, but multiple CLTs expressed anxiety in 
interviews conducted in 2009 that local housing associations were concerned about 
CLTs "treading on their toes", thus acting as a possible deterrent to partnerships. 
This was acknowledged by the director of Cornwall CLT who, even though his 
organisation had found a suitable partner, passed comment on a mutual wariness 
between CLTs and housing associations at a recent event we had both attended:
Researcher: I noticed at the seminar, if I interpreted it correctly, that a few 
people are wary of housing association involvement.
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Interviewee: Oh they are. I think it's very much a separate sector. Some 
housing associations think CLTs could be a threat [and] scoop up some of the 
resources they're after. I think there's an awful lot of mistrust of housing 
associations [from communities] over the shared ownership part ... I think 
there's an element of distrust because they're so expensive.
This "distrust" can be traced back to analysis elsewhere in this thesis, where a 
motivating factor for the formation of CLTs was the perceived inadequacy of local 
housing provision. There was clear concern over having to find a suitable partner for 
CLTs; not only because of the perceived competition between two organisations 
potentially seeking the same resources, but also due to a potential threat to the 
CLT's independence. A member for Holy Island CLT reflected on their relationship 
with a housing association at the 2011 national CLT conference:
Other community trusts may not have the same knowledge, track record and 
experience as HICLT so the risk is that they may defer to the RSL in any 
proposals. RSLs often want to do what they 'usually do' - which might not 
always match with what the community want to do - so any group needs to 
take the time to set out and be clear about their priorities for any proposals - 
along with the terms for the partnership at an early stage.
Kelly (2011)
The main value of the partnership to the CLT was the assistance with complex 
documentation and the obvious access to grant as a consequence. The need for this 
assistance was evident among many other CLTs, as illustrated by this volunteer's
experience of the technical nature of accessing housing finance:
>
Dealing [with the HCA] has been very much at the end of the telephone with 
no help or advice really at all. Their bureaucracy and forms are of a nature 
that when I first saw them I nearly gave up, I thought if this is the only way we
can get money I'm going to give up, I don't understand them. It was so - still is 
- complicated and lengthy. The explanatory notes are full of abbreviations; I 
haven't a clue what they're talking about. I am still of a mind that I'd love to do 
without them but I don't think you can.
Board member, Village CLT in the South West
i
The last sentence of this quotation exemplifies the value of the partnership struck by 
Holy Island CLT: they needed the housing association to act as the gatekeeper in 
unlocking a critical source of finance, though equally as important to the CLT was 
that this would be done on their terms and without major compromise in the CLT's 
independence. As a response to the CLG consultation described, ensuring the 
primacy and independence of the CLT in any partnership was deemed to be 
essential, rather than being merely incorporated as subsidiaries of existing provision:
Local people will not readily give up their time to be just a minor component of 
existing public provision. They want to be valued equally with other agencies 
as investors in their communities.
Development Trusts Association (2008, p. 4)
The following section describes how this experience has begun to influence the 
potential for more CLTs to access subsidy from the HCA.
2010-11: future support for CLTs
Fieldwork for this study had been concluded by this point, but it is worth
distinguishing this time period from the previous section due to the acquisition of
HCA funds by an increasing number of CLTs since this period. Although the
temporal boundaries of the study meant it was difficult to explore these in any depth,
it is possible to draw on both the plans put in place by the HCA for their future
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interaction with CLTs and some of the research data to provide an insight into the 
impact of public subsidy on CLT objectives and structures and processes to achieve 
them.
One of the main outcomes from the Holy Island process was the need for a 
simplification of the application process. From the perspective of CLTs, the 
technicalities involving completion of a lengthy PQQ and the requirements for 
periodic progress monitoring were deemed to be out of proportion with the scale and 
risk of the size of CLT developments. Furthermore, the need for an organisation to 
stand as a guarantor was perceived by some to breed an attitude that CLTs required 
surveillance and could not be trusted. As one volunteer commented:
I think the system has to loosen up and that there has to be an acceptance 
that communities have the capacity to help themselves given that they are 
allowed to do so. One of the downsides for modern government is that they 
want to control everything and its one reason why I've been very reluctant to 
get involved with HCA at all. Not because we don't need their money but 
because I'm wary of the controls that will be put on as a result.
Chair, High Bickington CLT
f
Yet, others acknowledged that such attitudes were always likely to exist given the 
small-scale specialist nature of an emerging organisation such as a CLT. Using the 
word "boutique" to denote this specialism, one CLT board member echoed the view 
that public subsidy would be a last resort due to general rules and regulations 
relating to design and use of finance, but equally acknowledged the validity of these:
I think philosophically, we would like to keep that as a final option or as a 
small part of our funding because - I hesitate to use the word boutique in 
connection with our schemes, but at the moment they clearly are boutique 
schemes and there's always a risk that you fall foul of general rules and
regulations that bodies like the HCA would bring into play, and quite rightly so, 
they're dealing with public money after all.
Board member, Foundation East CLT
A common refrain among CLT representatives, from volunteers to technical support 
workers, was the need for the HCA to develop an investment model aligned with the 
structure and philosophy of CLTs. The release of the HCA's Affordable Homes 
Programme for 2011-2015 gave specific advice to CLTs seeking subsidy. As "small 
specialist organisations" CLTs were advised they "may find it beneficial to partner 
with existing consortia or investment partnerships to benefit from shared expertise in 
development" (HCA, 2011a, p. 30), providing explicit encouragement to partnership 
arrangements akin to those described above. This encouragement is also provided 
to housing associations based on a perception strongly aligned with the philosophy 
of CLTs: that community involvement is able to improve reflections of local need:
Providers are particularly encouraged to include smaller, rural, specialist and 
community based organisations in consortia arrangements, either at the 
outset or during the course of the cdntract so that proposals will better reflect 
local need.
HCA (2011a, p. 29)
Alongside this, CLTs are permitted to put forward independent proposals provided 
they register with the TSA, with an acknowledgement that qualification for subsidy 
with the HCA is required to be more proportionate to the scale and nature of CLTs 
(though at the time of writing it is unclear what this entails in practice):
we will seek to ensure that our approach to qualification is proportionate,
and the TSA will seek to take a proportionate approach to Registration. We
will also take account of the scale of the funding required, and degree of risk
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in a project, in agreeing contractual arrangements where an allocation [of 
funding] is agreed.
HCA (2011b, p. 5)
The emphasis on consortia arrangements between housing associations and CLTs 
provokes an interesting path for future enquiry. As described in the previous analysis 
chapters, the value of a CLT in the eyes of those behind their formation is their 
organisational independence and autonomy in determining local priorities. Many of 
the "first generation" of CLTs saw their role as creating distinct forms of governance 
outside existing provision which were deemed to be more valuable than other 
professionalised providers precisely because of their independence and commitment 
to their community. This long-term commitment to the priorities of a local area was 
seen to distinguish CLT provision from that of housing associations, yet the two are 
now expected to join forces if CLTs wish to acquire public subsidy:
With this shift towards housing associations my worry is whether they see 
those long-term benefits or whether they see it as a short-term project. It 
seems to me that the first generation [of CLTs] were all formed by groups of 
idealists who wanted to develop affordable housing, and saw that there was a 
long-term benefit that perhaps we could regenerate that money for other 
community uses.
Board member, Village CLT in the South West
As the beginning of this section suggested, a common concern has been that 
community-led activity may be submerged by external priorities given weight by 
governing relationships that may collide with local autonomy for CLTs. Therefore, of 
particular interest in future research will be the extent to which community-led activity 
and the involvement of housing associations is negotiated by CLTs seeking to 
preserve autonomy, especially given the views of a Holy Island CLT volunteer who
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5 >warned of the risk of CLTs deferring to housing associations in consortia 
arrangements. This is also juxtaposed with the assumption that housing associations 
will be willing to assume a facilitative role in enabling CLTs to access subsidy. The 
housing association involved with the Holy Island CLT spoke of their role as a rural 
housing specialist and qualitative reputational benefits from helping the CLT, but the 
wider caution that seemed to characterise the relationship between the two sectors 
in the 2008-09 period suggests that the potential for such relationships will be varied 
according to local and organisational circumstance.
t
While a common theme from the research has been the perceived supremacy of 
community in identifying and meeting local needs, it is also clear that many CLTs 
acknowledge that their ambitions do not exist in a vacuum, and are instead 
embedded in wider processes that demand particular knowledge and skills. As the 
following quotes describe, a CLT in Cumbria formed to meet housing need on the 
basis that they could provide a greater local emphasis than housing associations 
could offer, while acknowledging that the CLT would not possess the necessary 
technical expertise to practically meet this need. While a housing association could 
provide this expertise, of clear importance and value appears to be the need to 
ensure a degree of separation in order to uphold the CLT's purpose and values:
Lyvennet Community Trust grew out of a community plan and subsequent 
housing needs survey which led to the setting up of an affordable housing 
group. The group looked into housing association affordable housing and 
community land trust housing eventually coming down in favour of the greater 
local emphasis offered through a CLT.
Cumbria Rural Housing Trust (2011)
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The community view is that direct local stewardship via [Lyvennet] CLT with 
expert support from a housing association is the right option, removing all 
doubt that the scheme will work for local people.
Graham (2011, original emphasis)
Analysing this through the lens of Lowndes and Sullivan's (2008) framework, we can 
interpret the encouragement provided to both CLTs and housing associations to join 
forces as akin to general aspirations for neighbourhood partnerships. Joining-up 
organisations delivering local services via a community-centred approach is thought 
to yield a greater outcome, bringing together key providers and decision makers (and 
their respective priorities) through a collective process (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008, 
p. 65). This is the social rationale in practice, yet this also involves a community-level 
acceptance of the challenges faced by neighbourhood governance and the trade-offs
cthat may be required to achieve the desired outcomes. Lowndes and Sullivan (2008, 
p. 68) describe how smaller units and levels of community governance inevitably 
involve a smaller pool of citizens to draw upon, impacting upon their capacity and 
competence in mobilising and fulfilling particular powers and responsibilities. In some 
of the instances described above, we can see a trade-off between preserving local 
accessibility to the community and accessing the technocratic skills and expertise 
from a housing association that were required to meet local housing need.
The shift towards partnerships between CLTs and housing associations was still 
developing at the time of writing and while recent informal discussion at a seminar in 
November 201058 indicated a concern that CLT involvement could be seen as 
"tokenistic", others saw value in filling the gap in CLT expertise. However, CLTs 
need to be understood within their geographical context and their relationship to a
58 The author attended a rural CLT practitioner seminar in Cornwall on the 3rd and 4th November 2010. Informal 
discussions were held during a session updating CLT volunteers on HCA funding provision.
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housing association and other stakeholders will be contingent not only on their 
locality but also on what a CLT wishes to achieve. While some will be keen to strike 
partnerships with housing associations in order to unlock access to funding, 
expertise and possible long-term services such as property management (while 
retaining elements of community control), others will wish to remain independent.
This raises the dualism of the process of forming a CLT versus the outcome of a 
CLT's activities. Much of the early literature on CLTs in North America argued that 
the value of CLTs should be measured not in concrete quantitative terms according 
to how many homes they build, but rather in terms of the community engagement, 
participation and activity generated through the process of forming a CLT (Institute 
for Community Economics, 1982, p. 256). While the CLT in the North East accepted 
that the need for public subsidy was too great to turn down and consequently 
entered into a partnership with the housing association (though community control 
over decision-making was retained), this was not the case everywhere. The CLT 
volunteer quoted below clearly felt that achieving an outcome of affordable housing 
was not enough. In this example, CLTs should have a wider scope in building and 
embedding locally-defined values, and forcing CLTs into partnerships simply to 
achieve housing outcomes had the potential to undermine the value of communities 
'doing it for themselves':
I don’t think they get that [idea of building community] and see it as a financial 
and affordability mechanism, rather than a community-building, value- 
building vehicle for participatory local democracy and good governance.
I
CLT volunteer, South West A
In this interviewee's eyes, CLTs should be a route to building the self-governing
communities described in the analytical framework - the manifestation of the civic■>
rationale - (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008) and this can be interpreted in relation to the 
communitarian belief that:
247
integral to the social order of all societies are at least some processes that 
mobilize some of their members' time, assets, energies and loyalties to the 
service of one or more common purposes.
Etzioni (1997a, p. 3, original emphasis)i
It is the mobilisation of these communitarian energies and loyalties via a CLT (and 
the "good governance" that it is assumed to bring) that services the common 
purpose of providing affordable housing and other amenities to the local population. 
As the same interviewee described, the consequence of moving away from the 
community-defined process of delivering this common purpose may be to become 
submerged into existing systems and forms of provision:
I felt there is a general lack of critical evaluation looking at the basic principles 
and values behind CLTs and that’s one of the weaknesses of the movement 
here. It’s what I call mission creep: you lose sight of your original mission and 
values and it becomes indistinguishable from what’s happening already.
CLT volunteer, South West A
The reason for this perceived "mission creep" could be pragmatic concern over the 
capacity and competence of the organisation and ways to fill this gap, but as the 
analysis so far has argued, the mission and values of the CLT 'model' are malleable 
rather than uniform. The common purpose that community members devote their 
time and energies to may not be consistent with the purposes of existing institutions 
and tiers of governance. For example, national funding bodies will legitimately be 
required to regulate the use of the public funds they distribute to some degree, and 
will require pragmatic solutions to try and meet their own objectives in ensuring 
appropriate use of public funds, as well as attempting to support those in receipt of 
those funds. While procedures designed for professionalised housing associations 
may be difficult for CLT volunteers to complete, a national funder of housing
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development will require certainty of delivery and economies of scale, particularly 
given recent budget cuts to the HCA's affordable homes development programme 
(Lloyd, 2010a).
The analysis presented in this section shows the way in which access to housing 
finance can guide or direct the behaviour of organisations such as CLTs, creating 
distinctive organisational relations that can affect the desired mode of community 
governance. Therefore, in aiming to become the primary decision maker over the 
provision and governance of local housing, the success of CLTs is dependent not 
just on gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the local community through claims to local 
expertise and loyalty. Instead their effectiveness may also rest on their ability to 
embed their activities within existing governance structures and practical processes, 
such as those related to the acquisition of financial resources.
7.2 Performing legitimacy and accessing local authority finance
As parts of the previous discussion described, some CLT practitioners held the 
objective of meeting their organisation's aims without public subsidy, aiming to 
circumvent conditions of use or bureaucracy that may act as a barrier to CLT 
volunteers. This was also built on an acknowledgement that the conditions of the 
housing finance sector, with probable reductions in the availability of HCA subsidy 
from 2011 onwards, meant that the CLT sector may need to find alternative sources 
of finance rather than competing with housing associations for a finite amount of 
subsidy. Temporary finance from local authorities was identified as a potential 
funding stream for CLTs and seen as a way of supplementing other sources of 
finance, though as the following analysis demonstrates these methods of financing 
locally-specific initiatives are accountable to wider political and financial 
environments.
.)
A key theme of the findings presented so far has been the manner in which CLTs 
may seek to redraw the lines of local governance through new understandings of the
appropriate geographic scale for governing and allocating housing. This has been 
shown by the strong emphasis on CLT autonomy to exercise local control and was 
explicitly illustrated by the localised definition of community and the appropriate 
geographic use of resources described by the Chair of High Bickington CLTT in 
section 6.2 of the previous chapter. This runs parallel to the view expressed by the 
response to the public CLT consultation exercise made by Community Finance 
Solutions (described earlier in this chapter), whereby the constitution and objectives 
of a CLT should be defined by local needs and not used to deliver regional targets, 
making the case for more localised governance as opposed to the traditional district 
or countywide priorities of local authorities. Paradoxically, despite the notion that 
CLTs should not deliver the regional priorities of local authorities, they have been 
seen as a key source of finance for CLTs.
However, as demonstrated by the politics involved in transferring land from public to 
community ownership, the devolution of resources to communities may not always 
coalesce with a local authority's ambitions. This may be due to the need to extract 
maximum capital receipts from assets such as land (as opposed to providing them to 
communities at low cost) or it may be influenced by a belief that localising control of 
housing to voluntary communities is not necessarily the most desirable course of 
action.
Of particular concern to some local authority stakeholders was the possible 
perception of giving preferential treatment to a tightly-knit group of people, and it was 
for this reason that support for CLTs had stagnated:
A lot of it is down to the fact it's a new concept which hasn't really taken off 
the ground to date ... I think it's such a new model here, I'm not sure whether 
any of these CLTs have actually gone forward to develop any housing units to 
date and the fact they were purely based on housing, the CLTs didn't have a 
wider business plan to incorporate other community-type projects and I think
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people might be a bit wary and sceptical really of the aims and objectives. Will 
they just be 'homes for the boys' and nothing else?
Affordable Housing Officer, North Wales Local Authority
The combination of CLTs being a new community-led concept whose exact 
operation and purpose was unclear and their objective of providing locally-specific 
housing raised the issue of transparency, with particular regard to the allocation 
process. From the perspective of a local authority receiving requests for financial and 
technical assistance, assurance over the aims and objectives of CLTs and their 
appropriateness to local contexts was critical:
There are elements of judgement; there might be something purporting to be 
a CLT formed by folk marginally in need of housing thinking this is a model 
where we can say "come on council, you gave them lots of money give us 
some". W e shouldn't assume every CLT will be [benevolent in their form] and 
there is this element of judgement and discretion that it's about a genuine 
partnership [between the CLT and the local authority].
VAffordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
Taking these quotes together, it becomes clear that one of the main barriers for local 
authorities in dialogue with CLTs has been a CLT's lack of an established track 
record and reputation. While CLTs may claim to offer an innovative approach to 
housing provision which may yield long-term financial and social benefits through the 
presence of a locally-rooted and permanently based community, for local authorities 
it is precisely the alternative scope of the approach and its collision with existing
, istructures of governance that may deter their assistance. Referring to the CLT in St 
Minver, this local authority officer described how a CLT's conformity to existing 
regulatory procedures could help the local authority negotiate this potential conflict:
The CLT structure provides proper articles, charitable objects, gives you that 
much more confidence as well. So they are a registered charity and you’ve 
got the Charity Commission regulating in the background somewhere. Most of 
these groups are impecunious when they start off with no assets or 
background or track record so you can’t say “here’s half a mill do what you 
want with it” and we’d find it much more difficult to support it and measure the 
acceptable risk if there wasn’t this legal format.
So we've got a duty to address housing need and they've got a duty to do 
whatever it says in their articles. If they've got charitable objects they will not 
be sort of vicious or unpleasant in any of that.
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
Obtaining charitable status was therefore seen as a badge of trustworthiness. The 
rules of charitable status mean that the extent to which a trustee or director of an 
organisation can extract personal benefit is legally restricted, while the organisation 
must demonstrate they are acting for public benefit in order to obtain this status. 
Using evidence such as housing needs surveys and ratios between local house 
prices and local incomes, CLTs have been able to gain charitable status through 
objectives such as: "the provision of affordable housing to relieve financial hardship
iin the area" (National CLT Network, 2011a). The fact that a group of individuals had 
formed an organisation to assist other people in the area, as opposed to forming a 
self-help group, persuaded a council to release substantial funds to assist the 
development at St Minver: a £5,000 grant to assist in obtaining charitable status, and 
a £544,000 interest-free loan to help with land purchase, associated fees and 
provide working capital. As the Affordable Housing Officer put it:
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Going into that [charitable] structure makes it a lot safer and acceptable to 
local authorities ... It would be highly unlikely to give it to a group of self­
selected self-builders who formed up themselves.
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
The issue of who benefits from the CLT's work - essentially, who the homes will 
eventually be allocated to - is clearly a challenging one for local authorities and 
extends beyond merely concern at individual self-help and selection. Local 
authorities possess strategic responsibilities for housing based on analysis of local 
needs and conditions. Generally speaking the limited resources of local authorities 
are focused on meeting the needs of disadvantaged people in poor or overcrowded 
housing conditions, along with meeting statutory responsibilities to assist in housing 
the homeless. As one interviewee (anonymised) put it, "the local authority waiting list 
is not necessarily for the local people that we target", indicating that the purpose that 
the CLT was built upon would not be met by the local authority. Instead, the same 
person said that "CLTs should represent local people, explain [to local people] why 
housing is required, who it is intended for - the local community - and how it will be 
protected for their benefit". The interviewee explained that the benefit the housing 
would bring would be to ameliorate the decline of rural services and facilities.
Although these are common reasons cited for the formation of a CLT, this example 
illustrates the way in which housing need can be interpreted in different ways: local 
connection and affinity, rather than economic situation, becomes the primary basis 
on which access to local housing is legitimised. Housing need is officially defined in 
planning policy as:
The quantity of housing required for households who are unable to access 
suitable housing without financial assistance.
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CLG (2011c, p. 27)
Planning policy also allows for housing built on rural exception sites to be allocated 
according to local connection, with an acknowledgement that rural areas are seen as 
an exceptional case due to the rural housing crisis of low supply and high demand 
which lead to an insufficient quantity of housing for those in housing need as 
understood above (Shucksmith, 1990; Taylor, 2008). However, the policy also 
contends that the needs of a local community are in some way related to the 
connection incoming households hold to the local area, rather than merely the 
affordability of housing:
Rural exception sites should only be used for affordable housing in perpetuity. 
A Rural Exception Site policy should seek to address the needs of the local 
community by accommodating households who are either current residents or 
have an existing family or employment connection, whilst also ensuring that 
rural areas continue to develop as sustainable, mixed, inclusive communities.
CLG (2011c, p. 12)
This contention is also reflected in CLT allocation policies. Appendix 6 shows a 
typical CLT allocation policy. The first set of criteria for accessing homes show that 
financial circumstance is the first determining factor. The inability to afford a home in 
the private sector must be complemented by the ability to afford a CLT home that will 
usually be sold or let at intermediate market rates: cheaper than the private sector 
but more expensive than social housing. The suitability of this type of provision is 
itself a contested issue. The last chapter described opposition to a CLT "tinkeringCwith market economics to benefit a smair minority" by using land values to build 
subsidised housing. Conversely, in other areas it was felt that intermediate market 
housing was unlikely to meet the greatest economic housing need in a local area, as 
described by a rural housing enabler who spoke of a CLT that had "ground to a 
standstill" due to division over the type of need being met:
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A number of residents came to me saying the CLT, all about low cost houses 
to buy for local people, it's not catering for people in most need, it's catering 
for an intermediate product. They felt that the CLT already had the names of 
the people who were already likely to buy the properties with those in most 
need in the community - not just the village but the community council area - 
those in most need could not afford to access those properties.
Rural Housing Enabler, Mid-Wales
The response to this aspect of the allocation process illuminates the variability and 
geographical contingency of CLTs. Indeed, it could be argued that rather than 
understanding CLTs as a model of affordable housing, it should instead be regarded 
as an approach reflecting the varied level of contestation over each CLT's 
constitution and objectives. The response from the rural housing enabler also 
furthers our understanding of the way in which CLTs may be formed on the basis of 
catering for a specific locality, circumventing traditionally defined geographic 
boundaries such as those of local authorities and parish or community councils.
Once the economic validity of housing need is established, the deciding criteria in 
allocations place greater emphasis on the applicant's local connection to the locality 
in question. The example allocation policy shows how this is accorded greater 
priority than the local authority points system, creating a locally-specific and 
contingent conception of housing need. This is of intrinsic importance to 
understanding the motivations underpinning many CLTs. As the quotation below 
illustrates, CLTs are not solely rationalised: by politicians in relation to their potential 
to increase local housing supply, particularly in rural areas, but also to ensure that 
that particular locality can influence who that housing is for. This is a key and 
distinguishing feature of CLTs:
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In one of my villages - Buckland (vlewton59 - a group is trying to set up a 
community land trust. A group of people inside the village are trying to 
promote something that will look after the interests of young people living 
there. If somebody had come from the outside ... and descended on them 
from Dorchester, the headquarters of the district council, which is not very far 
away, and said, "Thou shalt have eight extra houses here", all hell would 
have broken loose. I know exactly what the letters would have looked like ... 
whereas this way around, it is the villagers' initiative.
Letwin (HC-Deb 2006-2007)
The perceived advantage of a CLT, therefore, is its ability to ensure perpetual 
allocation and availability of local property for local people. While CLTs may be 
formed on the basis of the protectionism ffom market forces described in previous 
chapters, where a lack of housing affordability and the lack of a population in 
permanent local residence were problematised, underpinning this for many CLTs will 
be a desire to maintain control of housing at a micro level:
Exception sites rely on landowners giving up land and many communities are 
sceptical about working with housing associations as they see that they lose 
control and rural houses will be let to "outsiders". Setting up a CLT keeps 
local control and gets over this issue!
Teignbridge District Council (2010)
r
In the same way as tenants of social housing have been historically granted security 
of tenure of their homes, the allocation of CLT properties can best be understood as
59 It should be noted that the CLT in this village did not participate in this study. The quotation here is for 
illustrative purposes as to the potential purpose and function of CLTs more generally.
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providing a local security of tenure through which CLTs create local connection as a 
key determining factor in legitimising access to affordable housing. The creation of
V;
this local security of tenure is described in the quotation below. The volunteer in 
question was connected to a CLT attempting to build homes on a parcel of land 
subject to legislation such as the right to acquire and leasehold enfranchisement.60 
While these land use rules could potentially affect the affordability of homes due to 
the removal of price restrictions, of equally principle concern was their removal from 
being subject to a local security of tenure. Furthermore, this CLT had found their 
plans thwarted at certain points in time due to a perceived failure of local and 
national government to accept the validity of community-led and implemented 
housing development and allocation:
Just generally people would like to see their children being able to live in the 
area they're brought up in and if they see people from outside coming in over 
their own people from that community they would be concerned, I think. That's 
why I think when they realise it the CLT will be bothered by this affordability 
mechanism whereby the CLT homes cease to be affordable to local people.
They thought we were getting homes for our chums and senior civil servants 
thought we were potential bad news, you know, risk management. W e had a 
bit of support from the council before they realised we were serious about 
doing something.
CLT volunteer, South West A
60 Leasehold enfranchisement provides a legal right for leaseholders of shared ownership homes to purchase 
the freehold of the land on which their home is built, therefore 'staircasing' from shared ownership to full 
owner occupancy (CLG, 2009b).
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To return to Connelly's (2011, p. 929-930) view outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter, this helps us understand the way in which the effectiveness of community- 
led governance rests to some extent on their ability to establish legitimacy in the 
eyes of the wider political and practical processes within which they are embedded. 
This may not have been accomplished by those CLTs referred to by stakeholders in 
Wales, where concerns that allocation processes were influenced by a mantra of 
"homes for the boys", while in St Minver the Affordable Housing Officer stated that a 
group of "self-selected self-builders" would not have benefited from the financial 
support offered by the local council. Once convinced of the organisation's legitimacy 
through their legal structure and constituted aims and objectives, the council were 
willing to release financial support and enable the development:
Our job is to get them to sit within policy, to sit within and interact and do it in 
a way that is acceptable and enables you to have confidence, but it's not a 
way of telling them what to do because you do that and you're missing the 
point.
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
“To sit within policy” described the way in which the CLT would be able to take 
advantage of the local connection policies afforded by the rural exception site they 
were building on, while to do it in an acceptable way referred to the allocation 
policies. As the council official describes below, the CLT was able to establish 
legitimacy in the eyes of the council in that they were not aiming to choose precisely 
which people lived there (within the boundaries of the local connection criteria):
The danger is that when they're adopting these local policies they need to do 
it blind. They need to do it early on, swearing they've no-one specific in mind 
and they must be ethical and non-discriminatory ... Just from going through 
that with CLTs here, we've found that 18 months before it started the penny 
dropped so many times with folk during the discussions you had. While it
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started off as "we want to help these people", by the time you got round to it in 
the allocations policy they were virtually telling us "it needs to be blind".
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
Local authority support was also secured due to the pragmatics of obtaining 
mortgages for CLT properties. When probed on the operation of local connection 
policies, the official from Cornwall explained that the section 106 agreement within 
planning permission would ensure that the properties could not only be occupied by 
those from within the village:
The CLT can adopt criteria inside the boundaries of the 106 which can be 
more locally tuned. We would expect them to open it up to the parish and the 
adjoining parishes; if they don't say that, they don't get finance and mortgages 
because they haven't got a big enough catchment area and institutions won't 
lend to them.
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
This provides us with another illustration of how money can guide or direct the 
operation of CLTs. The cascade mechanism, where priority is given to a particular 
area initially but extended out if demand is not met, was deemed a suitable way of 
allowing CLTs the local flexibility they desired. A CLT's willingness to consider and 
include this was also seen as assurance that they did not have specific individuals 
lined up to fill their properties as described above. In Cornwall the St Minver CLT had 
unlocked a parcel of land that may not have otherwise become available for housing 
development and was seen to meet a housing need that may not have otherwise 
been fulfilled. The council's provision of finance was based on the perception that 
this would not have been possible to meet through other providers and contingent on
the legitimacy of the CLT's objectives in meeting a genuine local economic need:
v
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It's about providing housing for those in need of housing, it's not about giving 
people presents. So while it's charitable it's not necessarily about charitable 
giving to individuals, it's about providing housing which people can come into 
on the right terms.
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
There was, therefore, an acknowledgement of the potential for CLTs to play a role in 
providing local housing for local people, but that legitimacy of this role was 
dependent on their interplay with wider structures of accountability that could convey 
legitimacy to the local authority, such as legal and charitable structures and 
agreement to the potential of wider allocation of housing.
Conclusion
Previous chapters have identified that CLTs may attempt to redraw the boundaries 
for the governance of local housing, identifying local control and autonomy in 
deciding how housing is provided and occupied at a local level. This civic 
commitment is used to legitimise CLTs toTheir local communities, arguing that the 
control of local housing provides area-specific benefits.
This chapter has validated these arguments, from the attempts of CLTs to 
circumvent government money perceived to submerge and affect community-led 
activity, to the emphasis on local connection in formal allocation policies. It has been 
argued that the fundamental aim of CLTs is to create a local security of tenure for the 
housing under their jurisdiction.
However, CLTs should not be solely understood as a mechanism which uses civic
commitments to exercise "voice and choice" in local governance (Lowndes and
Sullivan, 2008). As this chapter has demonstrated, these attempts and commitments
are malleable and subject to negotiation due to the need of CLTs to establish
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legitimacy in the wider political and practical environments in which their activity is 
necessarily embedded. After all, without financial support their efforts may flounder, 
as shown by the dormant CLTs referred to by some of the strategic stakeholders. 
Although CLTs seek to retain independence to uphold their purpose and values, 
many have (and will) adopt consortia arrangements with housing associations in 
order to access public subsidy. This finance can be the difference between a CLT 
pursuing its objectives or not and the requirements of the HCA to have a 
performance guarantee provided by a housing association demonstrates how 
legitimacy is achieved through negotiation and compromise of different tensions and 
priorities.
Similarly, local authorities were willing to release vital resources such as land and 
finance provided CLTs could conform to existing structures that mark legitimacy. 
Here charitable status was seen as a badge of repute, while the demands of 
mortgage lenders were perceived to help ensure allocation policies that prioritise 
local connection paid respect to a local authority's wider area of governance. 
Therefore the adoption of civic rationales that privilege the right of a community to 
exercise local control and autonomy in the governance of local housing is 
necessarily contingent on the facilitation and permittance of this by stakeholders 
embedded within wider financial and governing environments.
t
Rather than creating autonomous self-governing communities as per Lowndes and 
Sullivan's civic rationale, in practice CLTs are dependent on this external facilitation 
and may need to compromise on certain ambitions, for example the involvement of a 
housing association or the agreement to extend the allocation of housing beyond 
those in the local area. Therefore rather than distinguishing between Cornwall's 
(2004) "invited spaces" - created and defined by the state to engage communities in 
governance - and "popular spaces" created and defined by citizens, it is more 
appropriate to view CLTs as occupying a third 'space' between top-down 
involvement on the terms of the state and bottom-up community autonomy. Within 
this space CLTs may instigate and create a structure capable of exercising local
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control over housing, but this is also tempered by a critical need for human and 
capital resources.
This then raises the question of whether there is a necessary trade-off in CLT 
ambitions between the desired level of control and autonomy and the need for the 
resources that advance their development. This returns us to the question of whether 
the community-led process of CLTs should be privileged over the outcome of their 
efforts which may or may not support their aims to create a local security of tenure 
for its community dependent on the wider context. It is to this issue that the following 
and final chapter of data analysis returns through an examination of the role 
structural representation of CLTs plays in their development, and the impact this has 
on the day-to-day development, management and governance of local housing.
Chapter 8: From experimentation to 
replication: the creation of a CLT sector
The smaller a unit of governance, the smaller the pool of citizens from which 
representatives and leaders can be recruited. The range of skills and 
experience is also likely to be less; this may impact upon the capacity of 
citizens to mobilize campaigns and to hold representatives to account.
Lowndes and Sullivan (2008, p. 68)
The competence of the organisations involved in neighbourhood-level governance is 
an enduring challenge for those involved with CLTs, as is a CLT’s ability to recruit 
volunteers and their potential to instigate requisite influence and change in policy to 
meet their objectives. These themes have been identified in the difficulties local CLT 
actors have faced in pulling together the human resources required to access the 
land and finance necessary to realise their ambitions.
While faced by these practical problems, an important influence on CLTs has been 
their perceived inability to adequately influence the practices of local and national 
stakeholders to create a sympathetic policy environment. The National CLT 
Demonstration Programme's evaluation identified that individual CLTs dispersed in 
areas around the country faced common problems that could be resolved through 
co-ordinated political change:
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There is still a need to mainstream certain aspects of support - in particular to 
create a nationally recognised body to represent CLTs, influence policy and 
lobby on their behalf.
Aird (2009, p. 2)
To remedy both the practical problems at a local level and the lack of a national 
voice, a network of structural representation has been built to shape the policy 
environment in which CLTs operate.
Firstly, umbrella CLTs have been created across the country to assist CLT groups 
with practical problems. Typically operating over a county (or multiple counties), 
umbrellas have the remit of increasing local CLT activity by supporting volunteers, 
resolving practical problems and creating greater local structural representation of 
the CLT approach to local housing provision.
Secondly, a national lobbying body structured on similar terms and with similar 
objectives to organisations such as the National Housing Federation has been 
created. The remit of the National CLT Network is to lobby on behalf of CLTs and 
instigate political change to create a beneficial policy environment for CLTs at a localtlevel.
This chapter is concerned with the growth of this structural support and the influence 
it has on shaping the activity of local CLTs. It begins by exploring the concept of 
umbrella CLTs. It focuses primarily on their connection with external stakeholders 
and local CLTs and the type of assistance they provide, rather than solely on the 
organisational structure of the umbrella. The findings suggest that CLTs should be 
understood as a diverse and complex set of approaches to local housing governance 
rather than a uniform model. Forms of assistance and legitimacy differ from area to 
area and analysis of this contributes to our understanding of the geographical 
contingencies attached to CLT development.
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The chapter continues by examining the role of the National CLT Network. As this 
body was formed and launched during the final stages of the study, it is difficult to 
make an effective judgement on its value to local CLTs, umbrella CLTs and external 
stakeholders. Rather than the organisation itself, the focus here is primarily on the 
Network's first major campaign to influence policy on behalf of CLTs in seeking their 
exemption from leasehold enfranchisement of homes. It is argued that the Network's 
campaign can be interpreted as an attempt to impose a form of legal legitimacy to a 
CLT's activities, paving the way for local influence to assume primacy over the type 
and allocation of local housing provision.
8.1 Beyond the local: the growth of umbrella CLTs
While enabling support for CLTs has been; subject to a relational exercise wherebyf
their acquisition of resources has been negotiated and politicised by funders and 
local authorities, of equal concern has been the ability of a voluntary-led CLT to 
actually fulfil their objective of providing local housing. It was for this reason that a 
performance guarantee was required by the Homes & Communities Agency prior to 
giving CLTs public subsidy, and assurance over organisational competence was 
equally important to local authorities, as illustrated in the partnership between Devon 
Council and High Bickington CLT:
There was opportunism to this particular community as we had the 
opportunity of land and the opportunity to do something with it and we've 
made it happen. I mentioned right at the beginning [of the interview] there
were three places.61 Two of those didn't work in the other part of the county;
v
61 The Council had provided initial support and encouragement to three communities interested in forms of 
community asset ownership and participation in decision-making. As described, two of these were 
unsuccessful due to human resource constraints.
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they didn't get past the earlier hurdles because there wasn't the energy or the 
opportunity within the community to make things happen.
Community Strategy Officer, Devon County Council
The "energy" in the community was used to denote the human resources of CLTs. A 
common theme that emerged from the fieldwork was the importance of having a 
local champion who could drive the CLT forward, reflecting the barriers faced by 
community organisations in pulling together volunteers with the requisite technical 
skills. Local authorities in two of the counties where CLTs had made greater 
progress than elsewhere highlighted the vitality of having local leadership which 
could in turn further the CLT's ambitions:62
I think they've been fortunate in having the Chair there. He's an experienced 
[and now retired] local government officer, he's a bright bloke, he's committed, 
he's a serious operator. I think if you were in a community where you didn't 
have that kind of strength of local leadership it would really struggle. I think 
not every community is fortunate enough to have that range of skills and that 
kind of commitment available to them. I guess that's a different kind of barrier; 
it's not a systemic barrier, it's more a question of "have communities got the 
resources in people to drive that kind of work forward?"
Community Strategy Officer, Devon County Council
The group were tenacious to the point of, not being annoying because you 
respected what they were doing, but they didn't want to take "no" [as an
62 These problems are not unique to CLTs; reliance on a small number of individuals and shortfalls in requisite 
knowledge and skills are common problems faced by voluntary and community organisations. For example, 
Amin (2009, p. 35) noted that social enterprises rely on the "ingenuity, contacts and sheer hard work of 
dedicated individuals" upon whom the "burden of expectation" can weigh heavy.
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answer in discussions over funding]. There was a fair amount of capacity 
there, there was a builder, there was a retired accountant, there were people 
with nous. The Chair is a born negotiator, he's a typical farmer so he was 
used to dealing with sub contractors and things, he'd be ok [in managing the 
CLT].
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
The attributes identified as important to the management of a CLT are very clearly 
related to particular professions. In the first instance, the skills brought by knowledge 
and experience of local government processes were identified as being key personal 
attributes, while the composition of th e , board described in the second quote 
indicates the need for technical professional skills such as construction and 
accountancy that usually require extensive experience and training.
Elsewhere, stakeholders held the perception that CLTs were not a viable option due 
to the lack of these particular skills, along with problems in ensuring a long-term 
voluntary commitment to CLTs:
Ultimately a CLT needs drive from the community itself. It shouldn't be third 
parties driving it along. I can advise and open doors for people but the drive 
needs to come from the community, that's what I genuinely believe. I still 
promote CLTs but when I say "you have to see the vision and it's a long-term 
vision and the drive has to come from the community", they seem to be quite 
hesitant then and think about what it actually means. It's not an overnight 
success.
Rural Housing Enabler, Mid-Wales
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This describes the problems in getting volunteers to make a long-term commitment, 
a temporal constraint related to the lengthy process of forming, developing and 
managing a CLT, a theme echoed elsewhere:
If you start off with a community group who's actually started ... there is the 
time lag that's between actually starting off and the enthusiasm there was at 
the beginning, they've gone through the stages of setting up a legitimate 
company or organisation, of getting the model practically in place, getting a 
potential land owner and mortgage lender. Lots of things like that have to be 
put in place and then there is a feeling that the whole process is such a long- 
winded process and so cumbersome, so many hoops and hurdles have been 
put in place ... That's the barrier I think, that individuals within the group face, 
and obviously they're doing this from a voluntary perspective so it's quite a tall 
order for them to carry on doing this from year to year and no real major 
benefits coming out in the foreseeable future.
Rural Housing Enabler, North Wales
v
Many of these stages were seen to require particular expertise, for instance creating 
an incorporated company requires the adoption of legally accepted company rules 
and an understanding of how this affects the organisation's directors (for example 
financial liability in the event of organisational failure or constraints on the type of 
organisational activity a legal form permits). This need for professional expertise was 
problematic not only for those forming CLTs but also for existing networks of 
community support such as rural housing enablers whose expertise lay elsewhere:
I can sell the idea to communities, which I do, but if I've got no-one to call on 
for expertise then it makes things difficult. It's these barriers and lack of 
progress and support starts to wane for anything.
Rural Housing Enabler, Mid-Wales
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This confirms the findings of the National CLT Demonstration Programme 
evaluation, which considered that the requirements of funders, regulators and 
government placed bureaucratic obstacles to CLT volunteers with sometimes limited 
professional expertise (Aird, 2009, p. 20). A potential remedy to this has been the 
creation of professionalised umbrella CLTs operating at wider sub-regions, with the 
specific remit of increasing CLT activity by providing practical support to volunteers 
and giving greater prominence and representation to CLTs in engagement with 
stakeholders.
As Appendix 7 shows, there were eight umbrellas in existence during this study, 
each emerging at different points in time between 2004 and 2011 and funded by a 
variety of sources with variable outcomes emerging from their formation. Of these, 
four participated in the study.
Umbrellas typically employ a single member of staff with responsibility for fulfilling 
four key (and overlapping) roles in supporting CLT volunteers:
• A dvisor - A key purpose of the umbrella CLT is to provide independent and 
expert technical advice and support for voluntary-led CLTs.
• Campaigner - The umbrella CLT engages in lobbying local and national 
government and funders for improved policies and support for the CLT 
concept.
• Enabler - This role is based on the premise that umbrella CLTs have the 
requisite skills, knowledge and expertise to negotiate the technicalities of CLT 
development.
• Negotiator - The umbrella CLT is deemed to develop and possess the ability 
and authority to act as a conduit between locally-rooted CLTs and the tiers of 
funding, regulation and government they are required to engage with, helping 
negotiate beneficial outcomes for both parties.
These can be described as brokerage functions and are typically fulfilled by all 
umbrellas. There is, however, a key difference in the long-term approach adopted by 
each umbrella CLT. Some of the bodies described in Appendix 7 have focused on 
providing time-limited brokerage services, while others aim to provide an 'all in one' 
service (a phrase commonly used by research participants) where, in addition to the 
brokerage provided to communities, the umbrella aims to develop and manage 
housing in its own right. Therefore, some umbrellas were formed with a remit of 
acting as a catalyst to community-led solutions within a specific time frame, and 
others were formed with a long-term strategic purpose of asset holding and 
organisational development in addition to their brokerage functions.
The motivation for the selection of a particular organisational approach varied. In 
Cornwall, the 'all in one' CLT was formed not only to provide advice to local CLT 
groups but to "create a new intermediate market of affordable housing for sale" 
(Director, Cornwall CLT). This was therefore a response not only to the human 
resource barriers faced by volunteers, but also to local housing market conditions. 
The umbrella CLT initially formed from a funding partnership involving charitable 
funders and a local housing association that had identified a local requirement for 
this type of housing:
They [the umbrella] don’t just help tlVe local volunteers, they were also formed 
to provide local intermediate housing for sale, sometimes on a shared 
ownership basis. W e got involved as we do rural housing for rent, we’re well 
respected for our rental housing, but we don’t have the capacity to develop 
products for sale. So it responded to a need.
Director, Cornwall Rural Housing Association
The asset-holding approach was therefore a pragmatic response to local housing 
need. Other umbrellas, such as the support service offered in the North East, were
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specifically focused on injecting housing expertise into communities. The umbrella’s 
project officer cited the emergence of her organisation as a response to a gap in 
local development processes. Local rural housing enablers had been able to work 
out the location of housing need but were less skilled in how to solve it. Therefore, 
recognising the existence of local communities wishing to meet this need 
themselves, the purpose was to:
Inject housing related development expertise to enable replication through 
networks and knowledge gained independent of infrastructure organisations 
... The task was to expand third sector networks into housing development, 
planning and finance as this was an area of weakness.
CLT Support worker, North East
The intention was not to create an entity in itself to meet housing need, but to assist 
CLTs in working through processes to solve need by creating partnership networks 
with organisations such as housing associations and development trusts. As the 
Officer quoted above went on to describe, this was based on the perceived 
importance of empowering communities with the requisite skills and knowledge to 
further their development:
The intention of umbrella CLTs should be to breathe life into communities, to 
empower them with the skills and networks they could then use as a 
commodity. The intention was for the project to act as a catalyst for new 
delivery solutions rather than to be an entity in itself. This is based on 
empowering, breathing life into organisations, and on a realisation that 
income generation was best focused on supporting the sustainability of the 
individual organisations themselves.
I CLT support worker, North East
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The value of creating third sector networks of support that could outlive the umbrella 
was thought to avoid leaving communities "high and dry" as the support worker put 
it. If the umbrella was to be dissolved or scaled back, the activity undertaken by local 
CLTs would not suffer as a consequence.
Unlike the 'all in one' umbrellas, these time-limited brokerage organisations do not 
assume a key role in creating the intermediate housing market through developing 
their own homes, rather their remit is merely to guide communities through the 
technical process and facilitate networks.
Having identified the reasoning behind these types of umbrella CLT, the following 
sections chart the perceived advantages and fault lines of this structural support, 
looking from the bottom up at community-level and from the top down at the level of 
governing, funding and regulating stakeholders.
8.2 Judging the value of umbrella CLTs
The umbrella CLTs that participated in this study had only recently formed when 
fieldwork was undertaken, making it somewhat difficult to judge the overall value of 
their operation (especially when combined with the slow burning emergence of 
CLTs). Furthermore, it appeared that some CLTs purporting to operate on an 
umbrella countywide basis were not perceived that way by others. When asked 
about the 'all in one' umbrella CLT operating in their county, one CLT indicated that it 
was more focused on acting as an individual CLT than on assisting volunteers:
We initially thought having the county in their title meant they were in the
position of swapping a lot of information between different organisations within
the county and all the rest of it [referring to umbrella support functions]. No -
they have only been involved in their own development ... so although they
helped us by giving us a few draft legal documents which we have used, and
that was helpful, but that's as far as it goes. Other villages have actually rung
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up and asked what we're doing; they're looking at us to perform the role we 
thought the umbrella was doing.
Board member, Village CLT in the South West
The umbrella in question held a particular ideological commitment to the concept of 
community-led control and local autonomy and the potential for this to be facilitated 
throughout the county, but in addition to this commitment it appeared there needed 
to be a critical mass of people desiring this assistance. This was described in the 
exchange that followed the above quotation:
Researcher: I was always led to believe they were operating as an umbrella 
body like we've seen elsewhere.
Interviewee: No, they're not like that at all. They ought to be, but there aren't 
enough CLTs going around here for them to co-ordinate.
Board member, Village CLT in the South West
In addition to this confusion over the exact activities of an umbrella, judging the value 
of umbrella CLTs in areas where development of CLT homes had yet to get 
underway proved problematic. The recipients of umbrella support did not always fit 
neatly into being an incorporated CLT with a clear mission and defined relationship 
with wider stakeholders. In some cases they were individuals or groups who had 
attended public meetings or consultations over potentially forming a CLT, often with 
vague ideas as to what they wished to potentially achieve, as opposed to individuals 
or groups seeking particular forms of skill and expertise in development. This was 
especially pronounced in the case of one 'all in one' umbrella which appeared to
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hdisband during the study, making it difficult to contact recipients of support and 
ascertain the value they attached to umbrella support.63
The number of homes any CLT has built may provide a quantitative assessment of 
the value attached to their local operations. This particular umbrella had failed to 
develop its own homes and nor had it assisted local communities in its area to do so. 
Yet, this disbanding of the organisation was not necessarily due to the type of 
service it offered, whether it was a long-term asset holding approach or a short-term 
brokerage service, and was juxtaposed by a body with similar structures and aims 
elsewhere deemed to be successful among CLT practitioners. Furthermore, reliance 
on the number of houses built as an indicator of value does not unpick the 
contestations and deliberations inherent to local claims to power and autonomy and 
their relationship to local, regional and national institutions and networks of 
governance. In short, it does not tell us why they failed to build homes.
Therefore, the purpose of the following analysis is not to judge whether an 'all in one' 
umbrella service is in any way better or more effective than those merely offering 
community brokerage and support. Aside from the aim of asset holding and the way 
advice to CLT volunteers is funded (both discussed in the sections that follow), there 
is a common approach of promoting and advancing the role played by local 
communities in housing provision and governance, and this commonality is the main 
focus of the following sections. As such, the analysis of the introduction of structural 
support for CLTs that follows brings to light further debates about the capabilities, 
legitimacy and geographical contingency of local CLT control and decision-making 
processes.
63 Land for People's funding expired in 2011 and personal correspondence with the National CLT Network in 
July 2011 indicated that the organisation had disbanded due to non-renewal of funding. Efforts were made to 
verify this with Land for People's staff and the Welsh Assembly Government, but neither responded to the 
request for information.
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Umbrellas' relationships with local CLTs
Aside from their long-term objectives, the other major difference in the approach of 
umbrellas is how their advice is funded. Unlike brokerage services, usually funded by 
particular grants or resources that are bound by their time-limited existence, 
umbrellas seeking to develop a permanent organisation require an ongoing source of 
funding. As the quotation below describes, this is often done through charging fees 
for technical expertise and development:
Introductory advice and informal guidance is provided at no cost, as 
Foundation East is sensitive to the financial constraints of embryonic 
community organisations. As projects develop, consultancy fees are charged 
for more technical expertise and professional development services and these 
fees help to sustain the charitable work of Foundation East. Fees are agreed 
in advance on a case-by-case basis and grants may be available to cover 
them.
Foundation East CLT (2011)
The fees for this service were usually covered by the charitable CLT Fund and were 
not usually charged until the development was close to becoming a reality and 
required technical development skills. Advice was provided informally as the 
feasibility of CLT schemes was being established, something deemed critical to CLT 
development due to the initial uncertainty over whether a new CLT would be able to 
access the financial, land and human resources required to progress schemes. 
Charging fees up front was seen as something that would have become part of the 
problem rather than the solution.
i
One of the main advantages of an umbrella CLT identified by research participants 
was in identifying the initial risk and uncertainty over CLT development, helping 
community volunteers to examine the feasibility of their plans. One CLT in the North
East received an offer of low-cost land transfer from the local district council. Keen to 
pursue their objective of providing rental housing for local needs, the CLT accepted 
the offer of land but found their ability to .both obtain funding and develop homes 
successfully was limited due to difficulties and inexperience in housing and 
organisational development. As the project officer of the local umbrella described:
A feasibility study convinced the organisation that community-led 
development was not advisable given the mainstream development options 
and that really the organisation was on a hiding to nothing pursuing 
community ownership and stewardship.
CLT support worker, North East
This identified two problematic aspects which the umbrella CLT helped local CLTs to 
identify. First, the idea of community ownership and stewardship required long-term 
commitment to the development and management of CLT homes, demanding 
particular expertise and experience. The project officer described how the CLT had 
engaged with an architect who had never designed affordable housing before. This 
was of critical importance as the architect designed homes for the CLT of a value 
that would exceed the incomes of the community the CLT wished to serve and would 
not qualify as the affordable housing required by the land's planning covenant, 
leading to a waste of time and financial resources (through the payment of the 
architect's fees). The introduction of the umbrella CLT was seen to combat this 
naivety and identify the feasibility of the CLT’s future involvement in processes of 
professional procurement and management of the technicalities of housing 
development.
Second, alteration and uncertainty in the CLT's management structures 
problematised the idea of long-term community management of the organisation. As 
described at the outset of this chapter, a common barrier for community 
organisations is both the quality (in terms of relevant expertise) and quantity of
potential community representatives. This was revealed by ongoing changes in 
directorship and denial of funding due to insufficient skill in business planning. The 
lack of skill also influenced the quantity of willing volunteers, as two parish 
councillors who had sat on the board of the CLT resigned due to both potential 
conflicts of interest between the CLT and council, and their reluctance to engage in, 
and assume responsibility for, complex financial planning:
The CLT has a lot of money tied up in it and I'm uncomfortable sorting 
through the paperwork and accounting properly, I don't always have the time 
and you need to dedicate a lot of time to go through it all.
Former board member, CLT in the North East
They've had changes in directors and had quite a struggle to get themselves 
off the ground, and now they're off the ground they realise the only nest egg 
they've got is the land transferred to them and they can't get any money to 
build on it ... Their business plan was rejected by funders as it wasn't strong 
enough.
Chief Executive, Housing Association, North East
This led to the creation of a partnership with a local housing association identified by 
the umbrella, whereby the CLT would lease the land to the association (retaining the 
freehold and thus a stake in the land use), allowing them to develop and manage 
homes for local needs housing.
The value of the umbrella CLT was, therefore, its advisory role in identifying and 
informing the risks inherent to CLT ownership, in particular with regards to the long­
term management of the CLT and its homes, and its ability to enable wider 
partnerships. For example, providing rental housing demands an everyday
commitment to rent collection and housing maintenance, alongside long-term
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accountabilities to funders (through servicing loans) and legalities (for example, 
completing annual financial returns to regulators). Umbrella CLTs were aware of 
these demands and saw their role as vital in ensuring local volunteers would take 
these into account in their plans:
‘-C
I don't think we speak enough about governance at any of our events, but 
then that's probably because we're so keen to get examples off the ground. 
You've got to think about the long-term governance issues.
Director, Cornwall CLT
This was deemed to be one of the most valuable services offered by the umbrella, 
with local volunteers suggesting that their support had been one of the critical factors
r
in enabling them to take their plans forward. One CLT was keen to create a local 
farm to grow and sell produce in addition to developing housing, and as such needed 
to be legally set up for a broad remit that allowed for a degree of commercial trading:
The process of forming a CLT is daunting ... It'd have been a much longer 
process [without the umbrella's support] and we'd have been more likely to 
give up because of the time and we're all volunteers. Not only do you now 
know exactly where to begin, but you don't even have the sense of where to 
begin (emphasis verbally expressed in interview).
We'd have probably found the support through the internet eventually but it'd 
have been a much longer process. The umbrella has enabled us to access 
grants and been there to suggest how it's been done elsewhere. I think we 
paid for a three day consultancy fee but they're there if we need them, 
we've probably had ten times that support.
Board member, Lands End Peninsula CLT
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The assistance with technical legal incorporation was a common theme in interviews 
with volunteers and umbrella staff, in particular with obtaining charitable status which 
was universally described by CLT volunte'ers as a daunting and stringent process 
demanding patience, time, commitment and skills. These findings illustrate the 
importance professional expertise plays in facilitating community volunteers and 
demonstrate that community development and ownership of assets does not operate 
in a vacuum removed from the demands and commitments faced by organisations in 
other sectors. CLTs are instead often reliant on external facilitation to enable their 
long-term objectives.
Acting as a constitutional custodian
A key finding in the previous chapters was that financial support from local 
authorities often depended on assurance that the objectives of a CLT would not be 
directly self-serving or exclusionary. Conformance to charitable regulation by St 
Minver CLT was seen as a badge of trustworthiness and reassured North Cornwall 
District Council.
These arrangements were supported by the concept of a 'constitutional custodian', a 
body independent from the CLT represented on its board. The purpose of the 
constitutional custodian is to provide guarantees at a local level that the equity or 
financial interest held by CLTs would be used for community benefit and prevent a 
misuse of power, for example to avoid the organisation being formed to benefit a 
small minority. This was equally critical to unlocking local authority support as all 
amendments to a CLT's objectives and structure would require approval from the 
constitutional custodian:
You can have the parish council or district council as your constitutional 
custodian, or you could have perhaps the umbrella CLT as the constitutional 
custodian. If you have you must make sure your group isn't hijacked by an 
interest group of some sort, so safeguarding against accusations of an
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undemocratic or unsustainable group, because I think we need to be able to 
tick all these particular boxes to make sure we don't have an excuse for 
people to utilise and prevent set-up.
i
Director, Cornwall CLT
The need for this was echoed by the Council, reaffirming their need for CLTs to 
conform to existing and recognised structures of legitimacy to access local authority 
support:
One of the key things for CLTs is going into that structure makes it a lot safer 
and acceptable to local authorities, so we gave them a considerable loan and 
a huge interest free loan and, yeah, that legal structure gave us much more 
comfort and reassurance.
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
The presence of a constitutional custodian was therefore deemed to confer a degree 
of authenticity to the governance of the CLT, but of particular interest is the issue of
i
who performs the role. Having a parish, town or district council as a CLT's 
constitutional custodian can be interpreted as an attempt to attach a degree of 
democratic legitimacy64 to CLTs, providing a route through which the wider public 
interest could be authentically represented in a CLT's operations. This was validated 
by the Affordable Housing Officer in Cornwall who clearly stated that their support for 
CLTs was based on a pragmatic attempt to deliver housing rather than overtly
64 It is worth pointing out that, as Pearce and Ellwood (2002, p. 37) describe, using parish councils as a measure 
of the strength of local democracy is contested due to variable turnouts in elections and a lack of interest in 
standing for election among local residents. Nevertheless they were clearly seen to be a valued consulate by 
the local authority in this instance.
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encourage new forms of community governance, hence the need for a constitutional 
custodian:
Researcher: Do CLTs fit into your wider priorities of community involvement 
and engagement, these wider agendas of empowerment?
Interviewee: Not to the extent of the parish council. That would be the primary 
route. W e haven't promoted these, the driver hasn't been the participation and 
engagement and capacity building agenda, the driver has been affordable 
housing. We gleefully see the' other aspects, to get unintended 
consequences, which are hopefully beneficial.
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
However, while parish and district councils retain this accountability to their 
electorate, and are therefore seen as providing a democratic buffer to CLTs claiming 
- but perhaps unable to practically demonstrate - accountability to their local 
communities, the legitimacy conferred by an umbrella CLT is less clear.
In the case of Cornwall, a view held by a local housing association board member 
was that their support of the umbrella CLT was important in attaching a "reputational 
credibility" to the umbrella's operation, though this was not picked up on by the 
council official.
Of more critical concern was the role the umbrella could play in facilitating groups 
and, as a constitutional custodian, stepping in if the local CLT were to disband, 
reflecting more general concerns about the long-term ability and commitment of 
volunteers:
And Cornwall [CLT], that's a different animal as that's a carrier for smaller
ones ... it's a mechanism to facilitate things and nurture other groups, to step
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in if other groups fail or lose interest, and to keep things operating while 
they're forming.
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
The value of the umbrella CLT here is not only its assistance to groups - the 
facilitative and nurturing role described in the quotation - but its ability to step in and 
assume responsibility for the development of local CLTs that may falter over the 
course of time. This was related to an acknowledgement of the time consuming 
demands faced by CLT volunteers and the likelihood that changes in management 
and directorship could quickly occur due to a change in circumstances. These 
concerns are similar to those that provoked the resignation of volunteers of a CLT in 
the previous section. Indeed, few CLTs in the study had given much thought to the 
long-term succession of directors and governance issues, with most reliant on a 
handful of individuals.
Acting as an 'all in one' asset-holding CLT enabled the Cornwall umbrella to perform 
the role of a custodian in this way. Having paid staff and a long-term commitment to 
development (as expressed through organisational objectives and business 
planning) appeared to give legitimacy to their activities and act as the distinguishing 
factor between volunteers whose commitment may waver or be hindered. Therefore, 
the perceived robustness of the 'all in one' umbrella CLT, conveyed through its long­
term approach, provided reassurance to local authorities who were content for 
umbrellas to act as a constitutional custodian. The legitimacy here is not necessarily 
found in the CLT as a unique body but in the surrounding infrastructure denoting 
links and adherence to professional support or democratic norms and accountability 
found in local councils, a form of normative isomorphism described by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983).
However, as the following section argues, the local legitimacy and viability of this 
approach needs to be scrutinised. Operating an apparently professionalised
structure through employment of paid staff and the adoption of long-term objectives 
does not universally translate into successful practical outcomes nor does it 
automatically create accepted structures of local governance between local CLTs, 
umbrella CLTs and local authorities.
8.3 The process/outcome dualism and the influence of umbrellas
t
Chapter 5 explored the motivations and rationales that have underpinned the 
emergence of CLTs, and found overt claims to local control and influence in the 
decision-making of local housing governance to be intrinsic to their formation. In the 
eyes of CLT volunteers, it is their community-based activism and associated 
commitment and closeness to the local population that provides local legitimacy to 
their activities. Yet, as the Cornwall Council Affordable Housing Officer highlighted, 
the operation of umbrella CLTs at a wider sub-regional level brings a new 
perspective on the appropriate basis of a CLT’s localism agenda:
It is a means to an end, and yes it is a CLT, but if the community's the whole 
of Cornwall it's not quite the localism agenda in the same way.
Affordable Housing Officer, Cornwall Council
This referred to the asset-holding approach of the umbrella rather than the 
assistance and constitutional support it provided to local CLTs, the “means to an 
end” being Cornwall CLT’s provision of intermediate housing (under the auspices of
7
being a "CLT") without active community instigation. The approach adopted by the
umbrella in developing its own properties "where a CLT is yet to form" (Director,
Cornwall CLT) was a pragmatic response to identified need. The emphasis was less
on the community building seen in the brokerage services provided to existing CLT
groups elsewhere in the county, and more on the delivery of housing in towns and
villages where a need for intermediate housing had been identified through housing
needs surveys. The umbrella CLT would develop the housing itself, dispose of it
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through a resale-restricted mechanism and/charge a ground rent of £150 per year to/
occupants. This was charged in order to boost the financial resources of the 
organisation and cross-subsidise their ability to provide extensive support and 
assistance to the volunteers of embryonic local CLTs.
The Director of Cornwall CLT was keen to stress that the umbrella only develops 
assets where community support is evident - "we only work where we're wanted" - 
and extensive consultation with parish councils was common, but in reality it could 
be argued that this asset-holding approach is in fact little different from that of a 
housing association. It is based on the work of professionals with expertise in 
planning and development rather than the voluntary-led arrangements thought to be 
typical of the CLT sector. Though the outcome of increasing local housing supply 
may be the same, the process of achieving this clearly differs.
i
The scope of the study did not extend to an investigation of the views of non-CLT 
actors in areas where umbrellas had developed, but the fact that this approach exists 
and has successfully developed housing emphasises that understanding the role, 
scope and operation of a CLT is complex and does not necessarily mean the same 
thing in each sub-region. This diversity reaffirms the argument that CLTs should be 
understood as a malleable approach rather than a singular model to be rolled out.
This is particularly evident when examining the case of a Welsh 'all in one' umbrella 
CLT. Funded by government grants, the objectives of this umbrella were similar to its 
counterpart in Cornwall with a full-time project officer employed to fulfil the remit of 
promoting and expanding CLT development across a wider geographic area - in this 
case across the country of Wales. Unlike Cornwall CLT, formed directly out of av
funding partnership between a local housing association and charitable funders 
aimed at meeting a perceived housing need, Land for People in Wales formed from 
a group of people with an interest in the topic of community land ownership:
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W e visited another CLT in 2004 and got together a group of interested people 
to set up Land for People as an [initially] unincorporated organisation.
Director, Land for People
Land for People then eventually obtained grants from the Welsh Assembly 
Government to employ a director charged with fulfilling the role of an umbrella CLT 
and developing links with communities wishing to develop affordable housing:
There was a feeling a few years ago that Land for People was the way that 
people wanted to see CLTs develop. They had the model, they had the way 
forward and I think there was a feeling that Land for People might be the CLT 
for all CLTs if you understand me. That they would be willing to take on any 
CLT groups to deliver housing for them and people would have the 
management of the CLT.
Rural Housing Enabler, North Wales
Certainly the concept [of an umbrella CLT] is a good one and that's the way 
forward. I think the Welsh Assembly have provided grant funding towards 
Land for People and you'd have to make sure they're operating on an all- 
Wales basis and not giving preferential time and support to schemes within 
their locality.
Affordable Housing Officer, North Wales Local Authority
The first quotation suggests a hands-on role for the umbrella, directly assisting
communities with the technical delivery of housing while CLT volunteers retained
control. This is typical of the relationship between umbrella CLTs and the recipients
of their help, while the second quotation describes the proposed geographical scope
of the umbrella's activities. This differs slightly from the structures in England as it
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aimed to operate on a nationwide basis rather than county-specific.65 Yet, despite 
the views of the Affordable Housing Officer, this structure was problematised by 
other research participants on the basis that it was not seen to have met the
I
aspirations of the local CLTs the umbrella was set up to serve:
There was a slight feeling really among some CLTs that, yes it'd be great to 
have someone who can be employed to do the work as a project manager 
and administrator, but the feeling was that they wanted to see more 
empowerment to a local level and not releasing that empowerment to a 
national level. There was a feeling like that with Land for People. There's a lot 
to be said about empowering communities to do things themselves but you've 
got to have the right people, the right infrastructure and the right model to 
show people this is how it's done. It just hasn't worked the way it could have 
worked you know.
Rural Housing Enabler, North Wales
This raises questions about the appropriate locus of empowerment for CLTs and 
questions the very purpose of the umbrella body. The umbrella's wide geographical 
scope was perceived to be at odds with, and removed from, the local emphasis of 
the communities seeking to form CLTs, a sentiment echoed elsewhere in Wales:
My colleagues were talking about the [local] CLT and said they would be 
willing to get involved with doing housing needs surveys and things, but then 
Land for People came in and said they'd do it. They're not even based in 
Wales, they're based in Oswestry, they're so far removed whereas the 
other two rural housing enablers actually live and work with these
65 Notwithstanding, of course, that Wales has a considerably smaller population than England.
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communities at all times. If anything we are more expert. When we're there to 
help the CLT, why have Land for People come parachuting in to take over 
when I know what will happen, they'll walk away again when the going gets 
tough.
Rural Housing Enabler, Mid-Wales
This reveals a perception that Land for People was geographically remote from the 
communities they serve and asserts that this remoteness equates to an insufficient 
bank of expertise, returning us to the idea that local attachment and bonds to a 
community make those within it best placed to identify what is needed. It also 
highlights an apparent collision between the roles of rural housing enablers and 
umbrella CLTs. From the perspective of the rural housing enabler, the umbrella body 
had focused on promoting the concept of CLTs to communities and providing 
encouragement to form them without providing or putting in place networks of 
necessary technical expertise. In other words, the focus had been on describing 
what a CLT might achieve, rather than how such outcomes might be achieved.
They go in and sell the idea, get people on board and when the going gets 
tough they're not there to help them. I can sell the concept but then you need 
the expertise to come in when the going does get tough ... I think the 
approach from Land for People was wrong; they dip into communities, they 
sell the concept and make it sound brilliant, but there's not a reality check. 
Then they walk away and leave the communities to themselves. I think there's 
been a big failing in their approach. They tend to dip in and out of 
communities and they make it sound actually rosier than it is. They say "this 
is what we can do for the community" and then they leave the community to 
their own devices and then all of a sudden support for the idea wanes.
Rural Housing Enabler, Mid-Wales
287
Therefore, the alleged geographic remoteness of the umbrella was perceived to lead 
to a lack of understanding of the requirements of the community being encouraged 
to form the CLT. This lack of technical support for communities interested in forming 
CLTs was deemed to be a particular flaw. The umbrella CLT's director described his 
organisation's offer to communities as an advisory and enabling one, with the main 
success deemed to be support provided to CLTs when undergoing complex 
processes of legal incorporation, but the Director equally acknowledged that:
We do not have the skills to provide them with robust, expert advice on 
business planning and the templates provided by other CLTs [to assist with 
this] are too complicated for me to understand.
Director, Land for People
Yet, it was these attributes that were required on the ground and they were the skills 
local CLTs were looking for the umbrella CLT to provide. In March 2011, an offer of 
land transfer from the Mid-Wales local authority to a local CLT was withdrawn on the 
grounds that the CLT could not present an effective long-term business plan to the 
council:
r
It become increasingly clear that, as a standalone organisation, the CLT 
lacked the expertise and the resources to make a convincing business plan 
for the purposes of demonstrating the affordability of housing in perpetuity ... 
Council representatives advised that they felt unable to recommend the 
transfer of the serviced plots to the CLT as it had not met the criteria 
previously laid down by Board.
Mid-Wales Local Authority (2011)
The failure to provide the tangible technical support required to translate the rhetoric
behind CLTs into practical outcomes was thought to have limited the development of
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CLTs in this area. The following quotations illustrate this. First, the lack of, and need 
for, technical expertise to provide momentum to community-led schemes is 
acknowledged:
There is support for CLTs and because there's been no affordable housing 
delivery they're willing to try anything, but nothing seems to be getting off the 
ground at all ... Sometimes you feel that infrastructure isn't in place from the 
outset. In more rural areas you're c^ own to your local community councillors, 
some professional individuals who could offer expertise, but the sparsity of 
community in rural areas means there isn't any momentum to take it forward, 
you've got less of that mixture of people who can deliver and move things 
forward you know.
Rural Housing Enabler, Mid-Wales
Second, despite the acknowledgement of support for CLTs, the rural housing 
enabler argued that the local communities that had held an interest in CLTs were 
motivated by more pragmatic outcomes than the utopian vision of community 
ownership. Here he describes a community group that had been involved in forming 
a CLT but struggled to advance beyond the embryonic stages due to the lack of 
technical expertise, before turning to a locaf housing association for development:
I don't think they are bothered by it [community ownership of housing] to put it 
bluntly. It just happens to be that housing associations have been the 
management organisations, building and managing houses, but the 
communities are pretty supportive of them because they've engaged with the 
designs and they're even welcome to monitor the allocations process. There's 
so much transparency. Housing associations didn't have a good reputation 
but I think that's starting to turn around ... they're loving it, they can't wait for 
those houses and they're not worried if it's a housing association, they've just 
got six houses and I've never known a community like it. They're so
289
V
supportive, the whole community, it's a representative process and it just 
happens to be a housing association involved.
Rural Housing Enabler, Mid-Wales
i
These findings develop two key themes. The professional skill and expertise appears 
to be the determining factor in whether an umbrella CLT is accepted as an 
appropriate stakeholder and facilitator in local governance. As the Director of Land 
for People acknowledged, in some areas tfieir human resources were lacking and as 
such they were unable to provide the momentum local communities desired, leading 
to a disconnect between the umbrella body and the local CLT:
We attempted to formalise the relationship with one CLT by asking them to 
consider a draft contract, but they did not want to do this ... [they are] the only 
CLT we have tried to enter into a formal arrangement with but refused to pay 
anything.
i
Director, Land for People
Additionally, it questions the ideal of community ownership and its centrality to the 
motivations of individual CLTs. It is clear that the CLT concept attracts the interests 
of communities for different reasons. Forborne in earlier chapters the process of 
community building within a CLT has been central, seeing it not just as a mechanism 
to deliver housing but as a way to unite the community around a shared agenda and 
common vision. However, in the instances described here by stakeholders working 
alongside community groups, the utopian vision of community ownership and 
stewardship of local housing was not deemed to be important. Rather, practical 
outcomes and significant community influence over the local design and allocation of 
housing were thought to be critical factors, not any ideological commitment to the 
value of community ownership. Indeed, these agendas promoted by the umbrella
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body became questioned due to perceptions of geographical remoteness and a 
perceived inability to understand the need for ongoing support of local volunteers.
One of the fundamental questions raised at the end of the previous chapter was 
whether there is a necessary trade-off between the ambitions of CLTs and their need 
for crucial human and economic resourced. Should the community-led process of 
forming a CLT be privileged over the eventual outcome, recognising community 
activism and entrepreneurship as a legitimate activities and end goals in their own 
right? The cases described in this chapter so far demonstrate such trade-offs that 
can occur if practical outcomes are to be delivered.
In the case of one CLT, there was a relinquishment of their initial aim of community 
ownership based on the feasibility study and advice from the umbrella CLT. The 
acknowledgement that the human resources of the organisation were lacking and 
unable to unlock access to the necessary funding persuaded them to enter into a 
partnership with a local housing association. In this sense the umbrella CLT helped 
facilitate a network of third sector support which allowed the CLT to retain the 
freehold of the land and a stake in its future use.i
In the case of Cornwall CLT, no overarching trade-offs were paramount, though this 
was partly due to the local authority's willingness to support local CLTs that had the 
benefit of a constitutional custodian. This was perceived to legitimise the 
organisational governance of local CLTs. Cornwall CLT was also responsible for 
developing its own properties, a process which can be interpreted as a trade-off 
between an umbrella's objectives in supporting CLT ambitions and their objective not 
only to meet identified housing need elsewhere but to generate critical resources. 
The finance obtained from annual ground rents on their properties was seen as a 
necessary source of finance to help support their long-term objectives and provide 
assistance to CLT volunteers elsewhere.
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In Wales the idyllic idea of a community-led process to achieve mutual ownership of 
property was not paramount to the local ambitions. Instead the tangible outcome of 
affordable housing delivery was prioritised as long as it was open to community 
influence in its delivery. As such, the disconnection between the umbrella CLT's 
operation and the recipients of its support led to communities moving away from the 
idea of community ownership towards a more conventional method of delivery via a 
housing association. The fact the communjty did not own the properties outright did 
not matter; the tangible delivery of housing for local needs was the fundamental goal.
This reaffirms the understanding developed at the end of the previous chapter: CLTs 
can be understood not as a uniform model but an approach to housing development 
that stresses the importance of community influence, not necessarily ownership, and 
relies on some form of institutional structure or partnership to facilitate the objective 
of providing affordable housing to meet local needs. This may be through a 
community building process that prioritises communitarian endeavour and creates a 
fully-formed independent CLT, or it may be through a partnership with a local 
housing association that undertakes technical development while prioritising the local 
knowledge and expertise a community is perceived to hold in identifying its needs. 
The crucial and unifying issue therefore is about where the locus of power sits in 
influencing how, where and for whom local housing is developed, rather than an 
ideological commitment to community ownership. It is an approach that may see 
housing development that provides responsiveness to a community’s needs, as 
opposed to responsibility for meeting them. A CLT’s ownership of property may be a 
route to achieving this power, but it is hot the only mechanism through which 
community influence is exercised.
Nor are these claims to local power and influence unreservedly accepted by 
gatekeepers to resources such as finance and land. As one of the key stakeholders 
in local governance, local authorities are reliant on institutional safeguards to try and 
ensure the power of CLTs is expressed as fairly and accountably as possible.
Community activism alone is not seen as a legitimate method of influence and the 
following issues often need to be addressed:
• The perceived competence of organisations is important if key resources are 
to be unlocked, as seen by the transfer of land at High Bickington, where the 
local authority was assured of the CLT's abilities by the Chair, and conversely 
in the case of the CLT where the offer of land was withdrawn.
• The validity of a CLT's objectives requires diligence, which can be assured by 
the use of a constitutional custodian, attaching perceived norms of democratic 
and/or professional legitimacy.
• The long-term ability and commitment of the CLT to fulfil their objectives is 
crucial, hence the need for guarantors of their developments and assurance 
over long-term business planning.
If these criteria are met, critical support for CLTs to assume an integral role in 
influencing local housing provision may be unlocked. Whether this role is fulfilled 
through community ownership or influence, the foundations of this are built on a 
unifying belief that:
Localism is about reducing the role of central and local government in 
decisions that need to be taken at the most locally appropriate spatial level, 
because levels of government have insufficient knowledge or no justifiable 
locus to make a competent decision.
Hill (2011)
However, even where CLTs, local authorities, funders and regulators unite around 
the apparent need to provide housing that prioritises local needs, as the following 
section discusses, potential legal impediments to this provision remain.
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8.4 Representation and legitimacy at a national scale
Alongside the growth of umbrella CLTs, a National CLT Network was formed in 
September 2010 to represent CLTs in England, lobby on their behalf and influence 
policy, with the aim of putting in place the conditions that will allow the number of 
CLTs to grow. At the time of writing the Network was only just a year old and it is 
therefore too early to make a judgement as to its role in (and position on) the 
arguments outlined by this thesis, not least because fieldwork for the study was 
conducted prior to the Network's formation. Nevertheless, the Network has made an 
early political move in lobbying for policy to be changed to support the ability of CLTs 
to offer a form of housing provision that can prioritise local needs in its allocation. 
This section describes the launch of this move and how it may help CLTs to meet 
their objectives.
A frequent claim by advocates of CLTs is that their ability to hold housing and other 
assets in trust brings community benefit (National CLT Network, 2011a). As this 
thesis has explored, this involves the primacy of a CLT in deciding, providing and 
governing housing for locally-defined objectives and benefits, based on the ideal that 
the locus of power in decision-making should be devolved to the lowest possible 
level.
The claims to providing local benefit were seen to be of key value in embedding 
acceptance of housing development in local communities and in unlocking land that 
may not otherwise become available for this purpose. For example, a CLT's 
attachment to a local area and commitment to meeting the needs of its residents was 
a valuable tool in persuading local landowners in St Minver and East Portlemouth to 
sell land at low cost on the condition that it would be used for affordable housing 
allocated to local households.
A CLT's ability to do this has been enhanced in rural areas by the use of rural 
exception sites for development. They have been a useful tool for CLTs due to their
low value and the occupancy constraints they are subject to: as exception sites can 
only be used to house local people, the fundamental objectives of a CLT developing 
on an exception site cannot be overtly contested.
In other areas, legalities over land use have been perceived as a hindrance to the 
purpose of CLTs. Homes built on land outside 'protected areas'66 are subject to 
leasehold enfranchisement which allows leaseholders of shared ownership 
properties to purchase the freehold of the land on which their home is built, therefore 
taking it into individual ownership and potentially onto the open market should the 
resident ever sell. This is commonly referred to as "staircasing" (CLG, 2009b).
It is clear how this conflicts with a CLT's desire to provide housing that prioritises 
local needs in perpetuity: if a home is allocated according to local need but is subject 
to a future legality that conflicts with this policy and allows change of use, the CLT 
has no legal foundation on which to apply restrictions on its future use. If 
leaseholders are not permitted to staircase, the CLT retains a stake in the use and 
occupation of that home.
Everything would be a lot simpler if we didn't have to worry about leasehold 
enfranchisement, we could just have a simple lease and the CLT would either 
be the freeholder or leaseholder and the person would be subletting, so it'd 
make the whole control method simpler if we didn't have to worry about 
leasehold enfranchisement.
Director, Cornwall CLT
65 Protected areas are typically rural locations with a population below 3,000. They are designated under the 
Leasehold Reform Act 1967 and restrictions on the right of residents to purchase the freehold of their shared 
ownership property are enforced in order to retain affordable housing (CLG, 2009b).
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The subject of leasehold enfranchisement was also problematised in the previous 
chapter where a CLT volunteer was concerned about a CLT's homes being seen 
merely as an affordability mechanism which fails to give due priority to community 
building and the needs of local people. Responding to these concerns, in May 2011 
a campaign titled 'Give CLTs the right to hpld on to their land' was launched by the 
National CLT Network, based on the fear that homes subject to leasehold 
enfranchisement would:
cease to be permanently affordable for the community the CLT has been set 
up to serve ... We want the land to stay in the hands of the community so that 
it can continue to have a social purpose and help those in housing need.
National CLT Network (2011c)
The campaign sought to include an amendment to the 2011 Localism Bill that would 
provide CLTs in all areas with a discretionary right to exempt homes built on land 
owned by a CLT from leasehold enfranchisement. In line with the primacy CLTs wish 
to assume in local decision-making, the proposed amendment would provide greater 
legal power for CLTs to meet their objectives of imposing a local security of tenure 
and measures of affordability on their homes. The quotation below, taken from a 
publicly available briefing note created to inform the Greater London Authority of the 
proposals, illustrates the discretion this would provide to communities and the 
elevated role bodies such as CLTs may seek to assume in the way local housing is 
allocated:
The philosophy of localism suggests that, in future, it should be entirely up to 
communities to take a view about their particular housing needs, and whether 
or not to protect affordable housing supply through exemption from leasehold 
enfranchisement. Communities should be able to make that choice for 
themselves ... CLTs are a legally defined body, with wide responsibilities for 
the well-being of their community. They are an appropriate medium for taking
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the decision on behalf of and with the people who are the beneficiaries of the 
trust.
Hill (2011)
It is clear that the creation of this exemption would boost the power of CLTs to assert 
their claims to power in local housing provision to a greater degree, and in doing so 
provide a wider example of the way in which agendas of localism may allow 
communities themselves to define the appropriate levels and boundaries of decision­
making which may or may not fit into existing structures and understandings. 
Although early in its development, this also shows how the National CLT Network 
may use its expertise and national voice in identifying and campaigning for legalities 
that can shape the CLT sector, particularly as local volunteers may not have had the 
capabilities to connect with national policymakers as individual organisations. As the 
quotation above describes, this in itself is based on the notion of 'community' as the 
site for collective action, consensus building and responsibility for local decision­
making.
Yet, while the geographic community is obviously the site for CLT action, consensus 
over their social purpose and a community's particular housing needs is often 
contested and complex. A key argument of this thesis has been that CLTs adopt 
civic rationales where the involvement of communities in local governance is related 
to the delivery and facilitation of housing outcomes that are highly valued by local 
people. Rather than the utopian idea of community ownership and mutual 
responsibility, CLTs are incentivised to form by the opportunity to address pragmatic 
concerns over who local housing is allocated to and the process undertaken to 
decide this. The focus is on the immediate locality and consensus over local policy 
outcomes is fundamentally linked to influencing the type and allocation of properties 
in order to provide a new mode of legitimacy for those seeking to access affordable 
housing, one which is based primarily on familial or occupational connection to an 
area rather than solely economic or social rieed.
‘t i
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While mechanisms such as rural exception sites and key worker allocation policies 
predate CLTs in operating on this basis, handing responsibility for deciding on the 
type and allocation of housing to communities can itself be contested due to its key 
focus on the immediate neighbourhood or locality, sometimes failing to placate 
external stakeholders with wider geographic responsibilities wary of perceived self­
defined social purposes. The legitimacy of CLTs to assume these responsibilities is 
itself complex. CLTs legitimise their activities to the local community by virtue of their 
affective attachment and closeness to $he area, but are required to include 
performance guarantors or constitutional custodians by funders in order to attach 
professional or democratic legitimacy to the organisation. In these situations 
community activism alone is not deemed to be a legitimising activity to stakeholders, 
rather it is one of a multitude of processes that need to be undertaken if CLTs are to 
be accepted as a credible provider of housing.
It could therefore be argued that the attempt to extend exemption from leasehold 
enfranchisement is a tactical move to attabh legal legitimacy to the role of CLTs in 
local housing governance. By limiting the ability of a CLT resident to dispose of their 
home on the open market, the CLT will be able to enforce restrictions over the resale 
of the home by retaining its freehold and thus a stake in its use. The National CLT 
Network and its activities are therefore likely to be influential in shaping the locally- 
defined spaces for community governance;,of housing, using changes in legalities to 
support the role communities perform in meeting their objectives. Within the 
framework of Etzioni's communitarianism (1995a; 1997), this can be understood as a 
process of contextualising the importance of community by framing the values it 
affirms within a higher order of legitimacy, imbuing it with a degree of accountability:
In search of a principled way to determine which values are properly 
accounted for, I join with those who hold that if a community (by democratic 
process or other forms of consensus building) reaches closure, the values 
endorsed or implied have been imbued with a measure of legitimacy but not 
sufficient accountability. I further argue that if these values also comport with
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the societal values (often ensconced in the constitution or other such laws), 
this fact enhances the standing of the chosen values.
Etzioni (1997a, p. 241)
While Etzioni was typically concerned with issues relating to the rights and 
responsibilities of citizens, we can interpret the campaign to exempt CLTs from 
leasehold enfranchisement as a process which attempts to embed the right of CLTs 
to enforce resale restrictions on their homes and from that the ability to secure the 
highly valued local security of tenure in perpetuity.
Conclusion
Whether this is a desirable outcome or not is geographically contingent. As has been 
described, CLTs are diverse, complex and reflective of local circumstances rather 
than a singular model that can be understood and judged solely in relation to their 
development value. j
What can be highlighted is that consensus over CLTs' social purposes is not always 
easy to generate, nor is it likely to have wide-ranging benefits beyond an immediate 
locality. Prioritising local needs in housing allocation by definition excludes particular
tgroups, which itself may be perceived to have undesirable impacts on those lacking 
the local connection and not qualifying for the community's assistance. Allowing 
communities to develop "shared visions" and "make the right decision for their 
community" (CLG, 2010) within localism agendas may sometimes fail to reconcile 
differences in power, competence, capacity and representativeness inherent to 
community governance.
These issues have been prevalent throughout the data analysis. In this chapter in
particular, the ability of CLTs to assume responsibility for local decision-making has
been questioned. Umbrella CLTs have assumed a role here in assisting CLTs and
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shaping the activities and mode of operation. For example, issues of competence 
were addressed by umbrellas or support workers in the North East and Cornwall. In 
the North East the umbrella's facilitation of a partnership network addressed 
shortfalls in the skill and knowledge of a limited number of volunteers, though the 
case of Land for People highlights that the role of umbrella CLTs operating at a wider 
geographical level is not universally accepted based on perceptions of remoteness 
and lack of understanding of a community's needs, as well as a disconnection 
between the service offered by the umbrella and the type of service desired at 
community level.
Despite this instance, it is clear that umbrella CLTs are likely to continue to play a 
greater role in facilitating CLT development due to the number that have recently 
formed. The creation of this structural support in the sub-regions alongside national 
political support is likely to attach greater professional and legal legitimacy to the 
concept of CLTs, playing a key role in shaping a policy environment that supports 
the locally-specific agendas adopted by CLTs within the wider context of political 
restructuring emphasising agendas of localism. The organisations that emerge under 
this context are likely to be diverse in their structure and aims based on the 
argument of this thesis that a CLT is not a unique model of development that acts as 
a panacea to shortages of housing supply, and is instead a particular approach and 
strategy to achieving particular ends, namely the primacy of communities in the 
governance and allocation of local affordable housing.
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Chapter 9: Concluding Remarks
By constructing a narrative of CLT development from reasons for formation to the 
acquisition of the resources needed for their plans to become reality, this thesis has 
attempted to document a period of change for CLTs. As the introduction to this thesis 
described, CLTs in England and Wales have yet to be fully explored academically, 
which has been advantageous for this research in so much as it can in one respect 
claim to be novel. The contribution this study makes to knowledge is, however, more 
nuanced than straightforwardly reporting the results of an empirical investigation.
First, the research has been conducted from 2008 -  2011, a time of significant 
change for CLTs and the social, economic and political environments in which they 
operate. In answering the overarching research question “what is the purpose and 
function of CLTs as a form of housing governance in England and Wales?” the thesis 
has attempted to document this change by exploring the rationales and acquisition of 
resources by CLTs in these countries. Within this, it has explored the dilemmas and 
compromises faced not only by CLTs but by those stakeholders to whom CLTs must 
demonstrate professionalism and legitimacy. The time frame of this research has 
made the exploration of these issues particularly interesting as the CLT sector has 
evolved from being locally rooted, dispersed and reliant on grassroots 
communitarianism, to one represented at national and sub-regional scales. The 
contribution this thesis makes is therefore to shed light on how and why this 
evolution has occurred.
Second, there is increasing governmental advocacy of the role of communities in the 
ownership and operation of housing and other local amenities, as well as their 
centrality to decision-making in policy arenas such as housing and planning. This 
continues the ideological commitment to community empowerment and active 
citizenship made by previous governments. The current push towards localism, 
reformed planning processes and ideas of mutualism in housing provision and wider
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concepts of 'big society' make CLTs an interesting example of these politicised 
processes. This research has identified various potential outcomes of and 
challenges to the current localism agenda with particular regard to the differential 
abilities and power relations inherent to collective action in arenas that typically 
demand professional skills and time.
A number of themes underpin these contributions. This chapter is divided into three 
sections that aim to summarise the key findings of this thesis thematically, drawing 
on the content of all four empirical chapters to answer not only the questions that 
they were structured around but to provide some observations and conclusions as to 
the purpose and function of CLTs in England and Wales. Section 9.1 summarises 
these themes; 9.2 discusses the theoretical and policy implications of these findings; 
and 9.3 reflects on the strengths and limitations of this thesis and proposes important 
pathways for future research. These suggestions acknowledge that this study 
represents the beginning of rather than the conclusion to academic scrutiny of the 
practices and organisation of the CLT sector.
9.1 Emerging themes and future prospects for CLTs
This research aimed to explore the differences, conflicts of interest and experiences
■ {
that occur through assertions of collective action, aspiration and interest, 
investigating not only how and why CLTs have emerged but the dilemmas and 
compromises that are faced and negotiated in their development (Levitas, 2000, p. 
192). Given the varied understandings and interpretations of the purpose ofi
community governance, the aim was to apply a critical approach to CLTs and
■j
investigate the negotiation of the interests and complexities inherent to an emerging 
form of community-owned and community-governed housing in England and Wales. 
The product of this approach was four empirical chapters intended to chart the 
narrative of CLT development from initial motivation and inception through to the 
acquisition of critical resources and interactions with networks of professional 
support and expertise.
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There are a number of cross-cutting themes that emerge from the findings of this 
research. This section discusses the purpose of community ownership in the context 
of CLTs, the local legitimacy of the CLT sector and the strategic legitimacy to which 
CLTs are beholden, with a view to the practical and critical implications these hold 
for theory and policy.
The purpose of community ownership
It is well established that the right of ownership confers certain entitlements and 
privileges upon the owners; in particular it grants a degree of power in decision­
making over the function and use of what it is that is owned. This is relevant in the 
context of CLTs as the intrinsic rationale of and for CLTs is that they alter the power 
relations conferred by the ownership of land and property. The alteration of these 
relations aims to privilege the voice of a defined, constructed or imagined community 
in the governance of local housing, with particular reference to the exercise of 
influence over the type and use of local property.
In theory, CLT ownership is a vehicle through which this voice can be expressed and 
a medium for exercising citizen influence and authority over local housing. The 
realisation of this power, and consequently the ability to achieve the particular 
outcomes desired by a CLT, are the main motivations for the formation of CLTs. 
They are formed principally in order to better represent and reflect local opinion in 
the delivery and management of housing. In line with Davis' (1991, p. 230) view of 
inner-city American CLTs, their instigation is orientated towards "a structural change 
in the ownership and control of domestic property". The reasons why this should be 
required are addressed later in this section.
This structural change is premised on altering the arrangements for housing 
allocations in accordance with a CLT's vision for the renewal and future of their local 
community. This defines who should occupy and benefit from local housing, typically
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marked by economic circumstances, local connection and contribution to community 
life through permanent residency.
y
The allocation of housing according to local connection is already a common practice 
in rural housing provision; indeed legislation allowing for the rural exception sites that 
some CLTs have used to develop their housing would not allow anything other than 
a combination of local and economic need to determine who occupies housing built 
on them. Therefore, the contention here is not that allocating housing according to 
local need is an approach that is intrinsically marked by exclusivity; it is instead one 
that places heavy value on a relational-based approach to defining and overcoming 
housing need. This is especially the case in the context of some of the rural areas 
where supply and demand push property values increasingly higher and beyond 
local incomes, with concurrent detrimental effects for community life and spirit 
observed as a result of this. Consequently, aspatial forms of prioritising people in 
housing allocations are scrutinised by communities that may embrace alternative 
mechanisms to realign this, such as a CLT.V
However, using local connection as the primary proxy for housing need may be a 
blunt instrument that has obvious implications for those seeking housing outside 
these parameters. It is a fundamental realigning of the rationales and bureaucratic 
processes, premised on ‘priority need’ according to economic and family 
circumstance that have governed the access to and allocation of subsidised housing 
in the UK. Allowing this realignment to be instigated by local communities may hold 
progressive possibilities in remedying a lack of existing provision in the face of land 
speculation, low supply and high property prices, but it may also oversimplify our 
understanding of housing need should be defined. Allocating housing and judging 
need simply in relation to local connection can build on, and result in, a nuanced 
form of territoriality that can lead to the exclusion of non-local and ‘risky’ social 
groups who fail to share a communal attachment to a spatial area.
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At its most extreme, as seen in debates over who benefits from land use in Chapter 
7, community-led and implemented local needs policies can be based on 
constructed distinctions between locals and non-locals, insiders and outsiders, that 
are premised on the envisaged potential contributions and non-contributions each 
provides to a community. Here, an interesting comparison can be made with Flint's 
(2009) study of European migrants to the UK and the problematisation of the 
behaviours of non-indigenous populations. These, Flint (2009, p. 133) argues, are 
premised on imaginative geographies that characterise 'outsider groups' as diverging 
from the behaviours and valued forms of community life desired by the 'insider 
group'.67 The allocation of housing according to local and familial connection in these 
cases is a bulwark against non-local occupation of property, exemplified by one 
research participant who saw the potential of a CLT as a method through which 
locally acceptable forms of housing development and allocation could be constructed 
on the basis of these imagined geographies rather than merely affordability. This 
was to be done by building only the number of homes that could be filled according 
to local need rather than a greater number to be allocated on the basis of economic 
need or other forms of social need drawn from outside the local area.
V
Looking beyond the 'puli' of prioritising local connection in housing allocation, the 
governance of which may be an attraction for embryonic CLTs, this geographic 
rescaling of housing governance also involves push factors that motivate those 
engaged in developing CLTs to instigate collective action. In these instances, CLTs 
can be seen as a reaction to fundamental changes to local housing stock. Examples 
include the impact of the right to buy, seen to remove a vital source of affordable 
housing, the impact of studentification on urban neighbourhoods and huge 
disparities between incomes and house prices in both rural and urban areas. Here, 
structural alteration of the ownership and control of domestic property is less about
67 Flint's work here takes reference from Elias and Scotson's (1965) work on the insider and outsider groups of 
community life in Leicestershire.
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the primacy of communities in housing governance and more to do with correcting 
the perceived inability of public, private and third sector stakeholders to resolve 
these issues. The need for a form of housing governance that takes greater account 
of local need may be an important factor but the problematisation of 'outsider groups' 
is not always overtly found. Instead local socio-economic forces and the neglect of 
these by traditional forms of authority and provision provide the basis for a strategy 
of community ownership aimed at benefiting local people disadvantaged by low 
incomes, high property prices and insufficient local housing supply.
A CLT is therefore a device which intends to remove doubt that housing will be 
provided and governed according to constructed community desires. It aims to work 
for local people and adheres to the communitarian philosophy of localising and 
demarcating the boundaries for responsibility and decision-making that furthers local 
aims:
Every community ought to be expected to do the best it can to take care of its 
own. Society, as a community of communities, should encourage the moral 
expectation that attending to welfare is the responsibility of the local 
community. ’
Etzioni (1995a, p. 146)
Communitarian efforts expressed through a CLT are extended towards creating and 
meeting an expectation that the governance of local housing and its occupation is 
structured on their terms, including a definition of which populations constitute ‘their 
own’. In some instances it will be aimed at assuming greater responsibility for local 
housing; in others simply towards ensuring that housing outcomes are at least more 
responsive to local wishes.
The purpose of CLT ownership is not simply aimed at delivering new housing, nor is 
it necessarily grounded in the ideas of mutuality, protection from land speculation or
of providing a more economically equitable housing system (though these ideals do 
sometimes exist). It is a form of housing delivery intrinsically linked to place 
attachment, close local connections and ties and shared collective aspirations. CLTs 
are a response to (and differentiated from) forms of provision perceived to have 
ignored and failed to meet local aspirations as to how local housing is governed and 
allocated, and are deemed to be more valuable by their instigators than other 
providers due to their local commitment.
The task for governments (locally and nationally), financiers and regulators is to 
ensure that this form of territorial housing governance on behalf of local people is 
balanced between its progressive possibilities in facilitating the opportunity for CLTs 
to deliver affordable housing and exercise choice as to who lives there, and its 
potential for excluding those who fail to conform to the membership criteria and/or 
values of the defined or imagined community that CLTs aim to serve. The 
reconciliation (or otherwise) of these ends of the spectrum is at the heart of 
understanding how CLTs will operate and capitalise on the opportunities generated 
by the context of an increased role for community action in the decision-making, 
delivery and management of planning for local housing. The extent to which CLTs 
are seen both as legitimate representatives of their community and legitimate 
providers of housing that conform with the requirements of funders, landowners andtgovernment will affect the extent to which the role of CLTs expands in the future.
The local legitimacy of CLTs
The “community” in the context of CLTs is synonymous with place and spatial 
boundaries in terms of who is best placed to decide over and provide local housing, 
as well as determining the criteria by which individuals are judged to be most 
suitable to benefit from a CLT’s work. Furthermore the work of CLTs is not intended 
to necessarily overlap or coalesce with that of other communities; it is a body whose 
boundaries of operation and interest are clearly demarcated.
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Though this strong attachment to place is how CLTs legitimise themselves to local 
communities, the legitimacy attached to who decides over local housing provision 
and who benefits from it can be contested within and between geographic 
communities rather than merely between structures of community representation and 
external organisations. CLTs are characterised by themselves and by MPs in 
government as holding a comparative advantage in contrast to public or quasi-public 
providers of housing due to their "untaintedness" from national or regional priorities 
and their ability to represent the local opinion of their communities (see Saward, 
2009). These perspectives link back to longer policy traditions in the field of housing, 
including the promotion of tenant participation, stock transfer, resident engagement 
in regeneration and co-operativism, as well as to governmental rhetoric dating back 
to the emphasis placed on active citizenship and empowerment by successive 
governments from the 1980s onwards.
What this ideological point of view fails to reconcile is that simply assuming a CLT is 
untouched from 'tainted' opinions and forms of knowledge is to ignore the fractured 
multiplicity of interests, relationships ahd identities within communities. The 
legitimacy of a CLT should not be understood just by being set in opposition to the 
state or against large housing associations perceived to struggle in balancing their 
accountability to private finance with their service to residents and communities,. 
Instead, legitimacy itself is something that can be contested on an intra-community 
basis and, as the example of the CLTs in Chapter 6 showed, is often linked to how 
housing is provided and managed, and to whom it is allocated.
The potential contestation and splintering of opinion over a CLT’s legitimacy may be 
contingent on and affected by variable levels of power organisation and relationships 
that can leverage power over competing interest groups. Association with 
democratically elected bodies such as parish councils was thought to privilege a CLT 
in organising a parish poll to decide on the local use of land, while competing against 
this the CLT's representatives felt that the negative outcome of the poll was a 
consequence of ignorance, insufficient knowledge of the subject and informal
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networks of citizen association as opposed to an accepted product and outcome of 
local deliberation. The development of a CLT here was therefore not merely 
grounded in an ideological stance related to the apparently apolitical nature of a 
CLT, but rather a relational and political process involving the positioning for 
resources and splintering of legitimacy in response to this.
Therefore, while CLT advocates may see the approach as being untainted by the 
norms and values held by other providers that are thought to negatively affect local 
communities, they are not untainted by the concept of interest. The representation 
and defence of one set of interests defined by place is set against another set of 
interests, priorities or opinions that threaten a CLT's aims and desires. These may be 
related to concerns commonly expressed by CLT representatives, such as the 
impact of private capital, land speculation or second home ownership, but they also 
hold the concurrent possibility for being defined solely in relation to spatial 
connection, commitment to a local area and citizen-defined contribution to a 
community. Rather than assume they represent the opinion of the 'authentic 
grassroots', I argue that CLTs simply articulate the interests of a particular strand of 
localised opinion which is itself open to challenge, debate and contestation by others 
who may claim similar legitimacy. Even where local consensus is generated, CLTs 
still represent a portion of grassroots interest that may simultaneously include and 
exclude either on the basis of spatial connection, or on the extent to which local 
people are involved in the relational and politicised processes that facilitate CLTs.
The local legitimacy of a CLT is therefore premised on its civic commitment to an 
area - the civic rationale of Lowndes and Sullivan's framework - and its ability to 
represent, articulate and defend the interests of a local area. Rather, this thesis 
found that these interests are not solely or universally articulated in relation to the 
existence or lack of affordable housing, they are instead intertwined with and 
contingent on associations with a bounded spatial area. Within this, intra-community 
contestation as to the type of housing that is provided and who occupies it shows 
that the "untaintedness" of a CLT is not enough to ensure it effortlessly glides to
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successful delivery or produces a legitimate communitarian consensus that is 
accepted by all.
The strategic legitimacy and emerging CLT sector
There are numerous tensions between conceptualising CLTs as a body untainted by 
interests that conflict with local priorities and the actual trajectory of the CLT sector. 
A number of CLTs in this study were committed to principles of local participatory 
democracy and followed the ideal of the American Institute for Community 
Economics (1982, p. 256) in seeing a CLT as a product of the effort of and by a 
geographic community as opposed to being created for or on behalf of local people 
and their interests. It holds that the process of creating a CLT is intrinsically linked to 
the extent to which the outcome is valued by and beneficial for the intended 
beneficiaries; that CLTs essentially need to avoid, as one urban CLT put it in 
Chapter 6, "just another government model" in order to uphold local interests and 
benefits. This view echoed a call from the National CLT Demonstration Programme 
in 2009 for "more support to enable CLTs to operate, without detracting from their 
core principle, which is about creating a sense of collective power and trust among 
communities" (Aird, 2009, p. 6). <
Yet, this rationale for instigating CLTs, premised strongly on an ideologically 'pure' 
form of community empowerment and local autonomy, has been riddled by 
contradiction and compromise evidenced throughout this research. While CLTs were 
initially reluctant to pursue or accept st:ate-sponsored sources of funding and 
prioritised their independence - their 'untaintedness' - their efforts to implement a 
new set of tenurial arrangements that privilege local communities has been 
necessarily contingent on the compromise and framing of this by those with the 
wherewithal to facilitate CLT development. This was fundamentally related to 
whether or not CLTs had the practical skills, strength and capacity to meet their 
objectives along with concerns as to the extent of resident control.
i
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CLTs were encouraged to "sit within policy in a way that is acceptable" by a local 
authority officer in Cornwall. Issues such as the blind selection of residents, the 
extension of catchment areas from which residents would be drawn and badgemarks 
of accountability such as legal and charitable structures all conveyed legitimacy to a 
local authority and persuaded them to release finance. Alongside this, CLTs in this 
area were required to have a constitutional custodian, a professional or 
democratically elected body through which constitutional changes would have to be 
passed, represented on their board in order to safeguard the aims and objectives of 
the organisation.
The requirement to ensure that CLTs were acting legitimately and in general 
accordance with local authority objectives, along with community-level need for 
human resources, created an emerging role for umbrella CLTs operating at wider 
geographic scales. Umbrella CLTs provided crucial assistance in supporting CLTs 
and brokering support from local authorities by conferring a degree of professional 
legitimacy to a CLT's aims. In this sense, legitimacy can be seen as a political 
resource which CLTs were able to mobilise in their favour, providing further weight to 
the argument that their development is not facilitated only by an ideological stance 
but by a relational and political process that emphasises universal professional 
norms and values.
The key finding here is that CLTs do not simply 'do it themselves':68 they were often 
reliant on external facilitation, support and brokerage. This is not to undermine the 
effort and spirit of volunteerism that underpinned many of the CLTs featured in this 
study, but typically CLTs were reliant on forms of professional expertise and
68 In 2008 a publication named 'Then We Will Do It  Ourselves' was launched at the National CLT conference 
with an accompanying press release that described it as a demonstration of "what is possible when the 
ingenuity and hard work of local communities is matched by a progressive approach from local authorities and 
funders."
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knowledge, the existence of which within a-CLT's operation were critical to unlocking 
the land and finance required for their development.
These findings are important to note as they show the key role of intermediary 
organisations highlighted by Archer and Vanderhoven (2010) in Chapter 3. Umbrella 
CLTs can be classed as intermediaries as they hold perform many of the functions 
described by Archer and Vanderhoven, including mediation between the state and 
communities, and active assessment and provision of the necessary support and 
resource needs of CLT groups. The intermediary role performed by many umbrella 
CLTs has been a key factor in delivering CLT homes in areas such as Cornwall. The 
combination of their capability to provide technical support and expertise and 
commitment to community empowerment and mediation with stakeholders makes 
umbrella CLTs important actors in the formation, progression and delivery of CLTs.
However, simply forming an umbrella CLT will not on its own be a panacea to the 
problems faced by communities. Other examples in this thesis have highlighted 
tensions in this intermediation role, as in some circumstances umbrellas were not 
seen as key actors as they were not able to provide the professional skills and 
support required by communities. Based on these findings, it is possible to identify 
three key attributes of umbrella CLTs, which have resonance for intermediary 
organisations elsewhere in the community self-help sector:
• They should be capable of providing the technical support and expertise 
required by local communities, such as organisational expertise, advice on 
legal incorporation and business planning.
• They should have a commitment to community empowerment while ensuring 
they complement rather than duplicate or compete with the work of other 
intermediary partners or organisations (such as rural housing enablers).
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• They must establish strong and lasting relationships with the communities 
they serve, and be established at an appropriate geographical level that 
connects local voluntary action with key resources and networks beyond the 
local area.
The requirement for technical expertise was clear even when CLTs were 
independently-led, with one local authority indicating that the professional 
background of volunteers was a crucial resource for the CLT to draw upon. It was 
further evidenced as CLTs entered into partnerships with specialist housing 
associations, reflecting the Homes and Communities Agency's need to monitor and 
guarantee performance of funding recipients. While accepted by CLTs, this was not 
necessarily seen as the most appropriate course of action, only the most pragmatic 
in order to achieve community influence and control over local housing.
i
The CLT sector is therefore not only characterised by grassroots organisations 
reliant on the activism and efforts of volunteers. Instead the specialist knowledge and 
professional expertise of those involved in housing development comes to the fore in 
order to broker, support and facilitate the development of locally-rooted CLTs 
committed to citizen-led housing governance. This therefore represents a limited 
form of active citizenship which delineates participation to those with the requisite 
skills. In other words, it is not even open to all in a spatially defined area and is 
instead contingent on either possessing the requisite skills or positioning to receive 
these resources from specialist bodies. The implications for theories and political 
developments grounded in discourses of self-sufficient communities and 
communitarian-minded behaviour are considered in the next section.
9.2 The research's implications for theory and policy
This thesis has drawn upon theories of community in order to explain the instigation 
and development of CLTs, focusing in particular on the communitarianism of Etzioni
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(1995a; 1997a) and Tam (1998). These were selected on the basis of their attempts 
to provide a grand narrative of the active role communities could and should play in 
their self-governance. In short, they argue for more weight to be accorded to 
community as both the site and tool for gQyernment, a tone that has influenced and 
characterised the approach to community of successive political administrations. 
Associated with this, the rationales for neighbourhood governance described by 
Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) provided a way of conceptualising how the civic 
rationale - the way in which CLTs are formed in order to exercise greater voice in the 
governance of housing - is received and negotiated by external actors and 
stakeholders that are involved with CLTs. In particular, the support or otherwise 
given to CLTs helps explain how dispersed forms of community governance aimed 
at harnessing the localised collective power and trust described in the previous 
section are shaped by their interactions with public, quasi-public and private tiers and 
forces of governance and decision-making.
Communitarian spaces for neighbourhood governance
Whatever the eventual institutional form or method of facilitation a CLT undertakes -  
for example a partnership with a housing association or the receipt of professional 
support and sponsorship from external partners - a central theme is the 
communitarian belief in the supremacy of community in identifying the most 
appropriate ways to decide, provide and govern local housing. These efforts pit 
community against external forces that threaten these abilities and promote a form of 
governance that produces outcomes perceived to be more locally egalitarian and of 
greater local value. These outcomes are intended to be a product of community 
spirit, local entrepreneurialism and above all community influence. In communitarian 
terms this involves a rescaling of governance that depends less on the mandate of 
representative governments or state-sponsored instruments and more on the 
enlargement of informal civic spheres that allow citizens to define, participate in and 
make decisions over an array of apparently local issues.
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These efforts are heavily reliant on the image of an active, empowered and capable 
citizen who has the capacity for self-governance and self-determination portrayed by 
successive governments (CLG, 2008a; Cameron, 2010). Involvement in a CLT 
demands time, professional skills and knowledge and an ability to balance a 
commitment to protecting the interests of a CLT's intended beneficiaries with the 
requirements and accountabilities of accessing land, finance and philosophical 
support from local authorities. The 'performing citizens' that aim to produce policy 
outcomes that matter to them by acting outside conventional political systems and 
structures are those that are likely to instigate the civic rationale (Lowndes and 
Sullivan, 2008, p. 55), yet this analysis has shown that CLTs should not be 
understood only as a product of civic endeavour and community self-help. The 
constitution of the civic spheres created to allow CLTs to represent and protect local 
interests are as contingent on the social rationales emphasising partnership, 
professional behaviour and accountability as they are on permitting communities to 
define the governance of housing solely on their terms.
In this context tensions emerge between competing and alternative discourses of 
what a CLT is for. The specialist knowledge and need to demonstrate accountability 
to local authorities and funders led to many CLTs adopting a pragmatic approach 
that relied less on volunteerism and more on partnerships to fill the gaps in capacity 
and competence that Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) can be found in forms of 
neighbourhood governance. Yet by others this was seen to threaten the 
communitarian governance that CLTs are thought to provide as described by a CLT 
volunteer in the South West:
It's what I call mission creep: you lose sight of your original mission and
values and it becomes indistinguishable from what's happening already.
The impact of isomorphism
/
In the quotation above, the perceived “mission creep” of CLTs had been found in 
their organisational structure which, in this interviewee’s eyes, had moved away from
rationalising CLTs in relation to their civic commitment and more in terms of a 
standardised model of delivery indistinguishable from other providers. These 
tensions had emerged from the need for specialist knowledge in delivery and 
accountability to other organisations, which lead to the creation of partnerships 
between CLTs and organisations including housing associations, independent 
umbrella CLTs and local authorities. Thes^ partnerships have been seen to direct 
the organisational structure and behaviour of CLTs, for example the requirement for 
professional skills has led to delivery partnerships between CLTs and housing 
associations. Elsewhere CLTs were required to have a constitutional custodian to 
help unlock key resources.
These findings have resonance with the processes of isomorphism described by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), who suggest that organisational fields become more 
structured and similar over time as they respond to isomorphic pressures. In 
particular, the concept of coercive isomorphism, where organisations are pressured 
both formally and informally to adopt particular characteristics according to 
expectations over purpose and behaviour, has resonance with CLT attempts to 
access public subsidy. The organisational structure and behaviour of the CLTs that 
were successful in obtaining subsidy was altered in line with the expectations of the 
Homes and Communities Agency, who required CLTs to partner with housing 
associations perceived to be more established and better regulated.
This also links to strands of normative isomorphism, where organisations are faced 
with pressures to adhere to dominant norms in a particular field. The continued 
requirements for a professionalised model of CLT operations, as shown by the 
growth of umbrella CLTs and need to ensure that CLTs are organisationally 
competent, highlights another isomorphic pressure on the CLT sector. Indeed, the 
structural growth of the sector, with sub-regional umbrella bodies and a national 
membership organisation formed in recent years in a similar fashion to similar 
sectors (such as that of housing associations), shows an emergence of hierarchies 
of responsibility and managerial authority, which DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 151)
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highlight as an indicator of both mimetic and normative isomorphism. This is also 
exemplified by the constitutional custodians in some areas that may eventually 
assume responsibility for ‘safeguarding’ the purpose and mission of a CLT.
While recognising the importance of these requirements, findings on the structural 
growth of the CLT sector show that the impact of isomorphic pressures on 
organisational behaviour is not always effective. The case of an unsuccessful 
umbrella CLT shows that the imposition of professional practices and norms by more 
powerful actors needs to remain connected to the local level, as these pressures can 
be contested and negotiated by CLTs dependent on the benefits such behaviour 
brings. As this thesis has described, the CLT sector is still at an early stage of 
development and evolved through the course of this study. As such, further research 
into the isomorphic pressures faced by CLTs and other community organisations, 
and the way in which these direct their organisational structure and behaviour over 
time will be important. In particular, the extent to which CLTs balance the 
technicalities of meeting their aims of housing development with a commitment to 
processes of volunteerism and empowerment will be of particular interest in 
understanding the impact of isomorphic pressures and change.
There is therefore a debate to be had both within CLTs themselves and between 
CLTs and those stakeholders with the means to facilitate their development as to the 
most appropriate locus of empowerment, management and governance of the 
housing produced by a CLT's efforts. For many the ideal of community ownership 
and an active and entrepreneurial form of housing organisation was willingly 
compromised in order to achieve and ensure a form of affordable housing delivery in 
the area. For others, the attachment a CLT holds to its geographic area and its ability 
to ensure that these local interests and priorities are prevalent in the day-to-day 
operation is what distinguishes a CLT's housing from a housing provider operating 
across or managed from wider geographies.
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According greater weight to 'community' in housing governance is therefore 
something that does not occur or operate in a vacuum removed from the wider 
structures of finance, housing development and management that demand specialist 
knowledge. Rather than the utopian ideal of community self-help inherent to the 
formation of CLTs, their development also depends on a wide variety of 
organisations - for example local authorities, funders, housing associations and 
umbrella CLTs - and the negotiation of both their influence and the weight of 
'community' upon the outcomes that are produced. As such CLTs should not be 
conceptualised as a uniform model that undertakes and produces a standard set of 
procedures and outcomes based on community-led participation and deliberation; it 
is instead a diverse and complex approach subject to contextual variation and 
different sets of social and organisational relations.
Even if these spaces for communitarian governance are contingent on many 
different factors - human capital, finance, philosophical support from stakeholders - 
common amongst all CLTs is their orientation towards promoting specific interests 
and objectives as to who should benefit from local housing. The process may differ 
but the desired outcome is usually the same: people that benefit from the new 
tenurial arrangements implemented by CLTs ought to share their attachments to 
place, residence and communal wellbeing as opposed to having greater ability to 
compete in the marketplace or receivirig preferential treatment from external 
organisations on conditions other than connection to place.
The extent to which this is a desirable strategy should be a priority for future 
research into this area. As the following section describes, there are several practical 
benefits that CLTs may bring dependent on local circumstances and a logical 
consequence of determining which groups should be prioritised in housing 
allocations is that statements are made about whose needs should not enjoy similar 
levels of priority. However, as seen by some of the examples and concerns by 
stakeholders held in this study, using local connection as a proxy for housing need is 
a blunt instrument that may permit providers to select a certain type of person to live
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in the community. This may hold bright prospects in terms of resisting gentrifying 
forces in some areas. In others they may be premised on the imagined geographies 
and cultural distinctions that mark the 'insiders' of a community with the 'outsiders' 
that are deemed to diverge from existing members of a community in terms of their 
cultural values, behaviour and contribution to a desired form of community life.
The key finding here concurs with the notable critiques of communitarian activity and 
argue that CLTs, just like other forms of collective self-governance, should be 
theorised in relation to the differential power relations and social and cultural factors 
that reliance on strategies of community may bring (Elias and Scotson, 1965; 
Levitas, 2000; 2005). The claims made by communities to challenge the prevailing 
political and economic social orders by altering the allocations and economics of 
local housing markets are not removed from the wider economic structural forces 
and social relationships that society is based upon. To argue otherwise is to frame 
CLTs and other forms of communitarian governance in a particular ideological 
stance that masks the relational approach and politicised process in which their 
development has been grounded, as well as the impact the broader political 
economy has in shaping both the potential and actual magnitude of community 
governance.
Therefore what much of the literature advocating communitarian governance and 
CLTs miss is that movements of bottom-up community and localism are not in 
themselves able to effect the significant shift in power and influence it is claimed, and 
instead this is dependent on the identifibation and acquisition of the resources 
demanded by wider macro forces and the alignment of their objectives with 
prevailing economic and political structures, as opposed to their substantial overhaul. 
Therefore, the extent to which CLTs are able to articulate alternative institutional 
forms of governance at the neighbourhood level is likely to be diverse both 
geographically and institutionally in terms of the relationships that are struck with 
wider society. As the comments that follow will detail, these findings bring forward
the need for a critical yet balanced approach to future studies of the role, purpose 
and potential of CLTs and other forms of collective action within agendas of localism.
Delivering affordable housing or local housing?
This thesis has been primarily concerned with charting the process of forming and 
attempting to develop a CLT, and the tensions and negotiations that are inherent to 
these processes, rather than the practical outcomes that have been delivered. This 
is reflective of the fact that the vast majority of CLTs were still grappling with the 
challenges documented here throughout the processes of research design and 
implementation: how to access land, how to acquire finance and how to balance 
securing local needs and ties with the need for upward accountability and 
professional requirements. There is therefore scope for a future audit of the exact 
contribution CLTs have made in their local areas both in terms of quantity of housing 
built and the levels of affordability they have secured, and the social consequences 
of this, though we are able to draw some tentative observations from the CLTs that 
have featured in this study.
In some rural areas CLTs have been particularly effective in negotiating the release 
of land that would have not otherwise been'made available for housing development, 
largely due to their objectives for local land use matching the concerns of 
landowners as to the groups that benefit and attempt to profit from its use. A CLT's 
commitment to meeting local needs and restricting the sale of housing for private 
profit was a key factor in unlocking this land. This scenario was evident in St Minver 
where the CLT acquired land for £120,000?to build 12 homes to be sold at low cost 
to those with strong local connections. Valued at £287,500 and £335,000 on the 
open market, these homes were sold for £90,000 and £105,000 with future resales 
restricted to the same percentage of market value. The implication is that CLTs can 
make a practical contribution towards tackling what Satsangi et al. (2010, p. 190) 
refer to as the "islands of wealth" in gentrified village locations created by insufficient 
land supply, high house prices and low rural incomes. As more CLTs are formed
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there will be a space for analysing the level’s of affordability CLTs offer in comparison 
to local incomes and alternative provision on offer, as well as methods of land 
acquisition, particularly where land is not available as a rural exception site.
Yet, it should be noted that delivering affordable housing was not the sole trigger for 
CLT formation. Instead, CLTs perceive their role as a deliverer of local housing (that 
is affordable and accessible to a specified group) rather than affordable housing (that 
is affordable in relation to wider geographies, incomes and market forces). They are 
a niche provider aiming to meet immediate local needs. As such, they are unlikely to 
come forward and fill gaps in affordable housing provision unless there is a clearly 
identified local need; as the Taylor Report argued they are aimed towards "specific 
arrangements [that are] responsive to the needs of particular areas" (Taylor, 2008, p. 
114). This stance was further endorsed in a Devon County Council press release 
promoting CLTs shortly before the conclusion of the study. It argued that:
This is all about local solutions to address local need ... which can enable 
smaller, appropriately sized schemes to come forward and so better reflect 
the historic flavour of Devon's rural communities and villages where the 
problem [of local people being unable to access housing] is so acute.
Devon County Council (2011)
Therefore, CLTs in rural areas are unlikely to be a universal panacea to problems of 
affordable housing delivery, they are expressly intended to be small scale and to 
meet need that is clearly defined in relation to locality. This is accepted by 
policymakers and indeed implied by some stakeholders in Chapters 6 and 8 to be a 
factor that unlocked their support: that CLTs were only undertaking developments on 
a small geographic scale was unlikely to have a major effect on altering forms of 
community governance beyond the arena of housing. The situation is less clear in 
urban areas due to the smaller number and slower progress of CLTs in this area, 
though some tentative propositions are offered in Section 9.3.
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Future trajectories for the CLT sector
This thesis has charted the variance that exists within the emerging CLT sector, 
ranging from the typecast of a locally-rooted CLT led by a spirit of volunteerism and 
philanthropy to the increasingly professionalised support structures and partnerships 
at local, sub-regional and national levels. These structures aim to realise what 
charitable funders involved with CLTs have described as "real prospect[s] for the 
Community Land Trust sector to grow and prosper" and they aim to "create 
something much bigger and much more sustainable" in terms of the sector's size 
and impact (Carnegie UK Trust, 2011). The professional knowledge and expertise 
provided more widely by umbrella CLTs and housing associations has made a 
significant contribution to many of the CLTs featured in this study, whether it be 
through assisting with tasks that demand specialist knowledge or providing a 
qualitative legitimisation of a CLT's objectives and future performance to 
stakeholders such as local authorities and the Homes & Communities Agency.
It is clear that the CLT sector is one of significant diversity, a point emphasised by 
the umbrella CLTs that develop and manage housing on their own terms. While 
producing the same outcome as CLTs -  affordable housing that is allocated 
according to local connection - umbrellas are led by individuals with specialised 
backgrounds in housing development and in this sense perhaps have more in 
common with small housing associations than voluntary-led CLTs. While the 
contribution this type of support work has made to the facilitation of CLTs has been 
significant in many areas, this research has also uncovered tensions within this 
professionalisation that are seen to threaten both the communitarian-led governance 
some CLTs are committed to and the appropriate scale on which housing should be 
planned and governed. These views are context-specific and variable but this in itself 
furthers the argument that a CLT should not be understood as a singular model that 
will be replicated in the same way across the country.
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The role housing associations perform has also been documented here, though 
greater attention could and should have been paid to their perspectives on whati
involvement with CLTs give to their organisations as opposed to merely the 
assistance they provide to CLTs. As this study concluded, a report titled Trust and 
Association was released by the National CLT Network in order to promote the 
significance of partnerships between CLTs and housing associations. This argued 
that there was a "natural fit between the two" (National CLT Network, 2011b, p. 1) 
and these partnerships could be "the best of both worlds" and realise a variety of 
mutual benefits related to accessing funding, land and appealing to demands and 
needs of local communities that may otherwise oppose affordable housing 
development.
This thesis has begun to document these benefits from the perspective of CLTs with 
the provision of specialist knowledge and performance guarantees helping facilitate 
their access to subsidy. From the perspective of housing associations, we could 
begin to theorise their involvement as being a progression of their branding as being 
"in business for neighbourhoods" (McDermont, 2010). This strategy aimed to assert 
the housing association sector's independence from the state, emphasise their role 
as the champion of community needs and priorities and identify with the rhetoric and 
practice of 'community' that in many wars mirrors the rationalisation of CLTs 
(McDermont, 2004). Involvement and partnership with CLTs at a local level may 
therefore serve to be an extension of housing associations' current practices and 
attempts to position themselves as independent supporters and champions of 
residents and communities, though it has been identified elsewhere in the thesis that 
many CLTs have disputed the local operation of housing associations in their 
community. The rise of housing association involvement is therefore one way of 
facilitating and delivering CLT objectives but it is far from the only one and may be 
subject to contestation and negotiation at local levels.
v>
Yet there is clear coalescence between the two sectors at a national level. The 
National CLT Network was launched in September 2010 part-funded and hosted by
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(but legally independent of) the National Housing Federation (NHF). The future 
objective is for the National CLT Network to become financially self-sufficient and 
independent within two years, breaking off from the NHF. This relationship may not 
be as complex as one may think; the CLT'Network is governed by an independent 
board and has its own methods of income generation, but it will be interesting to note 
how the relationship between the two bodies evolves and sustains in future years, 
particularly given the increasing prominence and potential placed on partnerships 
between housing associations and CLTs by strategic stakeholders.
In this context, the local relationships between CLTs and housing associations will 
be especially interesting to assess given concerns over funding future housing 
development. Financial challenges are likely to be as influential as any other factor in 
shaping the trajectory of the CLT sector. This has already been seen by the need for 
CLTs to meet the demands and specialisms of housing development and 
management (with accountability and legitimacy with funders being key), but equally 
CLTs will not be immune from the macro-economic forces that have made financet
and affordable credit difficult to access for any housing developer.69 This is again 
indicative of the difficulties in grappling ?with the demands and accountabilities 
inherent to wider structural forces faced by CLTs and alternative forms of 
communitarian governance and organisation. CLTs have so far funded their 
acquisition of land and development on a piecemeal basis, negotiating the release of 
land on favourable economic terms and temporary loan finance from local authorities 
to help supplement this, alongside the acquisition of subsidy. Given these challenges 
and the reduction of available finance, the encouragement provided by the HCA for 
consortia arrangements between housing associations and community-led housing 
providers (including CLTs, housing co-operatives, co-housing and other community
69 For example, In July 2011 Inside Housing reported that the ability of housing associations to build was "being 
eroded by the need to borrow more money for development following cuts in government grant from a 
national average of £60,000 per home in the 2008/11 [Homes & Communities Agency funding] programme to 
£25,000 from 2011/15". 1
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organisations) may be particularly influential in directing the future organisational 
arrangements of the CLT sector. 1
Finally, the National CLT Network has been formed to provide a strategic unity for 
local CLTs, lobbying on their behalf and securing favourable economic and political 
arrangements to harness development at local and sub-regional levels. This has so 
far largely involved representing rural CLT groups but over the course of this study I 
have found increasing variation and divergence in the rationales CLTs put forward 
for their formation and the organisational arrangements that are institutionalised. 
These are a result of the efforts and negotiations invested by CLTs and the various 
stakeholders that they are beholden to through land, finance and support 
arrangements, while these arrangements may be accepted, negotiated or disputed 
by CLTs depending on the level of their desire for organisational autonomy. The CLT
sector is one that meets local niche demand, expresses locally-specific priorities and
!
is motivated by a variety of values that do not necessarily coalesce around the 
fundamental provision of affordable housing. Furthermore, if the urban CLT portion 
of the sector is to take off then there will be significantly different challenges faced 
and prioritised across the Network’s membership according to variable local 
contexts. The challenge for any form of national representation will therefore be to 
represent and articulate the fractured, diverse and hybrid views and objectives that 
emerge from the formation of CLTs embedded in a variety of contexts and with a 
variety of aims and priorities, a task that is likely to carry considerable weight in 
steering the future prospects for the CLT sector.
Political agendas: localism and community ‘rights’
While it would be an exaggeration to say that CLTs have been used as a political 
bargaining chip, this research has been conducted and authored during a period in 
which the role of civic action and localism has been promoted with political 
enthusiasm. Contemporary developments include the publication of the 
government’s Localism Bill, offering communities the ‘right to build’ - the chance to
t?
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hold local referendums to decide planning decisions and the ‘right to reclaim land’ -  
an opportunity to demand the disposal of public land for community use (Shapps, 
2010b).
At the time of writing it is unclear how the latter will play out, though the former is 
quite simple in its premise. Community groups such as a CLT are encouraged to 
hold a local referendum over their plans to build housing (or other amenities) with 
community consensus determining the planning decision. The outcome of the 
referendum will be determined by a simple majority vote. This is part of a wider 
reform of planning policy, moving away from strategic planning of housing delivery at 
a regional level to the micro level of the neighbourhood and sub-region. This is 
framed as a mechanism to return power and decision-making from the perceived 
bureaucracy of the public sector to local communities seen as best equipped to 
identify and meet local housing need, as described by the Housing Minister at the 
2010 National CLT Conference:
i
I now want to widen opportunities for communities to shape what happens 
next ... I want communities to have the freedom to decide on the type and 
quantity of housing without external restrictions imposed by a centralised 
planning system.
Shapps (2010b)
Although the community right to build has yet to receive royal assent at the time of 
writing and become fully legislated, the findings presented here have raised two key 
implications for the practical delivery of these opportunities. First, it has been 
demonstrated that CLTs have faced significant practical difficulties in planning and 
shaping their housing and that these have often been resolved by umbrella CLTs 
reliant on charitable funding. Practical and professional skills are often demanded 
and the competence of organisations to fulfil the requisite tasks in day-to-day tasks, 
obtaining funding and obtaining planning permission has sometimes been contested
by external stakeholders. This suggests that even where CLTs form, their delivery 
will be fragmented and piecemeal. At the same conference, the Housing Minister 
Grant Shapps commented that:
Community based housing bodies like CLTs are going to have to work within
the same financial constraints as everyone else.
Shapps (2010a)
Although this primarily related to funding the physical development of homes, CLTs 
often work within human resource constraints as well as financial. Research 
participants in this study often called for an English equivalent of the Scottish Land 
Fund administered by a specialised Community Land Unit, though there currently 
appears to be no plan to provide this institutional infrastructure that was found to be 
critical in facilitating community land ownership in Scotland (Macleod et al., 2010). 
With these constraints in mind, CLT development either through the right to build or 
conventional planning routes is unlikely to be an overall panacea to issues of local 
housing supply.
Second, a section of this thesis described* a CLT that held a parish poll to decide 
over their local housing development. The result of the poll went against the CLT’s 
plans, stifling their intention to take advantage of cheap land on offer from the parish 
council and failing to generate the harmonious deliberation over the type and 
quantity of housing that CLTs are sometimes envisaged as bringing. Future enquiry 
will be concerned with investigating whether the experiences of the single case study 
presented here are exhibited elsewhere; whether the referendum process becomes 
a charter for NIMBYs to block development (as described by Lloyd, 2010b) and the
extent to which poll results not only deliver affordable housing but truly represent the 
wishes of a community.70
9.3 Reflections, limitations and pathways for research 
Data issues
As reflected upon in the methodology chapter, one of the limitations of this research 
has been the recruitment and participation of viewpoints from a wide range of all 
those affected by a CLT's operation. The changing environment in which CLTs were 
operating partly contributed to this. When recruiting potential interviewees during 
2009 the concept of a CLT appeared alien to many stakeholders external to CLT 
processes, with most following the view that it was a largely theoretical model to 
which they were currently ambivalent. The subsequent promotion of CLTs by 
government officials along with the burgeoning 'big society' agenda helped change 
this, as did the creation of the National CLT Network and an increase in the number 
of umbrella CLTs that promote the concept of a CLT. Even if CLTs still make a very 
modest and localised contribution to housing at the time of writing, the concept is 
without doubt more widely promoted and known than it was when this study began. 
As such, if this study had operated from 2011-2014 as opposed to 2008-2011, a 
wider pool of knowledgeable and engaged research participants may have been 
easier to identify and recruit. This opens pathways for future research, for example 
charting the role, purpose and value of the relationships between the National CLT
70 For example, Duffy et al (2008) analysed neighbourhood elections in the New Deals for Communities area- 
based urban regeneration programme in England. These found that those with more qualifications, greater 
roots in the community and better social relations were more likely to vote in elections that were only 
participated in by a minority. Similar research into voting patterns in community referendums undertaken via 
the community right to build will be of interest here, along with analysis of the planning, campaigning and 
undertaking of the vote itself.
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Network and the NHF, and looking more deeply at the social, legal and technical 
arrangements between housing associations and CLTs.
The framework of rationales for neighbourhood governance has been useful in 
identifying the tensions that can occur between CLTs initially committed to notions of 
untaintedness, independence and autonomy and the social rationales adopted by 
strategic stakeholders that seek professionalised and accountable organisational 
behaviour from CLTs. However, it is a very narrow heuristic device that has merely 
opened the door to the flows of power that occur within and between communities, 
organisations of representation and stakeholders within local authorities and funders. 
A number of issues arise from this.
Firstly, the framework did not (and could not due to the number of participants) take 
account of how these rationales were received by housing associations. Although 
their role has to some extent been documented, there would be space for analysing 
the help that housing associations offer to CLTs who in many respects could be 
perceived as competitors for scarce resources in providing housing. This could be 
considered in relation to whether they perceive CLTs as a method of improving their 
own forms of housing management and delivery and whether it is an effort to 
(re)legitimise their role as being 'in business' for and on behalf of communities.
Secondly, the usefulness of the framework as a critical analytical tool has been 
limited. Although the primary rationales it describes have been useful in describing 
the roots of CLTs, for example the civic rationale characterised by active citizenship 
and empowerment, it has been less useful in clarifying the institutional forms that 
emerge from each rationale and the ideal type of neighbourhood governance they 
are perceived to produce. As an illustration of this, the findings presented here 
suggest that the key objectives that Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) argue underpin 
different forms of neighbourhood empowerment, partnership, government and 
management are not distinct from each other in the design of local governance. 
CLTs may be formed and facilitated on the basis of civic rationales built on the active 
citizenship and empowerment of local communities, but their institutionalisation into
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local governance may be contingent upon their response to the isomorphic 
pressures imposed by tiers of representative democracy and their arms-length 
bodies such as the Homes and Communities Agency. Indeed, these could even be 
linked to the objectives of the political rationale that demand responsiveness and 
accountability to existing structures of representative governance.
Therefore, the framework fails to unpick the tensions between participative and 
representative forms of democracy, and the leadership roles that facilitate processes 
of neighbourhood governance. Rationales and the outcomes they produce are 
malleable rather than static as presented in the framework, and the objectives, roles 
and institutional forms are created by stakeholders with different rationales for and 
interpretations of the role and purpose played by communities in processes of 
governance. It also fails to take account of the important dimensions of community 
governance identified in parts of this thesis; including the power dynamics within and 
between communities and the contestation of who and what purpose the work 
undertaken by CLTs serves.
It does, however, act as an organising tool which allows us to differentiate between 
the different rationalisations of CLTs and other forms of community governance. 
Further research as the CLT sector develops may enable the creation of a new 
framework that acknowledges these developments and weaves together the 
enabling factors, opportunities and challenges faced by CLTs, their partners and the 
powerful actors (including the local and national state, and funding bodies) that they 
are required to be accountable to.
Related to this, one of the key contentions made by this thesis is that, beyond being 
a form of community-led or influenced housing development, a CLT should not be 
understood as being a uniform model that is rationalised or orientated to the same 
ends. The manifestation of and reasons for community control expressed via the 
formation and development of a CLT are likely to differ from place to place in relation 
to local circumstances. Future research agendas may explore the manifestation of 
CLTs in urban areas where, as in the US, community groups have begun to form in 
order to resist or engineer change in economically unequal housing markets,
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responding to issues such as escalating house values, gentrification and housing 
demolition. Here, we might find that enabling access to housing in relation to 
affordability rather than local connection is the defining objective of a CLT. An 
emerging body of work in the US has begun to go further than this, theorising a 
CLTs aim to hold land in trust as part of an “anti-authoritarian, anti-capitalist politics” 
(Dixon, forthcoming, 2012) that operates on behalf of the poor and working class and 
attempts to democratise wealth and power (Alperovitz, 2011). These possibilities for 
CLTs have also been discussed in relation to ‘right to the city’ social movements that 
aim to engender rights-based land use approaches for low income urban populations 
marginalised by neoliberal urbanism (Haas, 2011). These movements are driven 
towards conceiving the use of land and property in a way that draws less upon 
capital exchange values and more upon use values that claim rights of use and 
occupation for marginalised populations (Purcell, 2003).
t
Future research and concluding remarks
The extent to which the possibilities described above can be realised by CLTs 
should not be overstated given the weight of macro-economic forces and 
accountability to prevailing institutions and institutional relations that existing CLTs 
have needed to demonstrate in order to advance their aims.71 Nor is the intention to 
claim that CLTs in urban areas in England and Wales are necessarily orientated 
towards similarly ambitious ends as the American work suggests. Rather, 
‘community’ is constructed and utilised for a variety of means and ends. This thesis 
has begun to document some of them but this occurred during a period of transition 
and change for what can now be recognised as a CLT sector and as such has
«)
71 Indeed, there is literature to suggest that the ambitious aims of articulating forms of alternative politics and 
alternative economic futures is severely limited and requires national political support. Fainstein and Fainstein 
(1985, p. 204) argued that: "Urban social movements in themselves can do little to affect the forces that are 
restructuring the American economy... their capabilities of doing so awaits the formation of a collective 
consciousness that identifies their common situation".
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arguably raised more questions than answers in relation to the future prospects for 
CLTs. In addition to the pathways already mentioned, future research should aim to 
definitively interrogate: »
• The quantitative contribution CLTs make to affordable housing stocks and the 
levels of affordability offered.
• The varied geographies of CLT development, the scales of development and 
the legal forms and partnerships used to facilitate this.
• The allocation of CLT housing and the decision-making procedures and 
negotiations undertaken.
• The extent to which CLTs are financially and organisationally self-sufficient 
over time.
Further exploration of these topics will help deal with the task of theorising how the 
business of community and its multiplicity of prospects are managed and negotiated 
as more CLTs are formed and build housing. Additionally, one area this thesis has 
failed to explore is the involvement of CLTs in wider activities of community building 
such as the development of additional community amenities and participation in 
other arenas of governance such as neighbourhood forums and parish councils. The 
manner in which CLTs respond to -  and capitalise on -  the opportunities currently 
afforded by a shrinking role for the state and increased space for civic action will 
have broader implications for understanding the manifestation of localism agendas. 
Moreover, the way these opportunities are realised will tell us much about whether 
the strategies underpinning CLTs offer prospects for a democratising and locally just 
way of delivering and governing housing or whether the utopian idea of communal 
action is constrained by the competing interpretations, ideologies and potentially 
exclusionary aspirations identified in parts of this thesis.
While the research questions of this thesis ivere framed around describing how CLTs
are formed and acquire the land, finance and human resources to progress their
schemes, the findings of this research offer some deeper understandings of CLTs
and communitarian theory more generally that extend beyond these practicalities.
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First, the ideological weight and influence of community is itself not enough to 
articulate and design alternative futures for the governance of local communities, 
and more specifically local housing. The ability of communitarian forms of 
neighbourhood governance to challenge state and market forces within the context 
of national and global economies is curtailed by the existence and requirements of 
existing economic systems (for example, the acquisition of credit and performance 
guarantee linked to subsidy). While the idea that communities may be able to 
exercise greater democratic influence and control over their welfare through 
ownership is not dismissed, the scope for mechanisms of localism and community 
governance to truly respond to land and housing markets is contingent on its 
permittance and facilitation by wider structural forces and institutions. It is therefore a 
relational exercise and political process that involves competing for resources and 
legitimacy within wider cultural and political contexts. This holds obvious implications 
within the context of the current government’s ideological commitment to pushing 
power and decision-making downwards in a climate of economic austerity.
Second, the research has shed light on the diverse nature of the CLT sector. CLTs 
are diverse in their organisational structures, objectives and the way they acquire 
resources and form partnerships to pursue their aims. A CLT is not a singular 
organisational model to be understood in the same way across geographies nor that 
can act as a panacea to wider shortages of housing supply. Instead, it is a particular 
strategy aimed at achieving localised ambitions related to the type and allocation of 
housing. These strategies may be achieved in a variety of organisational manners, 
whether through partnership with a housing association, CLTs acting on an 
autonomous basis, or through housing being delivered by an umbrella CLT. The 
contribution of the thesis, therefore, is to fill a gap in our understanding of CLTs by 
providing a nuanced reflection as to the varied roles and functions performed by the 
organisations that have formed to create a National CLT Network.
Finally, the research set out to explore the^nstigating factors and objectives held by 
those who form CLTs on a voluntary basis. CLTs are commonly referred to as a
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model of housing organisation that is orientated towards providing more affordable 
housing. This may be an underlying objective of those within the CLT sector, but this 
research has argued that our understanding of this needs to extend beyond merely 
linking CLTs with the provision of affordable housing. Instead, the CLT approach is 
one that aims to alter the power relations conferred by the ownership of land and 
property in order to then seek a structural change in the way local housing is 
controlled and allocated. Of principal concern is that local CLTs are formed first and 
foremost to represent the interests and concerns of their defined community, which 
relate not only to the affordability of a home but to who it is occupied by, aiming to 
sensitively meet the needs and demands of local people. The contribution this 
research makes is to highlight that not only does this take a variety of forms and 
occur under different conditions, but that neither instigating nor benefiting from a CLT 
is open to all. A local CLT is instead an organisation that seeks to realign aspatial 
forms of ownership and governance on behalf of and in line with the needs of its 
instigators and beneficiaries, as opposed to creating linkages that extend beyond 
local identity and attachment.
These findings are not intended to delegitimise the potential CLTs hold for
engineering social change in their local are'a. Indeed, this thesis has been unable to
fully explore many issues that would define this (such as the extent and nature of
development, and the terms under which it is offered) due to the emergent nature
and growth of CLTs during the study's time frame. It is instead to acknowledge that
communitarian rationales offer us a view of the world that is bound by place, but that
this view and its potential for change can be partial and limited. There are therefore
constraints as to community's potential achievements in participating in public life,
working towards locally-defined forms of social justice and in delivering affordable
housing. The disparate nature of this meaVis that community may be an agent for
neighbourhood renewal and development, but it does not deresponsiblise the state
and the ideal of a self-governing and self-sufficient community does not occur in
vacuums removed from the effects and demands of wider structural forces. Nor is
this ideal open to all due to the significant demands community-based efforts place
on their participants. There are important linkages to be made within and between
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agendas of localism and the wider forces of the state and neoliberal economy. These 
may be the focus of future research, acknowledging that the growth of CLTs may be 
as much a product of -  and contingent on -  its alignment with larger social, political 
and economic environments as they are on the attempts of people to improve local 
housing outcomes.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Legal definition of a community land trust
(2) "community land trust" means a body corporate which satisfies the conditions 
below.
(3) In those conditions "local community" means the individuals who love or work, or 
want to live or work, in a specified area.
(4) Condition 1 is that the body is established for the express purpose of furthering 
the social, economic and environmental interests of a local community by acquiring 
and managing land and other assets in order -
(a) to provide a benefit to the local community, and
(b) to ensure that the assets are not sold or developed except in a manner 
which the trust's members think benefits the local community.
(5) Condition 2 is that the body is established under arrangements which are 
expressly designed to ensure that -
(a) any profits from its activities will be used to benefit the local community 
(otherwise than by being paid directly to members),
369
(b) individuals who live or work in the specified area have the opportunity to 
become members of the trust (whether or not others can also become 
members), and
V
(c ) the members of the trust control it.
\ iT
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Appendix 2: CLT events attended 2008-2011
29-30 September 2008: Rural CLT practitioner seminar
This event was held in Chester, attended by approximately 30-40 CLT volunteers 
and strategic stakeholders. The purpose was to provide updates on CLT policy 
development and allow CLTs to share and debate their enabling factors and barriers.
8-9 January 2009: Rural CLT practitioner seminar
This event was held in Gloucestershire and was similar in size and format to the 
preceding seminar.
30 June 2009: National CLT conference
This was a conventional conference held in London aimed at promoting CLTs to 
stakeholders at national and sub-regional levels. It was attended by a diverse crowd 
including policymakers, local authority representatives and CLTs.
11-12 November 2009: Rural CLT practitioner seminar
This event was held in Chester and was similar in size and format to the preceding 
seminars aimed at rural CLT practitioners. My attendance at this event was partly 
linked to my employment at Community Finance Solutions.
11 March 2010: CLT practitioner training and support event (part one)
This was held at the University of Salford and my attendance was linked to my 
employment. The purpose was to educate CLTs as to the legal, technical and 
organisational issues they may encounter in their formation and development.
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24 March 2010: CLT practitioner training and support event (part two)
This was held at the University of Salford and my attendance was linked to my 
employment. The purpose of the event was to follow on from part one of the training 
and support event series.
21-22 April 2010: Rural CLT practitioner seminar
This event was again held in Chester and was attended by 30-40 CLT volunteers 
and strategic stakeholders such as rural housing enablers. I played an active role in 
the event's organisation through my employment at Community Finance Solutions.
5 May 2010: CLT support workers meeting
This was held in Gloucestershire and the purpose of the meeting was for 
professional CLT support workers and advocates to meet and share learning 
experiences.
29 June 2010: National CLT conference
This was held in London and had the same purpose as the previous year's event. 
The National CLT Network was launched at this event and the Housing Minister 
Grant Shapps also launched the community right to build proposals.
3-4 November 2010: Rural CLT practitioner seminar
This event was held in Cornwall. The purpose of the event was similar to preceding 
seminars, though was also explicitly marketed to new and upcoming CLTs. Although 
my employment with Community Finance Solutions had ceased by this point, I was
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invited to lead an introductory workshop on the fundamental mechanics and 
organisational features of CLTs.
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Appendix 3: Fieldwork activities
Date Who? Organisation/strategic
background
Method
10th November 
2008
Director Cornwall CLT Semi-structured
interview
30th September 
2009
Affordable Housing 
Officer
Cornwall Council Semi-structured
interview
30th September 
2009
Board member St Minver CLT, Cornwall Semi-structured
interview
30th September 
2009
Resident St Minver CLT, Cornwall Semi-structured
interview
1st October 2009 Landowner/board
member
St Minver CLT, Cornwall Semi-structured
interview
14th October 2009 Chair Holy Island CLT Semi-structured
interview
14th October 2009 CLT support worker North East Semi-structured
interview
16th November 
2009
Chief Executive Housing association, 
North East
Semi-structured
interview
2nd February 2010 CLT support worker Somerset & Dorset Semi-structured
interview
30th March 2010 Chair High Bickington CLT Semi-structured
telephone
interview
9th April 2010 Director Cornwall CLT
Semi-structured
telephone
interview
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14"1 April 2010 Community Strategy 
Officer
Devon County Council Semi-structured
telephone
interview
15'" April 2010 Board member Foundation East CLT Semi-structured
telephone
interview
16th April 2010 Director Cornwall Rural Housing 
Association
Semi-structured
interview
23rd April 2010 CLT support worker Land for People, Wales Semi-structured
interview
28th April 2010 Affordable Housing 
Officer
North Wales Local 
Authority
Semi-structured
telephone
interview
29th April 2010 Rural Housing 
Enabler
North Wales Semi-structured
telephone
interview
20th May 2010 Board member Cornwall Rural Housing 
Association
Semi-structured
interview
20th May 2010 Chair St Minver CLT, Cornwall Semi-structured
telephone
interview
26th May 2010 Board member Board member, Lands 
End Peninsula CLT, 
Cornwall
Semi-structured
telephone
interview
1sl June 2010 Board member St Just in Roseland CLT, 
Cornwall
Semi-structured
telephone
interview
13th June 2010 Director Land for People umbrella 
CLT Semi-structured
interview
15th June 2010 Board member St Ewe Affordable Homes 
Ltd, Cornwall
Semi-structured
telephone
interview
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30th July 2010 Housing Organiser Citizens UK Semi-structured
telephone
interview
30th July 2010 Rural Housing 
Enabler
Mid-Wales Semi-structured
telephone
interview
4th August 2010 Director Headingley CLT Semi-structured
telephone
interview
11th August 2010 Former board 
member
CLT in the North East Semi-structured
interview
7th October 2010 CLT volunteer South West A Semi-structured
telephone
interview
8lh December 2010 Board member Village CLT in the South 
West
Semi-structured
telephone
interview
10ln December 
2010
Chair Village interest group 
(linked to Village CLT in 
the South West)
Semi-structured
telephone
interview
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Appendix 4: Interview guide used for people external to a CLT
organisation
Community Land Trust Research: indicative Topic Guide
Contact: Tom Moore, tom.moore@student.shu.ac.uk. Tel: 079 265 244 30.
1. Tell me about the background of you and your organisation's involvement with
2. Why have you become involved with the Community Land Trust model in 
particular?
3. What is the wider context of your organisation's role and partnerships with 
community organisations such as CLTs?
4. How has the CLT model related to your organisation's existing policies or 
agendas?
5. Community Land Trusts may be designed to meet specific local needs. How has 
this been received both in the wider geographical community and by neighbouring 
parishes?
Centre for Regional Economic 
and Social Research
CLTs.
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6. What has been the relationship between the CLT and the local planning system?
7. What have been the barriers faced by Community Land Trusts?
8. What have been the barriers faced by your organisation in supporting a 
Community Land Trust?
9. What could be done to improve the process of developing a Community Land 
Trust?
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Appendix 5: Interview guide used for people within a CLT
organisation
Centre for Regional Economic 
and Social Research
Community Land Trust Research: Indicative Topic Guide
Contact: Tom Moore, tom.moore@student.shu.ac.uk, Tel: 079 265 244 30.
1. What is the background and history of your CLT?
2. What are the main motivations behind forming a CLT in your area?
(Research note: probes may include affordable housing development, community 
empowerment, and community ownership and control.)
3. What is the context of your local area in terms of local community action and 
development? How does this impact/relate to the CLT?
4. What have been the most crucial enabling factors for your CLT’s development to 
date?
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5. Conversely, what have been the key obstacles faced by your CLT?
6. How is "community defined" in your area? (Research note: probe regarding 
emphasis on CLT relationship to local area and method of housing allocation).
7. What distinct issues are faced in accessing finance?
8. How has the CLT accessed land? What have been the issues and obstacles 
related to this?
9. What have been the CLT's relationships with statutory authorities such as local 
councils and other government agencies?
ft
10. What effect if any has the recent development of government policy and 
advocacy of CLTs had?
/ /
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Appendix 6: Example CLT housing allocation policy (adapted from
http;//www.communitylandtrusts.org.uk/step-by-step-guide/who-
will-you-house/allocation-policy)
High Bickington Community Property Trust 
HOUSING ALLOCATION POLICY
High Bickington Community Property Trust (HBCPT) has been established to assist 
in promoting and supporting economic and social life in High Bickington and the 
surrounding parishes. It holds interests in affordable housing, commercial property to 
rent and community facilities because it believes that without them the community 
will find it much harder to grow and thrive.
HBCPT’s local needs homes
Property prices in High Bickington are beyond the means of most local people unless 
they have existing capital to invest. HBCPT’s aim is to provide housing at a price 
that can be afforded. In particular it wishes to make it possible for those with 
employment or employment opportunities in the area to live close to their place of 
work so that job vacancies can be filled, the community can function effectively and 
local young people can be given an opportunity to remain in the area should they 
wish to do so.
These homes are intended to appear as little different from houses purchased on the 
open market: except that they are more affordable. Following the allocation of all 
newly built homes properties will become available from time to time when the 
existing residents decide to move. This policy describes how HBCPT will decide to 
whom properties that become available should be offered.
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The starting point for the allocation of one of the Little Bickington Farm properties is 
that the applicant(s) must be able to meet the following ‘Local Needs Housing’ 
requirements. These apply to both Rented (i.e. Tenancy Plus) and Equity Share 
properties.
a) A minimum continuous residence by a prospective owner or occupier of 
five years in the Parish (Note 1) immecliately prior to the offer date; or
b) Residence by a prospective owner or occupier in the Parish (Note 1) for 
five years within the ten years preceding the offer date; or
c) Where one or both parents or guardians of a prospective owner or 
occupier have resided in the Parish (Note 1) for a minimum period of 
ten years prior to the offer date; or
d) Where a prospective owner or occupier has had continuous 
employment in the Parish (Note 1) for the past five years prior to the 
Offer Date; or i
e) A person able to demonstrate key worker (Note 2) status
Note 1 Priority for affordable housing will be given to applicants who meet any of the 
requirements in a) to e) if they can demonstrate their current or previous residence in 
the parish of High Bickington. If the number of such applicants is less than the 
number of available affordable homes, then applications will be considered from 
those who meet criteria 1 - 3  inclusive below and any one or more of criteria 4 - 6 
below.
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Note 2 A key worker must meet the criteria set in the approved Torridge District 
Council Key Worker policy. At 25 March 2010 this policy was not yet available.
HBCPT criteria
In addition to the above criteria HBCPT will, when considering applicants who want 
to be considered for one of the homes in which HBCPT holds an interest, take 
account of the following eight criteria:
The first three criteria must be met in all cases
1. Inability to afford outright purchase
Only those whose household income and capital are insufficient to buy the
home they need on the open market will be considered.
2. Ability to afford an HBCPT home
The Equity Purchase homes will be made available at between 40% and 80%  
of value. The Tenancy Plus homes will be let at rents agreed at the outset and 
reviewed annually.
HBCPT will require proof of household income and capital so that the 
outgoings to which a resident would be committed are related appropriately to 
their means.
t
3. Family size accords with the home available
Because of the high demand, in general applicants will only be considered for
homes that meet their family need e.g. a family with one child may only be 
allocated a 2-bedroom home. Account will nevertheless be taken of expected 
changes and of factors such as visiting relatives or former partners or care 
needs.
The final five criteria will be used where necessary to decide the order of 
priority between more than one ‘qualified ' applicant:
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4. Additional Local Criteria
Those with a dependent relative or with non-dependent relatives who could
assist with childcare or similar needs, or who have previously lived in High 
Bickington, or who can demonstrate a connection with High Bickington, or 
who have children at school in High Bickington. .
5. Local employment
Existing employment or a written offer of employment in any of ‘Qualifying
Parish Areas’ (as defined in 6. Local Residence below). Those without 
employment or an offer of employment but who can show that they have good 
prospects of securing a job will also be considered.
6. Local residence
Already living in one of the remaining ‘Qualifying Parish Areas’ i.e. Atherington
(covering part of Umberleigh), Yarnscombe, St. Giles in the Wood, 
Roborough, Ashreigney, Burrington, Chittlehampton (covering part of 
Umberleigh) and Chittlehamholt, but in housing which is inadequate for the 
needs of the household e.g. sharing with parents or other households; in a 
low cost or rented home which is too small or unaffordable for household; or 
in unsatisfactory or insecure accommodation. The closeness to High 
Bickington will be a factor where there is more than one applicant.
7. Moving from one property to another
Those moving from one HBCPT property to another will receive additional
priority.
8. Length of wait
Those who have applied to be considered and who have been waiting longest
will receive higher priority if all other factors are the same.
Deciding priority
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HBCPT will maintain a list of applicants in order of the date of application. When a 
home becomes available, contact will be made with all those who meet the 
prescribed criteria as outlined above. HBCPT will also place local advertisements so 
that all who might wish to apply have the chance to do so. Those who wish to be 
considered will be asked to update their details and offered the opportunity to view 
plans of the property or to visit the property if already built and available for viewing. 
Those who remain interested in the property will then be asked to advise the HBCPT 
within 5 days of their visit or at most 10 days of being offered the opportunity to visit.
Taking account of criteria 4 - 8 ,  HBCPT will then offer the property to the applicant 
who in HBCPT’s sole discretion:
A. Meets the ‘Local Needs Housing’ requirements as set out in a) to e) 
previously.
B. Meets the HBCPT criteria 1 - 3 ;  and
C. Justifies receiving greatest priority under criteria 4 - 8 .
»
In broad terms HBCPT regards criteria 4 -  8 in order of decreasing importance. For 
example, a high priority under criterion 4 or 5 would be seen as more important than 
criterion 8; but if there were equal weight under criterion 4, criterion 8 would then 
become the deciding factor. However the HBCPT reserves the right to assess the 
weight of circumstances under each of a ll,the criteria from 4 to 8 and to recognise 
particular individual circumstances.
Liaison with Torridge District Council
HBCPT will work closely with Torridge District Council, which has statutory 
responsibility for the well being of the local community. HBCPT will inform Torridge 
District Council of all offers of housing made. Applicants should be aware that within
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High Bickington and adjacent parishes, Devon and Cornwall Housing Association 
and other social landlords may also have housing available at affordable rents or 
under a shared ownership scheme.
Equal Opportunities Policy
No person or group of persons applying for accommodation will be treated less 
favourably than any other person because of their age, colour, ethnic or national 
origin, gender, marital status, physical disability, race, religion or sexual orientation.
Right of Appeal
Decisions on applications will be made on behalf of HBCPT by its Housing 
Committee. The Committee may require an interview with the applicant to confirm 
that the criteria set out in this policy have been met. If an applicant feels that the 
decision made about their application is unfair, they may submit an appeal, in writing, 
to HBCPT’s Company Secretary. The appeal will then be heard, within 15 working 
days, by a Panel of at least three HBCPT Board Members who have not been 
involved in the earlier decision making process. The decision of the appeal panel 
will be binding on all parties.
Review
This policy will be reviewed by HBCPT from time to time to ensure that it continues 
to meet the needs of those in housing need in an efficient, fair and transparent way.
Appendix 7: Umbrella CLTs in England and Wales
Name Context Funding72 CLTs assisted and 
outcomes (if 
known and clear)
Land for People 
(operating 
throughout 
Wales)
Brokerage 
umbrella, 
operating from 
2004 but 
disbanded in 
2011.
Welsh Assembly 
Government 
grants and 
structural funding 
programmes.
Provided advice 
to multiple CLTs, 
no housing 
appear to have 
been directly 
delivered.
Gloucestershire 
Land for People
All in one formed 
in 2006
Charitable grants Provided advice 
to multiple CLTs; 
ongoing attempts 
to deliver housing 
itself.
Federation of 
North East 
Development 
Trusts
Operated 2006- 
OS, brokerage 
service formed 
within existing DT 
network.
District council 
funding and 
existing 
organisational 
funding via DT 
network
Provided 
extensive 
brokerage for 
CLTs and partners
Cornwall CLT Formed 2007 -  
present in 
partnership with 
Cornwall Rural 
Housing 
Association
Charitable grants, 
housing 
association help 
and aim of being 
self-sufficient
Aim to deliver 
180 CLT homes by 
2014 by 
supporting local 
CLTs.
72 This refers to the funding of an organisation's incorporation and staff, as opposed to funding development 
and construction of CLT homes.
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Cumbria Rural 
Housing Trust
Formed 2008 
within an existing 
affordable 
housing trust. 
Brokerage service.
District councils, 
charitable 
finance, structural 
funding 
programmes.
12 CLTs assisted, 
90 units of 
housing in the 
pipeline.
Somerset, Dorest 
& Devon CLT.
Formed 2010 
through 
partnership of 
two
community/social 
finance 
organisations. 
Brokerage service.
DCLG 
Empowerment 
Fund two-year 
funding, 2010 - 
2012.
Ongoing and in 
the early stage of 
formation during 
the study.
Foundation East 
CLT
All in one 
umbrella formed 
within existing 
microfinance 
organisation.
Host organisation 
funding.
Y
Ongoing.
Wiltshire CLT Formed in 2011 as 
an independent 
subsidiary of a 
local housing 
association.
Host organisation 
funding.
Ongoing.
NB: A variety of sources were used to gain this information. Some information was collected 
through primary research in fieldwork, supplemented by secondary data such as the National 
CLT Demonstration Programme evaluation (Aird, 2009).
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